

## Reintegration in Aceh Indonesia Opinions of the Finnish civilian crisis management experts

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The purpose of this article is to examine the opinions of the Finnish civilian crisis management experts in Aceh about the reintegration of the ex-combatants in Aceh. This article is based on interviews conducted during autumn 2006. The interviews aimed to find out how the Finnish civilian crisis management experts understood the concept of the reintegration in the light of civilian crisis management (CCM) context, methods and goals. Another aspect analysed in this article is the question about the success of the reintegration in Aceh. Did the Finnish civilian crisis management experts find the reintegration in Aceh to be a failure or success?<sup>1</sup>

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1 The article was finished in December 2007.

# 1 Background and context of the conflict in Aceh

## 1.1 Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration

Peacebuilding in conflict torn societies is always a complicated task. The problem is that one has to work in an environment that is characterised by weak political and social structures, uncertainty and insecurity. In this kind of situation the aim of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, (DDR), is to strengthen the overall security situation.<sup>2</sup> In the long run the aim of the DDR process is to create stability in post-conflict societies.<sup>3</sup> Today, the DDR processes constitute an important part of many peacekeeping and reconstruction programmes in post-conflict areas.<sup>4</sup> Despite the fact that disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration are linked to each other, it should not be defined too strictly as a continuum where disarmament is followed by demobilisation and demobilisation by reintegration. DDR should be understood more flexibly because it might be necessary to continue disarmament even if some groups of combatants have already been demobilised.<sup>5</sup>

In the disarmament phase arms, ammunition and explosives are collected, controlled and disposed. The objects of disarmament can be both combatants and civilian population. The aim of the disarmament is to reduce the number of weapons in the society. In this way it tries to diminish the threat of violence. On a wider scale disarmament is seeking to provide an environment that facilitates the transition from conflict to peace. Disarmament is normally taking place during a period when the parties giving up arms and the local population are still partly unsure of the durability of peace.<sup>6</sup> It should also be kept in mind that by giving up their arms, civilians and especially combatants are also giving up the physical and economic security that the arms have guaranteed so far. When giving up the arms

they are hoping that peace and its possibilities are better options than continuing the conflict.<sup>7</sup>

Demobilisation refers to a formal discharge of active combatants from the armed forces or from an armed group. The numbers of armed forces are cut off or they are disbanded as part of a bigger transition from conflict to peace. To the combatants themselves demobilisation means that they are giving up the combatant identity. By taking off their uniform, if they have one, they become civilians. The target groups for disarmament and demobilisation are in many cases overlapping but they are not identical. Demobilisation can happen in many ways. Mostly the combatants are brought to the camps that are built for the demobilisation. In other cases, demobilisation can simply constitute the delivering of the uniform and a ceremony that symbolises the transition from the military life to civilian life. Demobilisation can also happen without any formal process. After a conflict the members of an armed group can simply leave behind their arms and unit.<sup>8</sup>

The third part of the DDR process is the reintegration. First, the reintegration referred to the programmes dealing with the economic assimilation of the demobilised combatants. Later, more emphasis has been put on the social aspects of reintegration. The integration of the combatants to the local civil society has been considered as important. One of the latest improvements has been the recognition of the importance of political reintegration. Therefore, the goal of the reintegration can be considered as a societal process aiming at economic, political and social assimilation of ex-combatants and their families into the civil society.<sup>9</sup>

Originally, the DDR process was understood as a military question and emphasis was put on the disarmament and demobilisation. This was however insufficient to ensure the integration of the combatants into the civilian society. This is why a development focus was added into the process.<sup>10</sup> Today, reintegration is connected both to the development

2 UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations 1999, 16.

3 Stockholm Initiative 2006a, 13–14.

4 Gleichmann et al. 2004, 12; Knight & Özerdem 2004, 499.

5 Nilsson 2005, 31–33; UN Security Council 2000, 8.

6 Gleichmann et al. 2004, 29.

7 Knight & Özerdem 2004, 506.

8 Gleichmann et al. 2004, 45–48.

9 Nilsson 2005, 22–28.

10 Stockholm Initiative 2006a, 9.

and security questions. Because of these connections the problems and questions raised during the reintegration are more diverse than during the disarmament or the demobilisation. The reintegration touches also on other issues such as economic growth and the retraining of the combatants, the issues that arise when communities are receiving the returning combatants, and the issues that arise with the reintegration of groups that have special needs, for example women and children.<sup>11</sup>

The main objects of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration are the combatants. For example, the criteria that define who will get the reintegration benefits are based on the definition of combatant. A "combatant" can be a government soldier, a rebel, a cook or a prostitute. In general, peace agreements<sup>12</sup> define which armed groups are part of the DDR process, but they do not define what is meant by combatant.<sup>13</sup> In cases where the combatants are a clearly distinct group and these groups have their clearly defined command structures, the definition of combatant is not a problem. In the present day "new" wars, this is hardly the case because the same person can be a combatant, a robber or a civilian depending from the point of view.<sup>14</sup>

The opinions of how extensively a combatant should be defined can be divided in two. The supporters of the broader definition are saying that the goal, building human security via the DDR process necessitates as broad definition as possible. The definition of the combatant should cover all people who have been part of the fighting forces as combatants, or in supporting roles.<sup>15</sup> These supporting roles can be composed of logistical or administrative functions but also something else outside the present day military organisation. If this is not done, the result could be a situation where a sex slave does not get the benefits that their captors are getting.<sup>16</sup>

The narrow definition argues that only the ones who have participated in direct fighting and their families should be considered as combatants who are eligible to the reintegration benefits. Refugees, communities who are receiving the ex-combatants, and the people who have not participated in direct fighting should not be counted as beneficiaries in reintegration programmes or counted as combatants. In conflicts, different groups have different needs and problems. If these different groups are squeezed under the topic "ex-combatant", then the allocation of reintegration benefits is difficult. The broad definition of ex-combatant weakens the effectiveness of the aid. Other

groups, than the armed combatants, should be helped via other relief programmes.<sup>17</sup>

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11 International Peace Academy 2002, 2.

12 Look for example the peace agreement between the government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF) from the year 1999 at <http://www.sierra-leone.org/lomeaccord.html>.

13 Eronen & Linden 2006, 8.

14 Specht 2003, 77.

15 Ibid.

16 Gleichmann et al. 2004, 15.

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17 Nilsson 2005, 25–26.

## 1.2 Aceh and GAM

Aceh is situated on the north-western part of Sumatra. The population is around four million and the capital is Banda Aceh. The most common spoken language is Aceh and the official language is Bahasa Indonesia.<sup>18</sup> Aceh is one of the richest parts of Indonesia in regard to its natural resources, both oil and natural gas. This turned Indonesia's economy around in the 1970s, but the profits flowed to Jakarta to support Java's development or Jakarta-based politicians and military men.<sup>19</sup> Today oil and gas still account for a significant share of Aceh's GDP but in the future this share will decline due to a major reduction in Aceh's oil reserves.<sup>20</sup> Agriculture<sup>21</sup> is at the moment Aceh's main economical field.<sup>22</sup>

The state of Aceh was founded in the early sixteenth century and its "golden age" occurred in the early seventeenth century during the reign of Sultan Iskandar Muda 1607–1636. After this era the Malay-governed cosmopolitan trading state ceased to be a significant force outside the northern tip of Sumatra.<sup>23</sup> By the 1820s Aceh was again expanding as a commercial and political power. During this time it produced over half of the world's supply of pepper.<sup>24</sup> Up until the Dutch conquest Aceh's economic and cultural linkages were to the Indian Ocean and Malayan Peninsula, not to the Java sea world dominated first by the Java then the Dutch.<sup>25</sup> For the Dutch Aceh was too powerful and wealthy to allow it to continue as an independent state. In 1873 the Dutch started the conquest of Aceh but the Acehenese resistance continued for many decades after the annexation.<sup>26</sup>

During the Second World War Aceh alongside with Indonesia was occupied by Japanese. The surrender of Japanese Emperor in August 1945 left a power vacuum in Aceh.<sup>27</sup> In 1945 Acehenese leaders declared the area as part of the Republic of Indonesia. At first the Republican government had a very limited capacity to influence events in Aceh. In late 1948 and early 1949 Daud Bereu'eh, military commander of the province of North Sumatra and an Acehenese religious leader, demanded formal recognition of Aceh as a separate province. During this time the Republican government was in weakened position and accepted the Acehenese demand. From 1950s onwards Republican government sought to reassert its authority in Aceh. In September 1953 Daud Bereu'eh proclaimed Aceh's secession from the Republic of

Indonesia, and its adherence to the Indonesian Islamic state of the Darul Islam. This was followed by a series of attacks on army and government posts.<sup>28</sup> The goal of the rebellion was not independence, but rather regional autonomy and proclamation of Indonesia as an Islamic state.<sup>29</sup> Daud Bereu'eh and his troops withdrew to the hills and a military stalemate ensued. Eventually Daud Bereu'eh agreed to a ceasefire in 1957 and talks then began with Jakarta for a permanent solution to Aceh. In 1959 the government accepted the creation of what was virtually an Islamic state within the nation by giving the Aceh the status of a Special District (Daerah Istimewa). The fighting then stopped.<sup>30</sup> This and other concessions the central government made were eroded by the centralisation and authoritarian rule of Jakarta or were simply not implemented.<sup>31</sup>

In 1976 a new rebel group, The Aceh Freedom Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka GAM), was founded. Its leader was Teungku Hasan di Tiro. The small-scale initial revolt was quickly suppressed and most of the leaders were killed or arrested, although Hasan di Tiro and a few others managed to escape overseas. A larger rebellion in 1989 was met by a harsh counter-insurgency operation and Aceh was declared to be a Military Operations Zone (Daerah Operasi Militer, DOM). This gave wide authority to the Indonesian army to deal with the movement. The GAM rebellion was largely defeated by 1992. The fall of President Suharto in May 1998 led to the collapse of the authority of the central government. This caused a sudden growth in antimilitary and anti-Jakarta sentiment in Aceh. In an effort to restore public confidence in the central government the DOM status of Aceh was lifted. Despite this, violence continued in Aceh. By the middle of 1999 the GAM was better organised and in control of a greater proportion of Acehenese countryside than ever before.<sup>32</sup>

Despite the violence there were peace talks between the Indonesian government and the GAM. These talks led to a so called Humanitarian Pause in May 2000. The aims of the agreement were, among others, to deliver humanitarian assistance and promote confidence-building measures.<sup>33</sup> This cease-fire did not rest on firm foundations. Almost as soon as the Humanitarian Pause started there were reports of clashes between Indonesian security forces and GAM combatants. Despite this the pause was a significant achievement and it also set a pattern that was to be replicated throughout the following years of the peace process.<sup>34</sup>

In 2002, after further negotiations and pressure from the Indonesian government. The Cessation of Hostilities Framework Agreement (COHA) was signed between the

18 Reid 2006, 4–5.

19 Taylor 2003, 365; Brown & Cribb 1995, 162–163.

20 The World Bank & Bank of Indonesia 2009; The World Bank 2005.

21 This includes forestry and fishery.

22 The World Bank & Bank of Indonesia 2009.

23 Ricklefs 1993, 32–36.

24 Ricklefs 1993, 143–144.

25 Reid 2003, 1.

26 Ricklefs 1993, 143–145.

27 Reid 2006, 105–106.

28 Brown & Cribb 1995, 40–41.

29 International Crisis Group 2001, 3.

30 Ricklefs 1993, 265.

31 International Crisis Group 2001, 3.

32 Aspinall & Crouch 2003, 6.

33 Joint Understanding on Humanitarian Pause for Aceh 2000, article 1.

34 Aspinall & Crouch 2003, 14–16.

government of Indonesia and GAM in December 2002. The announcement of the agreement was greeted with much popular enthusiasm in Aceh, as well as in Jakarta and even internationally. Despite the agreement, clashes continued to occur and neither of the parties complied with the agreement.<sup>35</sup> For example the agreement required the “phased placement” of GAM’s “weapons, arms, and ordinance in the designated sites” together with the “simultaneous phased relocation of TNI forces”.<sup>36</sup> GAM fighters were naturally reluctant to hand over their weapons so long as armed soldiers and police remained in Aceh. In order to save the agreement the two sides met on May 2002. The discussions failed and military emergency declaration was issued to Aceh.<sup>37</sup>

In 2004 the elected president Yudhoyono wanted to resolve the conflict of Aceh by peaceful negotiations. Also the tsunami of December 26, 2004 changed the political and humanitarian situation in Aceh. Because of the catastrophe, international help was needed, which led to the opening of the previously closed area. These changes gave a possibility to Indonesian government to provide help for the Achenese and in this way to enhance its popularity among the local population. Quickly after the tsunami the government of Indonesia opened unofficial talks with GAM’s representatives in Finland, with the help of a Finnish citizen Juha Christensen.<sup>38</sup> The peace negotiations were initiated in Helsinki between the Government of Indonesia and the GAM under the auspices of the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI), a non-governmental organisation chaired by the former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari.<sup>39</sup> From January 2005 onwards the peace negotiations went through five negotiation rounds. The last of these was concluded July 17, 2005. Both the government of Indonesia and GAM agreed that the member states of both the EU and the ASEAN would be most suitable to form an independent control commission. The tasks of the commission were defined in the peace agreement.<sup>40</sup>

According to the agreement, which was named as a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), the government of Indonesia had to pull out its non-organic<sup>41</sup> military and police forces from Aceh in four stages. This withdrawal was to happen in parallel with the submission of GAM’s 840 weapons that also happened in four stages. In the MoU, the parties also agreed that they would draft a new law for the governance of Aceh. After the enactment of the law, local elections were supposed to be held. In addition to this, the MoU covered an agreement about the legal issues of Aceh, human rights, security arrangements, amnesty, and

the establishment of Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) and its functions.<sup>42</sup>

In addition to this, it stated in the MoU that the government of Indonesia and the authorities of Aceh would take measures to assist persons who have participated in GAM activities to facilitate their reintegration into the civil society. These measures included economic facilitation to former combatants, pardoned political prisoners and war-affected civilians. According to the agreement, these groups were to receive suitable farming land, employment or, in the case of incapacity to work, adequate social security from the authorities of Aceh. Also all persons that had been granted amnesty or released from prison or detention were to have all political, economic and social rights. Also the rehabilitation of public and private property destroyed or damaged as a consequence of the conflict was part of the reintegration.<sup>43</sup>

### 1.3 The Aceh Monitoring Mission

The Aceh Monitoring Mission was officially launched on 15 September 2005 and the mission ended on 15 December 2006.<sup>44</sup> According to the MoU, the tasks of the AMM were as follows.<sup>45</sup>

- a) monitor the demobilisation of GAM and decommissioning of its armaments,
- b) monitor the relocation of non-organic military forces and non-organic police troops,
- c) monitor the reintegration of active GAM members,
- d) monitor the human rights situation and provide assistance in this field,
- e) monitor the process of legislation change,
- f) rule on disputed amnesty cases,
- g) investigate and rule on complaints and alleged violations of the MoU,
- h) establish and maintain liaison and good cooperation with the parties.

The parties responsible of the AMM were EU together with five ASEAN contributing countries (Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) and Norway and Switzerland. At most it numbered 227 international personnel.<sup>46</sup> About thirty Finns worked in the mission from the beginning. Of these thirty, fifteen were mainly working with disarmament, and fifteen as monitor, reintegration or human rights experts or in other functions. In my research I have focused on the latter group because they were engaged in the reintegration issues. Those who were involved in the disarmament accounted for only one part of the DDR.

AMM’s Decommissioning Branch that included an office at the AMM Head Quarters and four Mobile Decommissioning

35 Aspinall & Crouch 2003, 32–36.

36 COHA 2002, article 3b.

37 Aspinall & Crouch 2003, 37–38, 43–45.

38 Council of the European Union 2005a.

39 Council of the European Union 2005b, 3.

40 Council of the European Union 2005a.

41 Non-organic troops mean troops that were situated in Aceh temporarily from other areas of Indonesia.

42 MoU 2005, 3.

43 MoU 2005, 3.2–3.2.7.

44 AMM homepage.

45 MoU 2005, 5.2.

46 Council of the European Union 2005a.

Teams, was responsible for the disarmament in Aceh. According to the peace agreement, GAM had to hand over 840 weapons to AMM. This happened in four stages and in every stage 210 weapons were submitted.<sup>47</sup> Disarmament ended December 20, 2005 by which date GAM had handed over these 840 weapons. In practice, disarmament happened in places that GAM had previously announced. In these places GAM submitted their weapons to AMM. AMM then checked the functioning and condition of the weapons. Also the representatives of the Indonesian army approved the weapons. After this the guns were destroyed by cutting them into three pieces. AMM also took care of the disposal of explosives and ammunition.<sup>48</sup>

When the last weapons were submitted, Indonesia pulled out 25 890 soldiers and 5 791 police. Officially, GAM demobilised itself and ceased to be an armed actor in December 2005.<sup>49</sup> Therefore, disarmament can be regarded as a success in Aceh. Despite of the GAM's official declaration of its demobilisation it is still unsure whether the demobilisation was a success. In DDR, demobilisation means that a combatant gives up their fighter identity and old military command structures disappear.<sup>50</sup> In some cases the members of GAM spent their time as a separate group and did not want to assimilate to the normal population.<sup>51</sup> According to the interviewed Finns, the group's identity among the members of GAM remained strong.

The MoU provisions on reintegration cover assistance to three groups: GAM ex-combatants, amnestied political prisoners, and affected civilians.<sup>52</sup> To achieve this, a governmental implementing body of the MoU reintegration, Badan Reintegrasi dan damai Aceh (BRA) was established. AMM monitored the work of BRA both at provincial and district level. At district level eleven AMM district offices monitored and reported on the field situation, to ensure that the agreed assistance was received by the beneficiary groups.<sup>53</sup> AMM was reorganized on 15 September 2006 when AMM's Banda Aceh office, with its two mobile teams, took up the monitoring responsibility.<sup>54</sup>

#### 1.4 The method and the research question

One of the main methods used in conducting research about DDR is by interviews.<sup>55</sup> My own research uses this technique. The first selection of the interviewees was initiated via the Finnish Ministry of the Interior. Originally there had been fifteen Finns working in Aceh as monitors, reintegration or

human rights specialists. From the Ministry of the Interior I received a list of twelve people. From these twelve I finally interviewed eight. Reasons for the missing interviews are that some of these people worked abroad during the research, or the interview was not possible for other reasons. The interview method that was used to gather information for this article is the theme interview<sup>56</sup> and the tool for the arrangement and description of interview material was the content analysis<sup>57</sup>. With the interviewees it was agreed that they would remain anonymous. Referencing of interviewees is by using abbreviations such as I1, I2 etc.

One might question the decision to concentrate on the opinions of the Finnish experts. The main reason for this selection was economical. This article is based on a thesis work on international politics for the University of Tampere, Finland. As a student one's financial situation didn't allow interviews made abroad. It should also be reiterated that the Finnish contingent in AMM was the biggest among the participatory countries.<sup>58</sup>

Most of the texts about reintegration are case studies and compilations of lessons learned without emphasis on building a reintegration theory.<sup>59</sup> Therefore, the themes discussed here did not emerge from some theory on reintegration, but from literature about the reintegration. The first theme, the goal of the reintegration, emerged because there is still some disagreement about it.<sup>60</sup> I wanted to find out how the Finns saw it. The second theme was the subjects of the reintegration which is also extensively discussed in the reintegration literature<sup>61</sup>. Thirdly and most significantly, there is always discussion about the methods of the reintegration

47 AMM HQ Decomm Office 2005.

48 Merikallio 2006, 167-169.

49 The World Bank 2006, 2.

50 Gleichmann et al. 2004, 45-48.

51 The World Bank 2006, 26.

52 MoU 2005, 3.2.3.

53 AMM homepage.

54 AMM 2006.

55 Look for example Conaway & Martínéz 2004; Brett & Specht 2004.

56 In theme interviews the themes that have previously been decided on guide the process of the interview. One tries to find valuable answers in the light of the research question of theme interviews. The interview themes are based on the frame of a research and on the previous knowledge about the research subject. The theme interview is not a formula that has to be followed precisely. The relation of the interview questions to the research frame do vary from allowing the intuitive findings to keeping to the questions previously decided. (Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2002, 76-78)

57 Content analysis is the verbal description of the content of the analysed documents. The material of the research represents the phenomenon in question. The purpose of the analysis is to create a verbal and clear presentation of the phenomenon in question. The aim of the content analysis is to organise the material into a compact and clear form without losing its information. With a well structured analysis it is possible to make clear conclusions about the phenomenon in question. The qualitative treatment of the material is based on logical reasoning and interpretation, where the material is divided into smaller parts, conceptualized, and coded in a new way to a logical entity. (Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2002, 109-110)

58 The Ministry of the Interior 2005.

59 Nilsson 2005, 35.

60 Nilsson 2005, 22-29; Stockholm Initiative 2006b, 20-28.

61 Look for example Nilsson 2005, 14; Specht 2003, 76-81; Stockholm Initiative 2006b, 28-32.

in the reintegration literature.<sup>62</sup> What should be done and how? As for the fourth and fifth themes, the success and failures of the reintegration, I wanted to know how the interviewees felt about the reintegration in Aceh.

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62 Look for example Gleichmann et al. 2004, 77–90; Specht 2003, 94–102; Stockholm Initiative 2006b, 33–45.

## 2 Understanding the reintegration in Aceh

I think it was and it is a quite good mission, but we have a lot to learn from it and if we especially speak about this reintegration side then this is one of those things.<sup>63</sup>

The AMM operation lasted from August 2005 to December 2006.<sup>64</sup> One of the tasks of AMM was to monitor the process of the reintegration which was under the responsibility of the government of Indonesia. Because AMM was there only for a year, it could not monitor the whole reintegration process. Results of the reintegration process should be controlled for at least ten years from the beginning of the process. Because of lack of time, the opinions of the Finnish civilian crisis management experts give a picture of what they understood and saw of the reintegration in its infancy. Because of the length of AMM's mandate it was considered important inside the mission that it should help to build a working reintegration system in Aceh before its exit.<sup>65</sup>

### 2.1 The objective of the reintegration and its targets

The aim of the reintegration is social, economical and political inclusion of the combatants and their families into civil society.<sup>66</sup> The MoU is ambiguous about the targets of the reintegration. Strictly interpreted it says that reintegration is only meant for the ex-combatants of the GAM<sup>67</sup>. According to the MoU the government of Indonesia and the authorities of Aceh will take measures to assist persons who have participated in GAM activities to facilitate their reintegration into civil society. These measures also included economic facilitation to former combatants, pardoned political prisoners

and affected civilians.<sup>68</sup> It should be noted that AMM's mandate was only to monitor the reintegration of active GAM members.<sup>69</sup> In this light it is easy to understand that the interviewees placed emphasis especially on the reintegration of the combatants. All but one agreed that inclusion of GAM's members and the combatants was part of the reintegration. "It was like; place these combatants back to civil society."<sup>70</sup> On the other hand some of the interviewees did not separate the objects and means of the reintegration. In this situation the object of the reintegration was, for example, to provide economic help and support to the combatants returning to society. One of the interviewees thought that the aim of the reintegration was stated in the MoU: "Officially the things mentioned in the Memorandum of Understanding were understood as reintegration. To the guerrillas, coming from the mountains, was promised money, land and education."<sup>71</sup> Generally, amongst the interviewees there was a consensus that the aim of the reintegration was the integration of the combatants back to the society. Also within the UN there is a growing consensus that focusing on the combatants is essential in the reintegration process, despite the fact that the combatants may get disproportionate benefits after the conflict.<sup>72</sup>

The opinions of the interviewees were split on significance of the reintegration. They can be divided into two opposite groups according to how extensively and within what time frame the reintegration is viewed. According to the first opinion the reintegration in Aceh should be looked at through the MoU. Reintegration should be understood as the parties have agreed to be in the peace agreement and no external elements should be introduced. This view sees reintegration more as a technical process and as a work that has to be done immediately. Reintegration ties the fighters into work and gives them something else to think about. From this point of view reintegration is seen as a rather narrow field that is followed by another kind of help. The other view sees reintegration as a wider process that is connected to other events and changes in society. Reintegration is understood as a long time process and results cannot be achieved in a short time.

According to the MoU the targets of the reintegration were people that had taken part in GAM activities. Part of the reintegration was the economic facilitation to former combatants, pardoned political prisoners and affected civilians. These groups were to receive an allocation of suitable farming land, employment, or, in the case of incapacity to work, adequate social security from the authorities of Aceh.<sup>73</sup> All the interviewees consider the ex-combatants of GAM or those who had participated in the fighting as participants of the reintegration. At the same time

63 I5, translation by the author.

64 AMM homepage.

65 AMM Special Report 074, 7.

66 Nilsson 2005, 26-28.

67 GAM's members were not only combatants that carried guns. GAM was also a civilian organisation. Some of the active GAM members were responsible for the logistics, part of them were a kind of a police and part of them trained to be combatants. Major part of the combatants, 75 %, was from age group from 18 to 35. Pardoned political prisoners were older, although major part of them were also from the age group from 18 to 35. In GAM there were hardly any combatants that were under eighteen. Some of the combatants claimed that they had joined GAM when they were sixteen or seventeen, but when the World Bank was conducting its research, combatants under eighteen were not found. GAM used children as messengers, guards or as certain kinds of scouts for gathering the information. About 4 % of GAM's combatants were women. The women combatants were also younger than the male combatants, because 60 % of them were under 25 years old. (The World Bank 2006, 12-14)

68 MoU 2005, 3.2.3.

69 MoU 2005, 5.2.

70 I3, translation by the author.

71 I5, translation by the author.

72 United Nations Development Programme 2005, 34.

73 MoU 2005, 3.2.5.

the majority of the interviewees believed that the pardoned political prisoners and affected civilians should also be the targets of the reintegration. Although in the case of affected civilians it is not possible to talk about reintegration in the same way as with the combatants and the pardoned political prisoners because they were never separated from society as the latter two groups were.

The question about women caused the biggest difference amongst the interviewees. The opinions were split in two and this separation followed the separation that existed previously on the question about the length and object of the reintegration. The question about women was problematic in a sense that in the MoU combatants are mentioned but there is no definition of the content of this definition.<sup>74</sup> The parties of the MoU, (the government of Indonesia and GAM), in practice excluded women outside the reintegration process. They did not bring out the status of women combatants although there were women combatants in Aceh.<sup>75</sup> Because of this the reintegration focused on men combatants and women combatants did not receive the reintegration benefits. About half of the interviewees thought that the exclusion of women was a problem: "In my understanding the women combatants having been left out of this whole reintegration process as beneficiaries is a central problem."<sup>76</sup>

Part of the interviewees did not discuss the issue of women combatants. To these interviewees, women were mainly thought of as affected civilians. One saw that the women combatants had adapted as men had. Another interviewee was not sure if there had been women combatants in Aceh. Also, these interviewees did not consider the issue important in the reintegration. It was thought that reintegration is part of the first phase in the containment of the crisis. The women issue should only be presented in the most acute phase of crisis. "It is difficult to strengthen the status of women in this stage. It doesn't bring a good result."<sup>77</sup>

Another difference among the interviewees was the issue of how well the target group was defined. At the beginning it was intended that reintegration benefits would be given to 3 000 combatants. In addition, benefits would be given to the pardoned prisoners and affected civilians. GAM and the Indonesian government had decided these numbers already during the negotiation phase of the MoU, after which it was written in the MoU. So the number of the beneficiaries had been decided before launching the reintegration programme. According to the interviewees, the GAM combatants who had surrendered before the signing of the MoU were not included in these numbers. The conflict had continued at different levels of intensity for about 30 years, so a large number of combatants were in danger of being excluded from the reintegration assistance that was meant for the combatants. A confused process in the distribution of the reintegration funds and in the organisation

that was responsible for it, the BRA, led to an increase in the number of beneficiaries. In March 2007 the groups that had received or were to receive integration benefits were the GAM combatants, the civilian members of GAM, political prisoners, the GAM members that had surrendered before the signing of the MoU, the militia that had fought against GAM, and the affected civilians. The affected civilians did not receive the money directly but the money was distributed to different villages. Also separate assistance was given to invalids in housing and to those using health services. In total, the government of Indonesia was to use about 150 million US dollars for these benefits during the period of 2005–2007.<sup>78</sup> So the target group for the integration benefits had widened from what was originally agreed in the MoU.

When it was asked was the definition of the subject group for the reintegration in the MoU a success or failure, the minority of the interviewees considered it a success. "It should be clearly defined what is the target group."<sup>79</sup> The majority though it was a failure. Those who thought it was a success said that in the reintegration process there should be a clearly defined target group like there was in Aceh. In this way the reintegration process was easier to observe from the monitors' point of view. The measurability of the reintegration was thought to be important. Also the lack of distinct target group was considered as making the possible reintegration more difficult.

From another point of view the definition had been a failure because the target group had grown during the reintegration process. "First of all the number of the combatants had been agreed to be 3000 in the MoU that was total nonsense and everybody knows that there were a lot more."<sup>80</sup> In the same way a categorical definition was not considered as the best starting point for the reintegration because there were a lot more that needed the help. Part of the interviewees thought that it would be better if the assistance had been given to communities. The communities and villages would have been given the money and they could have decided how to use this money. In the end this happened when the BRA gave economic assistance to villages.<sup>81</sup> This approach was considered as more important because after a long conflict majority of the population can be regarded as victims. Also this kind of approach was thought to help prevent problems caused by envy. Part of the Achenese saw the reintegration benefits that were given to the combatants as rewards and this did cause envy. For a reintegration programme to be successful, the benefits should be balanced so that it fulfils the expectations of the combatants but it is not seen as a reward. In conflicts where the combatants have committed atrocities the supporting of combatants is easily seen as rewarding. Then it would be hard for the local population

74 MoU 2005, 3.2.3–3.2.5.

75 AMM Special Report 074, 6–7.

76 I8, translation by the author.

77 I6, translation by the author.

78 World Bank & DSF 2007, 4.

79 I4, translation by the author.

80 I8, translation by the author.

81 World Bank & DSF 2007, 4.

to accept the distribution of the reintegration benefits to the combatants.<sup>82</sup>

According to one of the interviewees, an option to the categorical approach would be an idea where the starting point would not be different groups of people but the needs of the people. First step would be a survey of the needs that people have. The reintegration programme or programmes should be based on these needs. Those interviewees that did not think the categorical approach was the best possible solution, were the same people that supported the wider definition of the combatants and saw the exclusion of women as a problem. Despite this some of these interviewees said that they understood the categorical definition through the budget logic because the resources of the government of Indonesia were limited.

## 2.2 The methods of the reintegration

The methods of the reintegration in general were investigated in the interviews. Despite this, all interviewees linked their answers to their experiences in Aceh. Many of them said that they cannot generalise about the AMM, only about experiences they had in Aceh. Nevertheless, many of them proposed methods excluded from the MoU's framework. The methods that were most strongly presented were employment, education and financial help.

According to the MoU, part of the reintegration was economical assistance, but also the allocation of suitable farming land, employment, or, in the case of incapacity to work, adequate social security provided by the authorities of Aceh.<sup>83</sup> In AMM it was also thought that part of the reintegration was the vocational training and health care. In practice, employment, vocational training and health care were not emphasised enough and they did not have a big impact on reintegration. In AMM it was thought that the low overall level of the social security and poor employment situation in Aceh were the main reasons for this. In the MoU it was also stated that the people who had renounced their Indonesian citizenship during the conflict had the possibility to regain it. In the interviews this did not come out because the question of citizenship was not important to the parties. The biggest Acehenese community abroad was in Malaysia and they had not given up their citizenship. The Acehenese living in Europe and the United States did not have immediate need to come back. In practice, the MoU's main focus in the field of reintegration was on economic assistance.<sup>84</sup>

A research made by the World Bank found that the biggest need the GAM combatants had was the capital. Housing, health care, vocational training, and elementary schooling came in order of importance after this. They also needed money for their everyday life. However, the biggest need was the capital that they could use to buy land or to start

up their own businesses.<sup>85</sup> Other research, coordinated by the International Organization of Migration, discovered that 85 % of the people, whose minority were the ex-combatants, had problems in supporting their families and 90 % had difficulties in finding work. Also 72 % had problems in finding enough food. In this research, 600 people were interviewed in the districts of Pidien, Bireuen and Aceh Utara.<sup>86</sup>

In the end, economical assistance was not considered as a very important tool in reintegration. This was mildly surprising because the majority thought that the biggest problem with the distribution of the reintegration assistance was the major downfall and in practice the main focus was in the economical assistance. The assistance was thought to help the ex-combatants to survive immediately after the conflict. "In the first stage the economical assistance that people don't need to steal or do other crimes in order to get the daily food."<sup>87</sup>

On the other hand, the reintegration was criticised for being too focused on the distribution of the money. Many saw the poverty as a problem, but considered that it could not be fixed only by giving economical assistance. So the criticism was not targeted at the fact that money was given. It was thought, however, that economical assistance diverted the focus from other kinds of help and it would not help to create longstanding prerequisites for the reintegration. Other forms of action were needed. Also the amount of money was thought to be relatively small and this could be one explanation for the fact that the interviewees did not think that the economical assistance was very significant. It was thought that wider actions were needed to alleviate the poverty. These actions were not very precisely identified but emphasis was put on the perseverance of the reintegration work.

Giving jobs was a theme that came up in most of the interviews. This is supported by the fact that combatants saw unemployment and the lack of money as their biggest problem.<sup>88</sup> Normally, the armed conflicts affect the functioning of the employment markets. Especially "new wars"<sup>89</sup> diminish domestic and foreign investments. The markets are disturbed by the destruction of the infrastructure and the industry may stop functioning. These effects may not disappear after the peace. For example, different kinds of physical and mental injuries can make working harder and reduce the amount of work force after the conflict.

85 The World Bank 2006, 40–41.

86 International Organization for Migration 2006, 19.

87 I4, translation by the author.

88 The World Bank 2006, 41.

89 According to Mary Kaldor during the 1980s and 1990s a new type of organised violence developed especially in Africa and in Eastern Europe. These wars she describes with the term new war. What is new is the blurring of the distinctions between war, organised crime and large-scale violations of human rights. (Kaldor 1999, 1–3.) It can also be said that there is not that much new in these 'new wars'. Same kind of things can be found throughout the history of conflicts. (Newman 2004, 174–175)

82 International Peace Academy 2002, 4.

83 MoU 2005, 3.2.5.

84 Tardioli 2007.

Unemployment rates are normally very high in areas where there has been a conflict.<sup>90</sup>

There was some variation in the opinions of the interviewees of why they saw employment as important. The first viewpoint considered it important to create jobs because a vast unemployed group of people can cause problems. By giving them jobs it would be possible to give them something else to think about. "That is like the foundation of everything, when a person is employed in some way then he doesn't have time to think about what to do."<sup>91</sup> Also the other viewpoint agreed that employment was important in reintegration. But the main value was that it made possible for the people to integrate into society. With a job it was possible to earn money and get a hold of a normal life. Employment was a way of keeping the ex-combatants out of trouble.

Normally, many of those who earn because of conflict are unemployed after the conflict. This is particularly the case with the combatants. What increases the problem is that these people do not necessarily have education and those mechanisms that could provide education and training have disappeared or been destroyed.<sup>92</sup> All the interviewees mentioned that education was one way to reintegrate the people. Special emphasis was put on training that would give people professional skills, for example apprenticeships in work places. This kind of training was seen as giving the possibility of reintegration through work. Training programmes that have been done after a conflict have shown that vocational training in itself does not create jobs but it improves people's possibilities to find them. Typically, insufficient attention is given to training in post-conflict societies.<sup>93</sup> This came out in the interviews by way of emphasis on the importance of education and its civilizing value. Importance was given mostly to vocational training. The majority of the interviewees thought that the level of education of the combatants was low. In reality, the education level of the GAM members did not differ from the education level of an average Acehenese.<sup>94</sup> In this case, the interviewees thought that higher education would be one method of reintegration. "Firstly the best way is to educate them in some way, train them in some profession and this is the way to reintegrate them to society."<sup>95</sup>

Some of the interviewees introduced the idea of economical counselling along with the employment and training. In Aceh, support was given to the combatants to start economic activities. According to the interviewees the fighters had established fish farms and other types of small businesses. These new small businesses were seen to have problems because the fighters did not have enough knowledge of the markets or adequate business skills.

Thus, economical counselling was considered important. Also market research that would give information to the combatants and training that had to do with marketing was considered important.

According to the MoU, the government of Indonesia was to allocate funds for the rehabilitation of public and private property destroyed or damaged as a consequence of the conflict.<sup>96</sup> Many of the Acehenese had problems with housing.<sup>97</sup> Some interviewees presented the idea of rebuilding the destroyed homes. Many people had been forced to leave to other areas of Aceh. They said that for the Acehenese it was shameful to live in other people's homes. It was seen that the abolition of this problem would be important for social reintegration.

Farming land was to be allocated according to the MoU.<sup>98</sup> Aceh is mainly an agricultural community and the allocation of the farming land is an easy way to employ people. Those interviewees who considered that the work would keep people out of trouble also thought the allocation of the farming land to be an important way to employ people. Some of the combatants who had made their living previously from farming did not want to go back to agriculture after the conflict.<sup>99</sup> Therefore, some of the interviewees saw that the efforts to get the combatants back to farming were problematic. In practice, the question was theoretical because according to those interviewees farming land was not allocated during the time when AMM was there.

The interviews included ideas about strengthening the civil society, providing adequate information and making the MoU better understood among the combatants. Also building trust was thought important. Those who understood reintegration broadly were also supporting the change of those structures in society that were seen as causes for the conflict. In the end the main focus based on the interviews was put at work, training and financial assistance.

## 2.3 Two viewpoints

Two viewpoints emerged clearly from the interviews. Different opinions are easier to bring out with this kind of separation, which may have affected the analysis. Also the differences in opinions may have been caused by the fact that some interviewees looked at the reintegration process from inside the AMM's mandate, while some interviewees looked at reintegration more generally. Despite this, two points of view can be found in the results. None of the interviewees are in the extremes of the scale. However, the scale does not represent normal distribution and the differences in opinions are clear.

The views are labelled here as "technical" and "broad" view. According to the technical view, reintegration is a process that happens within a certain timeframe. The

90 Krishnamurty 2003, 53–55.

91 I4, translation by the author.

92 Krishnamurty 2003, 56–57.

93 Barcia & Date-Bah 2003, 211.

94 The World Bank 2006, 15.

95 I7, translation by the author.

96 MoU 2005, 3.2.4.

97 International Organization for Migration 2006, 19.

98 MoU 2005, 3.2.5.

99 The World Bank 2006, 41–42.

technical view sees reintegration as a shorter process than the wide one. According to it, the targets of the reintegration should be clearly defined. Prime targets are then the combatants. Also the reintegration itself has to be defined, its length, targets and so on. In reintegration, the targets should be bound to work and training, so that they do not have time to cause trouble. Issues concerning sex and helping physically and mentally sick are important, but they should not be included in the actual reintegration instead follow after it. This view is supported by the controllability of the process and the possible limits of the reintegration budget.

The broad view understands reintegration more widely. It also sees the reintegration as a longer process than the technical view. Further, the targets of the reintegration are not only the combatants but also other players that have supported the armed action even if they did not actually carry weapons during the conflict. The issue of women and children was also considered as important. The methods of the reintegration were also seen more widely and the distinction between the reintegration and development aid becomes blurred.

This separation can be partly understood by the way the technical view group saw the reintegration strictly through the mandate of the operation. It did not consider the women issue to be important because it was not mentioned in the mandate. On the other hand, the question about what is pursued with the reintegration is probably more significant. If the goal of the reintegration is to simply strengthen the overall security situation, then the fast employment of the combatants without thinking of their real needs can be a justified way to proceed. If the goal of the reintegration is economical, social and political reintegration, then the technical view cannot be considered adequate. In this case a broader view is needed, where the needs of the combatants and their families are taken into consideration.

As mentioned earlier, reintegration is also about security. According to Bill McSweeney, security can be seen as positive or negative. Negative security sees security as the absence of something negative, for example as an absence of war or violence. Negative security is security from something to which it is connected: objects that can be seen, weighted or measured. In this case the objects are protecting and preventing something from happening. Positive security is freedom from something. It is a question of making something possible. In this case it is referring, for example, to human security.<sup>100</sup> In the technical and broad views these same features can be found. The technical view emphasises the measurability of the reintegration. It also sees that the success of the reintegration is more about the absence of negative things, like the absence of violence. This is indicated by the idea that people should be employed in a way that doesn't cause trouble. Then again, the broad view has more in common with the positive security. It emphasises the tackling of structural problems,

wider definitions of the subjects of the reintegration, and including the communities as part of the process.

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100 McSweeney 1999, 14-15.

### 3 The successes and failures of the reintegration in Aceh

Most of the interviewees returned from Aceh during the early autumn 2006. Since then, some of the problems that were brought out in their interviews have been solved. When I asked in the interviews whether the reintegration was a success or a failure, at the time the failures and problems of the reintegration were of main concern, which was surprising. Before the interviews I had been under the impression that the beginning of the reintegration process had been a success. One reason for this can be that the EU wanted to build a success story out of Aceh. During the interviews I got a dimmer picture of the situation. However, the opinions of those civilian crisis management experts who had been in Aceh for longest were more positive. This suggests that the reintegration process had created some progress in Aceh.

One reason for the negativity can be the fact that the official reintegration process had not really started during the interviewees' stay in Aceh and they mainly brought up problems that were related to this. On the other hand, the social reintegration had been successful. The combatants had returned to their villages and towns and they had mainly been received well. There had been incidents between the parties after the signing of the MoU but these had been resolved with the help of the AMM. Peace has lasted. The majority of the interviewees were concerned about the future of the reintegration process. However, it has to be kept in mind that the success of the reintegration should be estimated ten years from now rather than only after the first year.

The definition of the subjects of reintegration is wide in Aceh, because combatants, pardoned prisoners, and affected civilians are part of it.<sup>101</sup> One way to go through the successes and failures of the reintegration is to go through it separately, one group at a time. Now, I have to admit that this separation was not made in these interviews and only one of the interviewees made this separation in his answers. Because of this, I will discuss the problems that emerged from the interviews one at a time.

The government of Indonesia demanded that the members of GAM should register before they would provide reintegration assistance to this group. This caused problems because the members of GAM considered the lists as a security risk if the peace process turned out to be a failure. This dispute led to a stop in the distribution of the government's reintegration assistance. About half of the interviewees brought this up. At the same time the dispute about the name lists was seen as part of a wider structural problem in Indonesia's administration. However,

the interviewees did not elaborate on this problem. Partly, because some interviewees had been in Aceh for so long that this problem had already been solved. It was an issue of trust. Because of the distrust, GAM was too afraid to give up the names. After the trust had been rebuilt, the lists were not an issue anymore. Then the reintegration could proceed with the combatants.<sup>102</sup>

BRA was the organisation of Indonesia's government that had been established for the distribution of the reintegration assistance. Also, it was meant to work in cooperation with a common forum called Forum Bersama. Members of this common forum were representatives of the government of Indonesia, GAM, international organisations, and local civic organisations.<sup>103</sup> In June 2006 the representatives of government, GAM, and civic organisations withdrew from this agreement because of a growing tension between them.<sup>104</sup> Many of the interviewees brought out the problems connected with the functioning of BRA as major stumbling blocks in the reintegration. Inside BRA there had been, among others, a political power struggle. At the same time there were problems in BRA's reintegration programmes that were caused by poor planning and corruption.<sup>105</sup> The interviewees particularly emphasised the problems with the distribution of the reintegration assistance. When the news about the possibility of getting reintegration financial assistance from BRA reached the people, about 40 000–50 000 applications were submitted. The organisation of BRA could not handle these applications and it became paralysed. Also it was clear that some of these applications were unfounded. Among the interviewees BRA was seen as a bureaucratic organisation that was hard to take measure of and did not work properly.

The majority of the interviewees saw that the problems connected with the local administration was making the reintegration harder. These problems were slow, ineffective administration, corruption, and bad communication. This was seen particularly with issues connected to BRA, and also the interviewees considered this a wider problem. Bad administration and the lack of good governance were seen as making the reintegration more difficult. Also the interviewees were unsatisfied with the slow progress of the reintegration: "You are always left with an impression that someone is always foot-dragging and there is always some explanation why something hasn't happened."<sup>106</sup> Related to this issue, some brought up the bad communication. There was not enough discussion and information sharing about the reintegration. Also the information and public relations work of BRA was considered weak. The information did not spread from BRA's central office to the district offices and in small villages they were not always aware of the progress

101 MoU 2005, 3.2.3.

102 Kokkarinen 2006.

103 AMM Special Report 058, 4–5.

104 World Bank & DSF 2006, 2.

105 AMM Special Report 087, 4.

106 18, translation by author.

of the reintegration. Also the flow of the information inside GAM was seen as a problem.

As discussed before, women were neglected in the official reintegration and they were not part of the institutions that made decisions about the reintegration, even though there had been women fighters in Aceh.<sup>107</sup> Because of the reasons stated before, the interviewees were divided whether this was a problem in Aceh or not. If the reintegration process is looked at from outside the AMM's mandate, this can clearly be considered as a problem in the reintegration. Themes that were almost always brought out in the interviews, although in different ways, were poverty and difficulties in finding work. The majority of the combatants were unemployed, and some interviewees considered that because of the unemployment and the lack of other basic needs crime was growing. Since the signing of the MoU, the crime rate had been growing and this growth concentrated on the areas that were previously pivotal to GAM.<sup>108</sup>

Many interviewees emphasised the lack of housing.<sup>109</sup> Homes had been destroyed during the conflict, which forced many to move to other places in Aceh and to live with their relatives or rent an accommodation. This was seen as a problem of the social reintegration because people did not have a home or they had to live in unfamiliar environment.

According to the interviewees one of the problems was the lack of trust between the ex-combatants of GAM and representatives of the government, the police and army. Also there was a lack of trust between civilians and the police and army. It was seen that one of the reasons for this was the fact that the main part of the military personnel and the police in Aceh were from other parts of Indonesia. In spite of peace there still was no real trust between the parties: "Of course the trust to the government and officials was really bad, amongst the civilians and GAM."<sup>110</sup>

As brought out earlier, the lack of economic knowledge or help was seen as a problem in the reintegration. In Aceh it was possible to get reintegration assistance to different kinds of common projects that the combatants had established with this money, for example, fish farms. The interviewees saw that the lack of knowledge about the markets and economy caused failures in these projects: "These combatants needed this kind of support. A grass-root level support about what is reasonable and what kind of economic activity would have prerequisites for long-lasting entrepreneurship."<sup>111</sup>

Also some interviewees were concerned about the way the economy of Aceh and the former combatants were steered. Firstly, the way the combatants were directed to agriculture was set in doubt. In a research done by the World Bank, 27 % of the combatants wanted to find new

kind of work. 30 % of the combatants and 43 % of the political prisoners had been farmers, which had been the biggest occupational group.<sup>112</sup> With this background it is understandable that not everyone wanted to be a farmer. Some interviewees argued that in a place where agriculture was dominant the people should be directed to agriculture because this is one of the easiest ways to employ a person.

The problems that the interviewees presented were similar. The majority of the interviewees especially considered, as the biggest problems, the name lists and the action of BRA. Those who brought out the status of women combatants saw this as a central problem in the reintegration. Things presented only by one interviewee were rare.

The only large scale successful thing that the interviewees brought up was the return of the combatants to their communities. So the social reintegration can be regarded as a success in Aceh. Almost 90 % of the combatants had not faced problems in their return to their homes.<sup>113</sup> During the conflict many of the combatants kept contact with the local population. Therefore, the differences between the local population and GAM were not big, which explains the successful return to the communities.<sup>114</sup> The opinions of those who had stayed in Aceh for the longest were more positive than the opinions of those who had left earlier. These interviewees saw that the reintegration had made some progress. There were also territorial differences and in some areas there had been lesser progress. A concrete example of the progress was the rebuilding of the houses that had been destroyed during the conflict: "The BRA built a lot of houses during the end of the year. They built quite a lot in the villages. This BRA started to work finally."<sup>115</sup>

The targets of the reintegration in Aceh were three groups: political prisoners, ex-combatants, and affected civilians. The reintegration of the pardoned political prisoners was seen as more successful than the reintegration of the combatants. The issue about the name lists that delayed the distribution of the reintegration assistance had not touched the prisoners. The majority of the interviewees were not in Aceh during the local elections in December 11, 2006.<sup>116</sup> The feelings of those interviewees that stayed until the elections were generally positive about the political process and the reintegration of the combatants. According to them, the political statements had been conciliatory before the elections. Closer to the elections the importance of the political reintegration was increasing. The combatants were considered as being well informed about the political situation. The political reintegration can be regarded as a success during that time, because in Aceh successful elections were held where the Acehenese and among them

107 AMM Special Report 074, 6–7.

108 World Bank & DSF 2006, 2.

109 International Organization for Migration 2006, 19.

110 I1, translation by the author.

111 I8, translation by the author.

112 The World Bank 2006, 41–42.

113 The World Bank 2006, ix.

114 The World Bank 2006, 23.

115 I1, translation by the author.

116 International Crisis Group 2006.

the combatants and the pardoned political prisoners were able to vote.

If the reintegration is looked at as a whole in Aceh then according to the interviewees the economic reintegration can be considered as a failure during the time when AMM was there. On the other hand, the political and social reintegration were successful. The successful social reintegration here means that the combatants had returned to their villages without considerable problems. Without work or earnings and in an atmosphere of possible mistrust, the success of the social reintegration can be threatened in the future. Due to reintegration being a long process only the passing of time can give the right answers to these questions.

## 4 Conclusion

What were the results of this article? First, I wanted to find out how the Finnish civilian crisis management experts understood the concept of the reintegration in the light of its subjects, methods and goals. The goal of reintegration was generally understood to be the return of the combatants to society. The question of who were the subjects of the reintegration evoked disagreement. Especially the status of women divided the opinions. The broad view also saw the gender issue as significant to the reintegration. According to the interviewees, the main methods for the reintegration were employment, training and economical assistance. The opinions about the reintegration can be divided roughly into two categories: the broad and the technical views. The technical view saw reintegration more as a clearly defined process where the subjects and time schedule of the reintegration should be clear. This view had points of contact with the negative security where the security is seen as an absence of some threat. The broad view did not emphasise clear categories as the technical did. Furthermore, they emphasized the connection of the reintegration to the whole society. In this case their view has more in common with the positive security where security is seen as a freedom to do something.

Another question for which I wanted to find an answer was did the Finnish civilian crisis management experts find the reintegration in Aceh as a failure or success? Those civilian crisis management experts that left Aceh in September 2006 saw the reintegration in a negative light. Those who left Aceh in December 2006 saw the reintegration more positively. The biggest problems in reintegration were seen in the economic side. The distribution of financial assistance had continued but unemployment was high. Nonetheless, many interviewees brought out examples how the combatants had started small businesses, with varying success, with the funds they had received from the reintegration programme. The interviewees, who were in Aceh during the elections, considered it successful. So the political reintegration had proceeded well. Social reintegration had been a success, at least in the beginning, because the combatants had returned to their villages and cities mainly without problems.

The lack of employment and money was seen as a problem that can cause problems in the future. The economical reintegration was the least successful of the three parts of the reintegration.

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## Appendix

### The interview outline

1. What did you do and how long were you in Aceh?
2. How do you understand the reintegration?
  - What is the goal of the reintegration?
  - Who are the subjects of the reintegration?
  - If the interviewees didn't bring out the issue of women I brought it out intentionally.
  - What are the means of the reintegration? How the reintegration should happen?
  - Quite often I also asked that what do people need after the conflict.
3. Was the reintegration a success or a failure in Aceh?
  - With additional questions I tried to clarify reasons for this.