

CMC Finland YEARBOOK 2008 on
Civilian Crisis Management Studies

CMCFinland

Kriisinhallintakeskus
Crisis Management Centre

Crisis Management Centre Finland
YEARBOOK 2008

Civilian Crisis Management Studies

CMC Finland Civilian Crisis Management Studies
Volume 1: Number 6/2008

Crisis Management Centre Finland
YEARBOOK 2008

on Civilian Crisis Management Studies

Kirsi Henriksson
(editor)

CMC Finland Civilian Crisis Management Studies

Publication Editor

Kirsi Henriksson, Head of Research and Development, CMC Finland

Editorial Board

Ari Kerkkänen, Director, CMC Finland
Hannu Rantanen, Research Director, Emergency Services College
Jari Mustonen, Senior Researcher, CMC Finland
Senja Korhonen/Olivia Šetkić, Research Coordinator, CMC Finland

Advisory Board

Researcher Cedric de Coening, Accord, South-Africa
Emeritus Professor Reijo E. Heinonen, Faculty of Theology, University of Joensuu, Finland
General Secretary Kristiina Kumpula, Finnish Red Cross
Professor Liisa Laakso, Department of Political Science, University of Helsinki, Finland
Senior Researcher Kari Laitinen, The Police College of Finland
Professor, Director Tuomo Melasuo, Tampere Peace Research Institute, Finland
Docent, Lecturer Pertti Multanen, Institute of Development Studies, University of Helsinki, Finland
Docent Arto Nokkala, National Defence University, Finland
Programme Director Hanna Ojanen, The Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Senior Advisor Christer Pursiainen, Council of the Baltic Sea States
Programme Director Kristiina Rintakoski, Crisis Management Initiative
State Secretary (Political) Teija Tiilikainen, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland
Professor Jarmo Toiskallio, National Defence University, Finland
Docent Pekka Visuri, National Defence University, Finland
Academy Research Fellow Tarja Väyrynen, Institute for Social Research, University of Tampere, Finland

© CMC Finland

Cover design: Comma Group Oy

Layout: Tarmo Majasaari, Crealab Oy

ISSN 1797-2140

ISBN 978-952-67127-0-3

CMC Finland
PO Box 1325
FIN-70821 Kuopio, Finland
www.cmcfinland.fi

Contents

Abbreviations	10	Recruitment and Training in Civilian Crisis Management: Learning from the ECMM/EUMM Experiences	42
Acknowledgements	12	<i>Olivia Šetkić</i>	
<i>Kirsi Henriksson</i>			
Prologue	14	1 Introduction	
<i>Alexander Stubb</i>		2 The European Union Monitoring Mission	
		2.1 The development from ECMM to EUMM	
Introduction	16	2.2 The EUMM mandate	
<i>Ari Kerkkänen – Kirsi Henriksson</i>		2.3 The EUMM methodology	
		2.4 The EUMM List of Qualifications	
		3 The recruitment of monitors	
Coordination and Cooperation on Tactical and Operational Levels: Studying EU-ESDP Crisis Management Instruments in Bosnia and Herzegovina	18	4 The training of monitors	
<i>Jari Mustonen</i>		4.1 Pre-mission training	
		4.2 The EUMM induction training	
		4.3 Learning on the job	
		4.4 Remedial training	
		5 Identifying gaps weakening the field performance	
1 Introduction		5.1 Knowledge of English	
2 Civil-Military Coordination in EU Crisis Management: Concepts and Structures		5.2 Interpersonal skills and cultural sensitivity	
2.1 Civil-Military Cooperation vs. Civil- Military Coordination		5.3 Political acumen	
2.2 Development and structures for civil- military coordination in the EU		5.4 Knowledge and understanding of the Balkans	
2.3 Framework for coordination between the EU-ESDP actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina		5.5 Analytical skills	
3 The ESDP missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina: mandates and modalities for cooperation and coordination		5.6 Age limit	
3.1 The European Union Special Representative		5.7 Stress management	
3.2 European Union Police Mission		6 Recommendations	
3.3 EUFOR Althea		6.1 Recruiting recommendations	
4 Experiences of coordination and cooperation		6.1.1 Detailed qualification criteria and job description	
4.1 The difficult debut of ESDP in Bosnia		6.1.2 Encouraging self-evaluation	
4.2 Fighting organised crime: the bottleneck		6.1.3 Adjusting profile to changed circumstances	
4.3 Field level interface		6.1.4 Dialogue and measures	
4.4 From Seven Principles to Common Operational Guidelines		6.1.5 Adding transparency and visibility	
4.5 Cooperation and coordination at the present time		6.1.6 The timing of recruitment	
5 Conclusion		6.1.7 Testing qualities	
		6.2 Training recommendations	
		6.2.1 Sharing responsibility for training	
		6.2.2 Additions to training curricula	
		• Interviewing techniques	
		• Working with interpreters versus working with international staff	

- Who benefits from the monitoring, how and why?
 - More specifics on the target area and target issues
 - Training of trainers and stress management
- 6.2.3 Individualising training
- 6.2.4 Developing new e-learning tools

7 Concluding remarks

Building Capacity for the Palestinian Civil Police: EUPOL COPPS and Communications Project 64

Ari Kerkkänen – Hannu Rantanen – Jari Sundqvist

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Setting the stage for the Palestinian Police
 - 2.1 Policing before the Oslo Accords
 - 2.2 Policing following the Oslo Accords in 1993 and international assistance
 - 2.3 The Second Intifada and its aftermath
- 3 EUPOL COPPS
 - 3.1 The Initial Communications Project and its rationale
 - 3.2 From bi-lateral project to fully-fledged ESDP mission - Establishing EUPOL COPPS
 - 3.3 EUPOL COPPS Communications Project description
 - 3.4 Stakeholders and beneficiaries
 - 3.5 Project implementation
 - 3.6 Project results
- 4 Conclusions
 - 4.1 The challenge of the political context
 - 4.2 Operational prospects and barriers
 - 4.3 Human Security principles as the Project framework

Human Security in Post-Status Kosovo: a Shared European Responsibility 88

Tanja Tamminen

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Human security – from a concept to the ESDP reality
 - 2.1 Human Security Doctrine for Europe
 - 2.2 Lobbying for certain priorities of action
 - 2.3 Human security training to influence the EU activities
- 3 Limits and challenges of the human security thinking
 - 3.1 Human Security in Kosovo under status negotiations
 - 3.2 ESDP development in parallel to human security debate
- 4 Kosovo focused Human Security training
 - 4.1 Future ESDP operation in Kosovo
 - 4.2 Added value of Kosovo specific human security training
- 5 Conclusion

PRT Models in Afghanistan: Approaches to Civil-Military Integration 104

Oskari Eronen

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Short history of PRTs
- 3 PRT mission and tasks
- 4 Present variety of PRTs
 - 4.1 Listing PRTs
 - 4.2 Institutional framework on the home front
 - 4.3 Local conditions
 - 4.4 Presence of other troops
- 5 Generic PRT models
 - 5.1 American
 - 5.2 German
 - 5.3 British(-Nordic)
 - 5.4 Turkish
- 6 PRTs under scrutiny
 - 6.1 Research on PRTs
 - 6.2 Incoherence of models
 - 6.3 Capacity in reconstruction and development
 - 6.4 Whole-of-government approach
 - 6.5 Blurring of civilian and military roles
 - 6.6 PRT as a security provider?
 - 6.7 Integration of capacities
- 7 The way forward
 - 7.1 Coherence
 - 7.2 Afghanisation
 - 7.3 Civilianisation
 - 7.4 Future of the integrated concept
- 8 Future research

Authors 140

Abbreviations

ACBAR	Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief	DIAG	Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups
AIA	Afghan Interim Administration	DoP	Declaration of Principles
AMIS	African Mission in Sudan	EAR	European Reconstruction Agency
ANA	Afghan National Army	EC	European Commission
ANP	Afghan National Police	ECMM	European Community Monitor Mission
AU	African Union	ECU	European Currency Unit
BCI	Palestinian telecommunications operator	EGT	European Group on Training
BiH	Bosna i Hercegovina, (Bosnia and Herzegovina)	ENP	European Union Neighbourhood Policy
CA	Civil Affairs	EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
CERP	Commander's Emergency Response Program	ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
CFC-A	Coalition Force Command – Afghanistan	ESDC	European Security and Defence College
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy	ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
CHG	Civilian Headline Goal	ESF	Economic Support Funds
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation	ESS	European Security Strategy
CIVCOM	Committee of Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management	EU	European Union
CIVMIL CELL	Civilian-Military Cell	EUBAM	European Union Border Assistance Mission
CJCMOTF	Coalition Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force	EU COPPS	EU Co-ordination Office for Palestinian Police Support
CMC	Crisis Management Centre Finland	EUFOR	European Union Force
CMCO	Civil-Military Coordination	EULEX	European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo
CMCOORD	UN Humanitarian Civil-Military Co-ordination	EUMC	European Union Military Committee
CML	Civil-Military Liaison	EUMM	European Union Monitoring Mission
ComNet	Telecommunications network	EUMS	European Union Military Staff
CONOPS	Concept of Operations	EUPM	European Union Police Mission
COPP	Co-ordination Committee of International Assistance to the Palestinian Police Force	EUPOL COPPS	EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories
COREPER	Council of Permanent Representatives	EUPT	European Union Planning Team
CORDS	Civil Operations and Rural Development Support	EUSR	European Union Special Representative
COTER	EU counter terrorism program (code name)	EU	European Union
CPCC	Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability	FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
CSTC-A	Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan	FSB	Forward Support Base
DDK	Danish krone	GAERC	General Affairs and External Relations Council
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration	GCPP	Global Conflict Prevention Pool
DfID	Department for International Development	GOA	Government of Afghanistan
DGE	Directorate General E Civilian Crisis Management	HART	HART-security company
		HF	High frequency
		HQ	Headquarters
		HR	High Representative
		ICG	International Crisis Group
		ICO	International Civilian Office
		ICT	Information and communication technology

ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia	RCC	Regional Coordination Centre
IDF	Israel Defence Force	RO	Regional and Mission Offices
IDP	Internally displaced persons	SAS	Sections Administratives Spécialisées
IFOR	Implementation Force	SCR	Senior Civilian Representative (NATO)
ILO	International Labour Organization	SFOR	Stabilisation Force
IMF	International Monetary Fund	SG/HR	Secretary-General / High Representative
INFO OPS	Information Operations	SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
IO	International Organisation	SRSO	Special Representative of Secretary General (UN)
IPTF	International Police Task Force	SSR	Security Sector Reform
IPU	Integrated Police Unit	SU	Stabilisation Unit
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force	TETRA	Terrestrial Trunked Radio
KFOR	Kosovo Force	TIPH	Temporary International Presence in Hebron
LGCD	Local Governance and Community Development	ToR	Terms of Reference
LOT	Liaison and Observation Team	UCK	Kosovo Liberation Army
LWB	Long Wheel Base	UK	United Kingdom
LSE	London School of Economics	UN	United Nations
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
MIP	Mission Implementation Plan	UNC	Unified National Command of the Uprising
MoD	Ministry of Defence	UN DPKO	UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
MoI	Ministry of Interior	UNDP	UN Development Programme
MONUC	UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo	UNIFIL	UN Interim Force in Lebanon
MOT	Mobile Observation Team	UN OCHA	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
MSF	Médecins sans Frontières	UNMIK	UN Mission in Kosovo
MSU	Multinational Specialised Unit	UNMIS	UN Mission in Sudan
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation	UNOSEK	Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General of the UN
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation	UNSC	UN Security Council
NOK	Norwegian krone	US	United States
NSF	National Security Force	USACE	United States Army Corps of Engineers
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom	USAID	United States Agency for International Development
OHDACA	Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid	USD	United States Dollar
OHR	Office of the High Representative	VHF/UHF	Very high frequency/Ultra high frequency
OPLAN	Operation Plan		
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe		
PA	Palestinian Authority		
PASC	Palestinian Armed Struggle Command		
PCP	Palestinian Civil Police		
PCPDP	Palestinian Civil Police Development Programme		
PHS	Peace and Human Security		
PIC	Peace Implementation Council		
PISG	Provisional Interim Government of Kosovo		
PLO	Palestinian Liberation Organization		
PMC	Project Monitoring Committee		
PMG	Politico-Military Working Group		
PMT	Project Management Team		
PNA	Palestinian National Authority		
PPPM	Palestinian Police Project Memorandum		
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team		
PRT ESC	PRT Executive Steering Committee		
PSC	Political and Security Committee		
PSR	Policy Survey and Research		
QIP	Quick Impact Project		
RC	Regional Command		

Acknowledgements

In the middle of the darkest period of Finnish autumn, it is comforting to finally see light in a form of this Yearbook. I owe a special debt of gratitude to many people.

First of all, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to the authors who have been patiently revising their texts.

To all the referees who have participated in the peer review process, you also deserve my warmest regards. I have enjoyed the cooperation with Director *Arno Truger* from Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution (ASPR), Dr. *Pilvi Torsti* from the Department of Social Science History at the University of Helsinki, Dr. *Johanna Valenius* from the Unit for Policy Planning and Research at the Ministry for Affairs of Finland, Research Fellow *Cedric de Coning* with the African Center for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), as well as with Dr. *Gordon Peake* from the Department for International Development UK (DfID). Also, the input of Researcher *Tanja Viikki* from the Tampere Peace Research Institute was invaluable, and it still is, while she is currently working in the EULEX Mission in Kosovo.

A few other individuals made practical contributions to this book. Without the valuable proofreading work of Mr. *John Mills*, Ms. *Joan Löfgren* and Ms. *Meghan Riley*, the quality of the language would not have reached the level it is now. Also, the patience of Junior AD *Tarmo Majasaari* from Crealab was helpful in realising the layout of this Yearbook.

Finally, I would like to dedicate this Yearbook to the professional personnel of CMC Finland. It is always a pleasure to begin the working day in such an inspiring and motivated atmosphere.

Kuopio, Finland, 4 November 2008

Kirsi Henriksson, Editor



STATE PROVINCIAL
OFFICE OF
EASTERN FINLAND

Foreword

The EU's role as a security policy actor has grown significantly since the creation of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). This has taken place in tandem with the evolution of the ESDP itself. The ESDP has been one of the most dynamic sectors of European integration. The objectives set in the European Security Strategy (ESS) guide the further elaboration of the ESDP. Currently the ESS is being re-examined to reflect changes in the security environment. New security challenges keep emerging, which is why the ESDP has to be subject to regular development. On the other hand, security policy challenges of a more traditional type keep emerging and pose significant demands for the response capacity of the Union and of other international organizations.

Enhancing the Union's crisis management capabilities is one of the key elements in strengthening the ESDP. The aim must be for the EU to have an ability to manage several civilian and military operations simultaneously and set up new operations at short notice. Military and Civilian Headline Goals set the framework for the development of capabilities. EU Battle Groups, on the one hand, and Civilian Response Teams, on the other, ensure the EU's rapid response capacity. These mechanisms can and should be further elaborated on the basis of experience accumulated so far.

Nowadays the ESDP comprises a variety of tools that provide a basis for comprehensive crisis management missions. Coordination between different actors as well as coordination between civilian and military activities is vital. Cooperation with third countries, other international organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) is essential as well. The EU has several tools that would not traditionally be defined as security policy instruments but that are useful and may complement the ESDP – such as development cooperation. Ideally, the EU should be ready to respond simultaneously to different kinds of demands in different parts of the world, but also to include in each crisis management operation a comprehensive set of tools to address the sources and consequences of a conflict.

Finland has actively contributed to the strengthening of the EU's capabilities in crisis management. Our own capacity to participate in EU operations is subject to continuing development – at the moment Finland is participating in most EU operations, the European Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia being the most recent one. The first National Strategy for Civilian Crisis Management was published in September 2008. Its main goal is to enhance national capabilities and coordination in civilian crisis management. Work is ongoing on formulating a national strategy for comprehensive crisis management.

For a Member State to be able to contribute effectively to EU crisis management activities and to the ESDP's further development, it is of utmost importance that coordination between different national actors functions well. This has been the case in Finland. Crisis Management Centre Finland (CMC Finland) under the Ministry of Interior has, since 2007, undertaken responsibility for the recruitment and training of civilian crisis management experts, and it also conducts research in this field. The work of CMC Finland has further enhanced Finland's capacity to be an active Member State in the development and implementation of the ESDP. This first Yearbook of CMC Finland is an illustration of the wide range of themes that the ESDP covers and with which the CMC deals with in practice.

Alexander Stubb
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Finland

Introduction

Kirsi Henriksson – Ari Kerkkäinen

Civilian participation in conflict management and conflict resolution is not a new phenomenon. The United Nations peacekeeping and peace support missions have contained a civilian component, through civil affairs, or police support for decades. In recent years, UN peacebuilding missions have typically been civilian in character, endeavouring to support post-conflict institution building, especially in the field of rule of law. There are dimensions within the UN missions that are similar to EU crisis management missions. The EU's crisis management missions have, from the very inception, been heavily built on the broader concept of the rule of law field. Civilian crisis management, the term coined by the European Union, is a rapidly growing crisis management tool within the EU under its Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). It is noteworthy that the number of EU civilian missions is significantly higher than EU's military crisis management missions.

This all reflects an understanding, stemming in large part from the context and consequences of contemporary wars, underlining the importance of a comprehensive approach in crisis management and peacebuilding. It is recognised that the complexity and nature of conflicts requires a broader response than the traditional military approach. Containment of conflicts is not enough; the objective must be in conflict resolution. It is not achieved by winning the war but instead by winning peace, which ultimately requires a comprehensive approach as well as a simultaneous political process. Winning peace requires institution building support in various fields of civilian expertise such as the rule of law, police, human rights, good governance and monitoring, for example.

The shift towards a comprehensive approach and increased civilian participation in the peacekeeping and peacebuilding paradigm is already transpiring but the results are still to be seen. However, they cannot be judged successful only by sharing the commonly acknowledged wisdom of comprehensiveness. The actual and sustainable impact as well as end-results of comprehensiveness must be tested. To achieve this, there must be further scrutiny, analysis and research on the current crisis management practises. Lessons learnt and best practises units of crisis management missions carried out by the EU and other international organisations are only now

taking shape; often within their own respective organisations. This is a good practise in turning lessons identified into lessons learnt on one hand, but on the other, makes it vulnerable for subjectivity, bias and partisanship. Independent, objective and academic research is of a paramount importance in order to support strategic design of today's and tomorrow's crisis management.

All phases of today's crisis management, whether in EU or UN or other context, must be scrutinised by the research in order to evaluate a genuine impact for long-term stability and end-results. CMC Finland aspires to integrate research into the national operational capacity building of civilian crisis management alongside the training and recruitment. The research must contribute to the formation of a crisis management culture that is based more on human dimension than technology and power orientated motives. Keeping these requirements in mind, the Research Programme of CMC Finland for the years 2008–2012 is based on four themes which provide a framework for the research. These four research themes are: *Research on civilian crisis management missions and methodology; Research on civilian crisis management training and recruitment; Research on coordination between civilian and military crisis management; Research on technological and material expertise in civilian crisis management.*

The key-words of the research practised at CMC Finland are **impact analysis** and **human security**, with a specific attention to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on *Women, Peace and Security* adopted in 2000. Human security provides a new paradigm and framework which eventually may replace presently predominant perception of crisis management. It provides a comprehensive and humanistic approach for crisis management, whether civilian or military. The human security culture of crisis management naturally takes into account development aid within comprehensiveness. It also appreciates values, morals, ethics and human rights in crisis management. The human security paradigm of governance in crisis management is more about creating conditions for security in fragile states and regions than merely enforcing or producing security by traditional means.

The impact analysis aims to evaluate the ongoing and completed civilian crisis management missions as well as finding better and more efficient methods to improve operational tasks and develop civilian crisis management. Also, the impact of training provided by CMC Finland as well as human resources and recruitment processes are all analysed in order to transparently develop the tasks of CMC Finland. The research gathers the experiences of those experts who have been trained and recruited by CMC Finland and who are working in different missions. Their experiences are important in order to assess the relevancy, usefulness and applicability of the training and recruitment vis-à-vis the mission work.

The research produced by CMC Finland is published in the electronic publication series *the CMC Finland Civilian Crisis Management Studies* which has an editorial board and an international advisory board. This *Yearbook 2008 on Civilian Crisis Management Studies* is based on the articles of this publication series. Civil-military cooperation is analysed by Jari Mustonen who focuses on different crisis management instruments in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Olivia Šetkić analyses the EU Monitoring Mission in the Western Balkans and gives recommendations to the recruitment and training in relation to the monitors. The article on EUPOL COPPS touches the political dimension of the operation as well as it gives an example of the use of Information Technology utilized in this specific operation. Implementation of human security principles in the ongoing crisis management activities in Kosovo is under examination in the article written by Tanja Tamminen. Oskari Eronen reflects the challenges associated with the different models of Provincial Reconstruction Teams on the crisis management efforts in Afghanistan.

The views expressed in the research articles are those of the authors and do not reflect the views of CMC Finland.

Coordination and Cooperation on Tactical and Operational Levels

Studying EU-ESDP Crisis Management Instruments in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Jari Mustonen

The article examines the coordination and cooperation between the EU-ESDP missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The EU has, under the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina a Special Representative (EUSR), a police mission (EUPM) and a military mission (EUFOR Althea). Coordination between the different missions is of utmost importance, and experiences from co-existence of the missions have revealed some inconsistencies in the comprehensive approach of the EU in Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, in a process of learning by doing, the relationship and coordination between the different missions, at least on the operational level, has significantly improved.¹

¹ The article was finished in March 2008.

1 Introduction

Towards the turn of the century, the demands for crisis management and crisis management operations have been changing. Since the end of the Cold War, most armed conflicts or wars have been intra-state, and thus in many cases have been more complex and more challenging for international community intervention than “traditional” inter-state wars. For this reason, crisis management operations have also become more complex and multidimensional. Operations may include different actions and phases, varying from conflict prevention and resolution to post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction operations.

Actions related to rehabilitation more and more often encompass aspects of state-building. As a result, the military, traditionally seen as the primary actor in crisis situations, has in many operations been deployed in parallel with civilian actors. The presence of various international actors representing the military and different civilian organisations and agencies means that civil-military interaction is a crucial element of operations, and that coordination and coherence between civilian and military organisations is one of the keys to the success of such operations.

The EU has developed its crisis management capabilities as a part of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The Petersberg tasks, incorporated into the EU in the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999, included both military and civilian crisis management tasks, even though in the beginning the role of military crisis management was more visible than that of civilian crisis management. Nevertheless, the appropriate structures for deploying operations according to the ESDP were established by the end of 2001, and in January 2003 the EU launched the first ESDP operation, the European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM).²

As Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter Bosnia) “represents a key challenge for the European Union”³, the EU engagement in Bosnia has steadily increased. The EU presence in Bosnia dates back to the European Community Monitor Mission (ECMM), operational in former Yugoslavia from 1991 to 2000, and the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM), operational since 22nd December 2000. Prior to launching the EUPM, the EU appointed Lord Paddy Ashdown as the European Union High Special Representative (EUSR) in Bosnia in March 2002.⁴ In December 2004, the EU deployed its largest military mission so far, EUFOR Althea, to Bosnia.⁵ The EU has also expressed its willingness and readiness to increase its presence in Bosnia after the closure of the Office of the High Representative (OHR).

Bosnia became the first theatre of operations in which the EU was operating, within the framework of the ESDP, both a civilian and a military crisis management mission. In this respect, the issue of coordination and coherence between different EU actors became evident. Currently Bosnia is still the only area where the EU has a civilian, a police and a military mission deployed. As the future engagement of EU in Bosnia seems even about to expand, the need for coordination among the different actors, whether civilian or military, is crucial. As eloquently set out in *the European Security Strategy (ESS)*⁶, combining the different instruments of crisis management at its disposal has become increasingly important for the EU, especially now that it is deploying the largest civilian crisis management operation so far in Kosovo.

2 Leinonen 2006, 127–129.

3 ESS-BiH 2004.

4 “Council Joint Action (2002/211/CFSP)”.

5 “Council Joint Action (2004/570/CFSP)”.

6 ESS 2003.

This case study examines the coordination and cooperation between EU-ESDP actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina: the EUSR, the EUPM and the EUFOR Althea. Even though the coordination in practice also encompasses relations between the ESDP operations and the Commission delegation, the scope of this paper will be limited to the examination of intra-pillar coordination and coherence between the ESDP actors. Consequently the Commission delegation will not be included in this study.⁷

This study will examine coordination on the decision-making, operational and tactical levels. The main focus will be on the operational and tactical levels, since the coordination on the Brussels level and implementation of comprehensive concepts and new institutional arrangements of crisis management have been quite widely examined⁸, as has the ESDP as a whole. Naturally, coordination on the strategic level must not be ignored, but in this study this coordination is only involved insofar as it provides the framework for the study.

The primary question of the study is: how is cooperation and coordination between the ESDP missions operating in Bosnia? Key issues to be considered are how the coordination is regulated or directed in the mandates of the operations, and how the mandates have been altered as EU engagement has been expanded and prolonged. In respect of the mandates of the operations and concepts for coordination, the study examines what kinds of solutions the actors have developed for mutual coordination and cooperation in the theatre, and how the coordination and cooperation between the missions has developed through the years. Finally, the current situation of the cooperation and coordination between the ESDP missions is addressed.

As interviews of personnel deployed in the missions provide a crucial source of information for this study, a short field trip was conducted in May 2007. In addition, personnel who have previously been deployed in these missions have been interviewed for the study. In total 36 persons of 8 nationalities, from field level to senior management of the missions, have been interviewed for the report, to all of whom the author wishes to express his gratitude. The interviewees will be referred to anonymously, with only a mention of the organisation the person represents or represented. Nevertheless, as the random sample of the interviews is rather limited and the majority of the interviewees represent the Northern part of Europe, the results are only indicative, but certain tendencies in the development of the cooperation and coordination between the ESDP missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina emerge. The author of this study himself served with EUFOR as a Liaison Officer between December 2005 and June 2006.

7 The issue of coordination between the different EU organisations in Bosnia, and especially the role of the Commission, was brought out in many of the interviews conducted within the framework of this study, and thus would constitute a topic for a separate paper. Most of the interviewees believed that co-locating the EUSR and the EC Delegation would offer added value for the EU and particularly for the united image of the EU among the local population. Further, in the case of EUSR replacing OHR without Bonn Powers (the right to remove from office public officials and to impose laws), closer cooperation with the Commission Delegation would increase the possibilities available for EUSR to use "carrot" instead of the traditional "stick". Interviews in Sarajevo, May 2007.

8 On this, see Penksa 2006; Khol 2006; Juncos 2006; Juncos 2007.

2 Civil-Military Coordination in EU Crisis Management: Concepts and Structures

2.1 *Civil-Military Cooperation vs. Civil-Military Coordination*

Given the complex nature of crisis management operations and the requirement for different types of crisis management instruments within the operations, civil-military interactions are nowadays a crucial element of EU operations. Even though Bosnia and Herzegovina is the first and, currently, only area of operations where the EU has both civilian and military missions, many civilian ESDP operations take place in an environment in which an ongoing military mission exists, under the lead of NATO, the United Nations (UN) or the African Union (AU).⁹ It is imperative to draw a clear distinction between the two terms, “Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC)” and “Civil-Military Coordination (CMCO)”, which apply to this area and often become confused. Both concepts also exist within the framework of EU activities in crisis management operations.¹⁰ Civil-Military Cooperation or CIMIC has many definitions, depending on the organisation. Civilian, humanitarian and military communities have developed different concepts of CIMIC, and the concept has been interpreted in different ways at national and international levels.¹¹

NATO’s definition of CIMIC – greatly influenced by the organisation’s experience of the peacekeeping operations IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina – is as follows:

“the co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies.”

The NATO CIMIC doctrine also defines the purpose of CIMIC, and mainly presents CIMIC as a tool for the commander and a tactical doctrine, not as a strategy for coordination as such.¹²

The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has developed a UN doctrine for peace operations, Civil-Military Co-ordination Policy¹³, but nonetheless most UN peace operations still use the abbreviation CIMIC to avoid the confusion of adopting a new acronym. Within the UN, the term “Civil-Military Liaison (CML)” has been introduced, but not yet approved by the DPKO.¹⁴ The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) abandoned the concept of CIMIC and created new guidelines¹⁵ for cooperation between military and civilian actors, also adopting the term “Civil-Military Coordination (CMCoord)”.¹⁶

The EU demonstrated its perception of CIMIC by adopting the “CIMIC Concept for EU-led Crisis Management Operations” in 2002. The EU definition of the term is:

“Co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between military components of EU-led Crisis Management Operations and civil role-players (external to the EU), including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies.”

Even though the EU definition of CIMIC resembles the NATO concept, the EU perspective is wider, highlighting the selection of civilian and military instruments at its disposal in crisis management operations.¹⁷ EU has also declared its ambition to develop both civilian and military crisis management capabilities, and in this respect has developed a concept for internal coordination – Civil-Military Coordination.¹⁸

9 The ongoing military ESDP operations (as of February 2008) are EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina and EUFOR Chad/RCA in Eastern Chad and North Eastern Central African Republic. Of the civilian ESDP operations, EUPT Kosovo (soon EULEX Kosovo) and EUPOL Afghanistan, for instance, are interacting with NATO-led military operations, and the ESDP missions in DRC alongside UN-led MONUC and EUPOL COPPS with UN-led UNIFIL.

10 Khol 2006, 123–124.

11 Rehse 2004, 14–27; Kristoffersen 2006, 9–11.

12 NATO 2001.

13 UN DPKO 2002.

14 de Coning 2007, 12.

15 UN OCHA 2003.

16 de Coning 2006, 103.

17 *CIMIC Concept for EU-led Crisis Management Operations*, Council Doc. 7106/02, 18 March 2002.

18 Khol 2006, 125.

The European Union's definition of Civil-Military Coordination is as follows:

"Civil-Military Co-ordination (CMCO) in the context of CFSP/ESDP addresses the need for effective co-ordination of the actions of all relevant EU actors involved in the planning and subsequent implementation of the EU's response to the crisis."¹⁹

In general, CIMIC is primarily a *support function to the military mission*²⁰ and covers the cooperation with external actors in the field on the tactical or operational level, whereas CMCO was primarily designed for internal coordination, covering planning, political decision-making and implementation of EU actions in crisis management. The purpose of this study is neither to limit itself to examining actions related to the concept CIMIC, nor explicitly focus on CMCO as defined by the EU, but rather to investigate the coordination and cooperation between the EU actors in a broader sense, using a comprehensive approach, and including interactions between the different civilian crisis management instruments. As the term "CMCO" has until recently described the relationship and coordination between civilian and military actors within EU crisis management, this acronym will be used in the study and so first presented briefly.

2.2 Development and structures for civil-military coordination in the EU

The importance of developing instruments and procedures for effective civil-military coordination in the ESDP context has been emphasized throughout the history of ESDP since 1999. A concrete landmark in developing the CMCO was the adoption of the *Action Plan for further strengthening of civil-military co-ordination in EU crisis management* in the autumn of 2002. The Action Plan contained both tools and guidelines for civil-military coordination, such as an improved Crisis Management Concept, inclusion of CMCO aspects in training and EU exercises and improving institutional coordination in Brussels. Although the Action Plan provided advice on internal coordination in different phases of conflicts, it introduced no mechanisms for enhancing such coordination.²¹

The Council adopted a document Civil Military Co-ordination (CMCO) in November 2003, which, in its own words, suggested some fundamental principles to provide a framework for civil-military coordination.²² Instead of emphasizing the structures or procedures of coordination, the document highlighted that "CMCO as a culture of co-ordination is an essential element in ensuring overall coherence in the EU's response to crisis." This culture of coordination should be created at the earliest possible stage of an operation

and for the whole duration of the operation, and is based on continuous cooperation and common political objectives.

In addition to the concept of a culture of coordination, the document also provides some fundamentals of CMCO in operations, both in the planning and operational phases. The status of the Secretary-General/High Representative as the initiator of the EU response to crisis is recognised, and the Political and Security Committee (PSC) is given a central role in ensuring the coherence of the EU's response to crisis. The cooperation between the Council General Secretariat and the Commission in the planning and implementation phase of an operation is also emphasized.

On the operational level, the EUSR, if appointed, maintains oversight of all the EU activities within an area of operations. The EUSR acts under the direction of SG/HR and receives strategic guidance from the PSC. The EUSR's activities are closely coordinated both with the Presidency, Commission and diplomatic Heads of Mission and with the Force Commander, the Police Head of Mission and the Heads of Mission for other civilian operations. A central task of the EUSR is to chair a Co-ordination Group comprising all the EU actors in the field. Even if CMCO primarily deals with internal coordination within EU, it also serves as a prerequisite for cooperation with external actors engaged in resolving the crisis.²³

Despite the fundamentals laid down by the CMCO on a documental level, there are some practical constraints that complicate the coordination and hamper the creation of a culture of coordination within the EU, such as the different national cultures of civil-military relations. Even though the military and civilian staffs at the Council Secretariat Directorate-General E in Brussels share the same premises, the different institutional cultures aggravate coordination efforts. Much of the coordination still takes place through informal meetings at a lower level, as the formal guidelines directing this coordination are less effective. The emphasis of EU crisis management efforts has for a long time been on developing the military capacity, and the fact of the imbalance of resources between military and civilian components is demonstrated by constant understaffing on the civilian side, and especially in the Police Unit.²⁴

To assist in strategic planning and operational tasks in both civilian and military operations, the European Council in December 2003 decided to create a Civilian Military Cell (CivMil Cell) within the EU Military Staff (EUMS). The central role designed for the CivMil Cell is to develop a capability rapidly to set up an Operations Centre (OpCen) for any operation. The establishment of the CivMil Cell was postponed as the negotiations concerning the Operations Centre delayed the process.²⁵ However, the CivMil Cell has now been established,

19 Civil-Military Co-ordination (CMCO), Council Doc. 14457/03, Brussels, 7 November 2003, Para 1 (as quoted in Khol 2006, 125).

20 Ibid.

21 Khol 2006, 127; Juncos 2006, 8.

22 Civil Military Co-ordination (CMCO), Council Doc. 14457/03, Brussels, 7 November 2003.

23 Ibid. Even though the acronym CMCO refers to the coordination between the civilian and military crisis management instruments, it should be interpreted more broadly to encompass also coordination between all of the different civilian EU actors, from Brussels to the mission areas.

24 Khol 2006, 127–128; Juncos 2006, 8.

25 Khol 2006, 131.

and the facilities for the Operations Centre have also been ready since 1st January 2007.²⁶

One "structural handicap" of the CivMil Cell, even though it consists of both civilian and military staff, might lie in the fact that as part of the EUMS, it represents the military side of ESDP, which could once again emphasize the military approach in operations. Nevertheless, the CivMil Cell and the OpCen have been loaded with high expectations, especially in the field of strategic planning for joint civilian/military crisis management operations. The Cell can also contribute to the development of doctrines and concepts to further enhance civil-military interaction. In addition, the Cell can also act as an interlocutor between the civilian and military components, since it reports to both the Committee of Civilian Aspects in Crisis Management (CIVCOM) and the European Union Military Committee (EUMC), and has a permanent link to the Commission.

The CivMil Cell is also in the position to conduct joint lessons learnt from both civilian and military missions ongoing in the same territory, as well as from EU exercises. Civil-Military Coordination has been included in two training programmes, one in use by the Commission since 2001 and the other by the Council since 2004. In December 2004 the PSC approved the EU Training Policy in the ESDP Concept, in which the civil-military area is considered an important aspect of training at both strategic and operational levels. In general, the training requirement for CMCO and inter-pillar aspects has been highlighted as a result of the experience from Operation Althea in Bosnia.²⁷

In June 2007 the European Council decided to establish the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC), a civilian equivalent to EU military staff, responsible for planning and conduct of civilian ESDP operations. The CPCC, which functions within the Council Secretariat, is headed by the Civilian Operations Commander, who exercises strategic level command and control over civilian ESDP operations.²⁸ The purpose of creating the CPCC was to systematize planning and command of civilian crisis management operations, but how it can contribute to the coordination of the use of civilian and military ESDP instruments remains to be seen.

With regard to the future of CMCO, and further coordination of civil-military interactions within EU, the CivMil Cell is at the centre of expectations concerning the planning of joint civil-military operations and the development of concepts and procedures. Deploying a joint operation containing all the different instruments of EU crisis management seems to be the next great challenge. Several lessons concerning co-ordination between the different EU actors have already been identified on the basis of the experiences from Bosnia and Herzegovina, but a thorough follow-up study of coordination between operations still needs to be conducted.

2.3 Framework for coordination between the EU–ESDP actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina

The elements of coordination between the civilian and military components in the case of EU operations in BiH were crystallised on a conceptual level in *the European Security Strategy – Bosnia and Herzegovina/Comprehensive Policy*, adopted by the Council in June 2004.²⁹ At the time the document was adopted, the EU engagement in Bosnia was being further enlarged with a military component, EUFOR Althea, which took over from the NATO-led military mission Stabilisation Force (SFOR). Some experience of cooperation and coordination between EU actors had already been obtained, mainly between the EUSR and EUPM that had co-existed for a year and a half. With respect to the European Security Strategy and the deployment of EUFOR, the need for a comprehensive approach to Bosnia and Herzegovina was increasingly apparent and embodied in the adoption of the document.

According to the Comprehensive Policy,

"all EU actors/instruments, whether political, military, police-related or economic, will contribute to implementing this overall EU policy towards Bosnia and Herzegovina."

The overall coherence of EU actions is highlighted, because,

"given the magnitude of the EU involvement, a key challenge will be to ensure close co-ordination and coherence of the EU actors/instruments in Bosnia and Herzegovina."

In order to promote this coherence, a number of arrangements were suggested, both at the Brussels and Sarajevo levels.

In ensuring the maximum coherence of the different actors on the strategic level, the Council and the Council of Permanent Representatives (Coreper), as its preparatory organ, have a strong role, as has the SG/HR together with the European Commission. The political control and strategic direction of the ESDP missions is the responsibility of the PSC, which will remain in direct contact with EU missions in Bosnia.

On the Sarajevo level, "the EUSR will promote overall EU political co-ordination in Bosnia and Herzegovina." The EUSR will assist the SG/HR and the PSC in their task, and also provide political advice for the EU Force Commander, without prejudice to the chain of command. In relation to the EUPM, the EUSR belongs to the chain of command and is therefore in a position to co-ordinate the interaction of these two actors. The role of the EUSR is also emphasized in respect of internal EU coordination, as the EUSR is to chair regular meetings of EU Heads of Missions (including participation or representation from the EUSR, EUMM, EUPM and EUFOR Heads of Mission). Further, informal meetings between the operational actors in Bosnia (EU Force Commander, EUPM, Commission Delegation, EUMM and EU Presidency) are also to be chaired by the EUSR.

26 Solana 2007, 4.

27 Khol 2006, 131–134.

28 "Presidency Report on ESDP", 10910/07, Council of the European Union, Brussels 18 June 2007.

29 ESS – BiH 2004.

It has to be realized that the Comprehensive Policy in its time only set out certain preconditions for coordination and cooperation between the EU actors. The mandates of the respective organisations also included coordination elements, and have since been amended to better meet the requirements or set out the conditions for coordination.

3 The ESDP missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina – mandates and modalities for cooperation and coordination

The EU's involvement in the country has steadily increased, which has been motivated by many factors. Firstly, the European Community's inability to prevent or stop the fighting in the heart of Europe, in the former Yugoslavia between 1991 and 1995, has been seen by some critics as resulting in a "guilty conscience" which needs to be appeased. Secondly, the development of the EU as a crisis management actor has created the need to strengthen the ESDP capabilities further, and for this purpose Bosnia and Herzegovina has served as a useful "testing ground".³⁰

In the following, the missions and mandates of the three EU-ESDP actors under consideration in relation to coordination are presented in the order of their appearance in the theatre. The purpose here, in short, is to present the tasks reserved for the organisations in their mandates and also highlight the preconditions and modalities for cooperation or coordination made public in the mandates, if applicable.

3.1 *The European Union Special Representative*

The basis of the existence of the European Union Special Representative EUSR lies significantly in the Office of High Representative (OHR), an *ad hoc* institution responsible for overseeing implementation of civilian aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995. The position of the High Representative was created in Annex 10 of the Dayton Peace Agreement, which also defined the mandate of the OHR.³¹

In order to expand the EU engagement in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to further facilitate the country's integration into the EU, the Council appointed the High Representative, Lord Ashdown, as EU Special Representative in March 2002. When this appointment was made, it was emphasised that the role of EUSR should not prejudice the mandate of the High Representative, but the EUSR would preserve the role of coordinating the activities of all civilian organisations and agencies and perform other additional duties.

To serve the EU's intentions, the EUSR was mandated to maintain oversight of the activities related to Rule of Law and,

as deemed necessary, provide advice to the SG/HR and the Commission. The coordination role of the EUSR also included a specific authority to give direction to the Head of Mission/Police Commissioner of the EU Police Mission, which was introduced to replace the United Nations International Police Task Force (ITPF) from 1st January 2003 onwards.³² From the beginning, the role of the EUSR in relation to EUPM was significant, owing to the fact that EUPM reported to SG/HR through the EUSR.³³

The EUSR operated under the terms of the mandate of the OHR until July 2004, when the Council adopted a Joint Action on the revised mandate for the EUSR.³⁴ The new mandate reflected both the EU Comprehensive Policy for Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Council decision to deploy an EU military mission in BiH, in which the role of the EUSR was further emphasised. As the military mission increased the number of CFSP/ESDP instruments, the mandate of the EUSR needed to be modified accordingly.

According to the first mandate, the EUSR's main tasks were to offer the EU's advice and facilitation in the political process and to promote overall EU political coordination in BiH. The EUSR was also mandated to contribute to the reinforcement of internal EU coordination and coherence in Bosnia and Herzegovina, to which end he/she would have authority to give direction, as necessary, to the Head of Mission/Police Commissioner of the European Union Police Mission and provide local political advice to the EUFOR Commander.³⁵

Many aspects of the EUSR mandate reflected the mandate of the OHR, and also the relations between the OHR and the NATO-led military missions, which meant that the mandate was to a certain extent out of date from the beginning. The main amendment in the mandate referred to the increased need for internal coordination and coherence of EU activities in the region, but gave no specific direction on implementation on the operational or field level. The mandate made clear the position of the PSC as the primary point of contact for the

30 Juncos 2006, 5.

31 *The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina*, Annex 10.

32 "Council Joint Action 2002/211/CFSP".

33 "Council Joint Action 2002/210/CFSP".

34 "Council Joint Action 2004/569/CFSP".

35 "Council Joint Action 2004/569/CFSP", Article 4.

EUSR with the Council. The EUSR was to report in person to the SG/HR and to the PSC, and also to other relevant working groups and to the Council, on the recommendation of the SG/HR or the PSC.

The mandate also regulated the issue of the provision of an EU dedicated staff within the office of EUSR/OHR. When Lord Ashdown was given the double-hat as EUSR/OHR in 2002 for the first time, no EU staff was appointed to his office, which obviously hampered his performance of his duties as EUSR. According to the new mandate, staff projecting EU identity should be assigned to assist the EUSR and to contribute to the coherence and effectiveness of the EU action in BiH. In practice, the EUSR staff was appointed well after the mandate came into force.

Regarding the coordination in the field, the central role of the EUSR was reinforced in the mandate. According to the first EUPM mandate, the EUSR belongs to the chain of command of the EUPM and acts as a link between the EUPM and the SG/HR. On the other hand, direction from SG/HR to EUPM also passes through the EUSR.³⁶

In relation to EUFOR, the EUSR was mandated to provide political advice to the Force Commander, *without prejudice to the chain of command*. Even though the EUSR is outside the chain of command of EUFOR, military operations should be co-ordinated with the EUSR to ensure consistency in EU actions in the field.

The mandate of the EUSR was amended in November 2005, mainly with the addition and review of tasks related to coordination with the other EU actors.³⁷ In particular, issues related to the local police and tackling organised crime had created problems in cooperation and coordination between EUPM and EUFOR, which is reflected in the revised mandate. The EUSR was thus given the additional task of promoting overall EU coordination of the fight against organised crime, even though the leading role in policing activities remained with the EUPM.

In his role in the chain of command of EUPM, the EUSR was also required to provide the EUPM Head of Mission with local political guidance. The policing aspect was emphasised overall in the revised mandate, as the EUSR was to provide support for reinforcing the Bosnian criminal justice/police interface and restructuring the local police force. The EUSR's role in EUFOR and involvement in matters related to the Integrated Police Unit (IPU) was now mandated to be carried out in agreement with the (EUFOR) Force Commander, which again reflects the obvious need for cooperation between all the actors.

The mission of Lord Ashdown as the High Representative and EUSR came to an end in January 2006, and Mr. Christian Schwarz-Schilling was appointed OHR/EUSR with effect from 1st February 2006.³⁸ In anticipation of the closure of the OHR office, the mandate of the EUSR was amended in July 2006. As the preparations to reinforce the EUSR office needed to be made in parallel with the closing down of the OHR office,

the EUSR was mandated to support planning related to this closure.³⁹ The mandate of the OHR was, however, extended until 30th June 2008 by the Peace Implementation Council's (PIC) Steering Board.⁴⁰

The mandate of the EUSR was amended again at the beginning of February 2007. The mandate of Mr. Schwarz-Schilling was also extended until 30th June 2007. These amendments to an extent reflect the recent political development, as the duties of the EUSR now include providing political advice on the process of constitution reform, and engaging with local authorities on their full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Co-ordination between the EU actors was again highlighted in the revised mandate, as

“in support of the EU crisis management operations, the EUSR, with other EU actors present in the field, shall improve the dissemination and sharing of information by EU actors in theatre with a view to achieving a high degree of common situation awareness and assessment.”⁴¹

As the mandate of Mr. Schwarz-Schilling came to an end on 30th June, Mr. Miroslav Lajčák was appointed the new High Representative and European Union Special Representative for the period until 29th February 2008.⁴² The mandate of the new EUSR remained at first the same as that of his predecessor, but was significantly expanded in November 2007.⁴³ The biggest changes in the mandate concern the EUSR's role in relation to EUFOR, as he/she is now mandated to offer the EU Force Commander political guidance, and not only political advice. The EUSR is in the position to give EUFOR political guidance on military issues with a local political dimension, particularly concerning sensitive operations, relations with local authorities and the local media. In return, the EUSR is to consult with both the Commander of EUFOR and the Head of the EUPM before taking political actions which may affect the security situation.

Setting the mandates aside, the actual functions of the EUSR have depended to a large extent on the staff and resources

36 “Council Joint Action 2002/210/CFSP”, Article 7.

37 “Council Joint Action 2005/825/CFSP”.

38 “Council Joint Action 2006/49/CFSP”.

39 “Council Joint Action 2006/523/CFSP”.

40 *Communiqué by the PIC Steering Board*, February 27, 2007.

41 “Council Joint Action 2007/87/CFSP”. Improving situational awareness in EU crisis management operations was visibly promoted during the Finnish Presidency in the latter half of 2006. The Finnish Presidency organised a seminar “Improving Situational Awareness in EU Crisis Management Operations” in Brussels in September 2006, at which the emphasis was laid on the lessons of cooperation in the field, especially from Bosnia, as of the two case studies available, the first concentrated solely on BiH. Representatives from EUSR, EUPM, EUFOR Althea and the Commission took part in the panel discussion, and the results of an Audit to BiH, organised by the Presidency and the Secretariat, were also presented. Among the seminar findings, the situational awareness, information sharing and also strengthening the role of the EUSR were highlighted, which can be seen reflected in the revised mandate of the EUSR.

42 “Council Joint Action 2007/427/CFSP”.

43 “Council Joint Action 2007/748/CFSP”.

available. As already stated, the first EUSR Lord Ashdown had no EUSR-dedicated staff until 2005, but only double-hatted OHR/EUSR personnel, limiting his opportunity to execute the mandate as effectively as might have been needed. By 2005 there were three officials working exclusively for the EUSR, and in early 2006 there were five EUSR employees.⁴⁴ The number of personnel then increased so that in October 2007 the number of staff within the EUSR was 28, of whom 22 were EUSR-dedicated.⁴⁵

The EUSR structure is concentrated in Sarajevo. The EUSR has no field presence of its own, and the OHR's field presence is also limited to Regional Offices in Mostar and Banja Luka, the Brcko Final Award Office and a field office in Bratunac.⁴⁶ Thus the EUSR's ability to coordinate directly EU activities on the field level is rather restricted.

Within the last two years, the resources and staff of the EUSR have steadily been increased, which has enabled the EUSR to fulfil the mandate better and to act as the coordinator of EU activities in the country. The future prospects of the EUSR depend greatly on the closure or continuation of the OHR in June 2008. In case of the closure of the OHR, the EUSR is to take over the functions of OHR, and its role is likely to be further strengthened and mandate widened.

3.2 European Union Police Mission

One of the features of the Dayton Peace Agreement was the provision of a safe and secure environment for the local population, and in order to assist the local authorities in meeting their obligations, a United Nations International Police Task Force (IPTF) was established.⁴⁷ The IPTF was operational from 1996 until the end of 2002 when it was replaced by the European Union Police Mission EUPM.

The deployment of EUPM formed part of the EU approach of addressing the whole range of the Rule of Law, in line with the general objectives of Annex 11 of the Dayton Agreement. The mission was launched with the aim of establishing sustainable policing arrangements under Bosnian ownership in accordance with best European and international standards. The EUPM was expected to reach its goals through monitoring, mentoring and inspecting, originally by the end of 2005.⁴⁸

The mission and the structure of the EUPM were defined by the Council in March 2002.⁴⁹ As described in the Mission Statement, the three-year EUPM was to concentrate on:

- Preserving, through continuity with the achievements of the IPTF mission, the existing levels of institutional and personal proficiency;
- Enhancing, through monitoring, mentoring and inspecting, police managerial and operational capacities; to this end, to focus on delegation of power and quality-oriented management principles as well as improving operational planning capacity based on analysis;
- Strengthening professionalism at high level within the ministries as well as at senior police officers levels through advisory and inspection functions;
- Monitoring the exercise of appropriate political control over the police.

As the mandate of the EUPM was in practice created in parallel with the mandate of the EUSR, the culture and modalities for coordination between these two actors were to some extent already defined. This also enabled the formation of a joint command structure, which evidently improved the coherence. Nevertheless it was stated in the mandate that "coordination arrangements in Brussels and Sarajevo are required", reflecting the need for further clarification of the procedures for coordination.

When the mandate of the EUPM was nearing its end, the Council of the European Union decided in July 2005 that in order to complete its current mandate, the EUPM was to continue its action, with adjusted mandate and size.⁵⁰ In the second phase of EUPM (so called EUPM-II), it was to concentrate on three pillars⁵¹:

- Supporting the local police in the fight against organised crime;
- Conducting inspections and monitoring of police operations;
- Supporting the implementation of police restructuring.

The revised mandate reflected a lesson identified from the first phase of the EUPM, as it directed the EUPM to take "the lead in the coordination of policing aspects of the ESDP efforts in the fight against organised crime, without prejudice to the agreed chains of command".

The clarification of the roles of the actors refers to the EUPM's and EUFOR's differing interpretations of the mandates, which emerged in relation to tackling organised crime. The fact that the actors had diverging understandings of their own mandate and the mandate of the other organisation caused confrontation that needed to be settled. Even though the mandate of the EUPM itself did not significantly change, the actual perception of the limits set by the mandate altered, thus widening the role and possible actions of the EUPM on policing matters.⁵² Furthermore, the focus of the mission changed after it had concluded its contribution to police reform by the end

44 Penksa 2006, 13; Interviews with EUSR officials, 15 May 2007, 18 May 2007, 22 May 2007.

45 *EUSR Organisation Chart*, October 2007.

46 <http://www.ohr.int/ohr-info/gen-info/#4>, read on the 30th October 2007.

47 *Dayton Peace Agreement*, Annex 11.

48 "Council conclusions on International Police Task Force (IPTF) Follow-on", 18/19.2.2002. From the point of view of the EUPM, it was supposed to follow, not replace, the IPTF, with a substantially different mandate. See Collantes Celador 2007, 8.

49 "Council Joint Action 2002/210/CFSP".

50 "Council Joint Action 2005/824/CFSP".

51 Penksa 2006, 15.

52 Interview with a former EUPM official, 16 February 2007.

of 2006. In 2007, the mission concentrated on supporting the fight against major and organised crime.⁵³

The contents of the mandate in relation to coordination remained somewhat similar. With regard to coordination, the Council stated that "arrangements already exist in the Mission area as well as in Brussels", which implies that the modalities for cooperation, which three years earlier had to be developed both in Sarajevo and Brussels, were now established not only in Sarajevo but on the field level as well – a fairly optimistic statement at that stage, especially from the point of view of the field level.

EUPM replaced IPTF with a significantly smaller organisation. During its first mandate, the personnel of EUPM encompassed an international staff of approximately 550 persons, both police officers and civilians, working in the field in 33 co-locations.⁵⁴ As EUPM-II, starting at the beginning of 2006, was to fulfil its mission with a modified mandate and size, the strength of international police officers and civilians was reduced to approximately 200, which is also the current figure.⁵⁵

When the mandate reached its end on 31st December 2007, the Council further extended the EUPM mandate for another two years, until the end of 2009. The content and the mission statement of the mandate remained largely unchanged, and the major change in the mandate is related to management of the mission. The Council of the European Union approved in June 2007 *Guidelines for Command and Control Structure for EU Civilian Operations in Crisis Management*. These guidelines provide that the Director of the CPCC within the Council Secretary will be the Civilian Operation Commander for all civilian crisis management operations, *inter alia*, for EUPM.

In general, the Civilian Operation Commander exercises command and control of the EUPM on the strategic level, while the Head of Mission retains command and control on the theatre level. As a result of the new structure, the EUSR no longer belongs to the chain of command for the EUPM, while remaining able to provide local political direction. The Civilian Operation Commander and the EUSR are, however, to consult each other when required. According to the Concept of Operations, there will be no changes in the structure or personnel of the mission in the near future.⁵⁶

3.3 EUFOR Althea

To assist the international community in the territorial and other militarily related provisions of the Dayton Peace Agreement, a multinational military Implementation Force (IFOR) was established in December 1995. The NATO-led IFOR with 60,000 troops completed its mandate of implementing

the military annexes of the Peace Agreement within one year and was replaced by Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in December 1996.

As the name implies, the overall role of SFOR with its initial strength of 32,000 soldiers was to stabilise the peace and contribute to a safe and secure environment in Bosnia. With this robust military force, SFOR was in general able to fulfil its mission of maintaining the peace. Over the years, the improved security situation allowed for restructuring the mission and reducing the troop numbers, first to some 20,000 in 2000, then to 12,000 in 2003 and finally to some 7,000 in 2004.⁵⁷

To further develop the crisis management "toolbox" of ESDP, the EU heads of state expressed their willingness and readiness to lead a military operation to follow SFOR as early as 2002.⁵⁸ In December 2003, the Council confirmed the EU's readiness for a military mission in Bosnia, in anticipation of NATO's decision to end the SFOR mission.⁵⁹ Consequently, NATO announced during its June 2004 summit in Istanbul that an EU-led peacekeeping force would replace SFOR before the end of the year. The fact that a European Union Force (EUFOR) would continue as the organisation with primary responsibility for maintaining peace in Bosnia reflected the opinions of both EU and NATO about the improved security situation in the country and the belief in the EU's ability to lead a military operation robust enough for the purpose.⁶⁰

Following the Council decision on 12th July 2004 and UN Security Council Resolution 1575, a military operation named EUFOR Althea was launched on 2nd December 2004. According to the mandate, EUFOR is to:

- provide deterrence, and continued compliance with the responsibility to fulfil the role specified in Annexes 1.A and 2 of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in BiH;
- contribute to a safe and secure environment in BiH in line with its mandate, and to achieve core tasks in the OHR's Mission Implementation Plan and the Stabilisation and Association Process.

In the EUFOR mandate, the other ESDP instruments had been taken into account with respect to the coherence and coordination of EU activities on the ground. The EU Force Commander was to receive local political advice from the EUSR

53 <http://www.eupm.org/MissionObjectives.aspx>, read 31st October 2007.

54 *Reports to the European Parliament by the OHR and EU Special Representative for BiH*, January-June 2003 and July-December 2003; Penksa 2005, 4.

55 Weekly establishment of EUPM personnel by countries, as of 26th October 2007; *Report to the European Parliament by the OHR and EU Special Representative for BiH*, February 2006-June 2006.

56 *EUPM Mission Mag*. N:o 28, 11.10.2007, 5.

57 ICG 2001; ICG 2004.

58 *Presidency Conclusions*, Copenhagen European Council 12 and 13 December 2002.

59 Summary of the Report by Javier Solana, EU High Representative for CFSP, on a *Possible EU Deployment in BiH*, 23 February 2004.

60 ICG June 2004. Even though the SFOR mission ended in 2004, NATO still has a small Headquarters in Sarajevo, in co-location with EUFOR Headquarters in Butmir. The role of NATO in Bosnia is to assist BiH to meet requirements for the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) program and eventually membership in the NATO alliance. NATO will also undertake certain operational tasks, including counter-terrorism, support of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, with regard to the detention of persons indicted for war crimes (PIFWCs), and intelligence sharing with the EU.

and liaise, as appropriate, with the EUPM. The Commander also needed to coordinate closely with the EUSR the consistency of military operations in the context of EU operations.⁶¹

When deployed, EUFOR comprised some 6,200 troops from 22 EU member states and 11 other countries, which means that it was roughly the same size as SFOR. EUFOR also adopted the structure of SFOR, with three regional Multinational Task Forces covering the entire country, and a headquarters (HQ) and Integrated Police Unit (IPU) situated in the main camp in Sarajevo. Under the Multinational Task Forces operated the Manoeuvre Battalions and Liaison and Observation Teams (LOT) which formed "the eyes and ears" of EUFOR on the ground.⁶²

In November 2005 the EU Council of Ministers extended the EUFOR mandate, leaving its force structure unchanged for 2006. However, in accordance with the second mission review, EUFOR was to align its operations more closely with EUPM and play a less active role in the fight against organised crime. EUFOR was to continue to prepare to support the local law enforcement agencies in operations directed against organised crime, and also to participate actively in the Crime Strategy Group, a body chaired by the EUSR to maximise the ESDP efforts in support of the Bosnian authorities' fight against organised crime.⁶³

As the security situation in the country remained calm, it was decided that EUFOR should further alter its role from deterrence to reassurance. In practise, this meant reorganisation of the force and troop reductions in spring 2007. The Task Force structure, dating back to IFOR, was dismantled and the field presence of EUFOR operational forces decreased respectively.

Restructured EUFOR reached full operational capability at the end of April, and is now deployed with some 2,500 troops on the ground. The new structure is based on a Headquarters, Integrated Police Unit and manoeuvre element (Multinational Manoeuvre Battalion) in Sarajevo, and a revised situational awareness matrix with 45 Liaison and Observation Teams, under five Regional Coordination Centres (RCC), covering the entire country. Under the new structure, the operation continues its organised crime.⁶⁴

61 "Council Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP". The EUFOR operation is carried out with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, under the "Berlin Plus" arrangements.

62 *Report to the European Parliament by the OHR and EU Special Representative for BiH*, January–June 2005.

63 *Report to the European Parliament by the OHR and EU Special Representative for BiH*, June–December 2005.

64 "Operation ALTHEA", 2007; In case of a deteriorating security situation, the Manoeuvre Battalion can be deployed throughout the country. In relation to the decreased number of troops, the readiness for the use of Over-the-Horizon Forces has been improved. Interviews in Sarajevo, May 2007.

4 Experiences of coordination and cooperation

4.1 *The difficult debut of ESDP in Bosnia*

In Bosnia, the coexistence and simultaneous use of ESDP instruments began in practice when the EU police mission was deployed at the beginning of 2003. As described earlier, Lord Ashdown had been appointed EUSR in March 2002 and, in accordance with his mandate, now belonged to the EUPM chain of command. At that point, the need for coherence in the "EU family" referred to the relations between the EUSR and EUPM, as EUMM had been deployed in the country for over a decade and was following its specific mission, on which the deployment of the new EU actors had no effect.⁶⁵

EUPM, as the first ESDP operation, had a difficult beginning. Neither the organisational structure itself nor the infrastructure were completely organised at the beginning of the mission. EUPM encountered severe delays in procurement and personnel which initially reduced the efficiency of the mission. Moreover, the handover from IPTF was not seamless, as not all the necessary documentation was received.⁶⁶

The biggest challenge for the mission, however, was the interpretation of the mandate, "to monitor, mentor and inspect". It was not completely clear what this meant in practice even at HQ, and there were voices demanding that EUPM should have a more operational, executive mandate, rather than the intended advisory role. In addition, problems were caused by the so-called program design, through which the objectives of the mission were supposed to be pursued, as few of the personnel were acquainted with longer-term programmatic thinking. Many of the first police officers had an IPTF background, and in practice did not always act in

accordance with the advisory mandate, but continued as they had been used to.⁶⁷

The fact that there was confusion at the EUPM HQ about implementing the mandate meant that there were no clear operating procedures or guidelines for the personnel at the regional and field levels to follow. At worst, this created a situation in which the police officers in the field had no idea what they were supposed to do, and so "developed their own private missions", according to their best knowledge.⁶⁸ In short, the most crucial internal failings at the start of the mission were inadequate implementation of the mandate, inadequate instructions to the field and non-functional communication and reporting structures. For the coherence of EU actions in Bosnia, the beginning of the police mission was not easy, "because even the coordination within EUPM did not exist."⁶⁹

In addition to internal confusion, the status of the double-hatted OHR/EUSR was sometimes unclear. The basic problem was that the mandate of EUSR was broad and quite comprehensive, but "ironically, you turned Lord Ashdown into a EUSR but you gave him no staff to execute that mandate."⁷⁰ From the EUPM point of view, the High Representative was occupied with many functions of the OHR, and without dedicated EUSR staff, it was felt that "he was the right person for the job...but he never really was the EUSR".⁷¹ Also the reporting from EUPM to Brussels varied: on some occasions, the reports went directly from the Commissioner to the Police Unit, and sometimes the EUSR was in the middle of the reporting chain. So from the point of view of EUPM, double-hatting the OHR sometimes created the situation that the High Representative used his status as EUSR only when it suited his purposes, rather than comprehensively. As one of

65 Interview with a former EUPM official, 16 February 2007. Relations between EUPM and EUMM were close and practical from the deployment of the planning team for EUPM, to which EUMM offered logistical and material support. Many of the EUMM personnel also joined EUPM later on. As there were no pressing issues between the two missions, in many interviews the relations between EUPM and EUMM were described as informal and "friendly exchange of information".

66 Penksa 2006, 4–5, 10; Interviews with former EUPM officials, 30 March 2007 & 18 April 2007.

67 Ibid; Collantes Celador 2007, 10. The amount of police officers that moved from the IPTF to the EUPM was 119 according to Michael Merlingen and Rasa Ostrauskaite (as cited by Collantes Celador 2007, 9).

68 Interview with a former EUPM official, 18 April 2007.

69 Interviews with former EUPM officials, 30 March 2007 & 18 April 2007; Penksa 2005, 11.

70 Interview with an EUSR official, 15 May 2007.

71 Interview with a former EUPM official, 18 April 2007.

the informants bluntly put it, in the first year of EUPM “the EUSR position was essentially irrelevant.”⁷²

The role of EUSR within the chain of command and providing political advice for EUPM became more relevant during 2004 and 2005. One of the issues that provoked discussions between EUPM and EUSR/OHR was the status of legal and political elements in EUPM. The EUSR proposed that EUPM II would no longer have political, media or legal functions of its own, but that these should be merged with the office of the EUSR.⁷³

From the viewpoint of coordination between the organisations and sending a unified European Union message to the field and the local population, combining these activities might have been a useful solution. However, from the point of view of the police mission, it was imperative to have so-called “in-house advisors” to be able to provide more technical knowledge and guidance concerning the political and legal aspects of policing. The fear was that without legal and political elements, EUPM would become merely a ‘hammer’ for the EUSR and over-influenced by the political aspirations. On this issue, opinions even within EUPM varied considerably, as a balance was sought between following the political agenda and conducting the professional “monitoring, mentoring and advising”.⁷⁴

With the deployment of the military component, EUFOR Althea, at the end of 2004, the need for coherence and coordination of EU activities in Bosnia became more evident. As Bosnia now became the first area in which the EU had its own Special Representative, police mission and military mission in the field, without having planned or deployed these missions simultaneously, problems concerning internal coherence started to emerge from the beginning. Quite soon it became clear that neither the modalities nor structures for coordination described in the mandates of the missions, nor the EUSR were able to prevent the problems encountered.

4.2 *Fighting organised crime: the bottleneck*

From the point of view of EUFOR, keeping the takeover period from SFOR as short as possible was a priority. To this end EUFOR started launching operations in line with its mandate as early as December 2004. Operations that were often conducted together with local law enforcement agencies included actions against organised crime, such as illegal logging, weapons’ smuggling and human trafficking.

The main cause of disagreements and problems between EUFOR and the EUPM was that both had been mandated to

have a role in fighting organised crime. As the mandate of EUPM limited its functions to monitoring and mentoring the local law enforcement agencies’ activities on this issue, EUFOR with its executive mandate was able to take actual measures and launch operations aimed at fighting organised crime. This was interpreted by some observers as EUFOR searching for a mission for itself, and EUPM hiding behind its lack of an operational mandate.⁷⁵ In other words, the fact that the EUPM’s mandate disallowed direct participation in policing activities was seen by EUFOR as an opportunity to gain justification for its mission. Some EUPM personnel also considered that the “Programme Design” approach drew attention away from actual policing, such as focusing on organised crime, and gave EUFOR the chance to have a role.⁷⁶

The proactive role of EUFOR in fighting organised crime was to a large extent due to interpretation of the mandate. The first EUFOR Force Commander, Major-General Leakey, was encouraged by High Representative Javier Solana to emphasize EUFOR’s mission as distinct from that of SFOR. Fighting organised crime, which was originally intended to be a support task for EUFOR, thus became the military mission’s fundamental task. From the EUPM point of view, EUFOR was exceeding its mandate and its actions were interfering with the EUPM mandate. Because of the criticism EUFOR faced in relation to its operations, Major-General Leakey raised the issue before the PSC on many occasions, pointing out that the actions of EUFOR were in accordance with its mandate and taken for the improvement of the overall security situation.⁷⁷

Even though EUFOR was, according to their own interpretation, executing their task of supporting the fight against organised crime, the methods employed raised considerable criticism in the EUPM. The overall principle that in most Western European countries, organised crime is not usually fought with military force but by regular law enforcement agencies was frequently put forward by EUPM. This was also recognised by General Leakey, who regarded the antipathy to military engagement as originating “from the leadership downwards”⁷⁸. The other major cause for complaint was that even though it was EUPM’s task to monitor the performance of the local police, this was impossible owing to the fact that they were not informed about the local police’s operations with EUFOR. On many occasions EUPM received information about EUFOR’s operations from the local police, not directly from the military.⁷⁹

72 Interviews with former EUPM officials, 30 March 2007, 18 April 2007 & 6 June 2007. One factor that the EUPM HQ felt was affecting the performance of the EUSR was the American influence in the OHR, as the Americans did not fully support the creation of EUPM with the non-executive mandate. On this, see further Penksa 2006, and Potter 2005.

73 Interviews with former EUPM officials, 16 February 2007 & 6 June 2007.

74 Interviews with former EUPM officials, 16 February 2007 & 6 June 2007; Penksa 2006, 13.

75 Penksa 2006, 20. As Hansen (2002) points out, “the division of labour between the military and the police has been a source of debate throughout the history of civilian police contributions to peacekeeping.” Further on the military-police cooperation, see Hansen 2002.

76 Interviews in Sarajevo, May 2007.

77 Juncos 2007, 59; Kupferschmidt 2006, 18. Major-General Leakey also urged that the initiative had to come from Brussels and that the mandates had to be changed to adjust the roles of EUPM and EUFOR. Interview of a CIVCOM official, 12 March 2007.

78 Leakey 2006, 144.

79 Interviews with former EUPM officials, 16 February 2007 & 22 May 2007.

EUFOR's active participation in disrupting organised crime was also problematic with regard to the results of the operations. Even though EUFOR was in some cases able to apprehend persons suspected of criminal activity, the fact that the operations were not executed in compliance with the procedures required by local law in general nullified the results, as the evidence EUFOR had found could not be used in court. Relating to this, some EUPM personnel accused EUFOR of an excessively robust and visible appearance in the course of these operations, which aimed at promoting their publicity about taking action against the problems encountered. Another concern with the EUPM was that EUFOR was in fact doing the job of the locals, and thus crushing the idea of enhancing local ownership, promoted by the EUPM.⁸⁰

EUFOR conducted its operations throughout the mission area, in all the Task Forces and with almost all the operational assets in its possession. However, one specified asset of EUFOR, the Integrated Police Unit (IPU), was often used in this connection and thus became a source of discord between EUFOR and the EUPM. IPU is a Gendarmerie type of military police force, with a strength of approximately 500 troops, which functions under the Commander EUFOR and can be used throughout the country. The task of IPU is to provide support to maintaining a safe and secure environment, and it can also be used in civil disturbance operations and police-like operations, including investigations.⁸¹

Most of the criticism of IPU actions touched upon the manner in which IPU executed its actions aimed at organised crime. From the perspective of EUPM, IPU often conducted its operations without any prior notice to EUPM or the local authorities, and frequently employed an excessive amount of force.⁸² Rather surprisingly, such opinions were echoed even within EUFOR. From the military point of view, the significance of IPU was and is recognised, taking into account its capabilities and the task of EUFOR. However, in early 2005, some IPU operations took place without the Task Force commanders of being aware of them, which created problems within the organisation itself.⁸³

80 Interviews with former EUPM officials, 16 February 2007, 30 March 2007 & 22 May 2007.

81 IPU took over from its predecessor in SFOR, the Multinational Specialized Unit, MSU, which was seen as a useful type of asset also for EUFOR. However, deploying the IPU under EUFOR and creating a constabulary force – with executive powers – under military command raised considerable opposition among some of the member states. See further Juncos 2005, 5, and Hansen 2002, 70–73.

82 Interviews of former EUPM officials, 22 May 2007 & 1 August 2007.

83 Interviews of former EUFOR officers, 19 April 2007 & 25 April 2007; Interviews of former EUPM officials, 16 February 2007 & 18 April 2007. Another point that the interviewees, representing both former EUPM and former EUFOR personnel, brought out concerning the coordination of EUFOR activities in relation to tackling organised crime was that, especially in 2004 and 2005, some of the troops belonging to the Task Forces were not operating completely in line with the guidance from HQ EUFOR, but following their own agendas.

4.3 Field level interface

Examining cooperation and coordination between EU and ESDP actors at the tactical or field level means in practice examining relations between EUPM and EUFOR, the organisations that actually have a field presence.⁸⁴ Even though coordination and coherence at the top – in this case Sarajevo – level is crucial for the success of such missions, it is equally important how the actors in the field implement and interpret the guidance received from above. The severe difficulties faced by the organisations at the operational level must have been reflected at lower levels. On the other hand, actions in the field were a manifestation of the mission's policy and mandate, both towards the HQ level and also towards the local society, and consequently it was important for the operational level to be in control of these actions.

From the field level perspective, the change from SFOR to EUFOR was not too great, as EUFOR inherited its field structure from SFOR largely unchanged. Also most of the their shoulder badge.⁸⁵

Having been operational for almost two years before the deployment of EUFOR, EUPM had been able to create its connections and liaison towards SFOR and other actors on the ground. The EUPM headquarters had liaison officers posted to each of the Task Forces to guarantee close cooperation. However, immediately prior to EUFOR deployment, the EUPM Head of Mission at that time, Commissioner Kevin Carty, decided to withdraw the liaison officers from the Task Forces, leaving the liaison responsibility to the regional headquarters. The lack of organic liaison officers became apparent when EUFOR replaced SFOR, and in many cases the connection to EUPM regional and field offices was cut. As one member of a regional centre of EUPM stated, in some areas the relationship between EUPM and SFOR had been much better than that between EUPM and EUFOR, at least during the first year of their coexistence.⁸⁶

The lack of organic liaison between EUPM and EUFOR slowed down the creation of relationships in the field. When the responsibility to act as the focal point for EUFOR was left to the EUPM regional offices, which lacked direct guidance or instructions about how to perform this, it became purely a matter of each person's judgement how important this relationship was. In practice, this was interpreted as meaning that there was no direct obligation to liaise with EUFOR, which was then used as an excuse not to contact the military and

84 At the regional level, EUPM is represented by the regional headquarters and SIPA regional offices. At EUFOR regional level, until spring 2007 there were Task Forces and later on the Regional Coordination Centres (RCCs). At the field level, EUPM has local police co-location offices and Border Police field offices, while EUFOR is mainly represented by the Liaison and Observation Teams and, prior to the restructuring, also the Manoeuvre Battalions. In this context, both the regional and field levels are included when referring to field presence or coordination in the field.

85 Kupferschmidt 2006, 18.

86 Interviews with former EUPM officials, 26 March 2007 & 1 August 2007.

create a liaison structure. As there were no procedures, in many cases the relationship between EUPM and EUFOR started on a national basis. For this reason, relations between EUPM and EUFOR in the field varied greatly. In some areas the actors, despite or even because of the lack of guidance, were able to create good contacts and relationships with their counterparts and find local solutions to the problems.⁸⁷

In general, the EUPM was initially not very active towards EUFOR, as EUPM was engaged in various projects which in no way included EUFOR participation. Moreover, the fact that the organisations lacked a matching regional or field structure made it difficult to find the right counterpart. However, the need for coordination to extend to the field level became an issue when the same cooperation problems faced in Sarajevo also became apparent on the ground, as EUFOR pursued an active role against organised crime. The Task Forces and IPU were conducting their operations without informing the EUPM, who were mainly learning about these operations from the local police. IPU did take the initiative and contact the EUPM at the regional level, but only in order to gain information for their operations, not to provide information about them.⁸⁸

The LOTs are the primary EUFOR actors responsible for liaison with EUPM at the field level. In addition to observing and maintaining situational awareness, the tasks of the LOTs include contacting the local authorities, inter alia, the local police, customs officials and Border Police. After EUFOR deployment, LOTs were directly contacting the local police and other local authorities, which in some areas irritated the local EUPM office, as they saw contact with the local authorities as exclusively their responsibility. In order to solve this problem, different local solutions were implemented. In some cases, LOTs were able to contact local police freely, informing EUPM only about possible operations which included the local police.⁸⁹

What created confusion among the local police and EUPM was the fact that the LOTs were not the only representatives of EUFOR who were directly contacting the local authorities. Even though it was the responsibility of the LOTs to maintain liaison and in this way coordinate EUFOR actions in the field, the Manoeuvre Battalion and IPU were also active in contacting local authorities. A frequent occurrence, for example, was that after an incident, the local Chief of Police would receive visitors from the LOT, the Manoeuvre Battalion and possibly the IPU, all wearing the same EU flag but asking one after another the same questions.⁹⁰

From the point of view of EU coherence in Bosnia and Herzegovina, almost the entire first year of coexistence of EUFOR and EUPM was characterized by the controversies in relation to the mandates and tasks of the missions. In addition to the conflicting mandates, there were some personal clashes

at the top level which were also reflected in the cooperation. Even though the actors were operating under the same flag, there was no actual planned coordination between the missions. The role of the EUSR in mediating the disputes was relatively small in the early phase, but increased in the final months of 2005.⁹¹ In this respect it can be said that the EUSR was unable to act according to the mandate to "contribute to reinforcement of internal EU coordination and coherence in BiH."

4.4 From Seven Principles to Common Operational Guidelines

As the difficulties in the cooperation and delineation of tasks with regard to fighting organised crime became ever more apparent, and appropriate mechanisms from the Brussels end were still lacking, the actors themselves took the initiative to improve the situation. The leading mission in this respect was EUPM, for whom the situation at that time was the least satisfactory. In September 2005 EUPM, EUFOR and EUSR agreed on the documents *Seven Principles and Guidelines for Increasing Co-operation between EUPM-EUFOR and EUSR*.⁹²

According to these documents, the organisations agreed on strengthening their complementary and coordinative roles in tackling organised crime, and that the EUSR would take responsibility for the overall coordination. To this end, the EUSR established a new body under EUSR chairmanship, the Crime Strategy Working Group, to ensure the coordination of EU-ESDP actors in support of the local authorities' fight against organised crime and corruption. EUPM and EUFOR were also to participate in the Working Group. The agreement gave EUPM the leading role in coordinating policing activities in the country by monitoring and mentoring the planning of counter-organised-crime operations. EUFOR was to change its role from a proactive to a clearly support role and align its operations with EUPM. The aim was to enhance local authorities' initiative in tackling organised crime and request operational support from EUFOR if necessary, but with EUPM assessing the need for assistance.⁹³

Agreement on the Seven Principles was the first official step towards delineation of the tasks of the organisations. These principles were reaffirmed in the revised mandates for both EUSR and EUPM in November 2005, thus confirming the roles.⁹⁴ Even though the revised mandates now included modalities and defined tasks for EUPM and EUFOR at the operational level, implementing the new practices at both operational and field levels demanded time and effort, and in practice the change did not happen overnight. EUPM was also busy finalising their programmes and projects as the mandate was ending by the end of 2005, which meant that the Seven Principles became effective at the field level only during the

87 Interviews in Sarajevo, May 2007; Interviews with former EUFOR officers, 19 April 2007 & 5 June 2007; Interview with former EUPM official, 1 August 2007.

88 Interview with former EUPM official, 1 August 2007.

89 Interviews with former EUPM officials, 26 March 2007, 1 August 2007; Interview with former EUFOR officer, 7 June 2007.

90 Interview with a former EUFOR officer, 7 June 2007.

91 Interview with a former EUFOR officer, 5 June 2007.

92 Juncos 2007, 60; Interviews in Sarajevo, May 2007.

93 Juncos 2007, 61; Penksa 2006, 20–21; Interviews in Sarajevo, May 2007.

94 Council Joint Action 2005/824/CFSP; Council Joint Action 2005/825/CFSP.

next mandate, starting in 2006. The principles created no clear structures for liaison and coordination as such, and the cooperation between EUPM and EUFOR at the field level continued to depend greatly on personalities.⁹⁵

The implementation of the Seven Principles and the revised EUPM mandate in the field again varied in different regional and field offices. In certain areas, EUFOR LOTS were able to maintain their liaison and continue their activities with the local authorities in the same way as before, as the guidance from EUPM did not actually change. Some problems occurred, however, concerning the instructions the local police had received from EUPM. These instructions were in some cases interpreted as meaning that the local police were not permitted to deal with EUFOR without first consulting with EUPM. As a result, the local police on the basis of these instructions refused to meet representatives of EUFOR and urged them to contact EUPM for permission. These situations were corrected through coordination with EUPM at the regional level and, at least in the area in question, the procedure that was followed concerning the relationship between EUFOR and local authorities before the Seven Principles remained the same.⁹⁶

Reflecting the need to further clarify and even detail cooperation and coordination, EUFOR and EUPM agreed on *Common operational guidelines for EUPM – EUFOR support to the fight against organised crime* in May 2006. The guidelines specified the procedures and methods to be used in cases of EUFOR support to local law enforcement agencies. In order to promote local ownership and at the same time reduce the need for EUFOR engagement, the support from EUFOR to local police was restricted to those cases in which the local police lack the capacity, or the confidence to use the existing capacity, and the need for EUFOR assets is determined to be essential by EUPM.⁹⁷

A significant change in comparison with the earlier Seven Principles was the inclusion of cooperation at tactical level under the Guidelines, a solution that was more than necessary to ensure that the improved coordination and cooperation between the missions on the HQ level would also reach the actors on the field level, that is, EUPM and EUFOR. Implementing the Guidelines naturally caused some problems, especially within EUFOR, but as confirmation that the Guidelines were found to be mutually beneficial, when the agreement was jointly reviewed by the actors in October 2006 and again during autumn 2007, only slight changes to the agreed practices resulted. The Guidelines will be updated again in spring 2008, following the renewed mission of EUPM.⁹⁸

4.5 Cooperation and coordination at the present time

All the actors involved in the creation of the Common Operational Guidelines emphasize the current good coordination and cooperation between the EUSR, EUPM and EUFOR, three years after the beginning of the coexistence of the missions. It is similarly emphasised that the improved coherence is largely due to the Guidelines that now regulate the relationships. Especially from the point of view of EUPM, their relation with EUFOR has been continually improving since spring 2006, after the Guidelines were first signed.⁹⁹

A practical example of improved coordination is the use of EUFOR assets in support of the local authorities, which used to be one of the critical points. EUPM assesses the need for support and makes the request to EUFOR, which then decides whether it will provide the support or not. The supporting unit then coordinates its actions directly with EUPM and local police. The Integrated Police Unit, IPU, is often used in this context as it possesses, for example, technical resources that local police forces lack.¹⁰⁰

The use of IPU, which previously caused problems, especially between EUPM and EUFOR, has also been regulated under the Guidelines and is now quite widely accepted as functional. When operating under the EU flag, IPU actions are coordinated and in line with the guidance from EUPM. On the other hand, IPU has also performed operations under NATO command; in these cases IPU is not bound by the Common Operational Guidelines. Nevertheless, IPU operations are no longer an issue.¹⁰¹

Moreover, the coordination structures between the missions have evolved and are now regarded as quite comprehensive. At the Heads of Missions level, the Board of Principals, a weekly coordination meeting chaired by the OHR, brings together the most significant international organisations in Bosnia. For EU operations, the EU Heads of Missions weekly meeting should coordinate the actions of the missions and of the EU Presidency, which generally chairs the meeting. The EUSR usually holds an additional EU Heads of Missions meeting once a month for a briefing on prevailing key issues.¹⁰²

On the lower level, there are several regular meetings. The weekly ESDP meeting gathers together the senior political and media advisers of the entire "EU family". The ESDP meeting is chaired by the Head of EUSR's Political Department and covers key political events and developments, common policies, police and media issues. The same organisations meet again in the INFO OPS Working Group, which, under the EUSR's Head of Communications, convenes to discuss the press and media functions. In the fight against organised crime, the most important meeting is the bi-weekly EU Coordination Board (the former EU Targeting Board), at which EUPM, EUFOR, EUSR, and the State Prosecutor's Office define concrete targets

95 Interviews in Sarajevo, May 2007; Interview with a former EUPM official, 1 August 2007.

96 Reflecting the author's own experience between 1.12.2005–1.6.2006.

97 The Council of the European Union 8900/07; Juncos 2007, 61; Penksa 2006, 20–21; Interviews in Sarajevo, May 2007.

98 Email interview with EUPM official, 28 November 2007.

99 Interviews in Sarajevo, May 2007.

100 Interviews in Sarajevo, May 2007; Interview with a former EUPM official, 15 May 2007.

101 Interviews in Sarajevo, May 2007.

102 Ibid.

in tackling organised crime. Different sections of the missions also convene on an ad hoc basis, whenever the need requires.

The liaison arrangements between the missions have become closer over the past year. Both EUPM and EUFOR have their representation at the EUSR morning meetings. Respectively, the Politico-Military Officer from EUSR attends the weekly EUFOR Chief of Staff and Commander's Update meetings, and one of the political advisers participates in the two weekly executive meetings at EUPM. The EUPM Liaison Officer also attends EUFOR Chief of Staff meetings, while the EUFOR Liaison Officer is present at appropriate meetings at EUPM.

With the above mentioned coordination and liaison structures in place, it was stated by interviewees of all the missions that the regular contacts between EUPM, EUFOR and EUSR are on a good level. It was also commonly noted that with more structured coordination, the end result might actually deteriorate, because merely sitting in a meeting or having a liaison officer from another mission does not equal coordination. It is also noticeable that cooperation makes sense only up to a certain point: all of the existing procedures need to have a purpose, and the aim of the cooperation and coordination is practical, deriving from the actual need.¹⁰³

Even though the relations between the missions in the headquarters level have significantly improved during the three years of coexistence, the level of cooperation and coordination in the field still varies considerably. The Common Operational Guidelines have in many areas been successfully passed on down to the regional and field levels of EUFOR¹⁰⁴, in practice the Regional Coordination Centres and the LOTs, at least concerning the present delineation of tasks. This means that EUFOR LOT personnel in the field have accepted the fact that EUPM has the leading role with respect to organised crime. Implementing the Guidelines has, on the other hand, caused some misunderstanding between the missions, as the instructions for EUFOR LOTs on how to deal with local authorities have varied. For instance, in some areas all direct LOT contacts with local police must first be approved by EUPM.¹⁰⁵

The EUPM policy towards coordination and cooperation on the field level very much depends on their own interests. The aim of the EUPM is to act according to its mandate and, by coordination with the other actors in the field, to seek to prevent others from interfering with its mission and mandate. Some interviewees actually give their opinion that "EUPM officers should focus on other things in the field than cooperation with the LOT Houses".¹⁰⁶ Also from the point of view of EUFOR, the focus of EUPM on the field level has shifted almost exclusively towards tackling organised crime, which leaves fewer issues to be coordinated between EUPM and EUFOR on that level. In many cases, the coordination and cooperation between EUPM and EUFOR is limited to occasional sharing of information and social calls, as EUPM personnel are unable to share information on most of their activities. In areas where there is no EUPM presence, the relationship is even more distant.¹⁰⁷

The status of the EUSR in coordinating the activities of both EUPM and EUFOR has become more significant, especially with the revised mandate and the ability to provide EUFOR with political guidance. However, the fact of the EUSR giving political guidance to EUFOR does not actually change the status quo because of the existing close relations, and in practice these arrangements have already existed for some time. The mandate confirmed the position of the EUSR as 'convener' for coordination arrangements that are already in place. Also the role of the EUSR in relation to the criminal justice/police interface and to developing and monitoring the prosecutorial system was affirmed, to which end the cooperation with the EUPM has also become closer.¹⁰⁸

Regarding the future prospects of the coordination and cooperation between the different EU actors in Bosnia, many of the informants stated that the challenge no longer concerns inter-ESDP relations, but the relations between ESDP missions and the Commission Delegation. Combining or co-locating the EUSR and EC Delegation offices seems to be the natural step forward, which the structures and personnel in Sarajevo are more ready and willing to take than Brussels. The decisions concerning the OHR also affect the coordination between the EU actors in the future, as "the longer OHR continues, the less the EUSR develops".¹⁰⁹

103 Interviews in Sarajevo, May 2007.

104 When referring to present field presence of EUFOR, the random sample of the study only covers the area of operations Regional Coordination Centre 4, the North-East corner of the country.

105 Interviews with EUFOR officers, May 2007.

106 Interviews in Sarajevo, May 2007.

107 Interviews with EUFOR officers, May 2007.

108 "Council Joint Action 2007/748/CFSP"; Interviews in Sarajevo, May 2007.

109 Interviews in Sarajevo, May 2007.

5 Conclusion

The improvement of cooperation and coordination between the EU-ESDP missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been a process of learning by doing. In the first phase, the differences between the missions were mainly related to differing interpretations of the mission mandates, both within EUPM and EUFOR. The mandates were broad and overlapping, giving both organisations a role in fighting the organised crime that emerged as the critical issue between EUPM and EUFOR. In addition, some conflicting personalities within the missions created a situation in which there was very little or no coordination of operations.

One lesson which has been identified is that the mission mandates need to be sufficiently clear and precise to be able to provide an undisputed delineation of tasks. However it has been observed, especially by the political elements of the missions, that the mandates should be broad enough to leave some room for action by the Heads of Missions on the operational level. Having clear mandates would in this respect also enable the Heads of Missions to concentrate on leading their own organisations, instead of having to create their own mission.

Another factor that has been identified is that initially the mandates took insufficiently into account the need for structures and modalities for coordination. There were some rather general directions concerning how to coordinate the EU-ESDP activities, but in practice there were neither clear structures nor guidelines for coordination and liaison, nor clear delineation of tasks between the missions. It very soon became evident that when left solely up to the will of the actors to liaise and coordinate their activities, the cooperation and coordination were inadequate and highly dependent on personalities and personal contacts. This was the main issue on the regional and field levels.

Clear structures for coordination of the activities and cooperation between the missions are required. If such structures are not included at the mandate level, then mutually approved procedures, for instance, would reduce the chances of overlapping or conflicting actions. The need for such structures is first encountered and responded to by the actors in the field, but the creation of structures and modalities for cooperation should already have been taken into account at the strategic

level before mission deployment. The implementation of clear structures would also mean clearly defined responsibilities for the actors in the field to liaise with other organisations. Naturally it is every mission member's task to cooperate with the other actors when required, but having clearly defined responsibilities would ensure better fulfilment of the task of liaison and cooperation.

According to the mandates of the ESDP missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is the EUSR's responsibility to coordinate the ESDP activities in the theatre. In the beginning, the EUSR was in no position to execute his mandate, mainly due to the lack of capacity or willingness to do so. As the mandate of the EUSR was quite extensive from the beginning, there were many expectations for the EUSR to implement the coordination function when the problems in the field became obvious. The functions of the OHR were, however, clearly the primary task for the EUSR/OHR, and in this sense double-hatting the OHR has not been a successful solution. The EUSR clearly needs full operational capability to be able to act in accordance with the role of the coordinator of ESDP missions, and to this end the EUSR's position needs to be strengthened. OHR, and in this sense double-hatting the OHR has not been a successful solution. The EUSR clearly needs full operational capability to be able to act in accordance with the role of the coordinator of ESDP missions, and to this end the EUSR's position needs to be strengthened.

One of the factors that have been identified as having hindered cooperation was poor knowledge of the other actors and their mission, especially at the field level interface. As the mandate and mission of the counterparts were unclear, it was hard to find common ground for cooperation. The missions have step-by-step increased the training given to their personnel, one of the aims of which is to enhance the knowledge of other actors in the field. In this respect, the situation has already improved since the beginning. One solution to further systematize the training would be to introduce common induction training for key ESDP personnel, in which the EUSR could take the leading role. In connection with improving preparedness to liaise and interact with other organisations, the need to increase training of civil-military relations in the pre-mission training has also been acknowledged.

The creation of the Seven Principles and later on the Common Operational Guidelines is a good example of how building up the cooperation and coordination is a never-ending process. The case of Bosnia, where the actors in the field were compelled to initiate such a process, also revealed the inability of the EU structures at that time to react promptly to the problems. This inability also becomes evident when the changes in the mandates of the missions are examined; every time, these changes seem to reflect the procedures and structures that the missions have already adopted or that already exist in the field, which means that the practice is guiding the mandates, rather than the other way around.

With the Common Operational Guidelines, the missions have mutually agreed on the delineation of tasks and coordination structures that now regulate their interactions. Because of these procedures and structures, coordination and cooperation between the EUSR, EUPM and EUFOR on the operational level in Sarajevo has improved over the past year and a half. At the regional and field level, the tactical level, the cooperation and coordination have also improved owing to the guidance the field presence receives from above. As each mission's tasks differ significantly, the need to cooperate in their field activities is not as imperative as at the operational level. From the point of view of speaking with one EU voice, however, a certain amount of coordination and cooperation is required.

Even though the relations and cooperation between the missions have improved and are considered good, this does not imply that there is no room for further improvement. Even though the missions operate under the same EU flag and same policy, nevertheless certain handicaps, such as national agendas, conflicting personalities, language problems, different nationalities and cultural background, are factors that have to be taken into consideration in the cooperation, as with any other international organisation or mission. However, the EU is in a unique position to develop its capacities in crisis management, as many of these handicaps seem to be less apparent owing to the relatively united approach of the EU missions.

Bosnia and Herzegovina has sometimes been referred to as a 'testing ground' for the ESDP, from the point of view of planning and coordinating the different EU crisis management instruments. After a rocky start, numerous lessons have been identified, and some even learnt, in developing EU crisis management in general. With regard to the coherence and coordination of civilian and military crisis management, the next great challenge for the EU lies in Kosovo, where the cooperation between the future EULEX Kosovo mission and NATO-led KFOR is one of the key issues. This challenge has been taken seriously, and the actors involved have already agreed on the guiding principles for their cooperation and mutual interactions. It remains to be seen how effectively these guidelines will be implemented on the ground. As the tasks of the missions are significantly different, the issue this time should not be the coordination of activities in the field, but rather reinforcing a credible and united international presence in Kosovo.

References

Interviews

- Interview of a former EUPM official, 16 February 2007, recorded.
- Interview of a CIVCOM official, 12 March 2007, recorded.
- Interview of a former EUMM and EUPM official, 26 March 2007, recorded.
- Interview of a former EUPM official, 30 March 2007, notes.
- Interview of a former EUPM official, 18 April 2007, recorded.
- Interview of a former EUFOR officer, 19 April 2007, recorded.
- Interview of a former EUFOR officer, 25 April 2007, recorded.
- Interview of a EUSR official, 15 May 2007, recorded.
- Interview of a former EUPM official, 15 May 2007, recorded.
- Interview of a EUSR official, 15 May 2007, recorded.
- Interview of a EUSR official, 15 May 2007, recorded.
- Interview of a EUSR official, 15 May 2007, recorded.
- Interview of a EUPM official, 17 May 2007, recorded.
- Interview of a EUPM official, 17 May 2007, recorded.
- Interview of a EUPM official, 17 May 2007, recorded.
- Interview of a EUPM official, 17 May 2007, email interview 28 November 2007, recorded.
- Interview of a EUSR official, 18 May 2007, recorded.
- Interview of a EUSR official, 18 May 2007, recorded.
- Interview of a EUSR official, 18 May 2007, recorded.
- Interview of a EUFOR officer, 19 May 2007, notes.
- Interview of a EUFOR officer, 19 May 2007, notes.
- Interview of a EUFOR officer, 20 May 2007, notes.
- Interview of a EUFOR officer, 20 May 2007, notes.
- Interview of a EUFOR officer, 21 May 2007, notes.
- Interview of a EUFOR officer, 21 May 2007, notes.
- Interview of a EUFOR official, 22 May 2007, recorded.

Interview of a EUSR official, 22 May 2007, recorded.

Interview of a EUMM official, 22 May 2007, notes.

Interview of a former EUPM and EUSR official, 22 May 2007, recorded.

Interview of a former EUFOR officer, 5 June 2007.

Interview of a former EUFOR official, 5 June 2007.

Telephone interview of a former EUPM official, 6 June 2007, recorded.

Interview of a former EUFOR officer, 7 June 2007, recorded.

Interview of a former EUPM official, 19 June 2007, recorded.

Interview of a former EUPM official, 1 August 2007, recorded.

Email interview of a former EUFOR official, 28 November 2007.

All the notes and recordings are in the possession of the author at the CMC Finland.

Official Documents

Council of the European Union

"Council conclusions on International Police Task Force (IPTF) Follow-on", 18/19.2.2002.

The Council of the European Union 8900/07: *European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina six-monthly review report*, Brussels 3 May 2007.

"Council Joint Action 2000/811/CFSP of 22 December 2000 on the European Union Monitoring Mission". *Official Journal of the European Communities*, L328, 23 December, 53–54.

"Council Joint Action 2002/210/CFSP of 11 March 2002 on the European Union Police Mission". *Official Journal of the European Communities*, L70, 13 March, 1–6.

"Council Joint Action 2002/211/CFSP of 11 March 2002 on the appointment of the EU Special Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina". *Official Journal of the European Communities*, L70, 13 March, 7.

"Council Joint Action 2002/569/CFSP of 12 July 2004 on the mandate of the European Union Special Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina and repealing Council Joint Action 2002/211/CFSP", *Official Journal of the European Communities*, L252, 28 July, p. 7–9.

"Council Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP of 12 July 2004 on the European Union military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina". *Official Journal of the European Communities*, L252, 28 July, 10–14.

"Council Joint Action 2006/49/CFSP of 30 January 2006 appointing the European Union Special Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina". *Official Journal of the European Communities*, L26, 31 January, 21–23.

"Council Joint Action 2006/523/CFSP of 25 July 2006 amending the mandate of the European Union Special Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina". *Official Journal of the European Communities*, L205, 27 July, 30.

"Council Joint Action 2006/867/CFSP of 30 November 2006 extending and amending the mandate of the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM)". *Official Journal of the European Communities*, L335, 1 December, 48–49.

"Council Joint Action 2007/87/CFSP of 7 February 2007 amending and extending the mandate of the European Union Special Representative in BiH". *Official Journal of the European Communities*, L35, 8 February, 35–38.

"Council Joint Action 2007/748/CFSP of 19 November 2007 amending Joint Action 2007/87/CFSP amending and extending the mandate of the European Union Special Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina". *Official*

Journal of the European Communities, L303, 21 November, 38–39.

“Council Joint Action 2007/749/CFSP of 19 November 2007 on the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)”. *Official Journal of the European Communities*, L303, 21 November, 40–44.

“Council Decision 2007/427/CFSP of 18 June 2007 appointing the European Union Special Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina”. *Official Journal of the European Communities*, L159, 20 June, 63–64.

“Operation ALTHEA”, *Quarterly Report to the United Nations, Council of the European Union*, Brussels, 3 July 2007.

Presidency Conclusions, Copenhagen European Council 12 and 13 December 2002, Council of the European Union, Brussels 29 January 2003.

Presidency Report on ESDP, 10910/07, Brussels 18 June 2007.

Other Documents

Communiqué by the PIC Steering Board, February 27, 2007. http://www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id=39236, read on March 6, 2007.

ESS (2003): *European Security Strategy*, Brussels, 12 December 2003.

ESS – BiH (2004): *European Security Strategy – Bosnia and Herzegovina/Comprehensive Policy*, 18 June 2004.

EUPM Mission Mag. No 28, 11.10.2007, Sarajevo.

EUSR Organisation Chart, October 2007, Sarajevo.

General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

ICG (2001): “No Early Exit: NATO’s Continuing Challenge in Bosnia”. *International Crisis Group (ICG) Europe Report*, No, 110, 22 May 2001.

ICG (2004): “EUFOR-IA: Changing Bosnia’s Security Arrangements”. *ICG Europe Briefing*, 29 June 2004.

NATO (2001): MC 411/1. *NATO Military Policy on Civil-Military Co-operation*. Military Council, Brussels.

Report to the European Parliament by the OHR and EU Special Representative for BiH, January-June 2003.

Report to the European Parliament by the OHR and EU Special Representative for BiH, February 2006-June 2006, published on September 11, 2006.

Summary of the Report by Javier Solana, EU High Representative for CFSP, on a *Possible EU Deployment in BiH*, 23 February 2004.

UN DPKO (2002): *Civil-Military Co-ordination Policy*. UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations, New York, September 2002.

UN OCHA (2003): *Guidelines on the use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies*. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Geneva, March 2004.

UN Security Council (2007): *Resolution 1785*. Adopted by the Security Council at its 5782nd meeting, on 21 November 2007.

Bibliography

- Collantes Celador, Gemma (2007): "The European Union Police Mission: The Beginning of a New Future for Bosnia and Herzegovina?" *IBEI Working Papers*, 2007/9.
- de Coning, Cedric (2007): "Civil-Military Coordination Practices and Approaches within United Nations Peace Operations". *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies*, Fall 2007, Vol. 10, Issue.
- de Coning, Cedric (2006): "Civil-Military Co-ordination and UN Peacebuilding Operations". *International Peacekeeping: The Yearbook of International Peace Operations*, Vol. 11.
- Hansen, Annika S. (2002): "From Congo to Kosovo: Civilian Police in Peace Operations". *Adelphi Paper 343*. Oxford University Press & International Institute for Strategic Studies.
- Juncos, Ana E. (2007): "Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina". In Michael Emerson & Eva Gross (eds.) *Evaluating the EU's Crisis Missions in the Balkans*. Centre for European Policy Studies, 2007.
- Juncos, Ana E. (2006): "Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Testing Ground for the ESDP?" *CFSP Forum*, Vol. 4, No. 3, 5.
- Khol, Radek (2006): "Civil-Military Co-ordination in EU crisis management". In Nowak A. (ed.) *Civilian Crisis Management: the EU way*. Chaillot Paper No. 90, June 2006, 123–138.
- Kristoffersen, Lene (2006): "Soldiers or Saints? Norwegian Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) in Afghanistan". *IFS INFO 5/2006*. Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies.
- Kupferschmidt, Frank (2006): "Putting Strategic Partnership to the Test – Cooperation Between NATO and the EU in Operation Althea". *SWP Research Paper*, RP 3, April 2006, Berlin.
- Leakey, David (2006): "Lessons on the ESDP and civil/military cooperation – Bosnia and Herzegovina" In *Faster and more united? The debate about Europe's crisis response capacity*. European Communities 2006, Luxembourg.
- Leinonen, Mika-Markus (2006): "Strengths and Weaknesses of EU Civilian Crisis Management". In Senja Korhonen and Johanna Sumuvuori (eds.) *From Conflict to Development – An Introduction to EU Civilian Crisis Management*. Jyväskylä.
- Penksa, Susan E. (2006): "Policing Bosnia and Herzegovina 2003 – 05. Issues of Mandates and Management in ESDP Missions". *CEPS Working Document* No. 255/December 2006.
- Potter, William C. (2005): *A Bosnian Diary – A Floridian's Experience in Nation Building*. The Florida Historical Society Press.
- Pullinger, Stephen (2006): *Developing EU Civil Military Co-ordination: The Role of the new Civilian Military Cell*. Joint Report by ISIS Europe and CeMiSS, Brussels, June 2006.
- Rehse, Peter (2004): "CIMIC: Concepts, Definitions and Practice". *IFSH Heft 136*. IFSH Hamburg, June 2004.
- Solana, Javier (2007): Address by Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, at the European Security and Defence Policy Conference "From Cologne to Berlin and beyond – Operations, institutions and capabilities", Berlin, 29 January 2007.

Recruitment and Training in Civilian Crisis Management Learning from the ECMM/EUMM Experiences

Olivia Šetkić

Monitoring is one of the European Union's civilian crisis management priority areas. This article contributes to the discussion of the quality of international mission personnel by examining the personnel serving the European Community Monitor Mission (ECMM) and its successor, the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM). Research results are mainly based on interviews of monitors and they highlight the lessons learned of the ECMM/EUMM experience. In general, the training and recruitment recommendations given in this article provide valuable tools to all those engaged in planning and assessing European Union Security and Defence Policy's monitoring missions.¹

¹ This article was finished in February 2008.

1 Introduction

The fall of Yugoslavia with the subsequent wars in the heart of Europe have acted as a catalyst for the European Union to develop and strengthen its role as an actor and its involvement in crisis management.² Following the EU's identification of its four initial priority areas³ within civilian crisis management at the European Council of Feira in 2000, an agreement was reached to make available a certain number of experts for each of these priority areas. This list of priorities was prolonged with two additions in 2004, namely monitoring and support for the EU Special Representative.⁴ Adding monitoring as an EU priority area has been claimed to be a consequence of the success of the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM).⁵

As the quantity of available experts was achieved, and even exceeded already in 2002⁶, the discussion came to focus increasingly on the *quality* of experts. The training centres that have been set up in several European states to provide experts with civilian crisis management training is an attempt to improve the quality of staff seconded to missions.

This article contributes to the discussion of the quality of international mission personnel by examining the personnel serving the European Community Monitor Mission (ECMM) and its successor, the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM). After introducing the mission in section two, the article continues by describing the recruitments (chapter three) made by some seconding nations, followed by a description of whatever training has been available for the future mission members by their seconding nations on the one hand, and by the mission itself on the other hand (section four). Both sections three and four highlight some factors challenging the recruitment and making the training less than comprehensive. Section five is based on the interviewees' reflections on the performance in the field, whereas section six gives a list of

recommendations based on identified shortcomings in the recruitment, training and performance of ECMM/EUMM monitors.

The article is based on facts, views and opinions as expressed by 50 informants, who can be divided into the following three categories:

- recruitment and/or training officers (11),
- mission personnel (31) consisting of
 - six Heads of ECMM/EUMM,
 - 24 active and former (at the time of the collection of data) ECMM/EUMM monitors, one former ECMM interpreter,
- representatives of the recipient of the ECMM and the EUMM reports (8) including
 - Western Balkans Desk officers at their respective ministries for foreign affairs,
 - embassies in the EUMM area of responsibility,
 - one representative to the EU Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management, CivCom.

The same informant may represent two different categories, in which case he/she has been listed according to where most emphasis of the interview has been placed. Active monitors were interviewed in the EUMM headquarters, with the exception of one telephone interview. In all cases but one had they previously been assigned to teams as field monitors. Several of the interviewed monitors had served the ECMM or the EUMM on more than one occasion.

Whenever possible, respondents were interviewed in person, in which case the interview was recorded on tape (with one exception), and later transcribed into written text for analysis. If this was not feasible, the interview was conducted by telephone, with due notes taken. In other cases responses were collected by a questionnaire via email, with possible follow-up questions made when applicable. Informants will not be identified as most chose to remain anonymous, and in a few cases due to the frequent rotation of recruiting personnel, the actual informant has in fact relied only on forwarded

2 See, for example, Langinvainio 2006.

3 The initial four EU priority areas within civilian crisis management were Police, Rule of Law, Civilian Administration and Civil Protection, as identified in the Santa Maria da Feira European Council, 19 and 20 June 2000, Presidency conclusions.

4 Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of ESDP 2004, 4 & 6.

5 Brief guide to the European Security and Defence Policy 2005, 37.

6 Solana 2002.

information as to how things have been done previously, but not done any recruiting for ECMM or EUMM in person.⁷

All the interviews were conducted and questionnaires collected between February and December 2007. The respondents represent eleven different participating nations of the ECMM/EUMM, with emphasis given to countries seconding civilians and one interpreter locally employed in the mission area.

The writer's own experience of serving the ECMM has been stated to the informants, and this insight into the mission is also reflected in this article.

A restriction in the research has been that with the EUMM reports being classified material, they have not been made available for review for this article. Neither have the ECMM presidency reports nor the EUMM annual reports from the past years been available as source material.

⁷ All source material collected is archived at the Crisis Management Centre Finland, Kuopio.

2 The European Union Monitoring Mission

2.1 *The development from ECMM to EUMM*

The European Community Monitor Mission was inaugurated in Slovenia in 1991 in accordance with the Brioni Declaration.⁸ The first concrete objective was to monitor the withdrawal of the Yugoslav Peoples' Army from Slovenia through Croatia to Serbia. The mission was set up to give the European Community speedy and unaltered information about the developments in the region from a reliable source, something which the embassies being located in Belgrade were unable to do.

After the commencing of activities, the mission actively monitored the developments of the 1990s, which led *inter alia* to the declaration of independence of five ex-Yugoslav republics, to the wars in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina which eventually led to the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords in December 1995, as well as the mass exodus from Kosovo in 1999, the NATO bombings in Serbia and Montenegro, and the post-conflict rebuilding of society up to late 2000. The monitoring continued for another seven years, but as a result of the Council Joint Action, and to emphasise how the mission was perceived as part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the mission changed its name to the European Union Monitoring Mission⁹. After 16.5 years of operation, the EUMM was finally dissolved at the end of 2007, on the very eve of the Kosovo Status decision.¹⁰

As the circumstances under which the mission operated changed significantly, the mission had to change its *raison d'être*. The focus of the mission shifted over the years, and the geographical coverage decreased a number of times. The number of international staff deployed varied from an initial 30 to a maximum of 420 monitors in 1996–1997, and nearing the closure of the mission in 2007 down to less than 60 monitors. With the number of monitors on the field shifting according to the degree of relative stability, the level of monitoring coverage focused either on local politics or on higher levels of politics. By so doing, the mission managed to respond to

the changing needs of the EU and the states participating in the mission¹¹, and the operation got new extensions annually. These extensions were not, however, automatic, as pointed out by one informant, but rather the result of long and heated discussions.

2.2 *The EUMM mandate*

The last Council Joint Action regarding the EUMM of 30 November 2006, which extended and amended the mandate of the EUMM, stated that the mission shall:

- *monitor political and security developments in the area of its responsibility, with a particular focus on Kosovo and Serbia, and neighbouring regions that might be affected by any adverse developments in Kosovo;*
- *give particular attention to border monitoring, inter-ethnic issues and refugee return;*
- *provide analytical reports on the basis of tasking received;*
- *contribute to the early warning of the Council and the confidence building, in the context of the policy of stabilization conducted by the Union in the Region.*

*The Council may also initiate specific tasking in co-ordination with the Secretary General/High Representative and in consultation with the Commission.*¹²

Successfully implementing these tasks by giving background information and up-to-date information and analysis about trends in the region, the EUMM was to contribute to the formulation of a common EU policy towards the region. The reports went simultaneously to Brussels and to the capitals of all participating nations.

Although not explicitly written in the EUMM mandate, one feature of any monitoring mission is seen to be to show the EU flag in the region¹³. More importantly, it is stated how the

8 Brijunska deklaracija 1991.

9 Council Joint Action 2000/811/CFSP.

10 Council Joint Action 2006/867/CFSP.

11 Except for the Member States of EU, Slovakia (before becoming an EU member) and Norway.

12 Council Joint Action 2006/867/CFSP, 1.

13 Concept for EU Monitoring Missions 2003, 6.

mere presence tends to lower tensions, as people do not feel neglected or forgotten.¹⁴ The importance of these features have, nevertheless, decreased on the one hand as the region has achieved relative stability, and on the other hand as the EU has increased its representation and presence by other means.

2.3 *The EUMM methodology*

The method which EUMM utilised was to deploy field teams of at least two international monitors representing different nationalities to cover a given geographical area of responsibility. The teams also consisted of a local, EUMM-affiliated interpreter. The teams had significant freedom in planning their activities and in choosing their interlocutors themselves, as long as they operated within the mission mandate.

The recommendations were for a team to conduct two meetings a day.¹⁵ These meetings were the principal way information was collected. Due to the form in which these meetings were conducted, and their anticipated outcome, it would be more appropriate to refer to them as interviews. The team would have prepared questions for the meeting, focusing on some particular area of interest that was in line with the team's short-term and strategic long-term plan for monitoring.

After the meetings, the team returned to their team site to analyse the gathered material and to write a short daily report about the most significant findings. The accuracy of controversial, if not all, material, should ideally have been verified from different sources. It would be fair to say that the core of the daily tasks thus resembled investigative journalism.

Once the report was finalised by the team, it was forwarded to the mission headquarters in Sarajevo. The headquarters used the reports of the mission's entire area of responsibility as the bulk of information that it analysed and from which it compiled an assessment, which was then forwarded to Brussels and to the capitals of the participating states on a weekly (previously daily) basis. The reports on the local level were also forwarded to other international players on the ground as well as to the embassies representing the participating states. In addition to the daily reports, the teams also produced speedy incident reports, more analytical special reports and weekly assessments.

The teams not only finalised their reports at the team site, a rented house among the local population, but most often also used it for accommodation. This feature meant that being an EUMM monitor did not only equal having a day job in a post-conflict region, but being attracted to such a way of living would call for certain life values. Although circumstances during the EUMM time were not harsh, they would be unusual and different from what the monitor was used to in his or her respective home country.

For most of the mission, the monitors would have worn a white uniform with visible EU insignia, with some regional exceptions to this practice. All monitors were unarmed throughout the mission.

Although EUMM officially was a civilian mission, it is interesting to note that mission personnel with a civilian background, Heads of Mission included, tended to describe the mission as mostly a military one, with some civilian elements. Mission staff with a military background, however, described the mission as civilian, unmilitary, or even antimilitary.

2.4 *The EUMM List of Qualifications*

At the beginning of the mission, all field staff was recruited from the military. The circumstances at the time meant open war and the monitored issues were such that a military background was needed at that time.

However, after a certain level of stability had been achieved, the focus shifted from monitoring activities related to warfare, to humanitarian issues and those of human rights as well as to monitoring the building up of a civil society. During the EUMM times, the focus shifted once again to fit the needs of the report reader, meaning that little attention was given to municipal level matters and all the more to middle and high level politics. The EUMM reports included more analyses of the meaning and significance of the monitored issues, than the ECMM reports ever did.

EUMM listed some basic qualifications and requirements¹⁶, which it has forwarded to the participating states and Brussels, as an aide to help identify suitable monitors to be seconded to the mission. This document lists the following:

1. Personal requirements

- citizen of EU member state (after 01 May 2004 only exception: Norway)
- graduated from university/equivalent (major in international politics, political history, law, economics etc.) or graduated from military academy (minimum rank of a captain – major/ equivalent or higher ranking) – exceptions for some specified EUMM HQ administrative and technical/personnel functions
- seconded for a minimum period of one year
- previous working experience for a minimum of two years
- proper physical condition (national medical check)
- fluency in English (written and oral)
- computer literate
- driver license

2. Practical skills or training in:

- first aid
- mine awareness
- radio voice procedures and
- driving of four wheel drive vehicles

14 Ibid.

15 EUMM introduction CD.

16 EUMM SOP Annex 4H/2.

As the ECMM was renamed the EUMM, the most visible change was the decrease in the number of personnel, dropping from 239 to 110 in a year's time.¹⁷ Despite this reduction of personnel, the job description and the area of coverage basically did not undergo a corresponding modification. With such a significant reduction in the number of personnel, the quality of the existing personnel naturally took on a new degree of importance; as a reflection of this, some of the participating member states did, indeed, take a closer look at the recruitments they made.

One could question if the number of personnel after the Council Joint Action of 2000 was sufficient for successfully implementing the mandate. However, this article does not take a stance on the number of monitors, but rather examines the quality of personnel reflected in the job description and the circumstances in which the job was being done.

17 ECMM/EUMM Personnel Strength 2006.

3 The recruitment of monitors

Currently nine out of ten mission members in EU civilian operations are seconded by their national governments.¹⁸ In the EUMM, all internationals but three¹⁹ were seconded. Contrary to the practice of recruiting to the ESDP missions, where the seconding nations nominate candidates to be selected centrally, for the EUMM the seconding states had the full right to choose and deploy anyone of their liking. The above-mentioned EUMM List of Qualifications served as a guideline for recruitment. The EUMM emphasised how there was also bilateral dialogue between the mission and the sending states, in order to point out the importance of the listed qualifications being met.

The recruiting of monitors to the ECMM/EUMM fell under different authorities in different participating states, this partly reflecting on who has been eligible for the assignment. In many cases the recruiting responsibility underwent some change, meaning two or three different bodies may have been involved over the years.

In most of the participating states, the recruiting was typically done either by the Ministry of Defence, the Defence Forces, or the Ministry for Foreign Affairs or through a combination of some of the above. In some cases where the recruiting fell under some other ministry or was outsourced to another body, a representative from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs might have interviewed some short-listed candidates, been present at the interviews, or at least given their final blessing on the nomination. This practice served as a means of ensuring the seconded monitors were of the calibre expected by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.²⁰

Despite the fact that the EUMM List of Qualifications allowed for very broad recruiting, openly advertising posts

in newspapers or other fora was rare.²¹ Most participating states restricted their recruitment to a "pre-selected" group of people. Thus, if the Ministry of Defence or the Defence Forces was recruiting, the posts would typically only be available to military personnel. Even in the case of seconding civilians, most countries restricted their secondments to a group of individuals somehow known to the recruiters²², or in the last years the candidates would be sought from a roster of experts. Such rosters have been set up in many EU countries, to cater to the ever-growing need of sending crisis management experts on missions abroad.²³

The rosters came in handy, as the turnover of recruiters was quite high in many cases, and on the other hand the recruitment process often had to be finalised in a matter of days to fill a

18 The role of the EU in Civilian Crisis Management 2006, 5.

19 Head of Mission, Chief of Personnel and Chief of Procurement.

20 An often stated opinion among monitors interviewed for this article was that more often than not, the recruiting personnel had poor knowledge of what circumstances and what duties the recruited monitors faced in the field. Another perception that was raised was the failure of the recruiters to pay attention to the need of their "real customers", those relying on the good quality of EUMM reports to facilitate them in their respective jobs.

21 Only in the case of one nation was there an annually repeated announcement of vacancies in the daily newspapers and on the internet, meaning that the recruiting personnel annually went through some 200 applications to fill six EUMM posts. Some states paid special attention to the recruitment at the time of their respective EU presidency, but lessened their efforts at other times.

22 With participating states nominating their own monitors, a fairly frequently stated criticism was that it allowed those in charge of appointing the recruits to favour their own preferred candidates. As some informants brought up, this "buddy-buddy system" was also felt within the mission, where senior management staff was able to favour their own national colleagues in turn, and little or no attention was paid to the motivation and skills of the appointed person, meeting the needs for a particular function. At the time before the Joint Action, this system was the prevailing one, where the state holding the EU presidency, had the overall responsibility for the mission, and was eager to promote its own nationals to as many key posts as possible. Some time after the Council Joint Action, this practice practically ceased to exist within the mission.

23 For thorough coverage of rosters, see Gourlay 2006. Also worth noting is how Glazebrook (2006, 56–58) points out how expert databases have been viewed negatively. Firstly, without constant management, they are not functional, secondly with the likelihood of getting a job through a roster being perceived as small, applicants lack confidence in these, which could reflect the fact that often these databases lack valuable information about the qualities of candidates.

post that unexpectedly became vacant, not leaving too much time for a comparison of candidates. Although there was no particular hurry, it seems that not too much time, money or effort, was to go into the recruitment process.²⁴

The number of people on the roster and the inclusion criteria varies highly between rosters, from having to attend special training before being admitted to the roster, to simply filling in an electronic form with personal data and employment history and thereby being included. Despite the existence of rosters with pre-trained candidates, there has been an experience of rosters being too limited and being unable to present any such candidates that would be considered suitable for the EUMM according to the standards set nationally. In such a case better candidates were actively sought, found outside the register and consequently nominated as EUMM monitors.

Most of the interviewed monitors had been selected 1–2 months before deployment, a period of time perceived by the monitors as short, not allowing for other preparation than taking care of practical issues. Only one seconding nation completed their selection process up to or even exceeding one year before deployment. At best this meant that a motivated monitor had covered a given list of reading material and was thus well prepared. At worst the motivation of the secondee had gone through a significant change in that time, leaving some intended monitors withdrawing their commitment on short notice and others performing poorly in the field.

Although elaborated recruitment strategies were not displayed, different participating states demonstrated quite a varied attitude towards their recruitment. This resulted in secondments varying from sending more senior and well experienced staff to sending very young people on their first-ever assignment abroad to gain experience and to grow professionally. One approach was to send people capable enough to get senior positions. Some stated historically and geographically close relations to the Balkans, others the promotion of the national image as a reason to send the best possible candidates to the mission. One voice raised the moralistic issue of the amount of money being spent on the mission being a reason not to fall back on lethargy, but to pay close attention that the right people are sent to the right mission in order to do a top quality job. On the other hand, one stated reason for disinterest in the recruitments to the EUMM was the fact that for the several years the mission had been expected not to get further extension, and thus directing resources there was not seen as worthwhile.

When asked to identify what factors had led to being recruited to serve in the EUMM, the lion's share of those interviewed with a military background stated only two things: having the necessary minimum rank and having the necessary knowledge of English – as identified by the recruiting body.²⁵

When asking monitors from civilian walks of life, among the most commonly cited factors were communication skills and previous international experience, quite often from the Balkans, and the ability to write a report.

The decision to extend the contract of monitors was a solely national issue, and most of the times was done without consulting the mission.

It is worth noting that at no point was there any mechanism for quality control of the seconded monitors at the end of the ECMM or EUMM.²⁶ The mission did not want to be selective when the seconding states were paying the salaries of the monitors, which led to the fact that any secondee was welcomed, even though he/she did not fulfil the requirements listed by EUMM²⁷.

Although there were differing opinions, generally speaking, the heterogeneity of the staff was seen as an asset making the mission stronger²⁸. The practice of mixing military and civilian monitors has thus, according to one interviewee, been given as a recommendation for the Aceh Monitor Mission.

24 Glazebrook (2006, 54) points out two occasions where crisis management personnel was sought, and how some applications was seen as a "flood", so open advertising was seen as being more work than it was worth.

25 The perception of the necessary level of English for an EUMM monitor varied greatly, with some seconding states requiring only a basic level. Differences were also apparent in the rating of the knowledge, at times giving

quite a misleading picture of the ability to use English professionally.

26 Without a system for quality control of the personnel, at the very worst, the mission on occasions found itself receiving a monitor who had in fact admittedly been sent away to sort out his or her family- or drug-abuse-related problems.

27 Although participating states did agree to the criteria listed in chapter two, in reality they often failed to deliver. The requirement to be seconded for a minimum of one year was not met by a number of participating states that second military personnel only. In the closing year, approximately 30% of the monitors served only for a period of six months.

28 In the final years of operation, the balance between military and civilian personnel had come close to half-and-half, with some emphasis always remaining on the military side.

4 The training of monitors

This chapter demonstrates how most of the training provided was limited to general crisis environment, leaving out both mission-specific and function-specific trainings.

4.1 *Pre-mission training*

Generally speaking, the practice of nationally provided training for monitors to the mission was inadequate, and in the case of quite a number of interviewed monitors, they had had no training whatsoever prior to deployment. Most of the times the lack of training would be due to the shortage of time between recruiting and deployment and/or the fact that even if there was more time, no training sessions would be set up for possibly just one secondee at a time.

In the cases in which training was provided prior to deployment, it was ordinarily 1–2 weeks in length. The training for the ECMM/EUMM was in most cases identical or very similar to that of UN military observers. Much of the training focus was given to managing in the potentially hostile or dangerous environment and circumstances in which the job is done, thus focusing on issues related to personal security and safety, the use of hand radios, driving four-wheel drive vehicles, and first aid. These four issues are what the EUMM, in fact, expected monitors to have already been trained in, according to the Standard Operating Procedures.

In very few cases, the training included mission-specific knowledge, typically restricted to a brief overview of the Balkans. Function-specific training was even more rare, thus the following issues were hardly ever covered: topical issues to be monitored in light of the current state of the Balkans, the interrelationship between different issues, how to address parliamentarians, interviewing techniques, what sort of data to collect, how to analyse the data in a wider former Yugoslavian context, identifying trends and being able to give an early warning of some undesired developments, and summarising the most important issues in a report written in good English. Hardly any emphasis was put on the larger EU context in which the mission operated, or on the impacts or results the monitoring was anticipated to have.

Although basic courses in civilian crisis management were organised during the last years of the EUMM in a number of

training centres,²⁹ only one monitor had learned about such a course in time to attend prior to deployment.

One informant said how the official training stood for 30% of his training, whereas the self-initiated meeting of a couple of previous monitors represented the remaining 70% of useful information.

The EUMM produced a Training CD which was envisaged to be handed over to future monitors prior to their arrival to the mission. The training CD included some PowerPoint presentations with monitoring and report-writing guidelines, some texts about Balkan history and a list of recommended reading.³⁰ Only in the most exceptional cases was this CD handed over to the monitor before his/her arrival. Instead, the monitors received it in their induction training.

4.2 *The EUMM induction training*

When a new monitor arrived at the headquarters of the mission in Sarajevo, he or she underwent EUMM induction training before going to his or her final destination. Although it was known that not all monitors were trained nationally, the induction training of one or at most two days was not envisaged to be training per se, but as the brevity indicates, rather a tool to refresh knowledge and skills that the monitor had previously been trained in.

The monitors interviewed for this article rated the usefulness of the induction training from very poor to good. Not surprisingly, monitors with a military background appreciated different parts of the training than those with a civilian background. However, as a result of listing the training issues that were perceived as the most useful, the training curriculum was actually rebuilt almost in its entirety. To give an example, for some it was most useful to learn of the EUMM organisation, for others it was to learn how to put on snow chains, while quite a few considered the role play "Attending

29 The European Commission launched a project on Training for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management, with the aim of creating national pools of pre-trained experts. One of the training programmes developed is a concept core course covering a multitude of issues relevant for every field worker. See more on www.eutrainingroup.net

30 EUMM Introduction CD.

a meeting" most useful. The last-mentioned topic divided the opinions greatly, as some of the interviewed monitors found it ridiculous and even misleading to use a set-up of negotiating to exchange prisoners of war, saying it gave an archaic picture of what the monitors do and therefore was completely unhelpful. Many a monitor felt that meeting the people from the Analysis Section and hearing about one's own area of responsibility was the most useful part of the induction training. For some, this exchange of information was, however, a matter of minutes.

Although the EUMM relied heavily on people learning on the job, and no one was expected to be completely operational regardless of how much training he/she had had before deployment, it became evident that more and better training was needed in order to achieve a higher degree of understanding of one's tasks and specific features of the area of responsibility, as well as in order for monitors to achieve a higher level of confidence. Some monitors suggested that even the same amount of information should be spread out over three days, as digesting the lot felt like a task too difficult to do in just two days.

4.3 *Learning on the job*

Once the monitor had reached his or her geographical area of responsibility, he/she was be in the hands of the team leader, who was expected to guide the newcomer and have him/her follow the work for some time, before "imitating" it. The EUMM relied heavily on all its monitors to undergo a similar "learning on the job" process and to be fit to take upon themselves the role of the new team leader a few months after arrival. As long as the team produced its daily reports, there was hardly any micromanagement of the teams from the Regional or Mission Office or the mission headquarters. Despite an improvement in the final years, the lack support instructions and feedback from the senior levels in the organisation was still a major disappointing factor for most interviewed monitors.

When asked when the monitors felt comfortable about understanding their task and fulfilling it in accordance with expectations, the answer would without exceptions reflect the length of the monitor's expected tour of duty. Thus, monitors who served the EUMM for a total of six months, would ordinarily state that they were fully operational after two months. Monitors serving for two years or more would, on the other hand, consider the entire first year a period of learning, stating how the importance of understanding nuances only comes with time and experience, and stated the disbelief that anyone could really grasp the whole picture in a matter of weeks or even months.

4.4 *Remedial training*

The Regional and Mission Offices (RO) of the EUMM arranged monthly meetings of all teams within their area of responsibility, in order to provide remedial training. The interviewed monitors did not, however, on a single occasion raise this as a supporting means to improve one's performance. In fact, some suggested there should be some further training along the way, but the

same persons did not connect or identify the RO meetings as being such, or as meeting the needs he/she had in mind.

Monitors willing to make the most significant possible contribution to the mission were keen on getting further training about the desired contents of reporting rather than the format of it. A few thematic training needs that had not been covered or covered insufficiently were training in interviewing techniques, training in the specific stages of the process from the collection of data to the sending of the reports to Brussels and the capitals, including how the reports were modified in headquarters, and general large-scale Balkan developments. It was suggested that among the mission members there ought to be competence enough to train in most of the subjects.

5 Identifying gaps weakening the field performance

This chapter analyses the major gaps identified by either field monitors working on the grass roots level, analysts in headquarters, Heads of Mission or representatives of the recipient of the reports. A number of interviewees were of the opinion that educational background and previous working experience were of no real significance. If a monitor was only flexible enough, knew English and had the right social skills, he or she would swiftly learn all other necessary skills, and do a good enough job. Report readers, however, desired more specific qualities, resulting in a list which incidentally exhibits great resemblance to those qualities identified in the Concept for EU Monitoring missions of May 2003.³¹

5.1 Knowledge of English

The one shortcoming almost unanimously identified by all those interviewed was insufficient knowledge of English. The understanding of how advanced knowledge was required for the mission varied between the seconding nations. A poor command of English affected the mission negatively in many ways. Firstly, when conducting meetings about issues that were not particularly familiar to the new monitor, there was great risk for misunderstanding the message the local interlocutors wanted to convey, or the main points being lost. Second, without the necessary fluency in English, the reports forwarded up the chain were of such poor literal quality, that an unintended large amount of resources had to be directed into polishing the language. With difficulties in understanding the contents of a meeting and in summarising the most essential issues in a readable report, the monitor without professional fluency in English failed to fulfil his/her two central duties. Third, with one monitor not pulling his/her weight, it resulted in

his/her peers having to carry an unfairly heavy workload. Time and time again this led to frustration and dissatisfaction within the team, affecting both the team spirit and the quality of the work negatively. Monitors lacking the necessary language skills were not able to realise their full potential regardless of how skilled they were in all other aspects. It is difficult to imagine that a monitor in such a position would find his/her position rewarding and feel professional contentment in serving the mission.

5.2 Interpersonal skills and cultural sensitivity

In addition to professional competence, paying attention to personality was seen as equally important for successful recruiting.³² The importance of this is demonstrated by the fact that the second-most stated shortcoming among the serving monitors, mentioned in almost every interview, included poor interpersonal skills and a lack of cultural sensitivity. Most EU countries were represented among the EUMM monitors, with a big variation in age, working experience and professional background. Among the seconded monitors were people with vast international experience and people to whom serving the EUMM equaled being abroad for the very first time. All these differences in life experience were evident also in different preferences about how to go about doing the job. Without solid interpersonal skills, teams suffered from an inflammatory atmosphere, which in turn affected the quality of and the motivation for the work. Without the skills to get along with peers representing different values than oneself, on occasion the mission had to shift monitors between teams. In the worst cases, skilled monitors left the mission earlier than originally intended.

Interpersonal skills and cultural sensitivity were essential not only within the team, but also when addressing representatives of the local population. A successful team managed to build confidence between the team and the local interlocutors, making the informants feel confident to share relevant information with them. In the best case scenario, the meeting would look like an informal or semi-formal and pleasant

31 The Concept for EU Monitoring missions lists the following qualities (notably similar to the list of EUMM identified shortcomings): familiarity with the country/region of operation; interpersonal/negotiating/diplomatic skills; skills in the mission language, as well as, where possible, in local language; report writing skills and, appropriate political analytical skills; for monitoring missions with thematic or sector focus, staff should possess the necessary specialist skills or experience, e.g. on refugee issues, human rights, in military affairs, civil-military relations etc.

32 Markkanen 1999, 17.

dialogue between equals, not like an interrogation, even if the monitor was the one posing questions and not giving answers or sharing views of his/her own or of the EU. Monitors who lacked the skills to address the locals from all walks of life with due respect and understanding for the reigning circumstances, and monitors who treated their informants like instruments or objects rather than subjects, ended up causing irritation and proved less successful in collecting relevant information. Monitors without the necessary cultural sensitivity also caused embarrassment among their peers as they were seen to convey a poor image of the EU.

Among the national recruiters, none but one identified interviewing skills as something mandatory for the seconded monitor to have, despite the fact that it was the one principal thing the monitor was doing during his/her assignment. Successful interviewing is a skill that does not necessarily develop automatically just by conducting a number of interviews. Successful interviewing includes: keeping calm even when meeting interlocutors that one has nothing in common with; understanding the fact that even catching someone telling blatant lies about one thing, does not necessarily mean that he/she is untruthful when talking about another topic; and paying attention to and being able to interpret non-verbal communication. An EUMM monitor was likely to meet a lot of people in functions that he/she would ordinarily not have any contact with in his/her home country. Adapting one's tone to suit each addressed interlocutor was paramount for the successful implementation of the mandate. Developed interpersonal skills and cultural sensitivity were needed when EUMM monitors met with interlocutors that other international actors on the field had declared *persona non grata* and decided not to have any dialogue with.

5.3 Political acumen

As the principal task of ECMM/EUMM monitors shifted from monitoring the political discourse at the municipal level, to that of middle or state level, it meant that all the more political acumen was needed to fulfil the task. With the majority of the recruited monitors still being military officers and not trained for the task they were employed for, a common – although not unanimous – view was that the mission found itself struggling to maintain quality of the reporting.

Some countries reacted by bringing in academics with theoretical knowledge of state-building or international politics. Having an academic education in political science became the prerequisite to be seconded by some participating states, whereas others used academics from a broader range of fields.

In order to avoid misunderstanding, it is important to note that the EUMM reporting was not of a theoretical but rather of a practical character, i.e. the EUMM delivered assessments which could be translated into enhancing the EU's political decision-making. Nevertheless, the necessary level of political acumen within the mission staff was still mentioned as a significant shortcoming.

It was also noted that very few of the monitors had an understanding of the EU's foreign policy and strategy, or were able to identify the link between the EUMM and the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, or the Commission. Having at least a basic understanding of the larger political framework in which the EUMM operated is believed to affect the reporting positively, making it easier for the monitor to distinguish which of all the collected information was worthwhile to forward up the chain and relevant to the final recipients of the reports.

5.4 Knowledge and understanding of the Balkans

Due to the complexity of the Balkans, no single training with one or more modules reserved for Balkan history and/or Balkan politics has been able to achieve anything greater than giving a polite introduction to the region. The historical, political and cultural complexity of the Balkans has also meant that relying on "learning on-the-job" would not automatically lead to monitors being able to understand how events and developments in their given area of responsibility interlinked or related to a greater picture. Simply getting a picture of what political parties are central in a given area, who the people behind these parties are, and what their discourse is with other local parties, would take some time to understand, let alone how the politics of the local level are linked with that of the state level.

The lack of understanding of the target area among the monitors resulted in the Analysis Section being left with a greater burden than necessary. Particularly the final recipients of the EUMM reports identified the need to recruit monitors with proper understanding of the target area as paramount, in order to achieve an end product that was of value as an additional tool in the policy formulation among all other available sources.

Although infrequent, one view that was presented was that previous knowledge of the Balkans may compromise monitors' neutrality. Curiously enough, only academic knowledge was presented as a significant risk to compromised neutrality, whereas previous working experience in the Balkans was only seen as an asset.

5.5 Analytical skills

The EUMM was envisaged to provide background information and analysis about development in the Balkans. The analysis was ideally to begin in the teams, with additional value given to it in headquarters. However, team reports were most often seen as a word-for-word repetition of what the interviewed interlocutor had said, lacking comments or an analysis that would put the statements in a context and give them significance. Monitors who proved to be most successful were often transferred to the Analysis Section in the headquarters, given that their time or service was long enough. As the analysis from the teams were from non-existent to scarce, it was the analysis section which was then faced with fulfilling

the task, something which was said to be possible only as reporting to Brussels changed from daily to weekly (in 2003), freeing the necessary resources for analysing.

Final recipients who have read the ECMM and EUMM reports for a number of years have stated that only some time after the first Council Joint Action, did the EUMM reports become analytical. Yet most report readers still described the reports as mostly descriptive, rarely or hardly including analysis. Whereas some informants valued the reports especially when they were perceived as being analytical, others felt quite satisfied with the reports as they were, some even stating that the final analysis and significance ought to be left to each individual reader.

The report readers recognised that the higher up the chain the reports came from, the more analysis they included. Nevertheless, the most useful reports were often said to come from the local levels, when interviewing less known interlocutors, noting that the information in the reports of higher levels would typically be available from a number of other sources as well.

When emphasis is put on producing analytical reports, it would require recruiting monitors who could stay in a mission longer, even up to three years.

5.6 *Age limit*

The juniority of monitors was mentioned a number of times as a factor threatening the credibility of the mission or weakening its performance. Many monitors would put a minimum age limit of approximately thirty years for monitors, among them monitors who themselves felt their youth and inexperience may have hindered them from making a particularly valuable contribution.

5.7 *Stress management*

Being away from home without one's customary social life, working in a foreign language and being in a potentially dangerous area are often stated as factors that might cause stress when being on a mission. In that context it is worthwhile to note that the monitors expressing the most stress were those also expressing the strongest keenness to excel in their job and to seek ways to constantly improve their performance. For them the lack of instructions and guidance combined with working with poorly qualified or mediocre colleagues proved to be the most stressful factors in their monitoring functions.

6 Recommendations

It needs to be emphasised that no two missions are alike, and a tailor-made approach to both recruitment and training should be adopted for each separate mission, be it a monitoring mission or any other type of mission. The recommendations below derive from the analysis undertaken above, meaning they are based on the ECMM/EUMM experience. However, most recommendations given here are of a fairly general character and would be applicable even for missions that differ from the EUMM, possibly with slight mission-specific modifications.

6.1 Recruiting recommendations

6.1.1 Detailed qualification criteria and job description

Contrary to the OSCE, the EU lacks detailed standards that the EU civilian crisis management experts in the various fields of expertise should meet; in other words, what sort of profile they should have.³³ In the absence of such, it is essential for each mission to be able to provide the seconding states with a list of qualifications that is far more detailed than that used by the EUMM.

It is important to explicitly state both corporate competencies and personal characteristics that have been identified in the mission as mandatory for the successful implementation of duties. According to the Monitor Efficiency Form in the EUMM Standard Operating Procedures, the monitors are rated in terms of ten qualities: integrity, interpersonal skills, personal behaviour, physical fitness, sense of duty and discipline, initiative, planning and organisation skills, judgement skills, decisiveness/self-confidence and finally communication/

reporting skills. Only one of the listed qualities concurs with the list of basic requirements, and that is physical fitness.

Taking into consideration the frequently changing recruitment personnel in charge of selecting national candidates, nothing should be left implicit. It is highly unlikely that any recruiting officer not exceptionally familiar with the special features of a mission will be able to understand that "proper physical condition" translates into interpersonal skills, cultural sensitivity and ability to work in a team and other social skills, as has been suggested to be included in "proper physical condition" in the EUMM List of qualifications.

In order for no future mission members to be taken by surprise when realising to what sort of mission he/she has been seconded, it is essential to articulate both the environment and the context in which the mission operates, the actual job description and a detailed list of qualities needed to fulfil one's duties. The list of qualities should be extended to include all such areas of expertise, skills and personal characteristics that have been identified as beneficial in a monitor (knowing that no chosen monitor would necessarily fit the entire description), rather than the absolute minimum requirements.

6.1.2 Encouraging self-evaluation

Identifying qualifications including not only educational background and years of working experience, but also desired attitudes and motivation, should be followed by detailing the actual job description and articulating all of this in a written document. This document should be made available for all candidates seeking secondment to support self-selection. In other words, it is not enough for recruiters to be aware of these qualities. Self-evaluation should be an automatic step of each recruiting process, regardless of whether candidates are found on a roster or by other means. If a potential candidate fails to see him-/herself fulfilling a particular job as it is described, and decides not to compete for the post, the first step of self-regulated quality control has been achieved. Whereas roster inclusion is passive, active application is not effortless. Thus any number of applications should be seen as more valuable than screening the same number of roster entries, for whom

³³ OSCE has a 12-point description of the profile for a mission member working in the field of General staff/monitoring functions. The EUMM list of qualifications, in fact, resembles the general minimum requirements expected of any OSCE candidate for any field operation, rather than qualities identified for a particular known function in a given mission; see www.osce.org/employment for a comparison with the EU-identified qualities mentioned on page 14.

motivation, timing, family situation and other rapidly changing factors are unlikely to show in the roster.

Following self-selection, mission- or function-specific challenges need to be dealt with again when interviewing candidates and thirdly in training, all in order to reinforce the image of possible challenges awaiting the future mission member, and minimise surprises.

6.1.3 *Adjusting profile to changed circumstances*

Many participating states have clung to the idea of "one-size-fits-all" and consequently not modified the profile of the seconded monitors from the beginning of the ECMM to the end of the EUMM, despite the circumstances and the monitored issues having undergone quite a significant change during the 16.5 years of operation.³⁴ In order to ensure getting the right kind of people for the right mission, it is of utmost importance to update the list of criteria and the job description on a regular basis to fit the current needs and the current vacancies.

It should be recognised that recruiting systems designed to cater for a variety of circumstances are unlikely to be the best choice for any particular mission, but in order for missions to be effective and efficient, seconding states ought to adopt a more tailor-made approach in their recruitments. This is to be emphasised in areas with a long-lasting mission presence, which is the case in the Balkans. As a consequence of the fall of Yugoslavia, member states, particularly their universities, came to produce numerous new experts, for whom secondment has not been possible due to the member states' sticking to a once adopted system of recruitment. The smaller the mission, the more crucial it is that each secondee's contribution can be counted on, as there is little to no room to hide misfits. It is essential to recognise that there are tasks for which a valuable contribution requires secondments exceeding six months or even a year, a limitation which is frequent among military recruitments.

6.1.4 *Dialogue and measures*

In case the seconding body itself is unlikely to initiate the necessary change in their method of recruiting, it is recommended that the respective foreign ministry in conjunction with the mission and a possible national contingent within the mission take a joint position and make a strong recommendation to allow for mission-specific exceptions.

For diplomatic reasons, the national contingents and seconding states ought to be the driving force behind such change. Nevertheless, when seconding states clearly fail to deliver in accordance with agreements and expectations, the mission must have a mechanism for quality control, which allows it to refuse or send back staff who clearly lack the necessary competence, and to do so without having to fear

that new and better candidates will not be put forward. The passing of an English test via telephone prior to deployment should be an easy matter if there is not a massive recruitment taking place at one time. No mission members ought to be seconded without any sort of competition, testing and comparison of candidates. If a certain number of seats are reserved for a particular nationality, it should be advised that a minimum of two or three candidates per seat be presented to the Head of Mission to choose from. All candidates must naturally meet at least the minimum requirements for such a practice to have meaning.

6.1.5 *Adding transparency and visibility*

The use of rosters has created an image of secrecy rather than transparency in the recruiting process. Some chosen candidates have stated how a lucky personal contact to the right person at the right time has been the reason for secondment. As this may favour returning mission members, it may reflect positively on the quality of secondments. Nevertheless, as rosters need to be managed in order to be functional, it also calls for some active strategy to ensure the right target groups enrol in the rosters. One particular country's monitors got much praise for being the most qualified ones. This happened after introducing the practice of going the extra mile to look for experts on the target area outside the existing roster. In light of the fact that there has repeatedly been Balkan experts who have not registered themselves onto rosters as seeking crisis management positions, but by some act of fate heard of and ended up in the EUMM, having blind faith in the roster's omnipotence may mean that the greatest experts found nationally never get seconded. Actively attracting new target groups in order to broaden the pool of talent should be part of the strategy to manage rosters.

Equally essential is to recognise that with rosters growing, it becomes more likely that recruiters stop searching for candidates when they find someone "good enough", rather than screening all potential candidates in order to ensure finding the most qualified one. One means to address this is to develop the rosters into an interactive channel of information. Making all posts public to those registered would allow for candidates to do self-evaluation as the first step in the recruiting process. Interactive rosters would further work as a means to inform about related training events, seminars or publications which could be of interest to those registered and add to their competence.

6.1.6 *The timing of recruiting*

If the time between recruitment and deployment is to be seen as an opportunity to become familiarised with the area, the task and the background, then the recruiting must take place more than 1-2 months ahead of deployment. As a recommendation, it would be useful to aim for the selection to be made 3-4 months ahead of time, which would allow the selected persons to familiarise themselves somewhat with

34 See comparisons with the OSCE by Gourlay (2006, 22) and EUPM as described in the International Crisis Group report: Bosnia's Stalled Police Reform (2005, 13) and in Future of ESDP: Lessons from Bosnia (2006, 1).

what lies ahead, something many interviewed monitors stated they have had the interest in doing, but lacked the time.

6.1.7 *Testing qualities*

Qualities and skills which cannot be trained in a matter of one or two weeks, and which should be up to a certain standard when entering a mission, rather than to be developed or improved during it, should be tested nationally. The command of the mission language is something which should unquestionably correspond to the identified level of English needed for the mission or the task. However, one must recognise that test results that are years old tend to give a more flattering picture than what the current command of English in reality is. Therefore, language testing should be made part of the selection process.

The general fluency in English ought to be tested when interviewing short-listed candidates. In order to get the full picture, it is highly recommended to also include a task in writing English, in which the candidate would be faced with a mission-typical text and would need to produce a summary or response to it, as appropriate. It is essential that the level of English is up to a professional level, including specialised vocabulary.

In case the recruiters are not equipped to assess the sufficiency of knowledge in the written English test, it would be advisory to develop a system where the receiving mission has staff to evaluate the performance as sufficient or insufficient. In such a case, it would be worthwhile to include, for example, the testing of analytical skills or of the knowledge of the target area if applicable, in the same task as when testing English skills. As an alternative, competent returning mission members could be trained to be used as judges of such skills.

Standardised language testing on the candidates' own initiative could be used as an alternative, but is not seen as the best solution, as test results do not age well, and thus candidates may not even themselves be aware of a possible deterioration of their language skills over the years. It is, of course, natural that the knowledge of English will improve according to mission specifics during the time of service. The necessary language knowledge should, however, be gained on refreshed before deployment to avoid losing valuable time in the mission.

6.2 *Training recommendations*

6.2.1 *Sharing responsibility for training*

When faced with the lack of guidance, especially right after deployment, interviewed monitors tended to blame the mission for poor training. Few informants recognised that the sending nations could or should have had a greater role in providing or extending the pre-mission training.

Whenever a mission lasts for several years and the rotation of staff can be characterised as high, a good practice would be for the mission and the seconding states to agree on the

sharing of training responsibility. As many interviewed monitors said the amount of information given in a short period of time is too overwhelming to absorb, duplication of training should not necessarily be seen as a problem in any other respect than that it uses resources. If the mission is stretched and only allows very little time for training, it becomes essential to focus on mission-specific and function-specific issues, and entrust member states to cover other basic and generic training needs like the unchanging or slowly changing issues, such as the use of radios, how to work with interpreters and stress management.

Giving the seconding nations the responsibility to provide minimum training equalling the time of the mission training, would be a good rule of thumb to use, at the same time recognising that two days of in-mission training is not enough. Pre-mission and in-mission curricula would be developed in tight cooperation between the mission and the seconding states, or ideally the EU would develop a commonly agreed paper with recommendations for standardised pre-mission training. This is not to say that every seconding nation has to develop their own training sessions, especially if only one or a few people are seconded at a time. A better alternative when the number of recruits is small is to concentrate the training in one or more seconding nations at a time, and for other seconding nations to buy their training services, when unable to provide training themselves.

6.2.2 *Additions to training curricula*

Depending on who is asked, the most central additions or improvements to the training curricula vary. Monitors in the field recognise particular needs, whereas their superiors recognise different ones; monitors with a military background seek reassurance in other matters than do civilians. One could draw parallels to the anecdote of the replies given by two men asked what they were doing, as they were seen working: one stated he was carrying bricks from one side of the river to the other, whereas the other replied by saying he was building a church.

The issues below have been mentioned in numerous interviews as desired training additions.

Interviewing techniques

As interviewing interlocutors is the main tool for monitors, the most often stated additional training need was to have not only the team leader but a true professional to teach about interviewing techniques. Things that monitors felt would be useful to know particularly included how to read things between the lines, things that are not explicitly said, but things that may be conveyed by not stating something or by non-verbal communication. How to recognise if a source is reliable? How to know what topics to avoid with particular interlocutors? How to interpret what is being said through the corresponding "cultural lens"?

Equally important is to realise that each monitor's own behaviour and communication will affect the success of the

interview. Monitors ought to understand how a well prepared set of questions may lead to different outcomes depending on the use of encouragement, interruption and/or silence, as well as the form and order in which questions are being posed.³⁵ Interviewees may feel obliged to state things they feel the interviewer wants to hear, socially acceptable things that may differ from the actual state of facts.³⁶ Assessing what the interviewee is stating to his/her position is one way to try to determine the trustworthiness of the interviewed interlocutor.³⁷

As many mission members other than just monitors will be using interviewing as a tool in their job, it is recommended that interviewing techniques be added to the curricula for core courses in civilian crisis management. Although both military and civilians recognised the need for training in interviewing skills, civilians often emphasised the need for theoretical knowledge, whereas military emphasised the necessity of practical training in face-to-face interviewing situations.

Working with interpreters versus working with international staff

Almost as often mentioned, but invariably by different informants, typically senior staff not using interpreters on a daily basis themselves, was the need to increase or improve training on how to best work with interpreters.

In addition to training international staff in how to work with interpreters (often including a warning that especially in a newly set up mission, the quality of interpreters may leave much to be desired), it is recommended to develop training for the interpreters on how to work with international staff. It is known that local interpreters may find it difficult to be unbiased. Nevertheless, using their local know-how in conveying impressions received at the interview is still seen as a safer bet than trying to train internationals possibly without previous experience in the target area's culture to read non-verbal signals.

The fact of the matter is that the only guidance given by the ECMM and the EUMM to the local interpreters has been to hand over a Code of Conduct in conjunction with the contract of employment. Thereafter the new monitors inform the interpreters of their own preferred way of working, which has at times meant an adjustment of the style of working every few months. In order to avoid such a lack of uniformity of standards, in order to streamline expectations and to improve the joint team performance, it would be worthwhile to ensure that international staff and interpreters are trained the same way. Rather than having monitors dictate personal preferences regarding the style of interpretation, interpreters could be used to train internationals on how to achieve the best possible result.

Who benefits from the monitoring, how and why?

Questions needing clarification include putting the daily work in a larger context. Several monitors stated that they were there to help the local people, but were not able to elaborate how the monitoring benefited the population. The questions needing answers included: Who reads the reports? What information are they interested in? How are they going to use the information that the mission provides? Whom does the EUMM work for? What is the framework in which the mission operates? Not only field monitors felt a need to get these questions clarified, but also mission members working in the Analysis Section noted that monitors' perception of what Brussels is expecting often differs significantly from theirs.

Whenever possible, it would be advisable for the monitors to meet a representative to personalise "Brussels and the capitals". In the fairly rare cases where a monitor met with someone within their respective Ministry for Foreign Affairs, who in fact received the reports, it has been said to have a motivating effect, especially if the ministry official explained what sort of reporting he/she anticipated. Striving for this to become common practice in the sending nations is highly recommended. The mission should not count on a brief overview at induction training to make monitors knowledgeable enough about the context in which they work. Such training should be extended and reinforced.

More specifics on the target area and target issues

Even if a monitor had significant background knowledge about the Balkans, the likelihood on him/her knowing the updated specifics of the actual given area of responsibility were slim. Leaving mission members have on a number of occasions proved to be unable or unwilling to give newly arriving monitors a comprehensive picture of the background and of issues relevant to monitor. Monitors have stated that the lack of essential documents to get familiarised with has slowed down their understanding of their target area.

Surprisingly, the monitors interviewed did not mention the need to be trained in specific monitoring issues, such as war crimes, exhumations, issues concerning refugees and internally displaced people, parallel institutions, the privatisation process, property legislation, education, or election implementation, just to mention a few issues many a field monitor would likely have dealt with on their tour of duty but less likely to have dealt with in their ordinary day jobs. There is reason to question how valid the contribution can be, when addressing such a variety of issues, without related background education or training in these issues from a Balkan perspective.

The ECMM/EUMM was an atypical monitoring mission in that it did not have strictly a single focus, like human rights monitoring, media monitoring or border monitoring, but covered a wide variety of issues. The spectrum narrowed, however, during the EUMM times. Although the variety of monitoring issues meant great challenges for any training, it is recommended for future training to increase the focus on what is being monitored, in order to increase monitors'

35 Hakkarainen & Hyvärinen 1999, 99–108.

36 Kuutti 2002, 118.

37 Kuutti 2002, 134–135.

understanding about the field they are monitoring and on which they are expected to report.

Training of trainers and stress management

As the role of guiding newcomers is an essential part of any monitor's duties, it should be included in the job description and duly supported in order to ensure newcomers get the desired systematic and effective reception. The levels above field teams were expected to give far more guidance, instructions and feedback than what was the case. As a method to support new monitors, as a way to compare notes about the politics driven and other monitored issues in a given area and its links and relations to higher level politics or neighbouring areas, it would be useful for superiors from headquarters to visit and talk to field staff more. The need had been acknowledged for a number of years, but had not been addressed due to a lack of resources. As most people are not natural born trainers or leaders, it is recommended to include a training of trainers system focusing not only on training skills and facts, but also on the motivation and reassuring of unconfident monitors.

Although stress management was covered in most training, it was evident in a number of the interviews how the most qualified and motivated monitors had taken upon themselves to bear such a heavy burden, that it was affecting their health. Frustration and exhaustion were mentioned especially when referring to the heavy workload leaving monitors short of achieving their own ambitions about their work. Something especially disappointing was the amount of time and effort having to be directed to motivate and reassure incompetent or unconfident monitors, something which was perceived as an unintended and unwelcome addition to the job load. Therefore it is suggested to add to the job description the assessing of newcomers' competence and their coaching into their new role. Stress management training, particularly related to coping with working with poorly performing staff, needs to be improved.

6.2.3 Individualising training

With mission members being recruited individually more often than in a group, tending to their training needs nationally prior to deployment requires a new way thinking. Although training would ideally include practical exercises with peers, certain training can be arranged without the use of multiple trainers, and it does not necessarily have to be bound to a given time and place.

A recommendation to train repatriated mission members to give an individual briefing to future mission members in accordance with an agreed curricula, is one way to ensure that no one is deployed without any general training at all.

Continuing the development and use of a mission-specific training CD, as the EUMM did, is strongly recommended. However, the distribution needs to be improved in order for selected mission members to familiarise themselves with the content on their own prior to deployment.

6.2.4 Developing new e-learning tools

In order to carry out more effective quality control, it is recommended to develop e-learning modules, which would work especially well in case the time between recruitment and deployment is short.³⁸ E-learning has the benefit of being rerun at any time the mission member needs to refresh his/her knowledge and in the long-run e-learning is also cost-effective.

If for logistical reasons it is difficult to gather a large number of mission members in one place, thematic e-learning modules could well be developed to be used as a supportive means for remedial training during the mission. E-learning could be used particularly for long-term mission members, as existing face-to-face training tends to cater primarily to the superficial needs of fast-rotating staff members. To achieve this, missions are recommended to cooperate closely with training institutions with the capability to develop new e-based training material.

38 One good example of an e-learning module is the introduction to ESDP developed by the Geneva Centre of Security Policy, available at <http://www.esdp-course.ethz.ch/access/start/index.cfm>.

7 Concluding remarks

Without questioning the usefulness of training, it is safe to say that no amount of pre-mission or in-mission training affects mission success to the same extent as a proper recruiting process does. Neither core civilian crisis management training, which is first and foremost designed to provide a general introduction to a wide variety of issues, nor function-specific training of a few days, can compete with relevant knowledge and experience gained over a matter of years. Thus, in ensuring mission success, one must start by putting recruitment under the spotlight. For the best possible results, the required qualifications must be set far higher than what the EUMM did. Achieving, or at least getting closer to excellence, requires setting the bar at the highest possible level which will still make it possible to find the necessary number of candidates.

On the other hand, as working with civilian crisis management means dealing with cross-disciplinary issues, no single educational background or working experience will in itself guarantee having a proper understanding of the specifics awaiting mission members in the field. Simply copying one's ordinary working methodology to a mission environment, without paying due attention to the local circumstances, is bound to lead to failure. Therefore, the utmost effort should be made to ensure no one is deployed without due pre-mission training. Furthermore, training provides an excellent opportunity to assess certain essential skills, like how the potential future mission member acts as a member of a group.

Comparing a few national training curricula with what monitors have claimed to be able to take in, remember and use when applicable, there seems to be quite a gap. Although most training will logically take place prior to deployment, it is advisable to see training as a systematic approach to the increasing of competence and as a continuum, rather than a single event, limited to a time and place. Pre-mission and mission induction training should therefore be supported by remedial training. In trying to achieve the greatest possible impact of the working efforts of mission members, a certain amount of investment needs to be made.

A lot of focus is being put on training for the Broader Rule of Law mission in Kosovo. The mission is designed to contribute to an improvement in the local society, not just to report

about changes as was the case with the EUMM. In addition to monitoring, selected mission members will have a mentoring and advising role as well (and in some case executive powers). This adds new human requirements to the profile of the ideal mission member and equally adds new challenges for training to cover.

References

Interviews

Interviews and questionnaires: Recruiting and training officers

- Interview with recruiting officer 24.5.2007, Helsinki (recorded).
- Telephone interview with recruiting officer 29.6.2007 (notes).
- Telephone interview with recruiting officer 17.7.2007 (notes).
- Telephone conversation with former recruiting officer 14.9.2007 (notes).
- Questionnaires completed by seven (7) recruiting officers.

Interviews and questionnaires: Mission members (monitors, heads of mission, and interpreter)

- Interview with former mission member 26.2 and 2.3.2007, Helsinki (recorded).
- Interview with former mission member 8.3, Helsinki (recorded).
- Interview with former mission member 19.4.2007, Kuopio (recorded).
- Interview with mission member 24.4.2007, Sarajevo (recorded).
- Interview with mission member 25.4.2007 and 2.5, Sarajevo (recorded).
- Interview with mission member 25.4.2007, Sarajevo (recorded).
- Interview with mission member 25.4.2007, Sarajevo (recorded).
- Interview with mission member 25.4.2007, Sarajevo (recorded).
- Interview with mission member 26.4.2007, Sarajevo (recorded).
- Interview with mission member 27.4.2007, Sarajevo (recorded).

Interview with mission member 27.4.2007, Sarajevo (recorded).

Interview with mission member 30.4.2007, Sarajevo (recorded).

Interview with former mission member 25.5.2007, Helsinki (recorded).

Telephone with mission member 15.6.2007 (notes).

Interview with former mission member 28.8.2007, Helsinki (notes).

Telephone conversation with former mission member 10.12.2007.

Questionnaires filled in by eight (8) former mission members.

Interview and questionnaires: EUMM report readers

Interview with EUMM report reader 12.3.2007, Kuopio (recorded).

Questionnaires filled in by seven (7) report readers.

All the notes and recordings are in the possession of the author at the CMC Finland.

Official Documents

Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of ESDP (2004), Adopted by the European Council (17-18 June 2004).

Brijuni Deklaracija (1991).

Concept for EU Monitoring Missions (2003). Council of the European Union. From Secretariat to Delegations 14536/03. DG E IX.

"Council Joint Action 2000/811/CFSP of 22 December 2000 on the European Union Monitoring Mission". *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 328, 23/12/2000, pp. 53- 54.

"Council Joint Action 2006/867/CFSP of 30 November 2006 on Extending and amending the mandate of the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM)". *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 335, pp. 47-48.

ECMM/EUMM Personnel Strength (2006), January 2006.

Bibliography

Brief guide to the European Security and Defence policy (2005).
Permanent Representation of France to European Union

EUMM Standard Operating Procedures CD. Effective 06 September 2006. Format: CD.

EUMM Introduction CD. Edited by Chief of Operations, Effective 01 March 2007. Format: CD.

Future of ESDP: Lessons from Bosnia (2006): *European Security Review*, number 29, June 2006. International Security Information Service. Europe.

Glazebrook, John (2006): *An investigation into the Factors Affecting Recruitment Success in the International Peacebuilding Industry*. Dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for a degree of Master of Business Administration, Henley Management College.

Gourlay, Catriona (2006): *Lessons Learned Study: Rosters for the Deployment of Civilian Experts in Peace Operations*. United Nations Peacekeeping in the service of peace. Peacekeeping Best practices (PBPU).

Hakkarainen, Tuula & Hyvärinen, Marja-Leena (1999):
Puheviestintää oppimaan. Jyväskylän yliopisto.

International Crisis Group (2005): "Bosnia's Stalled Police Reform. No progress, no EU." *Europe Report*, Number 164, 6 September 2005

Kuutti, Heikki (2002): *Tutkittu juttu. Johdatus tutkivaan journalismiin*. Jyväskylä: Atena Kustannus.

Langinvainio, Mikaeli (2006): "Siviilikriisinhallinta-käsitteen monet tulkinnat". In Korhonen, Senja & Sumuvuori, Senja (eds) *Konflikteista kehitykseen. Johdatus Euroopan unionin siviilikriisinhallintaan*, pp. 34–61. Kansalaisjärjestöjen konfliktinehkäisyverkosto & Committee of 100 in Finland.

Markkanen, Mikko (1999): *Etsi arvioi valitse. Onnistunut rekrytointi*. Porvoo: WSOY.

The Role of EU in Civilian Crisis Management (2006). International Workshop in Vienna 12-13 January 2006.

Solana, Javier (2002). Speaking points of Javier Solana, EU High Representative for CFSP at the *Civilian Crisis Capability Conference*, at ministerial level (General Affairs and External Relations Council), Brussels 19 November 2002.

Building Capacity for the Palestinian Civil Police

The EUPOL COPPS and Communications Project

Ari Kerkkänen – Hannu Rantanen – Jari Sundqvist

This article reviews EUPOL COPPS, and the developments leading to its establishment as an EU security and defence policy effort to contribute to the stability in the region. The primary aim is to analyse and evaluate the Communications Project implemented by EUPOL COPPS in terms of capacity building within the framework of the Security Sector Reform (SSR). The question of adherence by the mission to human security principles is also revisited on the basis of the principles of the Madrid Report of the Human Security Study Group. Launching an ESDP mission in the Palestinian territories was no uncomplicated matter, but the establishment of the ESDP mission itself in the Palestinian territories can be regarded as a significant development for EU security and defence policy. Operationally, the most significant task of EUPOL COPPS was to enhance radio communication of the Palestinian Civil Police during the initial phase of the mission. The project approach utilised in EUPOL COPPS proved to be a useful crisis management approach, easily tailored to meet a particular need, manageable, transparent and economic. Moreover, it provided a useful and deployable link between civilian crisis management missions and development aid. Linking of bi-lateral projects in support of ESDP civilian crisis management should be encouraged.¹

¹ This article was finished in August 2008.

1 Introduction

The European Union Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support (henceforth EUPOL COPPS) is the first mission within the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in the context of the protracted Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The mission was officially launched at the beginning of 2006², almost simultaneously with the second ESDP mission in the same political and geographical setting, namely the European Union Border Assistance Mission (EU BAM) in Rafah.³

The Oslo Process, beginning in 1993, and some years later the Roadmap to Peace, launched in 2003, laid the foundation for the feasibility of EU crisis management operations in the Occupied Territories of Palestine. There is abundant justification for EU participation in the crisis management of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The EU Commission has been the largest donor to the Palestinian territories (€550 million in assistance in 2007).⁴ The EU is an active member of the Roadmap Quartet – the other members being U.S., Russia and the UN – and has participated in several coordination forums, in particular in the field of judiciary and security reform. Israel and the Palestinian territories, within the wider Middle East, fall under the European Union Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).⁵ The EU has a Strategic Partnership with the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries⁶, the objective of which is to promote the development of a common zone of peace,

prosperity and progress.⁷ Stability in the Middle East is of paramount importance for Europe.

This article reviews EUPOL COPPS, a small mission of some 30 international staff members, and the developments leading to its establishment as an EU security and defence policy effort to contribute to the stability in the region. The primary aim of this article is to analyse and evaluate the Communications Project implemented by EUPOL COPPS in terms of capacity building within the framework of the Security Sector Reform (SSR).⁸ The question of adherence by the mission to human security principles is also revisited on the basis of the principles of the Madrid Report of the Human Security Study Group, led by Professor Mary Kaldor.⁹ The SSR itself, including its legislative reforms, lies outside the scope of this study.

The Communications Project, as stated above, will be at the core of this study. The purpose is not only to evaluate the content and scope of the Project, but also the approach as such, which reflects a new development within ESDP missions.¹⁰ EUPOL COPPS is reviewed on two levels:

- 1) on the political and strategic level, as the first ESDP crisis management mission in the very heart of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
- 2) and on the practical and operational level, as a means to building the capacity of the rule of law within the Palestinian territories through the Communications Project.

One of the central functions of the Project was coordination between donors and the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) in delivering an enhanced communication network for the Palestinian Civil Police (PCP). The core objective, however, concerns not the technical details of the Communications

2 Council Joint Action 2005/797/CFSP .

3 On 15 November 2005, Israel and the Palestinian Authority concluded an *Agreement on Movement and Access*, including agreed principles for the Rafah crossing (Gaza). The Council Joint Action 2005/889/CFSP was agreed on 12 December 2005. <http://www.eubam-rafah.eu/portal>.

4 The EU i.e. the Commission and member states is, with an annual contribution of US 400 million, the largest donor. For example, the Commission co-chaired the Palestinian Donors Conference in December 2007 and announced the sum of €440 million (\$650 million USD) for the Palestinians for 2008 (European Commission Press Release 17 December 2007).

5 Commission of the European Communities 2003, 3.

6 Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Palestinian Authority, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan.

7 Commission of the European Communities 2003, 3.

8 SSR in the Palestinian Territories has been dealt with by Roland Friedrich (2004).

9 The Madrid Report (2007, 9–10) outlines the main principles of the Human Security Concept, consisting of the primacy of human rights, legitimate political authority, a bottom-up approach, effective multilateralism, an integrated regional approach and clear and transparent strategic direction.

10 A project-based approach is also planned for the new EULEX Kosovo; ESDP rule of law mission in Kosovo.

Project, but the lessons learned from the Project. The latest developments in the Palestinian territories following the Hamas takeover of the Gaza strip in June 2007, resulting in a *de facto* division between the Fatah-lead West Bank and the Hamas controlled Gaza Strip, will be taken into account within the analysis.

A functioning system of communication is of the utmost importance for each and every organisation; for modern police and security structures, which are the cornerstones of the rule of law in every state and society, such a system is crucial. Effective command and control cannot be achieved without a properly established and maintained communication system operated by trained staff. It is impossible to secure either political or operational control of forces in charge of day-to-day security and public order in the Palestinian territories without operational communications. The very specific setting of a society in a process of state formation, which is evident in the Palestinian territories, presents an additional challenge to maintenance of the rule of law.

EUPOL COPPS is also an example of the process whereby a bilateral project turns into a fully fledged ESDP mission.¹¹ The Communications Project was initiated and initially financed by the United Kingdom Department for International Development (DfID). The initial report drafted by the DfID, based on the Palestinian Police Project Memorandum (PPPM), states that assisting the PCP to realise their full potential and build an effective, accountable and modern police service is an immense task.¹²

In fact, EUPOL COPPS already represents the second generation of international assistance to the PCP since the Oslo Accords of 1993. Extensive international assistance was channelled to the Palestinian police prior to the outbreak of the *Second Intifada* in 2000. The onset of the Oslo Process witnessed a multitude of international donor programmes delivering equipment and training to the PCP, even paying their salaries.¹³ This assistance was provided both on the basis of bilateral agreements and also by international organisations like the UN.¹⁴ The European Union became increasingly involved in this assistance during this period. The *Second Intifada* derailed the process of developing the PCP and led, among other things, to the partial destruction of the infrastructure, including buildings and complexes, of the PCP.¹⁵

The source material for this study consists of unclassified documents stored at the EUPOL COPPS office in Ramallah along with interviews of the key personnel of the mission and the PCP during a field visit to the Palestinian territories and Ramallah in April 2007.

The main limitation of the study is the restricted number of interviews of the Project's end-users about their experiences with the improved communication system. This kind of analysis, however, should only be carried out after a longer time-span since the inception of the project. All results concerning the Project's impact remain indicative only at this stage.

11 There is a more recent example of a bilateral mission turning into an ESDP mission in Afghanistan, where EUPOL Afghanistan has been launched in the summer of 2007 on the basis of a German-led bilateral police project.

12 Mclvor 2004, 4. The PPPM draft of 18 September 2003 was produced for the DfID by a team of specialist consultants.

13 A comprehensive account of international assistance in the 1990s is given by Brynjar Lia in his newly published book from 2007: *Building Arafat's Police. The Politics of International Assistance in the Palestinian Territories after the Oslo Agreement*. Ithaca Press.

14 Regarding the coordination and implementation of training assistance, the UN played an important role by seconding successive UN police training coordinators from the beginning in September 1994. They constituted the UN's response to the PLO's request for police training assistance, addressed to the UN Secretary-General at the time of the Declaration of Principles (DoP) signing ceremony in Washington, DC. The response to this request subsequently crystallized into an informal donor group that formed the basis of the first UN-coordinated police aid efforts for the Palestinian police. Beginning in mid-1994, the UN group implemented a wide range of police training programmes, reflecting the prevalent view among the donors that more training was their main vehicle for police reform and the promotion of democratic policing. As Lia (2007, 322-323) observes, the political and institutional framework for police reform was not ideal as the donors were lacking, for example, monitoring teams on the ground which could have given advice and follow-up on a daily basis.

15 Mclvor 2004.

2 Setting the stage for the Palestinian Police

2.1 Policing before the Oslo Accords

The establishment of a policing operation and a credible, accountable and functioning police force in a non-state setting, amid territorial fragmentation, within an extremely complicated and vulnerable political context and political transformation, presents a huge challenge. This was and still is the reality facing the PCP.

The process of establishing a recognised police force commenced with the signing of the Declaration of Principles (DoP) in September 1993 between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO). The DoP stipulates the establishment of a strong police force in order to guarantee public order and internal security for the Palestinians of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.¹⁶ Annex II of the Declaration states, in relation to the agreement on the withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, that arrangements for the assumption of internal security and public order will be responsibility of the Palestinian police force, consisting of police officers recruited locally and from abroad (holding Jordanian passports and Palestinian documents issued by Egypt).¹⁷

Policing of the Palestinians is not a new phenomenon by any means, although its history is limited and sporadic. Palestinian Arabs were serving in the Palestine Police during Mandatory Palestine, together with Jewish inhabitants as well as British citizens.¹⁸ The concept of a Palestinian police force has been on the agenda as part of an Arab-Israeli agreement on the

Occupied Territories since the occupation of the Palestinian territories by Israel in 1967.¹⁹

Palestinian Arabs gained considerable policing experience in the Occupied Territories within the Israeli Police. Almost half of the Israeli police force in the Occupied Territories was Palestinians. Nearly all of them quit at the beginning of the *First Intifada*, following the call to resign issued by the Unified National Command of the Uprising (UNC) in March 1988.²⁰ These professionally trained police officers formed the core of the new Palestinian police. However, the role of Palestinian police officers trained formerly by the Israeli Police was marginalised and minimised following the Oslo Accords.²¹

2.2 Policing following the Oslo Accords in 1993 and international assistance

The history of the Palestinian police since the Oslo Process has been analysed in detail by Brynjar Lia.²² In his research, Lia concludes that the many flaws of the Palestinian police in terms of organisational structure, chain of command, internal discipline and coordination, and mechanism of accountability have been the result of the PNA's non-state reality and consequent policing dilemmas.²³ Lia states that the Palestinian police have seen themselves more as a vehicle for achieving national independence than as a non-political law and order agency.²⁴ From a legal and political standpoint, the

19 Lia 2006, 93.

20 Ibid., 41.

21 Ibid., 141–142.

22 Lia 2006; Lia 2007. During the British Mandate, Palestinian Arabs served in the Palestine Police and had certain self-policing functions during the Arab Revolt in 1936–1939, as well as during the insurgency in Gaza in 1969–1971, in Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan in 1968–1970 and in the Palestinian guerrilla state in Lebanon in 1969–1982. The Palestinian Armed Struggle Command (PASC) served as a local police force in the refugee camps. The *First Intifada* in the Occupied Territories starting in 1987 was the next chapter in Palestinian self-policing, now transferred from the refugee camps of Lebanon to Palestine itself (Lia 2006).

23 Lia 2006, 309.

24 Ibid., 429–430.

16 DoP 1993, Article VIII: Public order and security. The strong Palestinian police force was also supported by the Israeli authorities as an early empowerment (Lia 2006, 99–100).

17 DoP 1993, Annex II: Protocol on Withdrawal of Israeli Forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area. This annex also stipulates concerning training that those who participate in the Palestinian police force coming from abroad should be trained as police officers.

18 Shepherd 2000, 66. For example, the Palestine Police Force, which was set up in 1926, had the following composition in 1930: British 692; Muslim 1396; non-British Christian 301; and Jewish 327.

Palestinian police was far from being a national police force in an independent state. The greatest anomaly was the fact that it was not established to provide security and render services for the people among whom its members were recruited, and on whose territory it exercised control, but to ensure improved security for a foreign state (Israel) and its citizens.²⁵ This dimension as a provider of extra-Palestinian security was only emphasised in the formulation of the Roadmap for Peace in 2003.²⁶

As early as 1978, the Camp David Framework foresaw the establishment of a local police force as part of an autonomy agreement for the West Bank and Gaza Strip.²⁷ In August 1992, Palestinian and Jordanian police experts met to discuss preparations for a future Palestinian police force, envisaged at a strength of some 20,000 Palestinians, assuming responsibility after an Israeli withdrawal.²⁸ A Police committee was set up at Orient House, which conducted feasibility studies and planning.²⁹

On orders from the PLO leadership, two police committees were set up in the Occupied Territories, one for the West Bank and another for the Gaza Strip, to supervise police preparations.³⁰ On 21 September 1993 the PLO began calling for police recruits in the Occupied Territories, and 14 recruitment offices in nine Palestinian towns were opened for this purpose.³¹ More than 2,000 Palestinian recruits were accepted into the Palestinian police. They were formally inducted into the police only after the exile-based police force arrived in May 1994.³² The PLO's emphasis was on a military aspect of national security, as National Security Forces were to be much stronger than the modest number of police units (3,000 in the Gaza Strip, 650 in Jericho and 3,000 in the West Bank).³³

The Civil Police³⁴, also known as the "Blue Police", was inaugurated in May 1994, and grew into one of the largest and most important branches of the Palestinian security structures. Its strength was an estimated 10,500 men in 1997, with 6,500 in the West Bank and 4,000 in the Gaza Strip. The Civilian Police had also a special Female Police Department with about 350 policewomen in 1997.³⁵ The Civilian Police experienced

the fastest growth in all branches after deployment, becoming the second-largest branch of the Palestinian police in 1997, the National Security Forces remaining the largest. In 1996–1997, the Civilian Police staffed 18 police stations in the main cities and 25 stations in West Bank villages. It employed from 8,000 to 11,000 personnel, with an officer core of more than 1,000. By the year 2000, its total strength had increased to 14,000, and 23 specialised departments had been formed.³⁶

International aid played a fundamental role in the establishment of the Palestinian police. The PLO's financial crisis together with the high cost of creating an entirely new police force from the very beginning meant that the PNA quickly became heavily dependent on donor assistance for developing and maintaining its police force.³⁷ Consequently, international assistance and donors stepped in following the Oslo Accords. Arafat, for example, called on the UN to supervise the training of the Palestinian police in the Occupied Territories in September 1994, an idea that was strongly opposed by Israel.³⁸ As the occupying and colonial power in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Israel viewed the Palestinian police through the prism of its territorial interests in the Occupied Territories and the omnipresent threat of terrorism. The dominance of Israel over the PNA hindered the ability of foreign donors to offer the Palestinian police relevant assistance.³⁹

In any case, donor pledges were numerous but the slow pace of disbursement and delivery emerged as the fundamental problem during the first wave of deployment in the summer and autumn of 1994. To coordinate the multitude of donor pledges and programmes, the multilateral body Co-ordination Committee of International Assistance to the Palestinian Police Force (COPP) was established at the Cairo donor meeting on 24 March 1994.⁴⁰ This can also be regarded as a prelude for the future EUPOL COPPS, and the selection of this particular acronym for the EU mission reflected in part an attempt to highlight what had worked at the COPP and build on the COPP concept.⁴¹ COPP had representatives from the United States, Russia, the EU, Norway, Japan, Egypt, the PLO and Israel, and its simple mission was "to speed up the mobilisation of international assistance."⁴²

Inclusion in COPP was important for the EU, as the EU wished to substantiate political returns for being the largest aid provider in the territories. In addition, it considered its regional involvement an important testing ground for the new

25 Ibid., 269.

26 U.S. Department of State 2003.

27 Lia 2006, 119.

28 Ibid., 98.

29 Ibid., 118–119.

30 Ibid., 133.

31 Ibid., 134–135.

32 Ibid., 144–145.

33 "Palestinian document on the police (in Arabic)", *al-Quds*, 8 November 1993, 7, quoted in Lia 2006, 183.

34 In addition to Civil Police, other official security agencies under the PA are the Preventive Security, the Civil Defence, the National Security, the Presidential Security, the Military Intelligence, the Naval Police, and the General Intelligence. In addition to the official agencies, a number of semi-official agencies operate such as the Special Security, the Military Police, the Border Police and the Special Forces (Friedrich 2004, 36–41).

35 Lia 2006, 318–319.

36 Lia 2007, 246–247.

37 Lia 2007, 25.

38 Lia 2006, 145.

39 Lia 2007, 2.

40 Ibid., 42.

41 Mclvor, email to Ari Kerckänen on 28 May 2008.

42 Lia 2007, 44. The Oslo Police donor conference had previously taken place on 20 December 1993. At this conference the PLO's representative Dr Nabil Sha'ath and Israel's representative General David Agmon stressed that the PLO and Israel were in broad agreement on the basic principles concerning the police force and called upon donors to start their aid efforts immediately with regard to training and equipment (Lia 2007, 34).

Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).⁴³ In April 1994, the EU foreign ministers' meeting supported a resolution to spend ECU 10 million (\$11.3 million USD) "in order to contribute actively and urgently to the creation of a Palestinian Police force." In fact, the police funding resolution was hailed as "one of the first actions taken by the Union under the Maastricht treaty's second pillar Common Foreign and Security Policy."⁴⁴

Within the donor community, Norway gradually adopted a leading role in the mobilisation and coordination of the police aid, primarily responding to PLO wishes rather than actively seeking such a role for itself.⁴⁵ But it was the United Kingdom which played the most crucial donor role from the European Union. According to the Arab and Israeli press, the UK had promised to contribute by "providing special electronic equipment" and also assistance in the areas of "restructuring, communications, training, and planning" in this early stage of donor support. The British police aid package, however, fell far short of Palestinian expectations.⁴⁶ Assistance in the field of communication remained, as seen in the later project initiated by the DfID, the primary interest and expertise of the British contribution to the assistance programmes.

It appears that the United Kingdom was the only major EU country with a strong interest in the police sector and possessing both the necessary resources and also the political strength and will. As a strong indication of its interest in the Palestinian police, the UK spent some £5 million British pounds in aid during 1994 and committed and dispersed new grants for police aid purposes nearly every year for the rest of the 1990s. The UK also provided one-sixth of the total EU aid to the PNA, which included sizeable contributions to the Palestinian police. The UK also offered a wide range of training courses in, for example, senior management training, riot control, drug control and counter-narcotics, community policing, forensic techniques, English language and counter-terrorism.⁴⁷

Donor activities did not raise concerns only in Israel; the donor community itself was wary of providing the Palestinian police with certain types of expertise. One example of a training course, that caused hesitation, concerned expertise in exposing document forgery. Donors feared that such expertise might fall

into the hands of international smuggler leagues, which forged documents for illegal refugees, or might be used by militants to smuggle suicide bombers into Israel. The problem of what kind of expertise the donors should transfer to the Palestinians was also raised in regards to communication equipment, and in this area Israel intervened to ensure that the Palestinian police were unable to get their hands on advanced equipment that Israel would be unable to monitor.⁴⁸ This attitude of the Israeli authorities only intensified following 9/11.

In the light of the communication equipment crisis, COPP made efforts to mitigate the situation with temporary measures. At COPP's suggestion, the Motorola communication system used by the Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH), an international observer mission in Hebron whose mandate expired on 8 August 1994, was transferred to the Palestinian police and became its first field communication system. This system included two repeaters and some 95 radio sets. After some consultations, the Norwegian MFA agreed to allocate about \$11,500 USD to upgrade the system with three more base stations in order to enhance its efficiency in the Gaza Strip.⁴⁹ On 4 January 1996, during a visit to Gaza by Jeremy Hanley, the British Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, a donor agreement was signed for establishing a communication network for the Civil Police in the West Bank at an estimated cost of \$2 million USD. The equipment was successfully delivered and installed just ahead of the forthcoming Palestinian elections.⁵⁰

Many conclusions drawn concerning the problems faced by the donor community in assisting the Palestinian police resembled those challenges faced first by the bi-lateral police assistance programme by the DfID, and after its merger into the ESDP mission, by EUPOL COPPS itself. The main challenges, especially in terms of delivery, can be summarised as follows: donors were slow in their decision-making; the Israelis were intentionally delaying delivery by bureaucratic hold-ups or at border crossings; and the PLO was slow to produce the information required to release donor assistance. Aid efforts were also hampered by Palestinian-Israeli disputes over radio frequencies and other security-related matters.⁵¹ The conclusion of Dr John Jenkins, the British Consul General, about the impact of the international donor assistance was that both multilateral and bilateral aid channelled into security assistance had produced very limited results. He further stressed the importance of channelling international assistance through a clear mechanism.⁵²

43 Ibid., 28.

44 Ibid., 64–65. Later the EU involvement was followed by adopting Joint Action 97/289/CFSP on an EU counter-terrorism programme for the PNA on 29 April 1997. The new EU counter-terrorism programme was code-named COTER and was supposed to use existing facilities in Gaza and Jericho and not aim to build new training centres. One important focus of COTER was to help the Palestinian intelligence services build an organisation with both intelligence gathering and analytical capabilities. Also a bilateral PNA-EU security understanding was concluded, providing for a joint security committee that was to meet regularly in order to assess Palestinian counter-terrorism efforts and review cooperation. The agreement was concluded in April 1998 during Prime Minister Tony Blair's visit to the Middle East (Lia 2007, 301, 304–305).

45 Ibid., 28–29.

46 Ibid., 41.

47 Ibid., 257.

48 Lia 2007, 271.

49 Ibid., 92.

50 Ibid., 93.

51 Ibid., 109.

52 Jenkins in *Palestinian Security Sector Governance. Challenges and Prospects* 2006, 26.

2.3 *The Second Intifada and its aftermath*

The outbreak of the *Second Intifada* in September 2000 constituted a major setback for the Palestinian police and everything that had so far been established and developed, especially within the Civil Police. Police infrastructure suffered heavily due to Israeli attacks. Some 45 police buildings and complexes across the West Bank and Gaza Strip were destroyed, including the Forensic Laboratory at Police Headquarters in Gaza City and the police complex at Ramallah. Communication systems were also targeted. There were few if any repeater stations left intact, resulting in radio coverage limited to a radius of a few kilometres from base stations. These base stations were generally vehicle radio sets mounted on control room desks.⁵³ Inevitably, the rule of law capacity of the PCP was seriously hampered.

The Roadmap had envisaged accountability for the Civil Police, Civil Defence and Preventive Security lying with the Minister of the Interior. Presidential Decree No.12 of 2002 stipulated that the Police, the Preventive Security and the Civil Defence are under the command of the Ministry of Interior.⁵⁴ The implementation of these provisions collapsed with the Abu Mazen government in 2003 and they were never effectively implemented, resulting in a situation in which the Civil Police, Civil Defence and Preventive Security were nominally accountable to the Minister of Interior, but their respective heads sat on the National Security Council chaired by President Arafat. Dr Khalil Shikaki, Director of the Palestinian Centre for Policy Survey and Research (PSR), made the assessment in 2006 that the ongoing security reform process, the restructuring of forces and the reorganisation of all security forces into three agencies were not being seriously implemented.⁵⁵

This state of affairs was observed also by Jonathan McIvor, Police Adviser in the DfID (UK Department for International Development) lead capacity building project for the Palestinian Civil Police and later the first Head of Mission of the EUPOL COPPS, who observed that overt political control and the absence of a mechanism to hold the Chief of Police accountable for the conduct and performance of the police militated against effective policing.⁵⁶

The rationale of international donor assistance to the Palestinian police had to be reassessed as a result of the *Second Intifada*. The political and security fragility had left many efforts during the post-Oslo period in ruins, and donors must have perceived that investing in the Palestinian Territories in general, and in the Police in particular, was like sewing wind.⁵⁷

53 McIvor 2004, 10. Also the Public Order, Traffic and Criminal Investigations Department complex at Der El Balah, rebuilt since 2001, was destroyed for the second time.

54 *Palestinian Security Sector Governance. Challenges and Prospects* 2006, 45.

55 Shikaki in *Palestinian Security Sector Governance. Challenges and Prospects* 2006, 20.

56 McIvor 2004, 8.

57 The *Second Intifada* and its consequences also led to a re-evaluation of the EU's role in PNA security affairs. A degree of scepticism was expressed in EU capitals with regard to assisting the Palestinian police when the latter appeared to be directly involved in the fighting. Counter-terrorism aid was replaced by EU attempts to introduce unofficial security monitors on the ground. An EU monitoring unit with multinational participation was set up in the PNA-ruled territories to report on and assist in efforts to conclude a ceasefire. However, Israel strongly resisted the move, seeing it as a covert attempt to introduce international observers or peacekeepers. Relations between the EU and Israel also deteriorated as a result of Israel's destruction of the EU donations to the PNA and the Palestinian Police, notably surveillance equipment, communication systems and an expensive forensics laboratory. In late 2002, the EU was still maintaining its special adviser's office, but its role was reduced to maintaining contacts with the Palestinians, gauging the possibilities for restarting police training and updating EU member states on the situation on the ground. (Lia 2007, 306)

3 EUPOL COPPS

The Roadmap published in mid-2003 formed a new framework for the post-Oslo era. The Roadmap, presented to Palestinian and Israeli leaders by Quartet mediators, envisages consolidation of all Palestinian security organisations into three services which should report to an empowered Minister of the Interior. The focus of the security paragraph in the Roadmap is that, instead of enforcing the rule of law in the Palestinian territories, the Palestinian Security apparatus confronts all those who are engaged in terror and dismantles terrorist capabilities and infrastructure. Furthermore, it is declared that the PNA must “undertake visible efforts on the ground to arrest, disrupt, and restrain individuals and groups conducting and planning violent attacks on Israelis anywhere.”⁵⁸ There has been an acknowledgement that a restructured, properly equipped and trained Palestinian Civil Police service and Public Order force are crucial to this process. It was within this framework that the EUPOL COPPS was conceived and delivered by the bilateral DfID project and financed, to a large extent, by Denmark and Norway.

3.1 *The Initial Communications Project and its rationale*

The DfID deployed a team of consultants following the publication of the Roadmap in mid-2003. The purpose was to assess what assistance might be given both to help the Palestinians meet their obligations under the Roadmap for effective and restructured Palestinian Security Services” and to develop the PCP as an element of good governance.⁵⁹ Project planning was further triggered by Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s announcement in December 2003 of unilateral disengagement from Gaza and parts of the West Bank. This would mean an urgent need for capacity building within the PCP.⁶⁰ As a first step, a Police Advisor was appointed on a six-month contract in mid-April 2004 to plan a possible development project.⁶¹ The DfID led the UK commitment to

the PCP and, as the initial assessment states, the UK was in turn seen by the European Union as the leading nation in security sector issues.⁶²

The Project fact-finding was carried out in 2004 by initial visits to police establishments and police commanders from Jenin to Hebron in the West Bank and Gaza City to Rafah in the Gaza Strip.⁶³ An Adviser’s Office was established at Police Headquarters in Gaza City. The Project started as the audit and inspection of vehicles procured by the Ministry of Interior for the Civil Police as a result of an assistance grant by DfID of \$1 million USD agreed in June 2003, and a task related to Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) teams as a proposal to provide them with four fully equipped Long Wheel Base (LWB) Land Rovers and Helmets/Visors/Protective Vests.⁶⁴ The UK had also supported the establishment of a Central Operations Room in Ramallah, responsible for co-ordinating the actions of a number of Palestinian security agencies.⁶⁵

The team produced a Palestine Police Project Memorandum (PPPM) outlining proposals for a three year, £5 million sterling project programme of support to the PCP in *Phase One*, with consideration of longer term support in *Phase Two*.⁶⁶ The aim of this support was to address both the security concerns of Israel, particularly in combating the threat posed by terror organisations, as well as the needs of the Palestinian people for improved safety and security. A final Project document was not produced or officially adopted owing to the ramifications of the collapse of the Abu Mazen government in September 2003.⁶⁷ The draft remained, however, an important document⁶⁸ and the DfID focused on the latter objective, seeing reform of the civilian police as a critical component of strengthening overall governance in Palestine.⁶⁹

58 U.S. Department of State 2003.

59 McIvor 2004, 5.

60 Ibid., 6, 14.

61 Ibid., 6.

62 Ibid., 4.

63 Ibid., 6.

64 Ibid., 6–7.

65 PPPM 2004, 15.

66 Ibid., 3.

67 McIvor, Jonathan (2004): Assistance to the Palestinian Civil Police. Initial Report May 2004, 5.

68 Ibid., 5.

69 PPPM 2004, 11.

The Project Memorandum states that support for the Palestinian police was widely recognised as having the potential to contribute to the improvement of the lives of the Palestinian people, by reducing crime and insecurity and helping create the conditions for economic recovery.⁷⁰ This already demonstrates a good understanding of the human security approach in the planning phase of the Project. The Project Memorandum further states that the police and other security services suffer from a crisis of legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of Palestinian people. This is not only due to their inability to counter the Israeli threat, but is equally related to the lack of internal accountability and the failure to provide for the safety and security of the population.⁷¹ A survey conducted by the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces reveals that Palestinian respondents were most unhappy with the performance of the security forces in fighting against corruption, in preventing violence against women, and in preventing damage to property.⁷²

The initial report proposed a twin track approach to providing assistance whereby an Operational Plan (medium term) would run alongside a Transformational Plan (long term) over a period of three years. The Operational Plan would deliver on a day-to-day basis, whilst the Transformational Plan would be concerned with organisational change and long term effectiveness.⁷³ The initial report already predicts a possible role for the European Commission in a coordination mechanism.⁷⁴ Jonathan Mclvor, appointed as Police Adviser, concludes in his assessment that an effective and competent Civil Police service will contribute in large measure to Israeli security in the long term.⁷⁵

Indigenous efforts were also undertaken following the publication of the Roadmap. The Abu Mazen government produced two strategy plans in July 2003. These were *The Action Plan of the Ministry of Interior on the Managerial and Organisational Level*, focusing on creating an independent policing structure under the Ministry of the Interior and rebuilding training and operational facilities, and *The Ministry's Plan to Control and Organise the Palestinian Street*, focusing on cooperation and coordination between the various security agencies.⁷⁶ Unfortunately for this development, the Abu Mazen government collapsed on 6 September 2003 and with it a number of reforms upon which the Project had been predicated.⁷⁷

The PCP, built in the post-Oslo period, consists of some 18,000 PCP personnel: 12,000 of them were deployed in Gaza, of whom some 3,100 were Public Order Police. Some 6,000 were deployed in the West Bank, 1,000 of whom were Public Order Police. The organisational structure revealed gaps in the Command and Control structures. Command and Control is a

key issue for the Civil Police, not only in terms of organisational structure, but also in terms of internal communication, taking into account the paucity of radio systems and information technology and the inability of the senior commander to move freely within and between the West Bank and Gaza Strip.⁷⁸

In terms of public order capacity, of the 4,100 Public Order Police, 3,100 were deployed in the Gaza Strip and the remainder at various locations in the West Bank. They were found to be lacking appropriate accommodation, vehicles, communications equipment, personal protection equipment, long handled batons and riot shields.⁷⁹ Training facilities were assessed as poor, whereas some potential was found at middle management level.⁸⁰ The PCP had a functional command structure with very few written documents, guidelines and rules. Police officers in their missions are led with vocal commands and instructions given by their superiors.⁸¹ Moreover, it was discovered that police officers are not trained or instructed to make independent decisions in the field.⁸² Only about 5% of crimes end up being investigated, and court as well as police training does not include crime investigation. Investigations are carried out only by order and guidance of higher level justice officials.⁸³

Mclvor's observations in undertaking the initial assessment were that little attention had been paid to the safety and security needs of the Palestinian citizenry, which should be the primary concern of the Civil Police. Capacity building in the past had been skewed towards Israeli security needs.⁸⁴ The PCP seemed to lack legitimacy; it seemed to many citizens that there was a sense of purposelessness within the police activities, which did not create confidence.⁸⁵ This conclusion was spelled out in a Project Memorandum drafted a few months later on the basis of Mclvor's assessment. There was a degree of lack of legitimacy and credibility of the Palestinian police and other security services, not only due to inability to counter the Israeli threat, but equally related to the lack of internal accountability and a failure to provide for the safety and security of the population.⁸⁶ In fact, the fear of internal insecurity due to the activities of local armed groups has gradually increased in Gaza.⁸⁷

Communication equipment had already been pinpointed by donors as the weakest point in the equipment of the Palestinian police during the first wave of international assistance in the 1990s.⁸⁸ At that time, for example, Spain,

70 Ibid., 3.

71 Ibid., 3.

72 Bocco et al. 2006, 35.

73 Mclvor 2004, 4, 15.

74 Ibid., 15.

75 Ibid., 4.

76 Ibid., 9.

77 Ibid., 5.

78 Ibid., 9.

79 Ibid., 11.

80 Ibid., 11.

81 Interview of Suleiman Khatib, ICT officer, 28 March 2007, Ramallah.

82 Presentation at Jericho Police School, 29 March 2007.

83 Interview of Frank Kirby, Project Coordinator, 27 March 2007, Ramallah.

84 Mclvor 2004, 9.

85 Ibid., 10.

86 PPPM 2004, 3.

87 Bocco et al. 2006, 14, 29.

88 Lia 2007, 90. At the COPP meeting on 6 April 1994, a joint communication system, to be used by joint Palestinian-

the United Kingdom and Germany had come forward with promises of communication equipment, but the failure to reach agreement on the frequency issue presented the most significant obstacle, causing the British government to ship a number of previously pledged police patrol vehicles to the Palestinian police without radio communications systems. Israeli authorities also physically removed police radios from a number of Spanish police cars donated in 1995.⁸⁹

As immediate priorities, the initial report drafted by Jonathan McIvor proposed the following action plans: Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), Support to Public Order and Counter Terrorist Units and refurbishment of training facilities at Jericho.⁹⁰ Thus this proposal was mainly made up of technical, material and training assistance. McIvor further concluded that if the goal for civil policing is to create an effective and accountable police service capable of delivering on security and safety for both Palestinians and Israelis, which also secures and maintains public confidence in the rule of law, then a comprehensive and strategic development plan will be required.⁹¹ This led to the formation of the twin track approach with emphasis on shorter term operational needs and longer term transformational objectives.

The Palestinian Police Project Memorandum of November 2004 contained a risk assessment according to which the probability of having no political counterpart on the Palestinian side, and PNA accountability as well as oversight remaining unclear, was assessed as medium, also resulting potentially in medium impact on the project.⁹² The impact of Israeli withdrawal from Gaza resulting in a breakdown of law and order was assessed as highly probable, with a high impact on the Project.⁹³ The risk assessment further states with high probability that rejectionist groups would gain ground as a result of a heavy-handed Israeli response. Likewise, the probability of internal conflict within the PNA was assessed as

high.⁹⁴ Since later developments following Hamas' ascent to power caused political turmoil within the territories, the Project risk assessment was a professional and realistic one, predicting quite correctly the possible future path of development. As a mitigating factor, the memorandum states that irrespective of the high probability of internal conflicts, without effective policing the outcomes were likely to be even worse.⁹⁵ The Project Memorandum's final assessment was that there was a high probability that the Project would not fully achieve its purpose and objectives.⁹⁶

3.2 *From bi-lateral project to fully-fledged ESDP mission – Establishing EUPOL COPPS*

The EU Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support (EU COPPS) served as a bridging phase between the bilateral UK-Palestinian Police Support project and EUPOL COPPS, launched at the beginning of 2006. On the basis of the bilateral programme, EU COPPS was established in April 2005 within the office of the EU Special Representative for the Middle East Peace Process, Marc Otte.⁹⁷ The establishment of the EU mission was further prompted by the unilateral Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and parts of the West Bank in August 2005, and its establishment had already been envisaged in the PPPM drafted in November 2004.⁹⁸

Several recognised factors contributed to the establishment of EU COPPS. The Israeli withdrawal strengthened the need for more effective civil policing in the areas falling under the sphere of the PNA. Supporting the PCP was perceived as a contribution to improving the lives of the Palestinian people by reducing crime and insecurity. The EU had already, in the declaration of the European Council on 17–18 June 2004, stated its readiness to support the PNA in taking responsibility for law and order, especially acknowledging the requirement to support improvement of civil police and law enforcement capacity.⁹⁹ The conclusions of the Council of the European Union on 3 October 2005 emphasised the importance of Palestinian security sector reform and the co-ordination of international effort in this regard. They further underline the EU's commitment to continued and enhanced support for the PCP through EUPOL COPPS.¹⁰⁰

EU COPPS consisted of four EU Police experts headed by Chief Superintendent Jonathan McIvor, and its office was based in the building of the Palestinian Ministry of the Interior in Ramallah, with a satellite office in Gaza City. The Office's role was to provide support for both immediate operational

Israeli patrols, was agreed upon. Spain provided a \$ 130,000 USD grant to finance the equipment, which was put in place in mid-July 1994. An internal Palestinian communication system was not forthcoming with the same promptness. This was one of the Palestinian police's greatest handicaps as they moved into the Gaza Strip and Jericho. Severe delays in the delivery of communication equipment were caused by a number of factors. The most important obstacle was Palestinian-Israeli disagreement on radio frequencies to be used by the Palestinian Police. The Israeli authorities insisted on their 'right' to monitor all radio communication by the Palestinian Police, and refused to grant a range of frequencies, which would complicate surveillance. The PNA wished to set up a closed radio system in order to evade Israeli eavesdropping. Attempting to arrange a compromise, COPPS recommended that the Palestinian Police accept an open radio system for traditional law enforcement operations, in which communication is less sensitive, and postponed the issue of closed radio systems, but to little avail. (Lia 2007, 90 91)

89 Lia 2007, 92.

90 McIvor 2004, 19.

91 Ibid., 14.

92 PPPM 2004, 24.

93 Ibid., 25.

94 Ibid., 26.

95 Ibid., 27.

96 Ibid., 28.

97 EU COPPS & PCPDP Factsheet.

98 PPPM 2004, 4, 12. Endorsed by the GAERC (the EU General Affairs and External Relations Council).

99 EU Council Secretariat Factsheet 2005; EU Presidency Conclusions, Brussels, 17–18 June 2004.

100 EU Council Press Release 3 October 2005.

priorities, and longer-term transformational change management.¹⁰¹

During this bridging phase, the Palestinian Civil Police Development Programme 2005–2008 (PCPDP) was produced jointly by EU COPPS and the PCP with input from the PNA. Its content was mainly the result of planning workshops held in Jericho in April 2005.¹⁰² The PCPDP sets out its objective as the establishment of a “transparent and accountable police organisation with a clearly identified role, operating within a sound legal framework, capable of delivering an effective and robust policing service, responsive to the needs of the society and able to manage effectively its human and physical resources.”¹⁰³ The PCPDP came to serve as a blueprint for building a modern, democratic and accountable police service and as a framework for donor assistance.¹⁰⁴

The PCPDP, and also the objectives of EU COPPS, were clearly founded on the initial assessment carried out by Jonathan Mclvor. The Transformational Plan aimed at fundamental organisational change, while the Operational Plan envisaged raising operational capacity and performance in the shorter term.¹⁰⁵ The DfID approach of providing support to the Palestinian police through a co-ordinated donor mechanism was strongly welcomed by the EU, and eventually culminated in endorsement of the idea to establish EU COPPS under the auspices of the EUSR.¹⁰⁶

At this stage financial assistance and police training were provided by Spain, the UK, the Netherlands and Denmark. Norway was co-funding the Police Communications Project with Denmark to enhance communications capacity in Gaza and to build new infrastructure in the West Bank.¹⁰⁷ An agreement between Denmark, PNA and EU COPPS concerning communication equipment for the PCP was signed on 2 July 2005. This agreement stipulates EU COPPS as an implementing agency, which shall manage the implementation of the Project, including proactive engagement with the Israeli authorities for the release of equipment from customs, and ensure that procurement, including delivery, installation, warranty maintenance and training, is undertaken in a timely way.¹⁰⁸

EU COPPS was transformed into the EUPOL COPPS by the EU Council Joint Action of November 2005.¹⁰⁹ This established an EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories under the ESDP, stating that the Mission would have a long term reform focus and provide enhanced support to the PNA in establishing sustainable and effective policing arrangements.¹¹⁰ The Joint Action was based on a draft Concept of Operation dated 7 October 2005, and preparations for launching the mission were followed by the drafting of an Operation Plan on 30 November

2005. The Joint Action stipulated that the operational phase of the Mission would start not later than 1 January 2006. The mission would have a three-year mandate, and would assist in the implementation of the PCPDP, advise and mentor senior members of the PCP and criminal justice system and also co-ordinate EU and international assistance to the PCP. Javier Solana, the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, appointed Jonathan Mclvor as Head of EUPOL COPPS¹¹¹ for the Palestinian Territories on 16 November 2005.¹¹²

The Mission Statement sets objectives for the ESDP Police Mission. The main objective was to contribute to the establishment of sustainable and effective policing arrangements under Palestinian ownership in accordance with best international practice, in co-operation with the European Commission’s institution building efforts as well as other international efforts in the wider context of Security Sector and Criminal Justice Reform. To meet this objective, EUPOL COPPS was to advise and closely mentor the PCP, and specifically senior officials at District, Headquarters and Ministerial level, assist the PCP in implementation of the PCPDP, co-ordinate and facilitate EU Member State assistance, and – where requested – international assistance to the PCP, and advise on police-related Criminal Justice elements.¹¹³ The Mission Statement reiterates objectives already set forth in the initial assessment of the DfID carried out by Jonathan Mclvor in 2004. The desired end state for the mission was the existence of a police organisation with sufficient capacity, which is both transparent and accountable with a clearly defined role, which operates within a sound legal framework and which is capable of delivering an effective and robust policing service responsive to the needs of society and of effectively managing its human and physical resources.

Elements included in the EUPOL COPPS structure were: Police Head of Mission (assisted by a Political Adviser and a Security Officer), Advisory Section, Programme Co-ordination Section and Administration Section. The Programme Co-ordination Section was given the crucial task of coordinating and facilitating EU donor assistance, and, where requested, international donor assistance, to the PCP within the framework of the PCPDP, and of designing and formulating projects as required.¹¹⁴

Incidentally, the official establishment of EUPOL COPPS coincided with the Palestinian legislative elections in January 2006, which brought victory for Hamas and led to the formation of the Hamas-led government. This new political setting complicated the objectives set for the new mission

101 EU Council Secretariat Factsheet 2005.

102 EU COPPS & PCPDP Factsheet.

103 Quoted in EU COPPS & PCPDP Factsheet.

104 EU Council Secretariat Factsheet 2005.

105 EU COPPS & PCPDP Factsheet.

106 PPPM 2004, 12.

107 EU Council Secretariat Factsheet 2005.

108 Agreement 2005a.

109 Council Joint Action 2005/797/CFSP.

110 EU Council Press Release 14 November 2005.

111 The EU Council Secretariat Factsheet dated November 2005 spells out the aims and scope of EUPOL COPPS. The mission would have approximately 33 unarmed personnel seconded mainly from EU Member States, and the financial reference amount intended to cover expenditure related to the Mission until the end of 2006 would be €6.1 million euros as common costs.

112 Statement of Cristina Gallach, Spokesperson of Javier Solana, 16 November 2005.

113 Council Joint Action 2005/797/CFSP.

114 Ibid.

in supporting the Palestinian police, as the Hamas-led government was boycotted by the Quartet and the international community because of its refusal to meet Quartet conditions. Hamas consequently took over control of the Ministry of Interior, the police forces of which the ESDP Mission had been commissioned to support. Funding of the PNA would have automatically been taken as support for Hamas, which was placed under international sanction. The freshly launched ESDP mission was not, however, called off. The difficulty created by Hamas control of the Mol was circumvented as follows: the President's Office, belonging to Fatah and not subject to sanctions, became the owner of the communication system and the Palestinian telecommunications operator BCI EUPOL COPPS system provider partner was committed to avoid linking the system with any fraction not under the control of the President's Office. This arrangement guaranteed continuation of the donor support.¹¹⁵

Hamas itself established the new Special Executive Force, which periodically raided the police headquarters for public order equipment and eventually succeeded in replacing the PCP as the de facto police in Gaza.¹¹⁶

The Quartet in its statement on 20 September 2006 encouraged greater donor support to meet the needs of the Palestinian people, with a particular emphasis on security sector reform.¹¹⁷

3.3 EUPOL COPPS Communications Project description

At the beginning of 2000, the PCP had medium to good quality information and communication technology (ICT) equipment in some districts (Gaza and Ramallah), which was however insufficient to cover all departments. Some other districts were particularly poorly equipped (Bethlehem, Jenin), and in other districts (Jericho, Hebron) no equipment was available.¹¹⁸

The Palestinian security agencies, including the PCP, were all suffering at that time from a shortage of communications equipment (radio, telephone, computer systems). The shortfall appeared geographically to be much worse in the West Bank than in Gaza. The agencies were equipped with different radio systems which were often incompatible with each other. Many of the devices were found to be old, neglected or damaged. In many areas police relied on their own mobile phones.¹¹⁹

The PNA made efforts to remedy this situation and in September 2000 imported through Ben Gurion Airport three new radio trunking systems which were to be installed in the police districts of Hebron, Nablus and Jenin. Owing

to the *Second Intifada*, Israeli authorities refused release of this equipment, which has since then remained stored at the airport.¹²⁰

The armed conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, including several Israeli attacks on the infrastructure of the PCP, especially during 2001–2003, damaged not only buildings but also all kinds of communication equipment and antenna masts. Geographically the conditions in Palestinian territories are very different: the West Bank is very mountainous or hilly, and therefore needs more antennas than Gaza, which is flat. Accordingly, a damaged antenna in the West Bank had more impact on communication capacity than a damaged antenna in Gaza.¹²¹

The equipment left undamaged by the Israeli attacks was partly functional. It was mainly very old radio equipment of different brands, which led to incompatibility of communication equipment. Some radios were inoperative because of a shortage of batteries or spare parts. In some West Bank districts, the police might have had some radios, but communication with patrolling police officers was nearly impossible due to the limited antenna coverage from base stations, which were generally vehicle radio sets mounted on control room desks.¹²²

Within the Palestinian police, the administration of communications was delegated to a very small unit of people with technological backgrounds. There seemed to be a gap between the police officers and engineers. The police officers would have liked to have more equipment and the engineers more elaborate technical tools. Nobody seemed to be in charge of the actual needs assessment.¹²³

The difficult operating environment also made it problematic properly to discuss and agree upon the content of the Project Memorandum with the main Palestinian counterparts – although the close working relationship which had been established earlier between the PCP leadership and the Police Adviser meant that many of the ideas presented were already familiar. The view was taken that although there were clearly risks associated with not having gone through a fully consultative project design process, the urgency of the situation demanded a more "fit-for-purpose" approach.¹²⁴

The Communications Project was part of a larger assistance programme, and its purpose was mostly technical capacity building, although there were the stated objectives of building public confidence and overall credibility of the PCP and other security forces.¹²⁵ To start with, EUPOL COPPS decided to carry out an overall audit of the communication infrastructure, covering not only the PCP but all security forces, in order to conduct a detailed audit of the current state of the PCP

115 Interview of Henrik Stiernblad, former Deputy Head of Mission and Project Coordinator, 7 February 2007, Stockholm.

116 Kaldor & Faber 2007, 9.

117 Quartet Statement on Middle East Peace, 20 September 2006.

118 *Communication Equipment for Palestinian Civil Police* 2005, 1–2.

119 Interview of Henrik Stiernblad, former Deputy Head of Mission and Project Coordinator, 7 February 2007, Stockholm.

120 *Communication Equipment for Palestinian Civil Police* 2005, 1.

121 *Communication Equipment for Palestinian Civil Police* 2005, 1.

122 *Ibid.*, 1.

123 Interview of Frank Kirby, Project Coordinator, 27 March 2007, Ramallah.

124 PPPM 2004, 13.

125 EU Council Secretariat Factsheet July 2005.

communication infrastructure, to assess the communication capacity in the other agencies, to identify the current and future communication needs of the PCP and to recommend an appropriate communication strategy to meet the needs of the PCP as part of a security agency's broad integrated communication network.¹²⁶

The audit was carried out by a German expert in April 2005, and a report was submitted to EU COPPS on 21 May 2005.¹²⁷ The main weakness of the audit was that the operational analysis was not carried out, which made the needs assessment less accurate.¹²⁸ On the basis of this expert's findings, EUPOL COPPS made decisions on activities to be undertaken on short-, mid- and long-term objectives. The short-term plan was to build a radio network based on HF long range radios in combination with VHF/UHF short range radios and repeaters to make the security forces, especially the PCP and National Security, operational as soon as possible. In the mid-term (1–3 years) the existing trunk radio solutions should be linked to more sophisticated technology. A nation-wide analogue radio network could be built to cover the growing or already existing needs of the security agencies. The long-term plan would be created by developing a common Information and Communication Technology (ICT) Strategy to ensure that all activities and needs of all Palestinian security agencies would be harmonized.¹²⁹

The PCP was using Motorola, but other systems were also in use. None of these systems functioned perfectly and their coverage was inadequate. EUPOL COPPS was convinced that the Motorola analogue system was good and worth upgrading, and the decision was made to implement this.¹³⁰

To sum up, the objective set by EUPOL COPPS was to increase the capacity of the existing analogue system in order to meet the requirements of 100% coverage cover of Gaza and the West Bank and to upgrade the number of radio users at district levels.¹³¹

The Project objectives were outlined in the development plan as follows: a full communication network for the PCP in Gaza, a full communication network in six of nine districts in the West Bank with a limited local communication network in the remaining three districts, technical capability for the PCP to link up with communication network of National Security Forces, more than 100% increase in handheld radio capacity and 60% increase in base station radio capacity, upgrading of already existing radio equipment through various accessories and, finally, an enhanced capacity to operate equipment

delivered under the Project through developing education and training.¹³²

The Project was put together with a Project Monitoring Committee (PMC) and a Project Management Team (PMT). The functions of the PMC were to be responsible for the achievement of the project result and to channel resources needed for implementation of the Project to the PMT. The PMC was the decision-making body and accountable to the partner organisations. All partners were represented on the committee. The PMC had 5 members consisting of representatives of the PCP, Danish Representative Office, a representative from UK Global Conflict Prevention Pool GCPP/UK Department for International Development DfID and EUPOL COPPS. The PCP Head of Planning and Technical Department chaired the meetings. Decisions were taken by consensus of the five members. The PMC decided the composition and size of the PMT. Both PMC and PMT were planned to meet as necessary and allowed to invite consultants and others to participate in meetings as required. The function of the PMT was the practical implementation of the project. Its responsibilities included ensuring that activities were implemented as described in the Project document and in accordance with the schedule as decided by the PMC. The head of PMT team was a Project Manager from the PCP. His responsibility was to report to the PMC. The EUPOL COPPS Police Adviser would mentor and support the PMT in its role in the project.¹³³

3.4 Stakeholders and beneficiaries

Several stakeholders and beneficiaries can be identified in the Communications Project with varying roles and activity levels. In the following these groups are divided into four categories: *Actors* are the groups who have had a leading and coordinating role at some time or during some part of the process; *Donors* are the groups within the international community who have been funding different parts of the assistance activities; *Beneficiaries* are the actual end-users and their customers within the Palestinian community; *External actors* are groups who have not taken part in the actual assistance, but have had significant roles in the background.

The main actors were the United Kingdom, EUPOL COPPS, the EU Special Representative and the Palestinian telecommunications operator BCI. The UK has played a very active role in assisting the Palestinians through the years, enjoying a good position within the security sector owing to the high level of trust it has gained from both parties to the conflict, as well as from important external actors such as U.S. and Egypt. Israel explicitly accepted the UK's role in strengthening the Palestinian security apparatus in the formal Disengagement Plan¹³⁴ adopted by the 16th Knesset at the end of 2005. The UK had a leading role in the establishment of EUPOL COPPS, producing initial surveys and coordinating the

126 *Communication Equipment for Palestinian Civil Police 2005*, 2

127 *Ibid.*, 2.

128 Interview of Henrik Stiernblad, former Deputy Head of Mission and Project Coordinator, 7 February 2007, Stockholm.

129 *Ibid.*

130 *Ibid.*

131 *Ibid.*

132 *Communication Equipment for Palestinian Civil Police 2005*, 4.

133 *Ibid.*, 4–5.

134 *Disengagement Plan of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon – Revised*, 28 May 2004.

assistance efforts which followed. The leading agency within the UK was the Department for International Development (DfID).¹³⁵

The Palestinian telecommunications operator BCI, owned by Said Baransi, can also be seen as an external actor or even as a beneficiary. The BCI was chosen on 14 July 2005 by EUPOL COPPS to be the contractor supplying communications equipment to the PCP.¹³⁶ Its role has been quite comprehensive, and without BCI's commitment and active participation in planning and problem-solving, the Project would not have been successful.¹³⁷

The UK, Denmark and Norway were the main donors of the Communications Project with their explicit wish to contribute to the overall aim to establish a transparent and accountable police organisation.¹³⁸

The direct beneficiary of the Communications Project was the PCP.¹³⁹ Within the PCP the following groups can be identified: leadership, end-users, technical staff and the training centre. All of these brought slightly different approaches and emphases to the project, but not contradictory ideas.¹⁴⁰ Indirectly, the whole Palestinian population must be regarded as the beneficiary, because the Project Proposal from the very inception of the Project clearly states that one of its objectives is to contribute to improving the lives of the Palestinian people by reducing crime and insecurity. The direct objective of the Project was to build the communication capacity of the PCP in order to improve command and control for all police operations as such, but with the short term focus being on the Israeli disengagement.¹⁴¹

External actors to the Project included the U.S., with the U.S. Security Coordinator playing an important and vital role in obtaining the release of stranded equipment from Israeli custody¹⁴². Israel as the occupying power of the Palestine had and still has a significant role in everything that happens within Palestine, and their interests also had to be taken into considerations in this Project. Israel was not actively trying to halt the Project, but also never saw any benefit coming from it.¹⁴³ Israel has continued to see the PCP as a threat, and thus

the freedom of movement of the PCP is not guaranteed; in fact, the opposite is mostly the case. PCP representatives are given no priority in passing through roadblocks even if they are on an urgent police mission.¹⁴⁴

Other external actors include Egypt and Jordan, which are important players on different levels of the Palestinian society. Egypt, in particular, was initially seen as a key player concerning issues relevant to Gaza, and has thus been considered as a potential actor in providing support to the Palestinian security services. Given the absence of assurances from the Israeli side about the safety of Egyptian personnel to be deployed to deliver assistance on the ground, the role of the Egyptians (as well as Jordanians) has remained quite small.¹⁴⁵

3.5 Project implementation

The Communications Project can be divided into four phases. Phase One concentrated on the building of communication capacity. The work started in mid-June 2005, and the main part was accomplished by October 2005. The contract with the BCI included maintenance for six months, delivery of equipment and the following installations on the sites: erection of a new and higher antenna mast in Khan Yonis, Gaza, and installation, optimization and testing of a Smartnet trunking system. This Smartnet trunking system had already been paid for by PNA, and had spent some 3 4 years in storage in Gaza under control of the PCP. The contract also included erection of antenna masts in Hebron, Nablus and Jenin and installation of fully-equipped sites with trunking system and repeaters in each location with a one-year warranty although the equipment had been bought and paid for by PNA in September 2000 and since then stored at Ben Gurion Airport. In addition, the contract included the erection of pipe tower antennas and installation of new fixed repeater stations in the towns of Jericho, Tulkarem and Qualkilia to relieve pressure on the main trunking system and to provide flexibility, and the purchase and distribution of 600 GP 240 radio handsets, 50 GP 280 radio handsets and 90 base stations. Also, the purchase of accessories, including batteries, antennas and chargers, the education and training of personnel in the correct use of the purchased equipment, as well as the training in correct procedures for radio communications, were stated in the contract.¹⁴⁶

Following *Phase One*, the BCI arranged a six-day training course at BCI facilities in Ramallah at the end of November 2005. The course was tailored to meet the requirements of the PCP and the objectives set by the EUPOL COPPS mission to enhance the radio communications capabilities of the PCP officers, and to give them the needed skills to train police users and to carry out first aid maintenance. Trainees were from the radio communication department of the PCP, and all were

135 PPM 2004, 15.

136 Interview of Henrik Stiernblad, former Deputy Head of Mission and Project Coordinator, 7 February 2007, Stockholm.

137 Letter from Said Baransi to Henrik Stiernblad on the PA Radio Communication Network, 1 March 2006.

138 Agreement 2005b. Denmark's share was to provide up to DKK 5 million (approx. \$800 000 USD) and Norway's up to NOK 3 million (approx. \$450 000 USD).

139 There are also other Palestinian security organisations which have had the opportunity to exploit the telecommunications system but the effects of this are somewhat vague, and thus they are not considered as beneficiaries in this study.

140 Interviews 27 and 28 March 2007, Ramallah.

141 *Communication Equipment for Palestinian Civil Police* 2005, 3.

142 Interview of Henrik Stiernblad, former Deputy Head of Mission and Project Coordinator, 7 February 2007, Stockholm.

143 Interview of Jonathan McIvor, Chief Superintendent, 8 March, London.

144 Interview of PCP representatives, 27 March 2007, Ramallah.

145 PPM 2004.

146 Interview of engineer Mohammed Tamimi, PCP, and officer Suleiman Khatib, ICT, 28 March 2007, Ramallah.

engineers. The participants were generally satisfied with the outcome of the course.¹⁴⁷

Phase Two was a follow-up to improve the existing communication infrastructure in Gaza, and the work was launched in late October 2005.¹⁴⁸ It had become apparent that in Gaza City area, the existing 14 channels were insufficient for effective communication. This was primarily because other security organisations than the civil police were using the same communication system. The system was overloaded with the result that delays were created and effective communication hampered. For this reason, EUPOL COPPS decided to prepare a project proposal, in collaboration with the PCP, on radio channel capacity expansion in Gaza City Smartnet Trunking Radio System. The project was intended to result in improved communication infrastructure in Gaza City with reduced queuing when using the system. There was an agreement that that BCI would order, deliver and install the necessary upgrade equipment at the Smartnet Trunking System site in Gaza City.¹⁴⁹

It had already been anticipated during the planning phase that the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) would perhaps prevent communication equipment entering PNA territories. This actually happened, the equipment was not released by the Israelis, and therefore some equipment was moved from Bethlehem to Gaza.¹⁵⁰

Phase Three of the project was effectively a maintenance contract of the system after the expiry of the maintenance part of the initial phase. After somewhat lengthy negotiations, the contract with the BCI came into effect at the beginning of December 2006 for a period of one year.¹⁵¹

Phase Four was a continuation of activities without any additional formal agreements. The main concerns of the Project Management Committee were the optimisation of the system, training issues and, above all, spare parts and batteries.¹⁵²

Maintenance constitutes a continual problem. Maintenance of the radio network is meant simply to keep the equipment functional. The most recent purchase was made two years ago, which also indicates that all the batteries are at least two years old. Their working time is about 10 minutes.¹⁵³ From May 2006 until December 2006, no resources were available for maintenance of the network. Simultaneously, the U.S. supported financially the Presidential Guard, which now has new radio handsets and base stations with functional maintenance.¹⁵⁴ To remedy this worsening situation, the

maintenance contract for the period from 1 December 2006 until 30 November 2007 between EUPOL COPPS and the BCI was signed in November 2006.¹⁵⁵ The objective of this contract was to ensure that the PCP continues to have radio communication capacity to exert command and control over police operations. This was to be achieved by the BCI providing technical service and maintenance of the existing radio network and all portable, mobile and base radios in use by the PCP.¹⁵⁶

The Hamas victory in the Palestinian legislative elections in January 2006 also had a negative impact on the future plans of the Communications Project, but small scale improvements have been ongoing since the transfer of power.¹⁵⁷ As the BCI contract was coming to its end in spring 2006, the decision was made to carry out a post-procurement audit of the Project. EUPOL COPPS contracted Hart Security UK Limited to provide an independent communication expert to conduct the post-procurement audit for the Communications Project. The audit was carried out during two weeks in March 2006, and the result praised the BCI for its competence and level of technical expertise.¹⁵⁸ The expert visited all the Trunked systems in the Gaza Strip and West Bank and had meetings with Said Baransi. EUPOL COPPS was recommended to continue using the BCI as the contractor for the communication network.¹⁵⁹

EUPOL COPPS records of the contract were found to be satisfactory, and the documentation was present, correct, and up-to-date, with files in systematic order. The expert recommended the agreement to be amended to include the provision by the BCI of a monthly Status Report at the same fixed date every month to EUPOL COPPS.¹⁶⁰

The report also found satisfaction of donor representatives to be excellent. As in the previous audit, the importance of maintenance was emphasised. If the equipment is not maintained properly, it does not function properly. It appeared that the attitude of the PCP reflected a failure to understand the importance of maintenance.¹⁶¹

3.6 Project results

Said Baransi as the system provider lists the EUPOL COPPS short term Communications Project results as follows: the Project provided the Palestinian security agencies with much better voice communication, 100% coverage in the Gaza Strip, and 60–70% coverage on the West Bank, an incremental

147 BCI Training Course Report, 3 January 2006.

148 *Communication infrastructure improvement phase 2* 2005.

149 Interview of Said Baransi, managing director of BCI communications company, 28 March 2007, Ramallah.

150 Interview of Jonathan Mclvor, Chief Superintendent, 8 March 2007, London.

151 *Maintenance of Palestinian Civil Police Communications Infrastructure* 2006.

152 Project Management Committee minutes, 7 March 2007.

153 Interview of Frank Kirby, Project Coordinator, 27 March 2007, Ramallah.

154 Ibid.

155 *Maintenance of Palestinian Civil Police Communications Infrastructure* 2006.

156 Interview of Said Baransi, Managing Director of BCI communications company, 28 March 2007, Ramallah

157 Interview of Frank Kirby, Project Coordinator, 27 March 2007, Ramallah.

158 Interview of Henrik Stiernblad, former Deputy Head of Mission and Project Coordinator, 7 February 2007, Stockholm.

159 HART Security UK Ltd 2006b; 2006a.

160 HART Security UK Ltd 2006b.

161 Interview of Henrik Stiernblad, former Deputy Head of Mission and Project Coordinator, 7 February 2007, Stockholm.

improvement in both the PCP and NSF command and control capabilities, support of the interoperability between the PNA Security Forces, improved motivation of the PCP and increased credibility of the PNA Security Forces.¹⁶²

The PCP has 8 radio networks built with Motorola equipment: Jericho, Jenin, Ramallah, Bethlehem, Hebron, Nablus and two in the Gaza Strip. The networks are positioned without general planning. Their coverage area is excellent and has a lot of overlap. The result might have been more efficient by concentrating resources on two or three networks.¹⁶³

Databases such as criminal, weapon and vehicle registers constitute the backbone of efficient police work. The PCP has connected the compilation of these registers with digitalising the radio networks.¹⁶⁴ At the moment, the present level of registers, by which each police station has its own registers based only on knowledge from its own area, is more an administrative than a technical problem.¹⁶⁵

Many handicaps were identified during the Communications Project that can be remedied by proper and professional training. The manner of communicating with radios is ineffective. Point to point discussions are long and informal, which strains the capacity of batteries and engages limited channel capacity. The coverage of main masts and repeaters is not utilised in cooperation. Police officers are not trained to shift from their own channels to channels of their neighbouring police station; most of the officers do not even know that this is possible. The ones who know are not in a position to make changes in policy. Radios are used like mobile phones for bilateral communication.¹⁶⁶

The technology delivered is quite appropriate, although towards the end of its life span in some respects. The PCP technology staff would be eager to utilise more modern digital, for example, TETRA technology, although there are no clear needs to justify this demand, taking into consideration that the level of digital repositories is very low within the PCP.

The HART audit states that the ComNet is current technology, TETRA capable and likely to remain this way for at least the next 5 years, and probably for longer, up to 10 years. The ComNet is scaleable and may be enhanced to include dual analogue/digital and digital equipment enabling digital encryption and the transfer of data/video, for example.¹⁶⁷

The Audit emphasises the importance of the PNA ensuring that adequate and appropriate security exists at the Motorola trunked system sites to prevent theft or loss of infrastructure. Similarly, the audit recommends that the PNA needs to become involved and take responsibility to ensure the training of all users of radios and/or equipment, especially in appropriate voice procedures.¹⁶⁸

Many training courses have been delivered by donor countries. Training continues to be seen as a priority and is being delivered by the PCP and NGOs on a daily basis. Facilities, however, are poor. There is a lack of teaching space and instructional equipment. The Training Centre at Jericho, although the completion of buildings is still taking place, could potentially be an important and valuable training asset. The majority of training needs are likely to be met by internal trainers, many of whom are exceptionally well qualified and experienced. In principle, any additional training should be delivered "in country", as this is the most cost effective method and more likely to target the right people.

It is obvious that PCP ambitions for the communication network are higher than those achieved and enhanced through the Communications Project and currently in use by the PCP and other security factions within the PNA. Digitalising is the next step in radio network development. In addition, the PCP wants to acquire end-to-end encrypted communications.¹⁶⁹

162 Letter from Said Baransi to Henrik Stiernblad on the PA Radio Communication Network, 1 March 2006.

163 Interview of Frank Kirby, Project Coordinator, 27 March 2007, Ramallah.

164 Interview of engineer Mohammed Tamimi, PCP, and officer Suleiman Khatib, ICT, 28 March 2007, Ramallah.

165 Interview of Henrik Stiernblad, former Deputy Head of Mission and Project Coordinator, 7 February 2007, Stockholm.

166 Interview of Frank Kirby, Project Coordinator, 27 March 2007, Ramallah.

167 HART Security UK Ltd 2006a.

168 HART Security UK Ltd 2006a.

169 Interviews of PCP representatives, 27 and 28 March 2007, Ramallah.

4 Conclusions

4.1 *The challenge of the political context*

Owing to the extremely complicated political setting within a protracted Israeli-Palestinian conflict, launching an ESDP mission in the Palestinian territories was no uncomplicated matter. The mission was to be launched in an area that lacked recognised sovereignty while simultaneously going through a transition and institution building process. The Hamas ascent to power in Gaza further complicated matters by putting the second ESDP mission at the Rafah border crossing into limbo. As the security sector became *de facto* divided between the West Bank and Gaza, the ESDP mission dealing with security sector issues was doomed to become partially and temporarily ineffective. EUPOL COPPS continued to operate on the West Bank on the understanding and assumption that international sanctions imposed on Hamas and ministries under its control did not affect the legality of the ESDP mission as long as it operated under the auspices of the President's Office.

One of the core successes of EUPOL COPPS has been the fact that the EU has succeeded in establishing a bridgehead for an international EU-led crisis management mission in the occupied territories. ESDP missions represent EU policy and a mission in the Middle East, volatile but geographically in close proximity to the EU, is of paramount importance, and not only in terms of EU security and defence. An EU crisis management mission increases EU credibility and political weight, and reinforces its position as the biggest donor for the Palestinian territories.

Consequently, the establishment of the ESDP mission itself in the Palestinian territories can be regarded as a significant development for EU security and defence policy. It has certainly also been welcomed by the Fatah-led Palestinian authorities as strengthening, albeit indirectly, political recognition for Palestinians and their aspirations of sovereignty. Israel has never given the mission full accreditation in line with their traditional resistance and suspicion about international peacekeeping and crisis management involvement, not only in Palestine but in the surrounding areas as well. Lack of accreditation has no doubt hampered the operational activities of EUPOL COPPS. Politically, it was also an intelligent and well-conceived decision to concentrate on improving the PCP, thus focusing

on the security of ordinary Palestinians, instead of going with the flow and supporting mainly U.S.-financed Palestine police training programmes within an overall framework of the fight against terror.¹⁷⁰ EU policy and the Project itself had a clear agenda from the very beginning which showed a healthy grass-roots and bottom-up approach.

4.2 *Operational prospects and barriers*

Operationally, the most significant task of EUPOL COPPS was to enhance radio communication of the PCP. Based initially on a bi-lateral UK-Palestinian project, the Communications Project demonstrated from its inception a very professional project planning capability taking into account many of the uncertainties prevailing in this extremely challenging political context. Already during the planning phase it was predicted that eventually there would be a different political order in Gaza, and its impact was quite correctly assessed. Mission planning, at least when analysed on the basis of documentary evidence, seems good in terms of quality. The Project target was justifiably chosen to be a police organisation in charge of everyday security for Palestinians. It was logically concluded that increased effectiveness of the PCP would contribute to increased security of Israel and Israelis alike. Improving radio communications for the PCP did not require installing secure communications, which would only have complicated the whole undertaking unnecessarily and made it even more suspicious from the Israeli point of view.

Capacity building was not only perceived in terms of improving technical capability, but also coupled with appropriate training for the police personnel using and maintaining communication systems. Although the lack of

170 At the beginning of 2007, the U.S.A. Security Coordinator appointed to assist the Palestinian President and strengthen his control over security forces has at his disposal some \$59 million USD, which is planned to be spent on strengthening the Presidential Guard. The risk, according to one observer, is that these other forces like the Presidential Guard or the Special Executive Force will lead to the establishment of more "quasi-military brigades" while weakening the PCP. (Kaldor & Faber 2007, 13)

communication equipment and capability among the PCP was clearly demonstrated, the main obstacle to effective and operational communication seemed to lie in the inefficient manner of using communication. The ultimate aim of the project, rising above improving means and tools, was therefore the transformation of the operating and working culture of the PCP. It appears that an even more robust approach in the field of communication training would have been required in order to achieve the stated objectives.

The changed political reality brought the Project to a standstill in Gaza, where the buildings of the Ministry of Interior were also taken over by Hamas, while the Project continued its activities in the West Bank. While there is a credible evidence of increased communication capacity, it is more difficult to point to clear evidence of transformed working and operational culture. This will certainly take a much longer time, a decade at least, to achieve, and therefore this particular mission cannot be judged on the basis of apparently slow transformational change.

A different viewpoint on EUPOL COPPS, outside its regional and political context, is supplied by its position within the EU bureaucracy. It appears that the difficulties in establishing the mission were aggravated by the slow and complicated EU bureaucracy. It is unacceptable that important policy tools such as ESDP missions are in danger of losing their credibility because administrative and logistical support is not provided quickly and easily enough. Transparency is needed in all phases of the mission planning and execution, but this cannot be an excuse for endangering overall objectives of a mission that has been approved by all EU member states. Bureaucracy and modalities at EU level must be revised on the basis of this and other ESDP mission experiences in order to guarantee unhindered operational capability from the very beginning. In particular, the procurement process must be made, while certainly no less transparent than before, smoother and faster.¹⁷¹

Procurement in ESDP missions constitutes an issue that can impede taking action in a timely and speedy manner. Commission rules require competition in the procurement process, which in terms of accountability and transparency is certainly legitimate and necessary. A crisis and conflict situation may, however, demand a very quick response in procurement, too, in order to execute decisions made on the EU political level and by the member states. Therefore a gap may appear between the need and will to act quickly and the practical capacity to execute the political will because of the decision-making bureaucracy of ESDP missions. Jonathan Mclvor witnessed difficult and slow EU bureaucracy in action when the time was ripe for decision-making, and this hampered

actual operational activity.¹⁷² Clear and transparent strategic direction, one of the Human Security principles, and in this case on the part of EU institutions, was unsatisfactory in this particular situation.

The same rigidity in selecting staff for the mission made a skill-based approach difficult. The skills and competences of the Project participants in the EUPOL COPPS were not in every respect appropriate to this type of project. The participants were experienced police officers experienced in legal matters, but not specialists in third world development work or telecommunications. The assumption of EU Member States was that the required mission personnel for an ESDP Police Mission like EUPOL COPPS can be found within the various member states' police services. This assumption proved to be incorrect, and the possibility of hiring specific civilian expertise in technology or project management, for example, from outside the various police services should be guaranteed.¹⁷³ A more systematic training of ESDP mission members would partly remedy inefficiency caused by unawareness of the ESDP culture, decision-making system and bureaucracy in Brussels.

The project approach utilised in EUPOL COPPS proved to be a useful crisis management approach, easily tailored to meet a particular need, manageable, transparent and economic. Moreover, it provided a useful and deployable link between civilian crisis management missions and development aid. Linking of bi-lateral projects in support of ESDP civilian crisis management should be encouraged.

4.3 *Human Security principles as the Project framework*

Professor Mary Kaldor, with her Human Security Study Group at the London School of Economics and Political Sciences, has also reviewed ESDP missions deployed in the Palestinian territories against six principles of Human Security. There is no distinction between the Police and the Border (EUBAM Rafah) mission in her summary findings, but according to her study there are problems especially in the principles concerning legitimate political authority, clear and transparent mandate, effective multilateralism and integrated regional approach.¹⁷⁴

In contemplating these principles strictly from the Mission point of view, the picture is somewhat brighter. Mission and Project planning documents bear witness especially to the primacy of human rights, and to the Mission having been planned with clear objectives to enhance the capability of the PCP, which is primarily in charge of security issues concerning ordinary Palestinian citizens.

Legitimate political authority is perhaps the greatest concern in respect of this Mission, as while invited and welcomed by the Palestinian authorities and approved as a mission by all EU member states, the Mission never received recognition and accreditation from Israel. It was clear from the outset that this lack of full legitimate political authority would complicate the

171 Lessons from this and other ESDP missions have in fact led to re-structuring of DGE IX which is in charge of civilian crisis management at the Brussels level. Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) within the Council Secretariat has been operational as of autumn 2007 with the specific task of improving mission planning, administration and logistics. The coming years will show whether this re-structuring will lead to a long awaited improvement within the Council Secretariat.

172 Interview of Jonathan Mclvor, Chief Superintendent, 8 March 2007, London.

173 Mclvor's e-mail to Ari Kerkkänen on 28 May 2008.

174 The Madrid Report 2007, 20.

Mission itself. Moreover, the predicted but still unexpected political outcome from the Palestinian legislative elections at the beginning of 2006 divided Palestinian territories into two halves, whereby continuation of the Project in Gaza proved to be extremely difficult.

While the Mission had a clear and transparent mandate for itself, it lacked the significance to connect it properly with other EU actors' and agencies' operations in Palestine/Israel, as well as with EU involvement in the Quartet. Mandates must take into consideration better other EU and international actors in the theatre in order to cooperate and coordinate more effectively; such scrutiny also assists in defining the limits of mandates and spheres of cooperation.

The fact that the PCP was the main recipient of the Project and the Mission itself, with its already stated objectives, demonstrates a good understanding of a bottom-up approach. There is evidence every now and then that civil society and its views are being considered and taken into account, but for a more profound engagement, a genuine bottom-up approach would require a wider engagement of the Palestinian civil society in different phases of the Project.

Effective multilateralism is to some extent evident in the Mission and its Project, especially close coordination with U.S. Security Coordinators and various donor countries. The U.S. consultation has been necessary in spite of the risk of being drawn into security sector development aimed not at increasing grass-roots level security but at implementing a more "politicised" security agenda. Many matters related to effective multilateralism and an integrated regional approach should be taken into account as early as the mission planning and mandate drafting phase, assuming all the time appropriate EU political support from Brussels.

Analysis of operationalisation of the Human Security principles by using EU and ESDP missions as a test case reveals some shortcomings in understanding the operationability of Human Security. It appears that the way in which these principles are operationalised and made usable by practitioners depends to a large extent on the level at which these principles are being operationalised. Using these principles as benchmarks on a planning and strategic decision making level seems to be easier than putting them into practice on the grass-roots level. The same principles do not necessarily resonate among those who are carrying out day-to-day crisis management activities in the field. Taking as example principles of effective multilateralism and integrated regional approach and then imagining how these would be implemented by a middle-level practitioner whose area of responsibility both in terms of mandate and region are limited. Therefore, when looking at EUPOL COPPS through the prism of the Human Security principles on the very strategic and EU decision making level, there seem to be gaps in effective multilateralism and integrated approach. These would of course be key factors for the overall success of the mission, but at the same time, they are not crucial for an individual practitioner who desires to abide by the Human Security principles by putting forward the agenda to protect people. This is to suggest that operationalisation of the Human Security principles requires

a varied approach depending on the level at which they will be operationalised. Having said this, the operationalisation will only succeed if these principles are comprehensively taken into account on the strategic level. Therefore a top-down approach to operationalisation is necessary in order to create conditions for the bottom-up approach, one of the basic tenets of the Human Security principles.

EUPOL COPPS complies to a large extent with many Human Security priorities. Retrospective analysis strengthens the view that these major principles, some of them even further modified and revised, would serve as a tangible benchmarks from the planning phase of any ESDP mission onwards, continuing as a means to evaluate a mission during its lifetime, and establishing criteria to evaluate mission short and long term objectives after the end of the mission. Making these principles operational requires however a different approach on the planning and strategy level from the grass-root practitioner level.

EUPOL COPPS is an ongoing mission and will be evaluated many times in the future. These conclusions suggest that in this small ESDP mission with its high political significance, operational goals have partly been achieved, but achievement has been hampered by the political development as well as by the need for more time-consuming transformational change. Human security principles are quite well followed by the mission itself, proving that principles proposed by the Madrid Report could be even more systematically followed by all ESDP missions, thus ensuring a more systematic and structured attachment to Human Security, and making Human Security standard practise, and very practical in a mission environment. Compliance with these principles on the strategic and policy making level that led to the establishment of this mission was less tangible and more vague.

Control over the security sector lies at the very heart of the internal power struggle between Fatah and Hamas over Palestine.¹⁷⁵ It is noteworthy that the trust in the PCP had fallen between July 2005 and May 2006 despite the fact that it had undergone an internationally assisted reform process during the previous 12 months. The reduced trust in the PCP indicates that, in the eyes of the public, recent reform and rehabilitation efforts had not been successful. In the search for an explanation, three assumptions must be considered: the reform process failed to produce tangible outcomes, it produced outcomes but not those valued by the public, and lastly, it produced the expected outcomes, but the public is unaware of them, because these had not been properly communicated.¹⁷⁶ It is also to be noted that any impact on the security sector in the PNA is difficult to achieve without simultaneous progress in the field of judiciary. Increasing efficiency of the police has no sustainable effect on overall security and feelings of security as long as a huge backlog of pending court cases exists.¹⁷⁷

175 Crisis Group Middle East Report 2007, 5, 7.

176 Bocco et al. 2006, 33–34.

177 According to one estimate by a European diplomat there is a backlog of about 50 000 cases in Gaza alone. Crisis Group Middle East Report 2007b, 9, footnote 77.

The desired end state for the Mission was the existence of a police organisation with sufficient capacity, which is both transparent and accountable with a clearly defined role, operates within a sound legal framework, is capable of delivering an effective and robust policing service responsive to the needs of society and is able to manage its human and physical resources effectively. Good planning and establishment of the Mission produced a promising start, which was mainly hampered by the new political setting. The Mission end state is still far away, but this does not mitigate the usefulness so far of this particular mission, its overall significance and what it has already achieved.

References

Interviews and other field trip material

Interviews of PCP representatives, 27 and 28 March 2007, in Ramallah by Hannu Rantanen and Jari Sundqvist.

Interview of Said Baransi, Managing Director of BCI Communications Company, 28 March 2007, in Ramallah by Hannu Rantanen and Jari Sundqvist.

Interview of Mohammed Tamimi, engineer, PCP, 28 March 2007 in Ramallah by Hannu Rantanen and Jari Sundqvist.

Interview of Suleiman Khatib, ICT officer, 28 March 2007 in Ramallah by Hannu Rantanen and Jari Sundqvist.

Interview of Frank Kirby, Project Coordinator, United Kingdom, 27 March 2007 in Ramallah by Hannu Rantanen and Jari Sundqvist.

Interview of Jonathan Mclvor, Chief Superintendent, United Kingdom, 8 March 2007 in London by Ari Kerkkänen.

Interview of Henrik Stiernblad, former Deputy Head of Mission and Project Coordinator, 7 February 2007 in Stockholm by Ari Kerkkänen and Hannu Rantanen.

Letter from Said Baransi to Henrik Stiernblad, 1 March 2006. Subject: The PA Radio Communication Network.

Presentation and visit to the Jericho Police School 29 March 2007 of Hannu Rantanen and Jari Sundqvist.

Official documents and project related documents

Agreement (2005a). Agreement between Denmark and Palestinian Authority and Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support concerning Communication Equipment for Palestinian Civil Police (104.PAL.21-7), signed on 2 July 2005.

Agreement (2005b). Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Norway, the Palestinian Authority and EU Coordination Office for Palestinian Police Support regarding Communication Equipment for Palestinian Civil Police, signed on 4 August 2005.

BCI Training Course Report, 3 January 2006.

Communication Equipment for Palestinian Civil Police (2005): Project related to the improvement of a better information and communication systems between Palestinian Civil Police, UK Global Conflict Prevention Pool, Denmark and EUCOPPS. Project Document, Development Plan, 12 June 2005, Project code 03C1/02/2005.

Communication infrastructure improvement phase 2 (2005): Project to improve existing communication infrastructure for Palestinian Civil Police in Gaza city (upgrade from 14 channels to 28 channels). Project Document, Development Plan, 24 October 2005, Project code 03C 1/04/2005.

Disengagement Plan of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon – Revised (2004). Addendum A–28/02/2004. http://www.knesset.gov.il/allsite/QGenTxt_eng.asp.

European Union Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support (EUPOL COPPS) & Palestinian Civil Police Development Programme 2005–2008, Factsheet.

HART Security UK Ltd (2006a): *Post Procurement Audit Report. Communication Network for Palestinian Civil Police*, 31 March 2006.

HART Security UK Ltd (2006b): *EUPOL COPPS – Independent Communications Infrastructure Audit*. Project Summary Sheet, 4 April 2006.

Maintenance of Palestinian Civil Police Communications Infrastructure (2006). Contract between Jonathan Mclvor, Head of Mission/Police Commissioner of the EUPOL COPPS and BCI for Communication & Advanced Technology, Ramallah, represented by Said Baransi, 11 November 2006.

Mclvor, Jonathan (2004): *Assistance to the Palestinian Civil Police. Initial Report May 2004 (Update July 2004)*. Department for International Development.

Project Management Committee minutes, 7 March 2007.

U.S. Department of State (2003): *A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*. Press Statement, Office of the Spokesman, Washington, DC, April 30, 2003. <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2003/20062.htm>.

European Council

Council Joint Action 2005/797/CFSP of 14 November 2005 on the European Union Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories.

Council of the European Union: Press Release of the 2679th Council Meeting on 3 October 2005 (12515/1/05 REV 1, Presse 242).

Council of the European Union Press Release 14402/05 (Presse 295) on 14 November 2005.

EU Council Secretariat Factsheet July 2005: *EU Assistance to the Palestinian Civil Police*. PAL/02 (update 2), 8 July 2005. http://www.consilium.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/050708_EU_Coord_Office_Palestinian_Police.pdf

EU Council Secretariat Factsheet, EUPOL COPPS/01, November 2005

European Commission

Commission of the European Communities. Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours. COM (2003) 104. 11 March 2003, p 3.

http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com03_104_en.pdf (accessed 19 February 2008).

Declaration of Principles, Article VIII: Public order and security.

European Commission Press Release. 17 December 2007. <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/07/1938&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en#fn1> (accessed 19 February 2008)

EU Presidency Conclusions, Brussels, 17 and 18 June 2004.

Statement of Cristina Gallach, Spokesperson of HR Solana, on 16 November 2005 (S368/05).

Quartet Statement on Middle East Peace, 20 September 2006. S261/06. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/declarations/91035.pdf.

Bibliography

Bocco, Riccardo, Luigi De Martino, Roland Friedrich, Jalal Al-Husseini & Arnold Luethold (2006): *Palestinian Public Perceptions*. Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of the Armed Forces and the Graduate Institute for Development Studies.

Friedrich, Roland (2004): *Security Sector Reform in the Occupied Palestinian Territories*. Jerusalem: Passia.

Crisis Group Middle East Report (2007a): *After Gaza*, No. 68, 2 August 2007.

Crisis Group Middle East Report (2007b): *Inside Gaza: the Challenge of Clan and Families*, No. 71, 20 December 2007.

Kaldor, Mary & Mient-Jan Faber (2007): *Report on Human Security in Palestine. Case Study for the Madrid Report of the Human Security Study Group*. LSE: The Centre for the Study of Global Governance.

Madrid Report (2007): *A European Way of Security. The Madrid Report of the Human Security Study Group*, delivered to EU member states on 8 November 2007 in Madrid. <http://www.lse.ac.uk/depts/global/studygroup/studygroup.htm>.

Lia, Brynjar (2006): *A Police Force without a State. A History of the Palestinian Security Forces in the West Bank and Gaza*. Ithaca Press.

Lia, Brynjar (2007): *Building Arafat's Police. The Politics of International Assistance in the Palestinian Territories after the Oslo Agreement*. Ithaca Press.

Palestinian Security Sector Governance. Challenges and Prospects (2006). Jerusalem: Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs, PASSIA & Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF). http://www.dcaf.ch/_docs/bm_palestinian_ssg.pdf.

Shepherd, Naomi (2000): *Ploughing Sand. British Rule in Palestine 1917–1948*. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press.

PPPM (2004): *Support to the Palestinian Civil and Public Order Police. Palestinian Police Project Memorandum*, 24 November 2004. Department of International Development. <http://dfidweb.dfid.gov.uk/prismdocs/EMAD/259565001p1.doc>.

Human Security in Post-Status Kosovo a Shared European Responsibility

Tanja Tamminen

The Human Security Doctrine for Europe is the work of a Study Group led by Professor Mary Kaldor. This article will analyse if, how, and, to what extent the concrete implementation of the Human Security Doctrine proposals are useful in the post-status situation in Kosovo; especially in regards to the launching of the EU civilian crisis management operation. It is argued in this article that the human security concept is important in particular when improving the EU's performance and effectiveness on the ground in crisis areas. This can be achieved, for example, by introducing the human security approach into the EU's crisis management pre-deployment training.¹

¹ The manuscript was finished for the first *Applying Human Security in Crisis Management Training* at the CMC Finland in January 2008.

1 Introduction

The Kosovo status negotiations are over, and Kosovo parliament was elected in free² and fair elections on the 17 November 2007; now the world prepares for the independence of this debated region³. The majority of the inhabitants being Kosovo Albanians, the position of Kosovo in the former Yugoslavia was marginal; it was a poor and underdeveloped region producing agricultural goods and raw minerals for export to other areas of the federation. During the Ottoman period Kosovo was already considered as part of the marginal border regions of the state. As a border region between the past and the future, between shattering Ottoman Empire and the strengthening nation-states in the Balkans, Kosovo was annexed by Serbia in 1912.⁴ Furthermore, when Yugoslavia collapsed in the 1990s Kosovo seemed to be the last unresolved territorial question. Today Kosovo's position appears to have shifted from "the margin of the margins" to the central focus of world politics. Kosovo's yearn for independence has not left many indifferent on the world scene. Even though the so called "West" more or less unanimously supports Kosovo Albanians' wish for sovereignty from Belgrade, Serbia, backed by its strong ally Russia, refuses to recognise an independent Kosovo.

In this tense situation the European Union (EU) prepares to take over civilian crisis management tasks in Kosovo from the United Nations (UN). Since the Kosovo War of 1999, the UN provisional administration, UNMIK (United Nations Mission in Kosovo), has ruled over the region. As the UN prepares to leave, the EU is planning the largest Rule of Law operation in the history of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) for the post-status Kosovo. The operation will include over 1700 civilian experts from different fields of rule of law: policemen, judges, prosecutors, customs officials and so on. These experts are prepared to assist, monitor and strengthen local institutions. As the international debate concentrates

on the status of Kosovo and the judicial basis of the ESDP operation, the main aim of the international assistance, however, seems to fade. Which is the priority – the successful launching of an ESDP operation or the effectiveness of this ESDP operation in achieving its goals? Outside intervention and civilian crisis management, the operations should be based on the reality. The Human Security Doctrine is an excellent tool to underline the need of an approach that focuses on the living conditions of the civilian population in the crisis areas; a fact often overlooked in the political debates about the crisis management.

Professor Mary Kaldor, world renown for her concept of "new wars"⁵, is leading a Human Security Study Group⁶ at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). This article will analyse if, how, and, to what extent the concrete implementation of some of the Human Security Doctrine proposals are useful in the post-status situation in Kosovo – especially in regards to the future launching of the EU civilian crisis management operation. The idea is not to describe the large debate around the concept of human security itself, but to concentrate on the functional recommendations of Mary Kaldor and her Study Group as well as to consider their usefulness and limits in the Kosovo context. I will argue in this article that the human security concept as defined by the Human Security Study Group, is significant, in particular when planning pre-deployment trainings for the EU experts being sent to crisis management operations.

2 Free, if Belgrade's pressure on the Kosovo Serbian population to boycott the elections is not counted.

3 It is useful to note that Kosovo's borders have not been clearly defined in the past. During the late Ottoman period the so called Kosovo vilayet, administrative region, comprised also Novi Pazar in today's Serbia as well as Skopje in today's Macedonia. Kosovo borders as we know them today date from the Second World War.

4 Malcolm 1998, 250–256.

5 Kaldor 1999.

6 Group includes Ulrich Albrecht, Christine Chinkin, Gemma Collantes Celador, Stefanie Flechtner, Marlies Glasius, Mary Kaldor (Convenor), Kimmo Kiljunen, Jan Klabbers, Jenny Kuper, Sonja Licht, Flavio Lotti, Klaus Reinhardt, Genevieve Schmeder, Pavel Seifter, Narcis Serra, Gert Weisskirchen.

2 Human security – from a concept to the ESDP reality

2.1 Human Security Doctrine for Europe

The Human Security Study Group's report "Human Security Doctrine for Europe" was received by High Representative Javier Solana on 15 September 2004 and is now known as *the Barcelona Report*. A new report⁷ from the group was published in the presence of Solana on 8 November 2007 in Madrid (*the Madrid Report*⁸). The philosophy of the Study Group has evolved over the years, but the main approach has remained the same: the ESDP should be based on a certain set of principles, the so called Human Security Doctrine that the Study Group hopes to be adapted as an official EU document.⁹

The Human Security Study Group has been developing and refining the concept of human security since the Barcelona Report 2004. A certain number of case studies on crisis areas based on this concept have been published. Macedonia, Great Lakes region, Sierra Leone, South Caucasus and the Middle East were analysed in a book edited by Marlies Glasius and Mary Kaldor, and some recent case studies on Kosovo, Lebanon, DR Congo, Aceh and Palestine form a part of the Madrid report.¹⁰

According to Kaldor and her Study Group human security is about the security of individuals and communities as well as about the "interrelationship of 'freedom from fear' and 'freedom from want'".¹¹ Intolerable threats to human security range from genocide and slavery to natural disasters such as hurricanes or floods to massive violations of the right to food, health and housing.¹² Kaldor and other group members argue

that the adoption of a Human Security Doctrine would give new dynamism to the ESDP practices.

"– human security can be seen as a proactive strategic narrative with the potential to further EU foreign policy integration."¹³

In stating this Kaldor and the Study Group present human security as a discursive change which involves a learning process among EU decision makers and actors. This change in attitudes towards crisis management operations moves the focus from stabilisation of a conflict area to a sustainable human security.

2.2 Lobbying for certain priorities of action

The Human Security Study Group has a number of high level contacts in the main capitals of the EU and has been lobbying for the adoption of the human security concept as part of the EU's ESDP language. The doctrine in 2004 was based on seven main principles, and in the new Madrid Report two of them have been merged and the new doctrine relies on six main principles.

First, "**the primacy of human rights** is what distinguishes the human security approach from traditional state-based approaches".¹⁴ In the Madrid Report Mary Kaldor and her Study Group underline that "respect for human rights" should be the main challenge of an international operation – not military victory or the temporary suppression of violence. Since 2004 the concept has evolved to embrace United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) definition understanding "protection" as referring to "both physical and material protection, that is economic and social as well as civil and political rights".¹⁵ According to the Barcelona Report, "the primacy of human rights also implies that those who commit gross human rights violations are treated as individual criminals rather than collective enemies".¹⁶ Thus, Kaldor criticises directly

7 In 2006 before the Finnish EU Presidency, the Policy Planning Unit of the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs asked the Centre for the Study of Global Governance to reconvene the Study Group and look at ways of taking forward a Human Security agenda within the European Union.

8 Madrid report 2007.

9 Ibid., 2–4: entitled "CFSP and ESDP: Promoting Human Security: A Proposal for a Declaration or Protocol".

10 Glasius & Kaldor 2006; Madrid Report 2007.

11 Madrid Report 2007, 8.

12 Barcelona Report 2004, 9.

13 Kaldor et al. 2007.

14 Barcelona Report 2004, 14.

15 Madrid Report 2007, 4.

16 Barcelona Report 2004, 15.

for example the “axes of evil” thinking of the United States’ foreign policy.

Second, the Human Security Doctrine underlines that any outside intervention “must strive to create **a legitimate political authority**” in the conflict area by providing necessary conditions for democratic institution building through political processes. Similarly, the “intervention must be viewed as legitimate locally and within the international community as a whole”.¹⁷ Legitimate political authority is seen as the precondition for human security.

Third, Kaldor appeals for close consultation of local populations by promoting the so called **Bottom-up Approach**. This means involving not only the local political leaders but also civil society and vulnerable or marginal groups in dialogue with the international actors. “This is not just a moral issue”, is noted in the Barcelona Report, “it is also a matter of effectiveness. People who live in the affected area are the best source of intelligence.”¹⁸

Fourth, Kaldor’s Study Group underlines need for **effective multilateralism** – better division of tasks between different international and local actors. Indeed, in crisis area, commitment to work together is needed, but also commitment to work in the framework of agreed rules and norms in an atmosphere of cooperation and coordination to prevent unnecessary duplication and rivalry.¹⁹

Fifth, the Human Security Doctrine is based on **an integrated regional approach**. According to the Madrid Report, “regional dialogues and action in neighbouring countries should be systematically integrated into policies for crisis”. As already noted in the Barcelona Report,

“[T]ime and again, foreign policy analysts have been taken by surprise when, after considerable attention had been given to one conflict, another conflict would seemingly spring up out of the blue in a neighbouring state. Thus, the failure to include Kosovo in the Dayton negotiations over Bosnia Herzegovina was one factor that led to the outbreak of the war in Kosovo in 1999.”²⁰

Sixth, the Madrid Report also appeals for **clear and transparent strategic direction** when it comes to the EU operations underlining the need of close link between policy-makers and those on the ground.²¹ Already in the Barcelona Report this was underlined by noting that the former should have the

“– ultimate control over operations. Human security missions should be led by a civilian. This should typically be a politician, or someone with a sense for the politics both of the sending states and the host society, with easy access to policy-makers as well as receptive to local political actors.”²²

2.3 Human security training to influence the EU activities

The above mentioned concepts are thus promoted by Human Security Study Group on the European scene. Dr. Mary Martin has been leading the planning of the human security training.²³ A draft concept of the training²⁴ was presented to the European Group on Training (EGT) partners²⁵ in Brussels on 26 September 2007. A pilot training based on these plans was held at the Crisis Management Centre Finland in February 2008. The idea was to train a first group of human security “evangelists” (in Mary Martin’s words) to promote the human security thinking both on the operational as well as on the policy planning level.

Martin also prepared a case study on the training concept for the Madrid Report in which she underlines the current “mosaic of different national and professional cultures and capabilities” when it comes to civilian crisis management training.²⁶ It is indeed agreed among member states of the EU that the operational pre-deployment training for seconded personnel to ESDP operation lies in the field of responsibility of the member states. Thus, there are no clear instructions on how the training should be conducted and by whom. Certain steps have been taken towards developing a more coherent training regime including a general agreement on a common *Training Needs Assessment* when it comes to the ESDP operations. It includes a specific list of capabilities that are expected from personnel deployed on the field missions. However, the discussion on the question of who should design the trainings is still seen as responsibility of the member states. In this respect the EU is still far from Martin’s wish of “generating a new operational culture surrounding crisis management and post-conflict stabilisation”.²⁷

Martin’s proposal to overcome the incoherence of the EU’s external operations is to create integrated human security training for both military and civilian personnel deployed on the ground, as well as target the planning of the operations in Brussels. Martin notes in her case study that on the strategic level “European training” has already been conducted since 2005 in the European Security and Defence College (ESDC). Martin sees the development of strategic training as an important step towards the right direction. Other initiatives exist to offer strategic ESDP training for middle and senior ranking diplomatic personnel.²⁸ The criticism Martin does not address in her paper is that few of these diplomats or other high level officials trained in the ESDP and other classes will

17 Madrid Report, 9.

18 Barcelona Report 2004, 17.

19 Madrid Report 2007, 18.

20 Barcelona Report 2004, 18.

21 Madrid Report 2007, 10.

22 Barcelona Report 2004, 16.

23 Mary Martin, Denisa Kostovicova and Tanja Tamminen conducted interviews together in Kosovo in September 2007 to prepare the pilot training.

24 Martin 2007b.

25 To implement a European Commission financed project on “Training for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management” an informal European Group on Training was formed of different training institutes. The project has been finalized, but the network remains.

26 Martin 2007a, 2.

27 Martin 2007a, 3.

28 Ibid., 5–6.

eventually be deployed in field missions. It is still quite rare that the newly appointed EUSR or Head of Mission would have the time or the opportunity to attend specific ESDP courses. It is thus a legitimate question how cost-effective these expensive trainings finally are from the point of view of the EU field operations. In general, the percentage of all those who have been trained by the EU or the member state for an ESDP operation, to actually be seconded to an operation is surprisingly low.

The Directorate General E Civilian Crisis Management (DGE IX) in the Council General Secretariat conducted a survey on the EU's on-going operations noting that a large number of personnel deployed on the field wished for more pre-deployment training. A substantial number (36%) of personnel had not attended any ESDP training what so ever prior to deployment.²⁹ The EU Planning Team in Kosovo (EUPT) has taken the training issue seriously and organised the first ESDP training conference in Pristina in October 2007. The EUPT invited the EU member state training institutes to attend and plan together solutions to address the acute training needs of the future EU operation in Kosovo.³⁰ Today most of the solutions are found on an ad hoc basis, but the ESDP training sphere is developing constantly towards new "best practices" that will help future operations.

Mary Martin suggests in her study that a common human security training for those deployed on the field could solve a certain set of problems when it comes to the EU's training agenda. The human security training as a concept itself would offer EU personnel a workable toolkit: a security doctrine that could be implemented on the ground thus creating the needed "operational culture" and an agreed "set of norms". Martin suggests that the training should always be region specific, taking the local society as a starting point promoting "bottom-up participation" and including trainers from the specific crisis area itself.³¹ The focus of the training should not only be the EU structures, but also the conditions on the ground. It should be noted however, that Martin's proposal does not include a problem that is rarely highlighted: in crisis situation or in a post-conflict society the international community stands in front of a difficult dilemma: who to listen to; whose interpretation of the conflict to believe or to subscribe to or how to learn the situation while still staying impartial; which NGOs or political leaders to support and for which to watch out. While preparing training on conflict situations these questions must be kept in mind – even if they cannot ever be answered exhaustively.

To reinforce the legitimacy of EU's action, Martin suggests that the training should be based on the specific operational mandate of which the trainees will be deployed.³² This is difficult in such cases when the mandates and rules of engagement, including CONOPS and OPLAN³³, are still restricted documents. Martin underlines that "the Human

Security approach requires a commitment by those involved with EU mission to international institutions, and to working through agreed rules and norms, particularly international law". As agreeable as it sounds the EU works in crisis areas also in such a political context where the EU as a political union has political priorities and preferences. The crisis management operations cannot work in a pure vacuum but have to follow the political guidance of member states: thus, for example answers to previously mentioned questions, "which political leaders to support or which local institutions to protect", may also have political meaning. The EU is a political union and its policy goals are determined in a political debate between member states, often as a compromise of their internal policies which has repercussions also on the field mission level.

Despite these practical difficulties of Martin's proposals, she manages to bring up a set of weaknesses that the current ESDP training is facing and to propose pertinent arguments as to how the human security training could respond to these weaknesses. Following the six principles of Human Security Doctrine, Martin notes that current training often lacks mainstreaming of human rights proposing only a human rights module or a lecture as if protecting human rights would not be as cross-cutting issue as gender for example. The Human Security Doctrine emphasises the primacy of human rights protection in all crisis management activities. Martin underlines that often the personal safety of mission personnel is accorded more training than the objective of the operation to protect local populations. The human security training would propose a different perspective. Martin also appeals for more integrated civil-military training to address the current "gap" between different kinds of methods combating old and new security threats. Moreover, Martin reminds us that "effective multilateralism", coordination between different international actors in the crisis areas, should be trained in view of "division of labour" and not as just understanding different work methods of crisis management.³⁴ According to Martin

"[T]he multilateralism principle would include instruction and enactment scenarios based on how the local situation relates to international law, how to co-ordinate action with other international and local institutions and what kind of division of labour is needed on the ground."³⁵

Martin's criticism towards current situations is pertinent. For example, in Kosovo the EU was represented by over half a dozen different actors in 2007: the economic pillar of the UNMIK administration is led by the EU, the European Commission has a liaison office in Kosovo, the technical aid is coordinated by the European Reconstruction Agency (EAR), the EUPT is deployed in the region to plan the future ESDP operation, at the same time the ICO Preparation Team is there to plan the office of the future EU Special Representative (EUSR) office, not to mention the EU Presidency and other member states' liaison offices, the visits of the High Representative Solana or the EU Status Envoy Stefan Lehne during the

29 DGE IX 2006.

30 See <http://www.eupt-kosovo.eu/training/>.

31 Martin 2007a, 12–13.

32 Ibid., 12.

33 CONOPS, Concept of Operations; OPLAN, Operation Plan.

34 Martin 2007a, 13–14.

35 Ibid., 17.

Ahtisaari period or Wolfgang Ischinger during the troika led negotiations. Indeed, the coherence of the EU activities needs to be improved if the EU plans to conduct a successful ESDP operation in the region.

3 Limits and challenges of the human security thinking

3.1 *Human Security in Kosovo under status negotiations*

As previously mentioned, certain ideas in the human security training concept are confronted to some practical problems such as the restricted EU documents that cannot be used as basis for training or the not so black and white situations on the ground that cannot always be easily explained in lectures during the training despite inviting local trainers and civil society representatives. Also the human security concept as such has faced a number of criticisms since its launch. I will very rapidly go through certain criticisms that the Human Security Study Group has dealt with on a conceptual level. However, I will analyse more in-depth the limits of the concept in the concrete case of Kosovo. Another set of criticism will be analysed in the framework of the development of European Union's crisis management policies in general.

The concept of human security is not only used by Mary Kaldor and her Study Group but also by other researchers as well as political actors³⁶. The concept itself has been judged in the academic circles as too vast and too vague to be clearly defined and effectively used in practise.³⁷ Indeed, the broad definition of the concept for example used by the UNDP can be seen to include all sorts of factors of insecurity. In fact, the wide definition has been criticised as too broad to focus on practical ways of dealing with security threats and it is not considered useful in academic theories or for policy planning. This is why the Human Security Study Group has adopted a much narrower definition of the concept based on the earlier mentioned six principles and focusing on the EU's crisis management activities.³⁸

Main criticisms on human security theorising are directly linked with the current debate on the excessive use of the concept of security in international relations; only if an issue is defined as a security issue in today's politics it can get overwhelming attention. Barry Buzan argues that "[O]ver-securitization risks destroying the intellectual coherence of the field, overcomplicating solution finding".³⁹ Indeed, in speaking about human security, some see a risk of giving space to increasing interventionism by the international community in the name of shared responsibility: "Human security challenges the role of the sovereign state as the sole provider of security" and "provides justification for continued surveillance and engagement, used by dominant powers to legitimize self-interested interventionism".⁴⁰ Buzan however reminds us, that "[h]uman security remains state-centric despite the supranational dimensions of the concept". It can be seen as "a new tool for existing governing agencies to shape and control civil populations".⁴¹

As the Madrid Report puts it,

"[S]ome critics worry that [Human Security] is a new label for neo-imperialism and a way to justify liberal interventionism and a new European militarism. Others argue that far from being hawkish, the concept lacks teeth and is too 'warm and fuzzy' or 'soft'".⁴²

Madrid Report answers a number of criticisms but has difficulties in defending the concept against the argument that human security "simply re-labels existing issues and tools".⁴³ The Madrid Report tries to provide a specific "discursive and operational framework"⁴⁴ for these multiple EU activities.

Kosovo represents an interesting test case for human security concept. Kosovo has been a testing ground for many

36 UNDP has used the concept in Human Development Reports since 2004 with a broader definition than the one used by Mary Kaldor, a Human Security referee journal is published in Paris by Center for Peace and Human Security (PHS), etc.

37 Excellent synthesis of criticisms and counter-arguments on human security concept can be found in Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy 2007, 59–68.

38 As this article is based on the Human Security Study Group definition of Human Security, I will not elaborate extensively on the broader debate on "human security" concept. A wide range of sources exist to study the

different uses of this concept. See for example Human Security Report (2005).

39 Buzan in Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy 2007, 63.

40 Buzan in Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy 2007, 64.

41 Buzan in Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy 2007, 63–64; See also Buzan 2004.

42 Madrid Report 2007, 10.

43 Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy 2007, 68.

44 Madrid Report 2007, 10.

European or Euro-Atlantic foreign and security policy ideas ever since the 1999 NATO bombings. That event marked a historical change in the NATO policy lines as for the first time the member states decided to strike against a sovereign state to come to the aid of a persecuted minority. Scholarly debate on the normative legitimacy of the NATO bombings was fierce during and after the bombings.⁴⁵ Some peace organisations and activists of political left organised public demonstrations against the bombings in defence of Milosevic's Serbia in Europe as well as for example in Canada.⁴⁶ However, it had been the president of Serbia Slobodan Milosevic backed up by most of the political elite and population that removed the autonomous status from the mainly Albanian inhabited province of Kosovo. Albanians were pushed to leave public posts forcing the area to a strange parallel system for 10 years in which Albanians had to organise the public services such as schools and general health services for themselves in private homes. Clandestine elections were held and the province's Albanian population was led by a commonly elected President Ibrahim Rugova, who chose a peaceful resistance policy line to avoid the massacres that were taking place in Bosnia in the early 1990s. Only in the late 1990s young Albanians took up arms and built the Kosovo Liberation Army (UÇK) which struck against Serbian police stations and provoked the Serbian security services to take up ethnic cleansing measures against the Albanian civil population. Finally, these events led to NATO intervention in the spring 1999.

Kosovo came under the UN Security Council resolution 1244 a UN protectorate administered by UNMIK. This solution in the aftermath of the NATO bombings was perceived as provisional. The issue of Kosovo status was to be determined later. However, the years passed under slow and ineffective international administration. UNMIK was built on four pillars which were: 1) Police and Justice, under the direct leadership of the United Nations 2) Civil Administration, also under the direct leadership of the United Nations 3) Democratization and Institution Building, led by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and 4) Reconstruction and Economic Development, led by the European Union. Today before the status solution only two of the pillars remain: the OSCE led institutions building pillar and the EU led reconstruction pillar. Most of the tasks in the field of police, justice and civil administration have been transferred to the local institutions including the creation of the Ministries of Justice and Interior in early 2005.

Despite huge international aid for reconstruction, Kosovo's economy was not able to recover in this *limbo* situation where potential private investors did not know whether they were investing in a province of Serbia or a future independent Kosovo. Without independence Kosovo was and is still not able to apply for loans from the international financial institutions such as World Bank or IMF. The extremely young population of Kosovo, of which among the Albanians over 50 percent are

under 25 years old, felt trapped in a situation with no prospects. Most of them were not allowed visas to move as *Gastarbeiter* to the Western countries but there was no work available in Kosovo. In this situation the threat of social instability was imminent and it burst into violence against the Serb minority during one weekend in spring 2004 in the aftermath of the death of three Albanian children in the Ibar river.

Only this sudden violence woke up the international community and forced the question of Kosovo status to be pushed into the forefront of the EU agenda. The "standards before status" logic had proved to be ineffective as one of the major standards; where as the return of the Serbian displaced persons (IDP) to their homes became a very useful tool in the hands of the Belgrade politicians. As long as the Serbian population felt insecure in Kosovo it was impossible for the Kosovo authorities together with the international community to convince Serbian IDPs to return. As long as the situation remained so, Belgrade was sure that the uncomfortable status issue would not be discussed. However, the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan asked a Norwegian diplomat Kai Eide to write a report on the causes of the 2004 incident, the report concluded that the violence against the Serbian minority was directly caused by the frustration of the Albanian population. In the summer of 2005 in a report to the UN, Kai Eide urged the international community to start the Kosovo status negotiations as soon as possible.⁴⁷

Former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari was nominated by Secretary General Annan to head these status negotiations in November 2005. An atmosphere of hope arose in Kosovo as the negotiations were not expected to be long. In parallel with the status negotiations the EU wanted to redefine its role in Kosovo. The UN was to leave Kosovo permanently despite the state of affairs and the EU started to plan for the ESDP operation: a Kosovo Rule of Law Operation. An EUPT was sent to Kosovo to make specific plans for the EU action in the post-status Kosovo in late spring 2006. Meanwhile Ahtisaari's status proposal was being drafted through the negotiations between Kosovo and Belgrade representatives on specific issues such as decentralisation, cultural heritage and minority rights. The international community accepted the idea of using the Bosnian model of institution: a High Representative who would have a small international staff to over-see the status implementation. In Kosovo this would be called the ICO, International Civilian Office. The plans were however severely slowed by the Serbian elections in January 2007 and later on by the Russian opposition to a new UN Security Council resolution based on Ahtisaari plan in summer 2007.

In this situation Ahtisaari backed off from the negotiations and the Contact Group on Kosovo took over. Wolfgang Ischinger was nominated to represent the EU in negotiations but many observers noted that this move from the hands of the UNOSEK⁴⁸ to the hands of the old great nations (United States, United Kingdom, Russia, France, Germany and Italy)

45 See for example Lutz 1999/2000; Krause 2000; or Booth 2001.

46 Manifestations in Canada, see for example Leblanc 1999.

47 Eide 2005.

48 UNOSEK, Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General of the United Nations for the future status process for Kosovo.

marked a clear failure of the EU's authority on the subject. However, the Ahtisaari plan of supervised sovereignty was never taken off the table and was kept as a basis of all EU and Western planning for future international presence in Kosovo, a presence that is supposed to be closer to the local population than the distant UNMIK administration had been.

Different studies and surveys have been conducted in Kosovo to analyse the human security situation and public perceptions of security.⁴⁹ Some of these studies/surveys do not use the human security concept but touch upon the human security issues. Some of these use the concept but maybe with slightly different definitions than Mary Kaldor's Study Group.⁵⁰ Despite different approaches, clearly the main security issue identified by Albanian, Serbian and other minority populations in Kosovo is economic uncertainty and unemployment (around 45%). Almost 70% of Kosovars still live in the country side, mainly living on small one family farms. The extremely young population lacks education. Schools are over crowded and working in triple shifts if not even with 4 shifts a day assuring each child at least few hours of teaching. Teachers are underpaid and unmotivated. A number of women living in rural areas are still illiterate.⁵¹ Kaldor's theoretical framework would indeed be useful in raising some major issues in Kosovo's current situation.⁵²

Human Security Study Group work on Kosovo has concentrated on the case of Serbian minority, a group that is keenly observed by the world. During UNMIK time they were a tool of Belgrade, asked to boycott all elections and all cooperation with the UN or local authorities in Kosovo. Despite a number of efforts from the international side and the significant drop of interethnic crime, the integration of the Serbian enclaves has failed. A number of other communities suffer a similar fate in the current situation: Roma, Ashkali, Gorani and other smaller ethnic minorities require integration policies and special attention.

Human security doctrine is not only about protecting vulnerable groups, but about listening to local knowledge, respecting local ownership and about legitimate action. These are pertinent questions when deciding upon the amount of executive powers of the future ESDP operation and the rights of intervention ("the corrective powers") of the International Civilian Representative. How to strengthen local ownership, accountability of the local leaders as well as the legitimacy of international presence? These are all basic human security questions. They can be analysed on the basis of the lessons learnt in Bosnia and Herzegovina or even in UNMIK. How will the future EU operation manage to overcome the problems

of UNMIK: sounding superior, lacking coordination and coherence with other international actors on the field? The human security concept is a useful tool in analysing these kinds of issues.

Trying to implement an academic concept into a crisis area reality or EU's ESDP bureaucracy is not an easy task. In the Kosovo case, it is in fact a pity that the Human Security Study Group has not concentrated on the above mentioned questions to contribute in developing the future EU operation in Kosovo. The Study Group has on the contrary shown strong criticism towards the Ahtisaari plan that has been widely accepted as the "best plan possible" to solve the Kosovo stalemate. The Ahtisaari plan sees a wide range of special rights to the minority communities in the post-status Kosovo – a set of rights that even highly esteemed democratic countries such as Finland are not able to implement in their minority areas⁵³. The criticism of the Human Security Study Group focuses on the non-involvement of the local inhabitants in the status negotiations. The Kosovo status negotiations were however led by the Kosovo Albanian side, the so called Unity Team, including representatives of all major parties as well as an NGO representative. The decentralisation plan has not been debated at the municipal level which according to Denisa Kostovicova, for example, is a major shortcoming of the plan.⁵⁴ The criticism does not take into account however the extremely difficult context of the negotiations, for example Belgrade representing Kosovo Serbs. More useful from the practical EU perspective would be a Human Security approach that does not propose a new academic status proposal but focuses on the best (human security) practices of the EU personnel to implement the status proposal achieved under pressure of world politics.

3.2 *ESDP development in parallel to human security debate*

On the political EU field the attempt of Kaldor's Study Group to lobby for the Human Security Doctrine concept has often been confronted with the argument: "We are already doing this, we just don't call it Human Security". Indeed, as elaborated more precisely later in this article, the human security principles are often included in the EU policy making and it is a legitimate question to ask, what would be the added value of a new concept in the EU security policy discourse if the content of human security principles are already existing. As such the Madrid Report gives very few concrete proposals for decision makers on operational changes in EU activities – if not counting the training proposals.

Civilian crisis management aims at strengthening the democratisation, respect for human rights and rule of law, good governance and functioning civil society in post-conflict areas. It is clear that military means are not enough to resolve a conflict – they can merely stop the violence, protect human lives and provide more stable environment for the civilian

49 Eide 2005; ICG 2007; Saferworld 2007a; 2007b; UNDP 2006a; UNDP Early Warning Report 2007.

50 Forum for Civic Initiatives and Saferworld 2007.

51 Illiteracy in Kosovo is among the highest in Europe, see UNDP 2006a, 12–13. "In rural areas, for example, about 9.5 percent of females aged 16 to 19 are estimated to be illiterate; moreover, one in four young women in those areas has very limited knowledge of reading and writing." (UNDP 2006b, 41)

52 Šaboviæ (2007) uses the framework and brings up the economic dimension of Human Security.

53 Cf. Sámi people in the Finnish Lapland. Finland has not ratified the ILO-Convention No. 169 on Indigenous Peoples. (See for example CCPR 2004)

54 See for instance Kostovicova et al. 2007.

actors to take up other responsibilities in the field of conflict management and peace building. As Mary Kaldor and the Human Security Study Group underlines, the functioning coordination and cooperation between civil and military actors is an absolute necessity.

This is an issue that has been underlined on the EU agenda as well. As such the ESDP field of activities is still developing. If the military side was first thought of in the European Council of December 1999 in Helsinki the EU member states underlined, in the aftermath of the earlier Kosovo War, that EU needs to coordinate and develop its non-military capabilities. Since 1999 EU civilian crisis management has become one of the most useful tools of the EU in the field of ESDP. The EU has launched operation in the Balkans, the Caucasus as well as in Africa and the fields of activities are multiple: including police and justice sector reform, border management, monitoring peace agreements, training, and so on. Currently the EU has 12 operations on-going or being planned.

The EU's Security Strategy from December 2003 defined a certain set of EU's global challenges which were in many cases echoing the United States' security doctrine drafted in the post 9/11. To answer some of these threats, EU's crisis management capabilities were further developed. In December 2004 work to prepare the Civilian Headline Goal 2008 was launched. The goal was to create such civilian capabilities that the EU would be able to conduct multiple and different kinds of civilian operations at the same time. This could either be independent operations or parts of other military operations. This would integrate the expertise of different EU focus areas such as policing, rule of law and civilian administration. According to the plans, operations should be able to be launched in less than a month from the moment that the political agreement is reached. The EU activities should be coherent and coordinated with the EU Commission activities. Indeed, one of the major practical flaws of the EU's rapid action is that the EU Commission is in charge of the money. When political decisions on the launch of an operation can be reached quite fast, the procurement and money related issues often lag behind.

Following the military Headline Goal example the Civilian Headline Goal 2008 process developed scenarios of future civilian crisis management challenges and the needs for civilian capabilities. As there are many actors involved in civilian crisis management, coordination between the EU institutions and different international organisations was strongly underlined. In addition, Civilian Headline Goal led to the creation of the rapid reaction activities, the so called Civilian Response Teams, which are ready to be deployed in 3 to 5 days and can work for example to make first assessments in the conflict areas, support in establishing a new operation or bring in expertise in a crucial phase of an earlier launched operation. Just recently, in the November 2007 General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) agreed on the report of the Civilian Headline Goal 2008 and launched a new process called Civilian Headline Goal 2010 to further strengthen the EU's capabilities to conduct field operations.

Thus, the debates inside the EU follow a certain agreed pattern. The ambassadorial level (PSC) has the political

leadership over ESDP operations. "New best practices" are invented both in the field missions and during meetings in Brussels (including the CHG process). The Barcelona Report has most certainly contributed to the thinking of the civilian crisis management capabilities. The proposals of the Barcelona Report were not seen as possible to implement and the EU did not endorse the report. However the concept of human security did stay in the debate inside the EU and impacts initiatives such as the planning. The Human Security Study Group still hopes that the Madrid Report which has been striped off the impractical proposals will be endorsed by the EU. The problem is that the EU has come a long way since 2004. A number of human security issues are currently discussed on different levels of the EU decision making process (CIVCOM, PMG, PSC, etc.⁵⁵). In the EU the discussions are focused (including in the earlier mentioned Civilian Headline Goal process) on: the need to strengthen civil-military cooperation, to implement the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women in armed conflicts, to focus on DDR and SSR activities⁵⁶, to improve crisis management training, to strengthen cooperation with civil society actors and other international actors as well as on linking and synchronising security and development issues. Indeed, all these issues can be found in the last year GAERG conclusions for example. Moreover, in November 2007 the EU Ministers of Defence and Development Aid held for the first time a meeting together to collectively discuss security and development issues and to agree on common Council conclusion.

Even though it is not discussed in the conceptual framework of human security, many of Kaldor's and her Study Groups' ideas are thus on the table in the EU. The work of the EUPT in Kosovo is an excellent example of how the EU is improving its crisis management activities in the spirit of "Human Security" even if it is not labelled as such. Consulting the local population, taking into account regional impact of EU activities, planning better training and evaluation policies for the operation, the EUPT is creating "best practices" for ESDP operations. Even though the EU is improving its activities, and this is also noted in the new Madrid Report, there are still plenty of issues that need to be tackled. For example, the effective multilateralism emphasised both in the Madrid Report as in the political debates inside the EU still needs improving. Not only are the EU actors on the field often unaware of their activities; Commission's technical aid projects can be planned with no link to ESDP operation planning for example. Close dialogue and coordination between the EU, NATO, the OSCE and the UN in the case of Kosovo is an absolute requirement for the success of the future ESDP operation. However, if it is considered on the political field as a matter of human security is another question.

55 CIVCOM, Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management; PMG, Politico-Military Working Group; and PSC, Political and Security Committee. They are all in charge of civilian crisis management planning.

56 DDR, Disarmament Demobilisation Reintegration; SSR, Security Sector Reform.

4 Kosovo focused Human Security training

4.1 Future ESDP operation in Kosovo

In this last chapter I will argue that a major test case for the human security concept – controversial or not – will be the post-status Kosovo. I will conclude this chapter by underlining the usefulness of the human security philosophy when preparing trainings for the EU experts to be deployed in Kosovo.

As already discussed, in June 1999 the UN Security Council adapted the famous resolution 1244 that established the provisional UN administration, UNMIK⁵⁷, to Kosovo. UNMIK has been in charge of the civilian administration, promoting autonomy and self-government in Kosovo by gradually transferring its responsibilities into the hands of the Kosovo authorities, the Provisional Interim Government of Kosovo (PISG). The resolution 1244 also called on UNMIK to facilitate a political process to determine Kosovo's future status.

Based on the UNSC resolution 1244 in November 2005 the Secretary General launched the process to determine Kosovo's future status. His Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari made a status proposal in early 2007 on "supervised independence". The proposal calls for the abolishment of the remaining UNMIK factions and the creation of a much smaller and lighter International Civilian Office. The idea is to follow the example of Office of the High Representative (OHR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to name a High Representative (HR) of the International community to supervise the implementation of the status agreement. The HR would also be nominated as the EU Special Representative. This new international presence in Kosovo would promote local ownership and accountability. The EU is considered to have a special role in the post-status Kosovo as the EUSR (double hatted as the International Civilian Representative, and maybe if needed even triple hatted as the SRSG⁵⁸) will supervise the status implementation. Moreover, the EU is sending to Kosovo the largest civilian crisis management operation of the ESDP's history.

The idea was not to create a new UNMIK that was already perceived as distant and unfair by the local population. There are several court cases pending against international organisations – no one has dealt with them during UNMIK administration. Some Kosovo citizens have felt mistreated by UNMIK but have had no forum to discuss grievances. The EUPT in Kosovo has underlined the willingness of the EU to be more close to Kosovo's local institutions and people. International judges are planned to sit together with local judges in the same buildings and not in some distant "ivory towers" behind heavily armed military personnel. At least on the surface the relations between international civilian crisis management personnel and the local population are planned to change. Does this also mean a change in the perceptions of the international role in contributing to the security of Kosovo? What will be the security doctrine of the future mission?

Despite or due to (the not so surprising) the failure of the negotiations between Pristina and Belgrade, the Ahtisaari plan is still expected to be the basis of the future status of Kosovo. The EUPT has been in place since the spring 2006 to plan the future ESDP operation to the post-status Kosovo. The Team has produced extensive set of options, needs assessments and financial blueprints for the future operation. However, the Concept of Operations can be decided upon only after the status solution, whether the UN Security Council resolution or, more likely, Kosovo's coordinated independence declaration and the recognition of the United States and the EU member states. For example, the possible executive powers of the EU operation and other specific parts of its mandate cannot be decided before the actual status of Kosovo is known. According to the primary plans, the future ESDP operation would include around 1700 international experts. Their main tasks would lie in the field of mentoring, monitoring and assisting Kosovo's own authorities, including police, justice and customs. A specific transition period between the actual deployment of the ESDP operation and the closing down of UNMIK (120 days) is foreseen in the Ahtisaari plan, but can also depend on the political decisions when Kosovo government actually declares independence; the UNSC resolution 1244 may be extended and thus a mini-UNMIK maybe needed. All these questions remain to be answered at the time of writing of this article.

57 <http://www.unmikonline.org/intro.htm>, accessed 27/11/2008.

58 Special Representative of the UN Secretary General in case the UN Security Council resolution 1244 is not changed.

Close cooperation between the international actors is, in any case, an absolute necessity. These plans also require quite a massive training effort to give the personnel of the future EU mission the specific ESDP and Kosovo knowledge needed in order to implement the operation efficiently.

4.2 *Added value of Kosovo specific human security training*

Indeed, the member states have been asked to organise Kosovo specific ESDP training for those experts that they count to propose for the seconded positions in the future operation.⁵⁹ Crisis Management Centre Finland prepared in cooperation with Mary Kaldor, Mary Martin and the Human Security Study Group, a Kosovo specific Human Security training which took place in February 2008.⁶⁰ These efforts are a clear answer to the EUPT appeal for better member state accountability in the field of ESDP training.

Kosovo focused human security training can at the same time contribute to the training of future ESDP personnel, but will also have a larger scope trying to influence not only those deployed on the field but also those they need to cooperate with whether in Brussels (Commission or Council Secretariat) or on the military side in Kosovo (Kfor) for example. Even though one pilot training cannot reach a large audience, the first step is significant. In Kosovo case, the human security approach can bring up some essential issues that are not often considered in the civilian crisis management efforts in place today.

The supremacy of human rights principle underlines that all locals are equal citizens. Often crisis management operations tend to take for granted that international staff treats minority and majority populations equally. Minority and majority divide is not however always an ethnic question. As underlined in Human Security Doctrine's "bottom-up" principle, international actors deployed on the ground should take into account and consult not only obvious minority groups such as ethnic minorities, but also other vulnerable groups that can be children, handicap, or even majority groups as in Kosovo case women or youth.

It is obvious that gender issues should be mainstreamed all through the international activities whether crisis management, reconstruction or humanitarian aid in crisis areas. Women are the best source of information when it comes to planning effective ways of helping their living conditions. There is a debate if women should be more involved in the peace negotiations because of their equal rights of being represented or because of their capabilities of reconciliation. Either way, their participation is seen as something that should be promoted. The Kosovo Women's network is in constant dialogue with mutual visits with the Women in Black of Serbia

– a dialogue that could not be imagined among the men.⁶¹ These kinds of examples are numerous but not so many times listened to; women do have a voice in Kosovo.

But who talks about the youth?⁶² Are the young people equal citizens in the eyes of the international actors or are they perceived more as a security threat in Kosovo? Indeed, when talking about the youth in Kosovo, too often attention is drawn to that weekend in the spring 2004 when the mobs of young men stormed on the streets and burnt orthodox churches in revenge of the death of 3 Albanian children, or to the spring 2007 when youngsters manifested against status negotiations and two of them got killed by the rubber bullets of the international police. The population of Kosovo is extremely young and growing; some estimates count about 70% of the population under 30 years. At the same time, this population lacks employment prospects, education opportunities or possibilities to immigrate. How to consult young people? How to integrate them in the dialogue between internationals and locals? These are important challenges for the future ESDP operation. For example, in the situation where the political elite has lost legitimacy in the eyes of the population, it is the population itself that suffers from the lack of education in a situation where the government makes future plans mainly on prospects of mining and electricity production. There is indeed no clear plan on reforming the education sector in Kosovo.

This young population expects a lot from the post-status times – a better future. A deep disappointment could be fatal. In this sense, also the human security principle of legitimate political leadership should be closely studied in the training. How to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the local population? How to support local institutions, local ownership and local accountability? The coordinator of the Internal Security Sector Review of Kosovo⁶³, Anthony Welch, underlines that the EU "needs to allow the new Kosovo – – to find its own way, make its own mistakes and grow as a society and political entity".⁶⁴ Too often, international advisors find it easier to draft the laws by themselves or make the project proposals on their own as they realise their counterparts in local institutions would not know how to do. How to avoid this again, as the EU sends a huge number of experts in the field? And how not to give promises that EU actors cannot keep? For example, the ESDP operation will not have such financial instruments in its hands as the Commission has. A smooth cooperation and coordination – as Kaldor says "effective multilateralism" – is a virtue that the EU actors in the field need to acquire.

59 For example, in Finland, the Crisis Management Centre Finland, located in Kuopio, has already organised three Integrated Rule of Law courses that focused on Kosovo.

60 *Applying Human Security in Crisis Management*, 11.–15.2.2008, Kuopio, Finland. See more at www.cmcfinland.fi.

61 The Kosova Women's Network and Women in Black Network Serbia formed the Women's Peace Coalition on 7 May 2006 (Kosovar Women's Voice 2006, 1)

62 Kuper 2007.

63 UNDP 2006a.

64 Welch 2006, 234.

5 Conclusion

It is evident that the European Union is facing a major challenge when launching an ESDP operation in Kosovo. First, it is a challenge for the EU's internal unity. Some countries seem more reluctant to recognise the independence of Kosovo than others which creates a problem for the commonly agreed judicial basis of the operation in a situation where Serbia is not ready to accept the internationally imposed status solution. As the credibility of the ESDP depends on how the EU is able to deal with such a sensitive political issue, it is however highly probable that the EU manages to get over its internal hesitations and launch the operation.

Second, the operation challenges the EU's credibility not only on the international scene but also in the field in Kosovo. Is EU able to deliver its promises, assist the institutions to take up more responsibility and ownership and contribute to Kosovo's sustainable development? Is EU able to convince the local population as well as the local leadership of the necessity and legitimacy of reforms and the signification of the EU perspective? On the Serbian side the EU perspective, even though it is often underlined in political discourse, it has not brought the same pace of reforms as in the candidate countries. On the contrary, many observers often wonder if Serbia even wants to join the EU in the future. The EU's ESDP operation in Kosovo will be closely linked to EU's enlargement policies and the EU assistance is based on the EU membership perspective.

As the European Union develops its common foreign and security policy, Kosovo, is a very useful test case for an integrated rule of law operation and the development of civilian crisis management operation. The EU partners discuss the EU's credibility, the EU's capabilities, and the EU's position on the world scene. The third challenge I would like to point out in the spirit of the Human Security Doctrine, is however the most important: the effectiveness of the EU activities, the added value of the EU operation, the actual benefits that the EU's civilian crisis management operation brings on the ground to the lives of local populations.

This article has made an effort to underline the specific value but also the limits of the Human Security theorising in the concrete civilian crisis management planning of the EU using the Kosovo case as an example. How the human security approach can be useful is to find concrete ways to enhance the EU's performance on the ground in crisis areas. By emphasising the primacy of human rights and the need of effective cooperation between different international actors, the Human Security Doctrine reveals relevant areas where the EU should improve the carrying out of crisis management activities. To underline in pre-mission human security trainings the EU's accountability towards the local populations is already a goal in itself.

References

Primary documents

Barcelona Report (2004): *A Human Security Doctrine for Europe: The Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities presented to EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana in Barcelona on 15 September 2004*. <http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/researchhumansecurity.htm>.

CCPR (International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, United Nations) (2004): *Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee: Finland*. 02/12/2004. [http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/\(Symbol\)/CCPR.CO.82.FIN.En?Opendocument](http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/CCPR.CO.82.FIN.En?Opendocument), accessed on 3/1/2008.

DGE IX 2006: *EU/ESDP Training Survey 2006*.

Eide, Kai (2005): "A comprehensive review of the situation in Kosovo". <http://www.unosek.org/docref/KaiEidereport.pdf>

Forum for Civic Initiatives and Saferworld (2007): *Human security in Kosovo: A survey of perceptions*, May 2007. http://www.saferworld.org.uk/images/pubdocs/Human_Security_in_Kosovo_English.pdf.

Human Security Report (2005): Human Security Centre, Liu Institute for Global Issues, University of British Columbia. <http://www.humansecurityreport.info/content/view/28/63/>.

Human Security Study Group, London School of Economics. <http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/researchhumansecurity.htm>

International Crisis Group (2007a): "Breaking the Kosovo Stalemate: Europe's Responsibility" *Europe Report*, No. 185, 21 August 2007. <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5018&l=1>.

International Crisis Group (2007b): "Kosovo Countdown: A Blueprint for Transition". *Europe Report*, No. 188, 6 December 2007. <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5201&l=1>.

Madrid Report (2007): *A European Way of Security: The Madrid Report of the Human Security Study Group comprising a Proposal and Background Report by Human Security Study Group (LSE), launched in Madrid 8th November*. <http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/PDFs/Madrid%20Report%20Final%20for%20distribution.pdf>.

Saferworld (2007): "Kosovo at the crossroads: Perceptions of conflict, access to justice and opportunities for peace in Kosovo", December 2007. <http://www.saferworld.org.uk/images/pubdocs/SafePlace%20Conflict%20Analysis%20%20Report%2020071202%20English.pdf>.

UNDP Kosovo Internal Security Sector Review (2006a). http://www.kosovo.undp.org/repository/docs/ISSR_report_eng_ver2.pdf.

UNDP Kosovo Human Development Report (2006b): "Youth – A new generation for a new Kosovo". http://www.kosovo.undp.org/repository/docs/hdr_eng.pdf.

UNDP Kosovo Early Warning Report (2007). http://www.kosovo.undp.org/repository/docs/EWR17_eng.pdf.

UNOSEK Kosovo Comprehensive status proposal. <http://www.unosek.org/unosek/en/statusproposal.html>.

UN Security Council Resolution 1244. <http://www.nato.int/Kosovo/docu/u990610a.htm>.

Bibliography

Booth, Ken (ed.) (2001): *The Kosovo Tragedy: the Human Rights Dimensions*. London: Frank Cass.

Buzan, Barry (2004): "A Reductionist, Idealistic Notion that Adds Little Analytical Value". *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 35, No. 3, September.

Calic, Marie-Janine (2007): "EU Enlargement and Common Foreign and Security Policy in the Western Balkans". *Südosteuropa Mitteilungen*, No. 1, Jahrgang 47, 12–19.

Dahl-Eriksen, Tor (2007): "Human Security – a New Concept which Adds New Dimensions to Important Human Rights Discussions?" Paper presented in a Conference International Relations and Security Theories: Impacts and Influences organized by CERI, Paris in cooperation with University of Tromsø, Norway.

Gladius, Marlies & Mary Kaldor (eds.) (2006): *A Human Security Doctrine for Europe*. London: Routledge.

Kaldor, Mary (1999): *New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Kaldor, Mary (2007): "Human Security in the Balkans". *Südosteuropa Mitteilungen*, No. 1, Jahrgang 47, 6–11.

Kaldor, Mary, Mary Martin & Sabine Selchow (2007): "Human Security: a New Strategic Narrative for Europe". *International Affairs*, 83(2), 273–288.

Kosova Women's Voice (2006): "Serbian, Kosovar Women Unite: Issue Statement", Vol 4, Issue 2, Spring. <http://www.womensnetwork.org/pdf/newsletters/kwniv-2-eng-e.pdf>.

Kostovicova, Denisa, Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic & Pavel Seifter (2007): *European Zones of Human Security: A Proposal for the European Union*. Paper commissioned by the Human Security Study Group.

Krause, Joachim (ed.) (2000): *Kosovo – Humanitäre Intervention und cooperative Sicherheit in Europa*. Opladen: Leske + Budrich.

Kuper, Jenny (2007): "A Minor Matter? Young People in an EU Human Security Doctrine". Paper commissioned by the Human Security Study Group and prepared for the International Workshop on an EU Human Security Doctrine: London February 8 and 9, 2007. <http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/PDFs/HS2007YoungPeople.pdf>.

Leblanc, Guy (1999): "Manifestation à Ottawa contre les bombardements de l'OTAN". *World Socialist Website*. https://wsws.org/francais/News/1999/juin99/8juin_ottamani.shtml.

Lutz, Dieter S. (ed.) (1999/2000): *Der Kosovo-Krieg. Rechtliche und rechtsethische Aspekte*. Baden-Baden: Nomos.

Martin, Mary (2007a): "Secure Learning: The role of training in embedding a Human Security doctrine for Europe: Case Study for the Madrid Report of the Human Security Study Group". <http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/PDFs/HS2007SecureLearning.pdf>.

Martin, Mary (2007b): *Human security training concept for CMC Finland*. Not published.

Šaboviæ, Senad (2007): "A Human Security Assessment of EU Engagement in Kosovo". <http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/PDFs/HS2007Kosovo.pdf>.

Tadjibakhsh, Shahrbanou & Anuradha Chenoy (2007): *Human Security: Concepts and Implications*. Routledge.

Welch, Anthony Cleland (2006): "Achieving Human Security after Intra-State Conflict: the Lessons of Kosovo". *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, 14(2), August, 221–239.

PRT models in Afghanistan

Approaches to civil-military integration

Oskari Eronen

The 26 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in Afghanistan combine military and civilian capacities in crisis management. This article gives an overview of the mission and history of the teams, presenting more closely four generic PRT models. The flexibility of the concept has developed into an incoherent network of lead-nation-driven units which could run counterproductive to Afghan ownership and the comprehensiveness of international efforts. While in need of reform, the PRTs in general provide an interesting and unprecedented model for civil-military integration at the field level.¹

¹ This article was finished in August 2008.

1 Introduction

A NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has been operating in Afghanistan since January 2002. Starting from a small task force to secure the capital, Kabul, it has grown to cover the entire country. NATO's prime operation commands 52,000 soldiers and has assumed a broad range of duties from counterinsurgency to stabilisation and reconstruction.

The latter tasks are crystallised in 26 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) that ISAF has across the country. ISAF describes PRT as a joint civil-military unit operating at the provincial level and led by an ISAF member nation². PRTs are intended to monitor their areas of responsibility, support security sector reform and better governance, and enable reconstruction and development. PRT lead nations total 14, which has resulted in a variety of organisations in terms of the functions and resources available. Each PRT has its own recognisable national features, resulting in a vibrant but vexing reality of diverse units. Fashioning novel approaches to civil-military integration, PRTs have become a topic of constant debate.

It could be asked whether PRTs remain in the framework of military crisis management or endeavour to establish a wider form of post-conflict stabilisation. Answers to the question vary between different stakeholders: ISAF, PRT lead nation governments and branches of these, the Afghan people and government, NGOs, the United Nations, and independent academia. In numbers, PRTs evidently appear to be military units: on average, civilians make up only some 5% of the total personnel. However, the PRT mission statement goes far beyond the military domain and requires also competent civilian activities.

This paper looks at PRTs from a wide crisis management angle. The main objective is to examine the current PRT concept and various approaches to integrating civilian and military crisis management within a PRT framework. In broader terms, a "PRT model" also includes the ways participating nations organise their development and reconstruction efforts in their PRT geographic areas of responsibility. Four generic PRT models are outlined: American, German, British-Nordic and Turkish. The paper also surveys the field of international research on

PRTs and introduces a few topical points of criticism towards PRTs in Afghanistan.

The study aims to broaden the understanding of PRTs and to introduce a brief and up-to-date conceptual history of the teams at large. This article attempts to provide comprehensive information especially for the Finnish audience, which so far has had to rely on public information produced by the Finnish Defence Forces and sporadic news items. Hopefully the text will feed the national discussion on Afghanistan and the Finnish mission there. At this writing, Finland has dispatched four civilian crisis management experts to PRT Mazar-e Sharif in northern Afghanistan.

The scope of the paper is limited to only cover PRTs in Afghanistan. The units under the Coalition in Iraq should be studied separately. Although civil-military relations are a source of timely and continuously debated topics, such as the PRTs' interaction with the local populace, this paper will not address such issues in detail. The focus is on how the PRTs are organised internally with regards to the civil-military integration and how the PRT lead nations apply their integrated approach in provinces. To implement ISAF's mission in a certain area does not only include running a PRT; it has gradually turned into the building up of a multifaceted support package for the province in terms of development aid, governance support and political lobbying in Kabul.

This study of selected PRT models in Afghanistan is largely based on publicly available research papers, studies, articles and documents from multiple sources written in the last few years. In addition, the author's personal experiences as a political advisor in PRT Meymaneh³ and PRT Mazar-e Sharif during 2006–2007 lay the foundations for the study. The actual effectiveness of different models cannot be analysed on these grounds as it would necessitate much more detailed research and interviews in the field. The approach here is consequently more conceptual, looking at how PRTs are designed and depicted. Assessments of the quality of their functions are drawn from other studies.

2 ISAF 2007, 3.

3 The great variety of transliterations of Afghan names must be acknowledged. For the sake of clarity, the text will hereafter follow versions used by NATO in the ISAF PRT Handbook.

2 Short history of PRTs

Afghanistan made a sudden comeback into the spotlight of international politics in September 2001. Terrorist attacks in the United States were soon tracked down to Al-Qaeda, an international network whose top leaders and training centres had been operating in Afghanistan for several years. The Taliban regime's horrifying human rights violations had already broken the news, but it was 9/11 that lifted Afghanistan back to world attention. The Taliban hosted enemies of the only superpower in the world.

To seize the leading Al-Qaeda terrorists and to dismantle the Taliban regime, a US-led coalition called Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) started a military campaign in Afghanistan on 7 October 2001. Taliban fighters rapidly lost control over vast parts of the land, the main ground force being US-backed Northern Afghan militias. Enjoying a UN Security Council mandate, OEF continued fighting remnants of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, especially pursuing Osama bin Laden.

Simultaneously with military success, the political future of Afghanistan remained to be settled. The international community prepared a conference in Bonn, Germany, assembling most of the political and ethnic groups in Afghanistan. As a result, the Bonn Agreement established the Afghan Interim Authority (AIA) and cleared the way for the constitutional process in the next three years. Hamid Karzai, an ethnic Pashtun from Kandahar, was inaugurated as Chairman of the AIA.

As requested in the Bonn Agreement and recognising the need to support the fragile political compromise built, the United Nations Security Council issued Resolution 1386 on 20 December 2001. Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, it authorised the establishment

“of an International Security Assistance Force to assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas, so that the Afghan Interim Authority as well as the personnel of the United Nations can operate in a secure environment.”⁴

For almost two years ISAF remained a rather small force of just 5,000 located in Kabul. OEF continued operating

throughout the country, though its permanent presence was limited to the Kabul region and a few bigger cities in the east and southeast of the country. Both the UN and the AIA Chairman Karzai proposed an extension of ISAF to cover the entire country. The USA disagreed, arguing that not enough international troops would be available. Unwilling itself to direct more substantial resources to Afghanistan and suffering from the feeble success of the combat operations of OEF, the USA started to develop alternatives⁵. In broad terms, the American thinking was in line with the UN approach, crafted under the term “light footprint” by the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General (SRSG) at that time, Lakhdar Brahimi. PRTs emerged from these discussions of how “to spread the ‘ISAF effect’ without expanding ISAF itself.”⁶

PRTs presented a light version of a presence deemed to better suit the Afghan context that was not permissive to robust peace-enforcement in any wide projection. The refusal to accept an enduring foreign influence has been recurrent in Afghan history.]

Even if PRTs appear to be quite a novel remedy to broad problems of instability and acutely immature government in a war-torn country, they are sometimes said to have early ancestors. Robert M. Cassidy has studied counterinsurgency strategies and the use of indigenous forces in a number of post-World War II cases. He asserts that PRTs may have forerunners in Algeria and Vietnam. The French-created Sections Administratives Spécialisées (SAS) and the US Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) are in some respects similar to PRTs in Afghanistan. These early precursors were trained to intervene and support locals in governance, justice, infrastructure and agriculture. CORDS, for example, included USAID experts, just like the American PRTs today. They were to some extent able to win hearts and minds or to “hold the countryside by pacifying and securing the population.”⁷

4 United Nations Security Council 2001.

5 Gauster 2007, 19.

6 McNerney 2005, 32.

7 Cassidy 2006, 53–54, 56.

In somewhat the same fashion, the ISAF PRT Handbook describes a PRT as:

“a civil-military institution that is able to penetrate the more unstable and insecure areas because of its military component and is able to stabilize these areas because of the combined capabilities of its diplomacy, military, and economic components.”⁸

The same Handbook tells that an early PRT concept was borne out of the Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells (CHLCs) established already in 2002. CHLCs operated under OEF’s Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (CJCMOTF). Staffed with only 10–12 persons, these military teams provided information on humanitarian needs, coordinated aid with military operations and implemented small projects.⁹ Later on, the teams were joined by US Department of State and USAID representatives.

The first concept of a “Joint Regional Team” was developed in November 2002 into “Provisional Reconstruction Teams” which began working in Gardez, Kunduz and Bamian. After a few months in a pilot phase, the name was finally changed to Provincial Reconstruction Teams¹⁰, deriving reportedly from President Karzai, who said: “Warlords rule regions, governors rule provinces.” The main emphasis was on reconstruction, which Karzai wanted to see PRTs chiefly engaging in.¹¹ Maybe he even foresaw an opportunity for governors to demand more reconstruction money for their provinces and play the PRTs against each other – as is happening at the very moment¹².

The first teams were established under US-led OEF in early 2003. As the PRT Handbook remarks, the first four locations were chosen strategically: Gardez (ethnically Pashtun dominated southeast), Kunduz (northern Tajiks), Bamian (central Hazaras) and Mazar-e Sharif (northern Uzbeks)¹³. The latter was launched by the UK in July 2003. The US PRT outreach continued with four other strategically important spots: Bagram, Herat, Jalalabad and Kandahar.

NATO took command of ISAF in August 2003. Two months later, at the request of the AIA and NATO, the UN Security Council issued Resolution 1510 authorising ISAF expansion outside Kabul. Backed up by the Resolution, NATO commenced planning for expansion first to the north. This was to take place through PRTs, a concept OEF had just proved useful. In December 2003 one of the first three pioneering units, PRT Kunduz, was transferred to ISAF command and taken over by Germany. That was, however, not the first PRT handover since the US had turned PRT Bamian over to New Zealand already in September 2003.

The first PRT to be established as part of ISAF was the German-led PRT Feyzabad in the remote and mountainous Badakhshan province. At the same time, UK-led Mazar-e Sharif was absorbed into ISAF command and a new PRT

Meymaneh was carved out from its area of responsibility. The year 2004 saw altogether 11 new PRTs being established.¹⁴ Afghan presidential elections in autumn 2004 on their part consolidated PRTs’ status as a useful tool in state-building¹⁵.

ISAF was further expanded to the west in summer 2005. The process put new lead nations onto the ISAF map when Italy, Spain and Lithuania organised their own PRTs. At the same time, the PRT extension was continued with two new OEF units established in the east.¹⁶

NATO’s plan was to spread the ISAF presence to cover all of Afghanistan. Reaching out to the south started already in late 2005 and continued in 2006 as the UK handed over its two units in the north and prepared to concentrate on the southern Helmand province, where it assumed command of an originally US-established PRT in May 2006. Also the Netherlands relocated from the north and Canada from Kabul to take over PRTs under the Regional Command South. The northern PRTs were assumed by Norway, Sweden and Hungary. Finally, ISAF took over responsibility for all the PRTs in Afghanistan in October 2006. Previously OEF-owned PRTs in the east were shifted to the NATO-led operation.¹⁷

After the three-year process to transform the international military presence in Afghanistan, the majority of operations are now, in autumn 2008, commanded by NATO/ISAF, covering also most of those directed against the Taliban. OEF in Afghanistan has been reduced in numbers and scope of operations, but still operates with a force of thousands. OEF is represented by Coalition Force Command – Afghanistan (CFC-A), which includes, for example, the Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A), a strong task force to support the reconstitution of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Police (ANP).

In November 2006, the PRT community was expanded by a Turkish newcomer when a civilian PRT was established in the Vardak province. The Czech Republic assumed PRT responsibilities in Lowgar, south of Kabul, in March 2008. Subsequently, two provinces have remained uncovered by a PRT: Daykondi in central Afghanistan and Nimruz in the southwest.

All PRTs are, at this writing, under the ISAF military chain of command. It should be noted, though, that this military chain of command only applies to the military units – not the civilians embedded into the PRT structures. It can also be questioned how much of the central (ISAF) military command structure is actually effective over the nationally commanded troops supporting and stationed in the PRTs. In addition to the Kabul-based military command structure headed by the Commander of ISAF, the echelons closest to PRTs are four Regional Commands (RC) established in 2006: RC North, RC West, RC South and RC East. The fifth RC is the Capital (RC C), but there are no PRTs formed in Kabul. The RCs are answerable to ISAF Headquarters in Kabul. The regional echelons command

8 ISAF 2007, 5.

9 ISAF 2007, D-2-1.

10 *Reliefweb* 2003.

11 McNerney 2005, 36.

12 IWPR 2007; *Irinnews* 2007a.

13 ISAF 2007, D-2-2.

14 ISAF 2007, D-2-3, D-3-2.

15 Stapleton 2007, 24.

16 ISAF 2007, D-2-3.

17 ISAF 2007, D-2-3/4.

not only the PRTs but also various other units like manoeuvre battalions, logistical units and other support elements. Some of these assets, together with the respective PRTs, may form nation-driven task forces under the RCs, such as the Canadian Task Force in Kandahar.

The PRT concept became truly international in November 2005 when it was adopted in Iraq by the US-led coalition. Since the introduction of the "New Way Forward" plan in Iraq, there currently are 31 PRTs covering all the 18 Iraqi provinces. Manning of the PRTs differs somewhat from those in Afghanistan, units in Iraq being much smaller (26 persons in average) and containing more civilian staff. Altogether 13 PRTs in Iraq are embedded into combat troops (ePRTs), while the rest are led by civilians. These dual features present a substantial alteration from the models used in Afghanistan.¹⁸

18 US Department of State 2007a; Perito 2007, 1–6; Perito 2008.

3 PRT mission and tasks

The United Nations Security Council amended and expanded ISAF's mandate to cover regions outside the Afghan capital Kabul in October 2003. By that time, the first PRTs had been operating under the US-led Coalition's OEF for more than half a year. Although Resolution 1510 did not mention PRTs, it prepared the way for the establishment of the first ISAF PRTs and set ISAF's mission for the next years. Security Council Resolution 1510 stated:

"Stressing also the importance of extending central government authority to all parts of Afghanistan, of comprehensive disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of all armed factions, and of security sector reform including reconstitution of the new Afghan National Army and Police,

--

[The Council authorizes the] expansion of the mandate of the International Security Assistance Force to allow it, as resources permit, to support the Afghan Transitional Authority and its successors in the maintenance of security in areas of Afghanistan outside of Kabul and its environs, so that the Afghan Authorities as well as the personnel of the United Nations and other international civilian personnel engaged, in particular, in reconstruction and humanitarian efforts, can operate in a secure environment, and to provide security assistance for the performance of other tasks in support of the Bonn Agreement."¹⁹

In short, the Council gave ISAF a mission to expand outside of Kabul in order to create security conditions for aid and to support the slow spreading out of Afghan government authority to provinces that were controlled by warlords armed to the teeth. The latter, in its essence, is a political mission. Following the UN-preferred light footprint approach to Afghanistan²⁰, it requires not only military capabilities but skilful local diplomacy and sponsoring of the Afghan government. PRT is a tool of "robust military diplomacy," Peter Viggo Jakobsen argues²¹.

It thus deviates from the neutrality principle of traditional peacekeeping.

Who, then, opposed this mandate? Writing of counterinsurgency strategies, David J. Clark and Raymond A. Millen observe that the creation of PRT webs in Afghanistan and Iraq follows an "oil spot strategy."

"This technique -- employs pockets of civil-military teams including police, administrators, and soldiers in clusters throughout the country. The object is to gradually expand from these locations by conducting pacification operations in the surrounding areas. In theory, the clusters will become contiguous as the insurgency melts away."²²

The oil spot scheme corresponds in its form with realities in Afghanistan, but it might miss the real target of such a strategy. For the UN and the enlarging ISAF, the enemy was not insurgency, but potentially old warlords and criminals that threatened the rule of the Afghan central government and the outreach of its authority to the provinces. ISAF's master plan from 2003 onwards was to balance and gradually shrink warlords' powerbases in order for the Afghan security forces and administration to evolve. The PRT concept essentially carries a political mission. Warlords were the opponents (or "spoilers" in military language) to ISAF's mandate and the post-Bonn regime symbolised by Hamid Karzai. Insurgents emerged a bit later -- both in the streets and at the top of ISAF's list of concerns.²³

Ironically the same powerbrokers that ISAF tried to play down had been key partners in OEF's campaign against the hard core of Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Even if the oil spot theory seems to be weak on explaining the expansion of ISAF, it is likely that the counterinsurgency spur was a strong factor behind some of the OEF PRTs, at least in the east and south.

The UN's broad mission for ISAF was later refined by the PRT Executive Steering Committee (ESC), a high-level body co-chaired by the Afghan Minister of the Interior and the Commander of ISAF and consisting of other Afghan ministers, NATO, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

19 United Nations Security Council 2003.

20 Jakobsen 2005, 8.

21 Jakobsen 2005, 12.

22 Clark & Millen 2006, 20.

23 An astute article on the art of dealing with warlords and state-building in Afghanistan is Orsini 2007.

(UNAMA) and EU representatives and ambassadors of the PRT troop-contributing nations. The ESC was established in December 2004 to provide guidance and oversight of PRTs. It approved a document titled "PRT Terms of Reference (ToR)" in January 2005 and gave PRTs a mission to

"assist The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to extend its authority, in order to facilitate the development of a stable and secure environment in the identified area of operations, and enable SSR and reconstruction efforts."²⁴

The mission was still rather general in disposition although the ToR further listed PRT responsibilities with regard to other actors, security, reconstruction and information activities. In all relations the PRTs should aim to extend "the reach and legitimacy of national government." Besides monitoring the overall situation in assigned areas, the most precise mandate PRTs are given is in supporting the build-up of the Afghan National Police (ANP). Regarding reconstruction activities, the PRTs are steered to primarily create conditions for other actors such as the UN and NGOs. But the PRTs may also run their own projects following the idea of filling the void that others leave. PRT efforts need to be in line with Afghan government activities. To this end, the PRTs are to support the local administration's development planning in their responsible provinces.²⁵

ISAF Headquarters later refined the PRT ToR into a doctrine of three "lines of operations" including security, governance and reconstruction & development. Sometimes also a fourth, cross-cutting dimension of coordination is mentioned. Some activities like the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) process of the Afghan Militia Forces have ended, but the list of supporting activities for PRTs has mostly remained the same. Focusing on Security Sector Reform (SSR), governance and development PRTs are expected to "provide", "observe, assess and report."²⁶ It may be said, however, that many units have gradually overplayed their role in reconstruction and development and are taking responsibilities in governance support that would more naturally fall within the mandate of UNAMA.

In addition to the UN mandate and the ToR guiding the PRTs, their tasks are frequently reviewed by both the ESC and ISAF Headquarters. ESC issued three Policy Notes in December 2006 and February 2007 defining the PRT role in development, humanitarian aid and disarmament²⁷. These documents are *de facto* binding as the decisions have been made by ambassadors of the PRT troop-contributing nations.

ISAF Headquarters, through the military chain of command, frequently tasks PRTs with new duties. In 2007 PRTs were given orders to start monitoring and assessing development levels in districts, including mapping existing infrastructure, new projects, and evaluating the basic conditions and needs in the judicial sector. The latter task came as the international

community was preparing for the Afghanistan rule of law conference in Rome in July 2007. It seems the PRTs are conceived as a handy tool available when the international community needs to get something done fast and broadly across Afghanistan. The PRTs are present almost everywhere, they are fairly mobile and are capable of securing themselves. Freedom of movement is combined with civilian expertise able to guide simple fact-finding activities run by the military.

24 ISAF 2007, B-1-1/2, B-2-1/2.

25 ISAF 2007, B-2-1/2.

26 ISAF 2007, B-2-1/2.

27 ISAF 2007, B-4-1/2, B-5-1/2.

4 Present variety of PRTs

4.1 Listing PRTs

There are currently 26 PRTs across Afghanistan, all somehow different from each other. The same mission and tasks have lent themselves to a variety of implementation in diverging circumstances. Units may be compared against several criteria, for example in light of the ten following factors:

1. Nations contributing;
2. Size of the PRT in numbers;
3. Balance between the military and civilian components in numbers;
4. Leadership of the PRT and integration of the military and civilian components;
5. Security activities and capabilities the PRT has (both military profile and civilian assets such as police trainers);
6. Activities in governance by the PRT itself or its lead nation;
7. Reconstruction and development activities the PRT or its lead nation runs;
8. Funding mechanisms and modalities for reconstruction and development; pattern in distribution of funding via the PRT versus outside of it;
9. Total amount of funds flowing to the area of responsibility in relative and absolute terms;
10. External environment for the PRT to operate in: security situation, quality of governance and development, presence of the UN and NGOs, modus operandi of other troops present.

The list lays heavy emphasis on civilian assets and their integration into the whole framework. In the Foreword to the PRT Handbook from February 2007, the ISAF Commander, UN SRSG and NATO Senior Civilian Representative maintain that

“all effective, well-functioning PRTs have one characteristic in common: they operate as fully integrated civil-military structures, and, as such, bring a comprehensive range of resources to bear in assisting GOA [Government of Afghanistan] to

extend its authority and to increase its capacity to govern.”²⁸

NATO considers PRT to be a holistic civil-military unit, the achievements of which are dependent on successful cooperation between the civilian and military components. It may well be argued that the tight integration of civilian and military capabilities is the most fruitful innovation of the entire concept. Summarising Anglo-American research on PRTs, Hannah Godsave observes that this integrative core of the organisation has not raised criticism, unlike so many other traits of the PRTs²⁹.

The questions above make an extensive list and would necessitate thorough field research in order to come up with a wide-ranging study of the nature of all 26 PRTs in Afghanistan. Although the information base in this research setting (public sources, limited field exposure) remains incomplete, it is certainly possible to draw some general conclusions on how and why PRTs differ so much.

4.2 Institutional framework on the home front

The most apparent observation is that every PRT is one of a kind. It is often noted that this divergence derives from the capitals and thus occurs not between the PRTs as such, but the 14 lead nations. Having a look at the two German PRTs in the north and especially those 12 led by the USA across Afghanistan, it becomes clear that domestic reasoning is a major force behind modelling a PRT. The American PRTs have a standardized structure – even though they cover such different provinces as Parwan north of Kabul and Ghazni in the southeast of Afghanistan.

The PRTs are a somewhat novel innovation in international crisis management in their way of bringing together different branches of home governments. Assets sent to Afghanistan are dependent on the resources the nation has on the whole. In addition, experts, of course, do not arrive in Afghanistan from any vacuum, but carry along attitudes, bureaucratic traditions

28 ISAF 2007, ii.

29 Godsave 2007, 33.

and the legal restrictions of their employers back home³⁰. Jakobsen argues that both operational approaches and the way cooperation between civilian and military components is arranged are predominantly reflections of domestic inheritance³¹. Putting together the military, police advisors, development experts and diplomats carries serious potential for explosion. Luckily, the outcome of the interplay between these living organisational memories and policies written in PRT planning documents guide, but do not determine, the nature of a PRT. National policy rigidities on reconstruction and development or the showing of force are repeatedly loosened on the ground.

The widest disparities emerge from national policies towards reconstruction and the PRT role in it. It was originally thought that PRTs would run only small and short-term projects to rapidly build up their role in provinces and to meet the immediate needs of the local population. This was supposed to take place where and when other development actors would not be available or capable. Many PRTs have over time boosted their reconstruction activities; some due to the non-permissive security situation for NGOs, some for more political reasons.

From the ISAF perspective, these restrictions, or caveats as they are sometimes misleadingly³² called, are complicating the normal business. Leading a military operation infiltrated so heavily by various national policies and civilian expertises proves difficult. For example, CIMIC (Civil-Military Cooperation) branches in higher echelons have been surprised to find out that the two Nordic PRTs in Meymaneh and Mazar-e Sharif do not have any dedicated CIMIC on-the-ground assets available due to national Afghanistan policies – whereas such activities form the military backbone of the American PRT model.

On the other hand, it could be noted that bizarre priorities and constraints favouring one sector, activity or modality over some others may serve a point. Often these arrangements are needed to motivate rigid domestic bureaucracies and induce agencies to any meaningful cooperation. Positively, recent experiences in Afghanistan have set in motion processes of interdepartmental adjustments in many countries.

One more complicating factor in the field is the various partnering nations behind the PRTs. They too have their own institutional rigidities and favoured policies. But adding to those of the lead nation, partners' priorities could well provide needed supplementary assets and flexibility to the PRT. There

are altogether 16 PRT partnering nations in ISAF, including Finland³³.

4.3 Local conditions

Establishing a unit solely according to bureaucratic circumstances would soon prove to be a futile effort. The real environment certainly has had an impact on how PRTs have been modelled. The PRT concept has been notorious for its flexibility in adjusting to varying and changing needs, challenges and opportunities. The lack of direct guidance from above has resulted in the excessive capacity to bend the model and activities. Many regard this incoherence as a major error of the whole enterprise³⁴.

Afghanistan for sure is plagued with bad and weak governance, poor capacities in provinces to plan and administer, low education, a lack of infrastructure, a feeble judicial system and corruption permeating the government at all levels. These vexing problems are common across the country. However circumstances in provinces differ when it comes to the production of narcotics, narco-trade, activities of illegal armed groups and the power of old warlords, or insurgent activities. Helmand province in the southwest produces alone more illicit drugs than any other country in the world, whereas more than half of Afghan provinces are poppy-free³⁵.

The security situation in the southern and eastern parts of the country has remained volatile and has affected PRT activities as well. Most clearly it is reflected in the low numbers of NGOs present in most of the provinces that see regular fighting and strikes by insurgent groups. Michael J. Dziedzic and Michael K. Seidl note that the US PRT belt was built in hotspot areas "where there was virtually no IO or NGO presence"³⁶. Only the biggest cities like Kandahar and Jalalabad and a few of the provincial centres attract substantial numbers of aid workers.

Similarly poor security is equivalent of incapable and sometimes even totally collapsed local administration, leaving the people without public services. This kind of security situation and level of development challenges lead PRTs in the south and east to take a larger role. They have robust military elements (CIMIC or Civil Affairs³⁷ type) for reconstruction and their lead nations provide provinces with high sums of development aid.³⁸

30 Insightful text into these dynamics is written by Piiparinen 2007.

31 Jakobsen 2005, 28; Perito (2005, 3) makes a point of homeland legal requirements hindering comparisons, evaluations and learning processes between lead nations.

32 Limitations to PRT functions described above should not be mixed up with the larger scale issue of military caveats and other serious operational restrictions that some ISAF participating nations have notified. The latter, like the German or Italian policy not to send troops to the south, have sparked a fierce debate in NATO over its members' participation in ISAF. Partly because building on outdated information, Godsave (2007, 11–13) falls into a trap of muddling these two matters.

33 ISAF 2007, D-3-2.

34 E.g. *Save the Children* 2007; Perito 2005; Godsave 2007; Stapleton 2007; Gauster 2007.

35 UNODC 2008, vii.

36 Dziedzic & Seidl 2005, 4.

37 American equivalent to CIMIC.

38 Even if general trends may be tracked, it should be noted that there are no comprehensive statistics available covering every PRT and showing the funds flowing from PRT contributing nations to their responsible provinces. Comparisons from easy-access sources are difficult to make as some governments publicise exact figures, some nothing. Some aggregate estimations of donor contributions to the Afghan provinces can be found in Waldman 2008, 14.

The security environments for PRTs vary from the rather peaceful northern and central regions to high-risk provinces like Helmand, Kandahar or lately Kunar. This warrants a principal question of whether the PRT concept is at all viable for high-threat-level areas. PRTs were originally established in potentially unstable provinces where low-level conflicts between local militias could be ignited or areas in which PRTs served as part of OEF's post-combat counterinsurgency approach. Godsave terms these territories as "quasi non-permissive areas"³⁹, while Robert M. Perito favours "reasonably permissive environments."⁴⁰ At the moment some of the PRTs are operating in combat zones. Are they able to accomplish their political mission at all in environments that seriously preclude freedom of movement of units other than those heavily armed?

4.4 Presence of other troops

Variations in the security situation correlate with combat troop presence. In numerous Afghan provinces ISAF or OEF forces other than a solitary PRT. These include different sorts of task forces or headquarters equipped with manoeuvre battalions, engineering battalions and special forces. Moreover, some PRTs themselves host non-ISAF elements like Police Mentoring Teams of CSTC-A or detachments from the US Army Corps of Engineers in their camps.

Such partners provide PRTs with a set of external resources and assets in force protection, intelligence, reconstruction and security sector reform. An assortment of these capacities around a PRT obviously shapes its own nature. Militarily requirements that PRTs face in Afghanistan vary at least as much as the development levels across provinces. These factors seem to go unrecognised in most of the studies on PRTs. It is by essence a different task to run a unit in north or west Afghanistan or the remote central parts than in the south and east where there are plenty of other ISAF and OEF forces operating.

In the absence of other forces nearby, the PRT is solely responsible for covering its province in terms of the show of presence, intelligence collection and if needed, use of force. The Lithuanian PRT in the extremely remote Ghowr monitors a vast central highlands province on its own. Whereas the southern neighbours, the Dutch in the PRT Tarin Kowt, are surrounded by a full task force of more than 1500 soldiers⁴¹. The Dutch PRT is able to concentrate on cooperation with local administration, reconstruction efforts and coordination with other actors. Paradoxically, military requirements for PRTs are the highest in areas of relative peace. On the other hand, this is well in line with the limited military muscle the units have and their original design for a "limited range of security challenges."⁴²

As a part of ISAF doctrine, all PRTs rely ultimately on Forward Support Bases (FSB) collocated with the Regional Commands. FSBs host a variety of troops deployable across the responsible region. For their protection in extremis, the PRTs may "reach-back" to these assets or ISAF joint air power.

The ways in which the PRTs interpret their military role differ. The size of the territory to be covered, the presence of other troops and the security situation lead the units to compose varying military capabilities. PRTs in areas where there are close to no external forces tend to be bigger in terms of both mobile troops and staff. These comparisons should not be taken as criticism. They only highlight the immensely varying nature of the PRTs and the contexts in which they operate in Afghanistan.

39 Godsave 2007, 26.

40 Perito 2005, 15.

41 Dutch Ministry of Defence 2007.

42 US Interagency 2006, 6, 11.

5 Generic PRT models

Already the first year of PRTs in Afghanistan saw the emergence of distinctive models. PRT Gardez, PRT Kunduz and PRT Mazar-e Sharif started without any uniform guidance or strict regulations of their tasks and organisation. Soon there could be observed recognisable American, German and British models. These generic models are often referred to in the PRT discourse. Whether newer PRTs under the leadership of nations like Spain, the Netherlands, Lithuania or Hungary fall within the old categorisation remains an almost untouched field of research. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to add at least one new model: the Turkish civilian PRT in Vardak opens a new chapter in the short history of the PRTs. A summarising table of these models is provided in Annex B.

5.1 American

It was the US-established PRT Gardez that began the build-up of the PRT web. In February 2003, the US Embassy in Kabul decided on "Principles Guiding PRT Working Relations with UNAMA, NGOs and Local Government." The paper listed three key objectives for PRTs: to extend the authority of the Afghan central government, improve security, and promote reconstruction. These principles gave initial guidance to all PRT activities in Afghanistan, also setting milestones for later developments under ISAF.⁴³

The US PRTs developed under the OEF umbrella until recently. The United States has launched 18 units in Afghanistan altogether, running 11 at the moment. These are mostly located in the east and southeast, along the Pakistan border. Those handed over have mainly been situated in the south and west of the country. The USA has also transferred the PRT concept to Iraq, where it leads 22 units.

A distinctive feature of the American model is that there are nearly no partnering nations involved in the PRTs. The only exceptions have been PRT Qalat in the southern Zabul province and PRT Bagram, supported by Romania and South Korea respectively.

US PRTs are fairly small in size, including on average less than 100 military. The original OEF draft model consisted of

83 military and civilian personnel. Compared to the German and British PRT models, the military organisation is built light: planning and intelligence staff is thin and operational assets are directed to Civil Affairs and force protection. Perito also reminds of difficulties in finding enough qualified military personnel, resulting in frequent understaffing. On the civilian side, the American PRTs comprise only two or three individuals. All units include US Department of State and USAID representatives. Some also benefit from the expertise of advisors sent by the US Department of Agriculture.⁴⁴

The American units are led by military commanders. The main organisational vehicle for coordinating between the civilian and military components is the PRT Command Section, which combines civilian representatives with the commander and his/her closest lieutenants. This arrangement is, however, a later improvement replicating the successful joint Command Group model created by the British in the north. Its American precursors were the civil-military boards that guided reconstruction efforts⁴⁵.

Command Sections are designed to feature a forum for the synchronisation of efforts in security, governance and development lines of operation. Civilian experts are also expected to work closely with Civil Affairs teams. Despite this appearance of equal integration, the American model seems to have been plagued with overriding military leadership. Jakobsen portrays civilian representatives as "embedded in military teams" and "all operating under military command."⁴⁶ Perito's report on PRT lessons learned is based on extensive interviews with US and NGO representatives who have served in Afghanistan. He notes that unclear terms of reference for civil-military interaction inside the organisation have led to varying operational success. Some of the American PRTs have been torn by internal rows whereas the most effective ones have been able to fuse military and civilian components "into a close-knit and mutually supportive team."⁴⁷ Even as late as June 2006, the US Interagency assessment demanded that

43 Perito 2005, 2.

44 ISAF 2007, D-2-2; Perito 2005, 4 5.

45 US Interagency 2006, 14.

46 Jakobsen 2005, 28, 17.

47 Perito 2005, 11.

all PRTs start applying the joint Command Section approach – recognised to be a best practise already earlier⁴⁸. On the other hand, it must be noted that the US model is the only one on which there are collected substantial and public lessons learned.

As an exception to the rule, the United States established a civilian-led PRT in Panjshir in October 2005. This small and historically exceptional area was carved out from the three provinces covered by PRT Bagram. A small military component (approximately 40) is ordered by a commander, who works under the civilian director of the PRT. The director represents the US Department of State and is joined by advisors from USAID and the Department of Agriculture. A “small footprint” approach was chosen deliberately to fit the unique circumstances of Panjshir – an ethnically homogenous valley which has successfully resisted all intruders in the past 30 years. One of the key characteristics of this exercise is to engage the PRT in daily interaction with local government and its processes.⁴⁹ Even if it was called a prototype in 2005, the USA has not adopted the same approach elsewhere in Afghanistan.

In the security line of operation, standard US PRTs carry out some mobile military patrols though their direct role as a security force is mainly limited to “force protection.”⁵⁰ Jakobsen reduces this feature both to US operational traditions and the demanding security environments in the south and east of Afghanistan⁵¹. Perito remarks that this narrowed mission has caused disappointments with NGOs and UNAMA⁵². On the other hand, there have on most occasions been other coalition manoeuvre forces in close vicinity of the PRTs. Interestingly enough, fierce verbal collisions have sometimes occurred between commanders of these two types of American units so different in nature and tasks⁵³. Also military-military coordination proves to be a challenge in conflict zones.

In line with the longer-term mission of capacity-building amongst the Afghan security forces, US PRTs work on the development of local police forces through Military Police teams⁵⁴. They work together with OEF’s CSTC-A and its police mentors contracted from the DynCorp company. These external resources, often collocated with US PRTs, are used for conducting police training and as a source of donated equipment. CSTC-A Police Mentoring Teams and an infrastructure element implemented by US Army Engineers were not available outside the southern and eastern regions until spring 2007. Since then, they have come into close cooperation and support also non-American PRT efforts in SSR across Afghanistan.

The American support package for governance and reconstruction in a province is built on two legs: PRT projects and USAID activities. Aimed to win “hearts and minds”, CIMIC-type projects are mapped, proposed and supervised by Civil Affairs teams. The first funding source available was the Defence Department’s Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA).⁵⁵ In the early years 2002–2003, the average project cost in these programmes was \$45,000⁵⁶. Another funding modality is called CERP, Commander’s Emergency Response Program. CERP is flexibly utilised in projects implemented by local constructors. Funds provided for different PRTs vary considerably, since they are based on applications and compared to the needs of other units – becoming sometimes difficult to reach. This new modality was introduced in 2004 and it granted commanders up to \$100,000 per month⁵⁷. In the fiscal year 2007, CERP provided American PRTs with USD 231 million and its newer supplement Economic Support Funds (ESF) totalling USD 216 million⁵⁸.

Especially in the early years, rapid spending on projects (schools, clinics, wells) greatly irritated NGOs, who felt their expertise in long-term development and capacity-building was threatened by the reckless and untrained military.⁵⁹ Confrontation eased up a bit when all US PRTs finally received USAID representatives during 2004. They provide the second pillar of the American reconstruction effort in PRT areas of responsibility. In conjunction with expertise, USAID offers PRTs Quick Impact Project (QIP) funds that can be used in projects in line with provincial development plans, implemented by contracted NGOs or foreign commercial firms⁶⁰. A group consisting of senior military and civilian officers identify and suggest projects that support the whole mission of the unit in its specific area. These project review committees reflect an important lesson learned in the American model: expert vetting needs to be arranged for all projects, also those fulfilling the commander’s goal of winning “hearts and minds,” in order not to harm work done by NGOs and humanitarian agencies. Committees were for a long time the only formal executive body integrating military and civilian components in US PRTs, highlighting the heavy reconstruction focus of the American model.

USAID funds projects and programmes also independently. The Agency’s provincial representatives embedded in the PRTs do not decide on these projects but provide information and monitor them – thus giving the PRTs an opportunity to comment on USAID activities in provinces. USAID typically channels funds to projects in infrastructure (roads, local government premises), water resources and irrigation, local governance training and agriculture. Sums allocated to different PRT areas presumably vary as with CERP. USAID does not publicise provincial figures.

48 US Interagency 2006, 14.

49 US Department of Defence 2005.

50 It is interesting that the same kinds of restrictions in the early German model have gained so much more negative attention (see Section 5.2).

51 Jakobsen 2005, 19.

52 Perito 2005, 7.

53 Perito 2005, 8.

54 Perito 2005, 9.

55 Perito 2005, 10.

56 Jakobsen 2005, 19.

57 Stapleton 2007, 21.

58 Abbaszadeh et al. 2008, 49.

59 Perito 2005, 10; Dziedzic & Seidl 2005, 9 10.

60 Perito 2005, 10.

It should be noted that most US PRTs operate in rather small provinces. Many of them are located near the Pakistan border and are essentially those territories where most insurgent attacks and fighting between the Taliban and ISAF-OEF take place. Consequently, there are usually very few NGOs active in the US-observed provinces – with the exception of the significant regional centre Jalalabad in the east. This has probably led the PRTs, and the USA overall, to take a larger role in reconstruction and development than might have been the case in more peaceful areas.

Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the American model has from the beginning focused heavily on a quick impact and reconstruction. The underlying objective of such a *modus operandi* has been to win the support of the local population, in other words counter-insurgency motivation⁶¹. This mirrors the suitability of the choice for American strategists in need of tools, but also the environments where US forces have operated in the south and east of Afghanistan. The abundance of reconstruction projects and an unconcealed counterinsurgency association have rendered the US model the most criticised one by non-governmental actors⁶².

Resources to implement reconstruction in provinces have been funnelled to the military, having its echoes in PRT activities. A group of researchers from the University of Princeton – Nima Abbaszadeh, Mark Crow, Marianne El-Khoury, Jonathan Gandomi, David Kuwayama, Christopher MacPherson, Meghan Nutting, Nealin Parker and Taya Weiss – remind that “the agency that controls funding heavily influences PRT priorities.”⁶³ A slow turn in the American rationale might be expected, however, as QIPs funded through CERP and the newer ESF are gradually scaled down and confer to the Local Governance and Community Development (LGCD) programme. The latter mechanism in support of the US PRTs in Afghanistan focuses on long-term governance capacity-building and has since September 2007 enjoyed an annual funding of USD 249 million⁶⁴.

5.2 German

Kunduz is frequently mentioned as one of the exemplary cases of a PRT. After only nine months of American leadership, the organisation was adopted by the Germans. Half a year later, Germany established its second PRT in the northeastern Badakhshan province.

Germany does not work alone in its two PRTs, but works with a long list of partnering nations: Belgium, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Hungary, Romania, and the United States. Multinationality has been firmly built into the German model.

The small American PRT in Kunduz grew a great deal after being taken over by the Germans. Already in 2003 it contained a military force of 300 soldiers. Despite high numbers, the

operational approach was limited by domestic policy pressure to mere, and exceptionally robust, force protection. During 2003–2005 the German PRTs in Kunduz and Feyzabad lacked mobility and presence in outer districts of their provinces. Consequently some of the older studies draw heavy attention to these restrictions and the overcautious approach and hence slander the entire German PRT model⁶⁵.

The German units today demonstrate mightier military muscle. Consisting of 400–450 soldiers, the military components are designed to maintain not only robust force protection but also patrolling in districts and relatively wide CIMIC activities. After the commencing of long-range patrols – though unnecessarily heavy in size – the German model has militarily moved slightly towards the British one. A clear strongpoint of the German military component has from the beginning been that information operation capabilities play a pioneering role for all ISAF⁶⁶. A clear weakness of the PRTs is posed by the extremely short rotation cycle of military contingents (regularly four months).

Civilian components in Kunduz and Feyzabad are well staffed, including some 10–20 experts. Germany provides most of them, but some of the other contributing nations send their political, development and police advisors as well. Some critics acknowledge the extensive pre-deployment training of also the civilian component, while reminding of the lack of integration across the civil-military boundary⁶⁷.

A true speciality of the German model is dual leadership. The unit has two chiefs: a military commander and a civilian head, both running their own, independent halves of the organisation. Military components are led by colonels and civilian parts by representatives of the German Foreign Ministry to the provinces. They decide matters concerning the whole PRT collegially and represent the unit on equal bases towards the local population and officials. Initial strict independence and tensions between the components have over time eased off to some extent.

The German PRT type is firmly built on four pillars by the ministries represented:

- Federal Ministry of Defence
- Federal Foreign Office
- Federal Ministry of the Interior and
- Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ)⁶⁸.

Despite certain progress in the institutional framework, there is still some rigidity in the German system of interdepartmental cooperation. Problems reflect the developmental foreign policy tradition, the high degree of independence given to

61 Abbaszadeh et al. 2008, 7.

62 Gauster 2007, 22–23.

63 Abbaszadeh et al. 2008, 9.

64 Abbaszadeh et al. 2008, 49.

65 See Jakobsen 2005; Perito 2005; on the more recent developments, see also the non-updated Godsava 2007.

66 ISAF 2007, D-2-2.

67 Abbaszadeh et al. 2008, 27.

68 Jakobsen 2005, 24.

the departments, domestic political pressures and the public mood⁶⁹.

Security is primarily a duty of the military, although it must be noted that police mentors sent by the Ministry of the Interior (Mol) and a strong German Military Police play an important role in supporting the development of local police forces. This has been well in line with Germany being the international lead in building up the Afghan police – taken over in 2007 by the EU Police Mission in Afghanistan.

The civilian part is tasked with governance, reconstruction and development. Within the civilian component, the head is responsible for the general coherence of the broad German approach. However, BMZ has preserved wide operational independence due to the fact that it maintains budgetary autonomy⁷⁰. Representatives of other nations are included in the civilian component in coordination with their national directions.

The German approach to reconstruction and development in the provinces is two-fold. The military CIMIC teams map needs and implement QIPs in education, water management and other small infrastructure. BMZ-funded longer term development work is implemented by partners such as the German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ). There is also a considerable number of German-funded NGOs active in northern Afghanistan. In Kunduz the German community is among tens of actors sharing a common “German house” in the city centre⁷¹. Sectors prioritised through these various channels and modalities are economic reconstruction, education, water, energy, governance and rule of law⁷². The German impact on the northeastern provinces has grown so extensive that Markus Gauster believes there to be a risk of becoming counterproductive to the building up of local capacities and institutions⁷³. On the other hand, a Local Development Initiative has been established in each province which integrates German military and civilian representatives with the local Afghan government in order to prioritise and decide on projects funded by Germany.

5.3 *British(-Nordic)*

Of the three original PRT models, the British one has probably witnessed most adjustment. The United Kingdom established its first PRT in the northern centre, Mazar-e Sharif, in July 2003. This first non-US PRT originated under the OEF command, but was transferred to ISAF in summer 2004. At the same time, the UK launched its second PRT in Meymaneh, Faryab province, detaching it from PRT Mazar’s huge area of five provinces. Meymaneh and Mazar-e Sharif were later handed over to Norway and Sweden respectively as the UK headed south.

There, it took over the PRT in Helmand from the Americans in May 2006.

Recognising certain changes over time, the paper at hand adjusts the name of the third generic model from the traditional British into British-Nordic. This is due to the fact that Nordic countries have all along the way been functional partners to the British leadership, providing both military and civilian resources. The old contributors and currently lead nations Sweden and Norway have continued with the British-initiated model, developing it further. They have been supported by Finland, Denmark and Latvia, of which group Denmark has recently opted for the south, being now in Helmand with the UK and Estonia. Another smaller contributor to the British-Nordic PRTs is the United States with its civilian resources.

In size, the early British PRTs were much closer to the American than the German model. With a military force of 50–150, they put a heavy emphasis on SSR. The PRT Handbook praises the British mitigation of conflict between two rival warlords in the north: General Dostum and General Atta.⁷⁴ Following the policy of disarmament and mediation, conflict resolution between power brokers via diplomacy and cooperation with local authorities has been typical for the British model⁷⁵. From the very beginning, the British PRTs have maintained capabilities to operate in all corners of their provinces with small and lightly armed Mobile Observation Teams (MOT)⁷⁶. A territorially wide presence has supplemented the endeavours of the civilian components to build up the capacities of the local police force through training and infrastructure projects.

The British-Nordic PRTs have been reinforced over time and are now the size of about 150–200 soldiers. PRT Mazar-e Sharif is notably bigger (over 400), but on the other hand covers four provinces – an area five times that of Kosovo. Civilian capacities have been strengthened significantly from the original three representatives including a political, development and police advisor. The PRTs in Lashkar Gah, Meymaneh and Mazar-e Sharif sponsor now, in autumn 2008, a number of civilian specialists, whose expertise covers, for instance, political affairs, governance, development, civilian police, the penitentiary system and counter-narcotics. By far the best resourced is the UK PRT in Lashkar Gah, Helmand, which incorporates 28 civilian experts, covering some 15% of the total personnel in that unit⁷⁷.

In the original British model, PRTs are led by a triumvirate consisting of the principals of three agencies: the Ministry of Defence (MoD), Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), and the Department for International Development (DfID). Cooperation of the three resembles the German model on paper, but has in practise resulted in much more tightly knit

69 Abbaszadeh et al. 2008, 26.

70 Abbaszadeh et al. 2008, 27.

71 Recent collocation with the PRT commander’s new city office has raised some tensions in the NGO community. (Abbaszadeh et al. 2008, 28)

72 BMZ 2007; GTZ 2007; more detailed information of German aid by Gauster 2007, 45–47.

73 Gauster 2007, 42.

74 ISAF 2007, D-2-2.

75 Jakobsen 2005, 21–22.

76 Covering vast and remote areas, both the PRT Bamian led by New Zealand and the Lithuanian PRT Chaghcharan have adopted somewhat the same mode of mobility. In this respect, they resemble the UK model though deviating from it in other ways.

77 Abbaszadeh et al. 2008, 46.

teams. The triumvirate discusses plans and activities in all three lines of operation and seeks to make decisions unanimously. This early innovation of the British in Meymaneh and Mazar-e Sharif was later adopted as an ISAF best practise and promoted to all PRTs under the term “integrated command group”. The new UK PRT in Lashkar Gah is represented by a joint command group as in the north, but reports now to a Kandahar-resident regional coordinator appointed by the FCO⁷⁸, hence making the PRT effectively civilian-supervised.

Michael J. McNerney appraises the British mode of civil-military integration as the finest example of interagency jointness on a tactical level in Afghanistan.⁷⁹ Jakobsen notes that interconnecting military and development resources on the ground necessitates institutional arrangements back home. He attributes the British success to Conflict Prevention Pools, which are joint mechanisms for bringing together assets in foreign affairs, defence and development.⁸⁰ Another key arrangement to institutionalise coordinated planning and leadership on the capital level has been the interdepartmental Stabilisation Unit (SU), integrating members from the FCO, DfID and the MoD. SU is organically present also in the field, having six officers in the PRT Lashkar Gah.⁸¹

The Nordic PRTs have deviated from the triumvirate model and have become ostensibly led by a military commander. In any case, they have upheld close cooperation between military and civilian components, integrated in the Command Groups. A Nordic PRT Command Group consists of the senior military officers and the civilian component. Even if internal consensus is a common objective, the commander is the leading figure outside the PRT. There has been some tendency to promote a political representative or advisor to a senior position in the civilian component as a sort of counterpart to the commander, but not as manifestly as in the German model, in which a PRT is a dually headed, two-pillar organisation. More apparently, the Nordic PRTs seem to depict all civilian representatives as embedded advisors in slightly the same fashion as in the American model. Despite these relative changes, the Command Group model still continues to be strong and fairly equally integrative⁸².

The transformation has probably more to do with strengthened military capacities and the organisational culture of these PRTs than direct instructions from the respective capitals. The divergence between the UK and the Nordic countries also reflects the different stages in integrating the government branches in the capitals. The installation of an integrated approach to planning, follow-up and leadership is proceeding at varying paces.

The British-Nordic PRTs have not taken as strong a role in governance and development as they have in security. They have largely been limited to a facilitator role, sharing information, advising and coordinating with UNAMA. Trying to avoid duplication with NGO efforts, direct funding via PRT has been made available only for infrastructure and capacity-building projects in the security sector and local administration. DfID provided an annual £1 million pounds of funding for the PRTs in 2003–2006.⁸³

With regards to reconstruction, the British PRT in Lashkar Gah has transformed the established model and implements now QIPs. Also the PRT external troops of the Royal Engineers have been deployed to upgrade police and water infrastructure.⁸⁴ In addition to previously used funding modalities, the British Ministry of Defence has introduced what Barbara Stapleton calls the “CERP-equivalent” fund. It furnishes the PRT Commander with a maximum £40,000 pounds a month for “hearts and minds” types of projects.⁸⁵ The introduction of QIPs may be seen as a response to the particularly demanding security situation in Helmand.

The Nordic edition of the British model has evolved as well. Policymakers in Stockholm and Oslo have decided to refrain from allowing any project activities by the military and have opted for directing aid to the region solely through NGOs and multinationally funded development programmes. Sums funnelled through these arrangements are increasing. Representing a partner nation, the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs has funded SSR-oriented projects implemented by using local employment and supervised by the civilian component of the PRTs in Meymaneh and Mazar-e Sharif.

The British-Nordic PRTs in northern Afghanistan have not run notable CIMIC projects, only occasional and small force-protection ventures. PRT commanders have raised this issue repeatedly and asked for a small, flexible and swiftly obtainable tool for them to be able to react at a fast pace to changes in their area of operations. From 2008 onwards, Finland is directing an annual sum of €100,000 to €150,000 to QIPs watched over by a civilian development advisor.

The original model of a light footprint in reconstruction has been changing mostly in the same direction. All three lead nations following the British-Nordic model bring more development to their provinces, but for the most part still externally to the PRT. Each lead nation has adopted a joint approach to their areas of responsibility – thus approaching the broad German model in Kunduz and Badakhshan. Home governments are not only looking to the PRTs, but plan for a comprehensive presence in a province.

78 Abbaszadeh et al. 2008, 46.

79 McNerney 2005, 45.

80 Jakobsen 2005, 32.

81 Abbaszadeh et al. 2008, 43. The SU was formerly known as the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU).

82 An updated Nordic version of integrated thinking on PRT organisation and activities is offered by PRT Meymaneh 2007.

83 Jakobsen 2005, 22–23.

84 House of Commons 2006, Column 367-8W.

85 Stapleton 2007, 21–22.

5.4 Turkish⁸⁶

Vardak province west of Kabul got its own PRT in November 2006. Turkey did not emulate any existing model, but wished to create one of its own. PRT Vardak was launched as a civilian-led organisation, concentrating on governance and development.

The civilian component of the Turkish organisation is robust. The PRT is led by a Civilian Coordinator, a mid-level diplomatic officer. Under him civilian experts run the business. Advisors in governance and development mentor and train local administration, as well as implement projects in education, infrastructure, health care and agriculture. A team of police advisors is working to train the local police force and to upgrade its facilities. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs provided funds to PRT projects totalling \$6.5 million in both 2006 and 2007.

There are about 70 soldiers in the PRT, all Turkish. Their role is merely to provide logistics, communications and protection. The PRT has no regular military presence outside the provincial centre unless civilian experts wish to visit some of the outer districts. As such, the PRT does not have its own military operations. Since insurgent activities are spreading also to Vardak province, other forces than the PRT are needed to counter them.

Like the US PRT in Panjshir, the unit in Vardak is a small organisation focused on reconstruction and governance capacity building. It is not taking a role in the daily security business. In the security line of operation, it concentrates on longer-term investment in developing police forces. Doing so, it seems to neglect immediate security-related duties of patrolling and support for the government outreach to terrains held by combinations of tribal leaders, illegal militias and local powerbrokers/old warlords. This type of PRT undoubtedly necessitates the more robust presence of other forces in any "normal" Afghan context. PRT Vardak is thus a truly special venture, seeing the whole PRT mission and tasking differently. Panjshir province is an exceptional, and easier, case of "natural" security in this regard. Vardak resembles more closely the thinking behind PRTs in Iraq and could set an example for civil-military integration in less hostile environments.

86 Based mostly on personal communication with the Turkish Consulate General in Mazar-e Sharif.

6 PRTs under scrutiny

6.1 Research on PRTs

Professional debates on the transformation of peacekeeping, a comprehensive approach to conflict management or the humanitarian-military relationship often bring up the case of PRTs in Afghanistan. Nearly all observers have an opinion on the PRTs. In contrast to the popularity of this theme, PRTs are a fairly understudied concept in peace support. No broad and public study exists that compares the characteristics of all 26 PRTs. Research papers tend to focus on one PRT model or summarily measure the three generic models: US, UK, German. This paper is no exemption to the rule.

Many of the papers study only models and concepts as portrayed by contributing governments; just few truly try to examine how PRTs function in reality. Some of the studies are barely more than distant comments and may have a strong bias towards or against the PRTs in general or certain national models.

PRT research has been conducted chiefly by individual researchers and commentators in various countries. Often they have professional experience in Afghanistan, be it in diplomatic or military service or work with NGOs and international organisations. Military studies of operational and strategic scope make up a large share of PRT research. The US Army War College publishes several master's theses concerning Afghanistan every year in which the PRTs are scrutinised from counter-insurgency and stabilisation operation perspectives.

Research on the PRTs remains fairly scattered. Researchers are not networked to extend over professional boundaries of government bureaucracies, military, research institutes, UN agencies, academics, and NGO representatives. PRT conferences and seminars are normally organised by governmental actors or NATO and tend to exclude wide participation.

Despite a moderate body of research, one single best model of PRTs in Afghanistan cannot be identified. There seems to be, however, some common understanding across the PRT literature that the British model is probably the closest approximation of a well-built provincial reconstruction team.

Nevertheless, it is more important to recognise the difficulty of PRT best practise identification. If nothing else, PRT research unanimously agrees on the lack of instruments to measure

success and even any impact of the PRTs. How to assess what the teams are doing or have achieved?⁸⁷ Lessons learned and evaluation processes in ISAF have been weak and seriously distracted by the heavy lead-nation drive behind the PRT network. Supporters of each national model are convinced of their case without tools to back up their argument, according to the critics of the *Save the Children* organisation⁸⁸. Judgments are too often built on anecdotal evidence and impressions. McNerney warns of "smiles on Afghan faces" methodology⁸⁹. Another easy solution is to list inputs instead of analysing impacts. The Americans have tried to quantify their work in wells, schools and clinics built, but that can hardly mirror success in such a multidimensional state-building task as that of the PRTs. Indeed, the very political nature of the PRT mission may render it nearly impossible to assess its impact in a time frame of a couple of years.

Recent research raises many critical challenges for the working and future development of the PRTs. Godsave describes the discussion as a "heavily critical scholarly debate."⁹⁰ Here some of the key topics in this battle for the "hearts and minds" of the international audience will be briefly introduced.

6.2 Incoherence of models

One of the key characteristics of the PRTs is flexibility. Adaptation to local circumstances in Afghanistan's wide countryside was part of the original idea⁹¹. However, localised flexibility was soon overridden by lead nation policies, traditions and bureaucracies. This has resulted in an imbalanced network of provincial units, whose performance in governance and development is not controlled by ISAF. The Headquarters in Kabul has effective command only of the core security (military) activities of the PRTs. Altogether 14 nationally designed models determine how the PRTs execute their mission to support the Afghan government. The most critical incoherence of PRT models is

87 *Save the Children* (2004, 38–39) and McNerney (2005, 39) propose some parameters for measuring effects.

88 *Save the Children* 2004, 37.

89 McNerney 2005, 39, 43.

90 Godsave 2007, 43.

91 McNerney 2005, 37.

manifested by the relative weight they give to their role as *Reconstruction Teams*. As project funds derive from domestic budgets, the ISAF operation maintains no control over them, but can only observe national priorities being promoted under the ISAF flag.

The establishment of Regional Commands (RC) to bridge the PRTs and ISAF Headquarters in 2006 tightened the military command and probably enhanced military coordination. Various sorts of reporting have boomed to cover also a wide range of governance and development-related matters, thus incorporating civilian expertise into the ISAF command structure to a higher extent than previously. Increased reporting is a result of the demand of aggregated information by the international community in Kabul, as well as NATO Commands requiring ever wider situational picture.

Real-life PRTs out in the provinces have evolved into many and diverse endeavours. The Terms of Reference issued by the PRT Executive Steering Committee (ESC) in 2005 attempted to set some guidelines for reconstruction activities. ISAF soon realised the need to further explicate and guide the activities on the ground. In order to get a grip on the PRTs, NATO held a series of seminars on the matter and work on publishing a PRT Handbook started. The first edition came out in October 2006 as part of a larger scheme to develop mission training and lessons-learned-processes within ISAF. It coincided with ISAF's expansion to cover the whole Afghan territory and absorb the remaining OEF PRTs. Since autumn 2006, PRT pre-deployment training courses have been arranged for both military and civilian officials at the NATO School in Germany. ISAF Headquarters hosts quarterly PRT conferences in Kabul and distributes a bulletin called *ISAF PRT Weekly*, presenting a collection of news sent in by PRT civilian officers. The CIMIC branch at the ISAF Headquarters has been reinforced with additional military and civilian staff to better engage and support the PRTs. On a political level, PRT ESC and its Working Groups were reactivated in late 2006, which led to the issuing of three policy notes that give direct guidance to PRT activities in development, the humanitarian sphere and disarmament.

Clarifying the tasks is not enough. What is even more troublesome is that Afghans are confused by the seemingly chaotic PRT presence. Precisely how the different PRTs work is not well known to the Afghan government, which is wishing to better coordinate development activities. A US interagency study on PRTs warns that flexibility in funding bewilders organised national development process; PRTs, operating in their responsible provinces, may choose project priorities that are not in line with Afghan planning⁹².

6.3 Capacity in reconstruction and development

PRT Terms of Reference (ToR) stipulate that units "may conduct Quick Impact Projects [QIP] in their areas to gain the consent of the local population to support operational priorities."⁹³

The loose guidelines of the ToR have been utilised in various nationally driven models to expand PRT reconstruction activities. QIPs have turned into the building of schools, clinics, roads, wells, and water channels.

Assuming wider activities poses PRTs with the challenge of development capacity. Are PRTs equipped with the knowledge necessary for becoming development actors? Critics claim that the units deal with too many things, lacking the skills needed⁹⁴. Development should be left to the Afghan government, aided by NGOs and the UN. PRTs are not effective in their reconstruction activities, due to deficient training, skills and experience. There are systemic deficiencies in military organisations stepping into the development sphere: the tendency to plan and act in the short-term and a lack of transparency and accountability.

The selection of QIPs in the PRTs is not based on the same kind of criteria as with development agencies and NGOs. Stapleton reminds that military and political objectives influence the selection of projects. Also the capacity to oversee project implementation has remained low, resulting in poor quality.⁹⁵ A US interagency study repeats the emblematic accounts of how American PRTs have built local infrastructure in health and education without paying attention to realities around the walls. Clinics and schools do not bring much development if the local government is not able to maintain these installations by securing the purchase of medicine and books, or lacks the funds to employ competent doctors and teachers.⁹⁶

Examining the recent critique, Godsave suggests that PRTs should turn from QIPs towards longer term infrastructure and the development of local institutions⁹⁷. McNerney points out that PRTs have performed fairly well in security sector capacity-building. He would like to see resources channelled also to governance, where PRTs could have great potential, so far unexercised.⁹⁸ There seems, however, to be some obscurity as to how to actually operationalise the vague PRT mandate in terms of governance. The PRT Handbook does not give a clear answer. Roger Lane and Emma Sky list the PRT tasks in governance as being regular engagement with local government and people's representatives, the promotion of Afghan leadership, the bridging of information gaps between centre and periphery, and training and mentoring in administration and the judicial sector⁹⁹. Stapleton takes a more critical stance toward the general idea of the military-minded PRTs "filling gaps" in governance and reconstruction. She maintains that longer term capacity-building depends on how and by whom things are done, not just achieving the immediate, concrete goal.¹⁰⁰

The various reconstruction and development activities of the 26 PRTs in Afghanistan carry the risk of seriously confusing other actors and further complicating the already challenging task of

92 US Interagency 2006, 9.

93 ISAF 2007, B-2-2.

94 For instance, Godsave (2007, 27–28) collects the critical tones.

95 Stapleton 2007, 23–24.

96 US Interagency 2006, 9.

97 Godsave 2007, 28–29.

98 McNerney 2005, 42.

99 Lane & Sky 2006, 48–49.

100 Stapleton 2007, 36.

coordination. PRT activities may raise too high expectations and differing funding modalities put PRTs into competition with one another¹⁰¹. A more structural challenge is posed by the often too loose alignment with the national and provincial development planning of the Afghan government¹⁰². PRTs have their own agendas and plans uncontrollable by Afghans. Stapleton warns of a "parallel development strategy", which ends up being counterproductive to both local development and the development of a functioning government¹⁰³.

Policy Note 1, issued by the PRT Executive Steering Committee in December 2006, strives for better coordination of activities and underlines the vital need for PRT projects to be in line with local priorities and Afghan national programmes. The paper ranks support for provincial planning as a major PRT task in the development line of operation.¹⁰⁴

6.4 Whole-of-government approach

PRT lead nations' support packages for capacity building in governance are directed through the UN or Afghan national development programmes. Similarly, funding for development and reconstruction is channelled via Afghan programmes or contracted NGOs. What is remarkable is that as large donors the lead nations have managed to bend national-level efforts to allocate resources to their responsible provinces. For example, programmes utilised in the "provincialisation" of aid by Norway, Sweden and/or the UK include the:

- National Area-Based Development Programme (NABDP)
- Afghan Sub-National Governance Programme (ASGP)
- National Solidarity Programme (NSP)
- Microfinance Investment Support Facility for Afghanistan (MISFA)
- National Rural Access Programme (NRAP)
- Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Programme (RUWATSAN)
- Education Quality Improvement Project (EQUIP)¹⁰⁵.

Overall investments of lead nations in provinces are increasing rapidly. The British development agency DfID has started a three-year programme to fund some of the above-mentioned national efforts in Helmand – with a total cost of £30 million¹⁰⁶. Considering all the channels used, the British assistance to Helmand totals up to £20 million per year¹⁰⁷. This is equivalent to \$40 million. In 2007 Norway channelled 82.8 million Norwegian krone to Faryab, equivalent to nearly \$15 million¹⁰⁸.

It should be noted that the UK, Norway and Germany are not the only ones in Afghanistan to apply what could be called a (provincial) "whole-of-government" approach to post-conflict stabilisation. After deploying in the south, also the Dutch and Canadian governments now follow this line of heavily supporting their responsible provinces both through and outside the PRTs, combining military elements, local diplomatic efforts, development activities and humanitarian aid. The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs planned to direct €24.5 million to Uruzgan in 2007, mostly external to the PRT¹⁰⁹. In their previous area of responsibility, Baghlan province in the north, the Dutch had only a small budget for humanitarian projects¹¹⁰. The Canadian counterpart has pledged up to \$20 million to Kandahar¹¹¹. The United States has during the past few years employed a somewhat similar scheme in its PRT provinces.

Other governments and lead nations are moving towards an integrated, interdepartmental approach as well. Whole-of-government thinking – or "3D" as it is sometimes called after Diplomacy, Development and Defence – is clearly the predominant new trend in PRT concept development in Afghanistan. This reflects a wider policy change in major donor nations' approaches to fragile states. The whole-of-government idea seeks national policy coherence and has emerged as an answer to new global and local realities of the security and development environment.¹¹² In Afghanistan, the approach is for the first time reaching a provincial or tactical level with the co-presence of various tools. Success on the ground necessitates institutional integration in the donor capital. For example, some critics note that poor strategic coordination in Rome has seriously maimed the Italian PRT in Herat¹¹³.

The concentration of national efforts on single provinces triggers criticism. Stapleton refers to this phenomenon as the "Balkanisation" of aid, since development becomes geographically scattered and dependent on the priorities of each donor¹¹⁴. Also the recent report by ACBAR, the Agency Coordination Body for Afghan Relief, seriously criticises the immense disparities in the aid different provinces receive¹¹⁵. "Balkanised" Afghanistan is unevenly divided into donor areas of responsibility, resulting in ineffectiveness and uncoordinated fractures in sectors such as police, justice and counter-narcotics, warned the outgoing NATO Senior Civilian Representative Daan Everts in an interview by *Al Jazeera* in December 2007¹¹⁶. The whole-of-government approach is intended to increase policy coherence, but being so tied to selected provinces, it also runs the risk of becoming disaligned from Afghan policy

101 *Irinnews* 2007a.

102 World Bank 2007, 27–28.

103 Stapleton 2007, 23–24.

104 ISAF 2007, B-4-1/2.

105 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2007; DfID 2007.

106 DfID 2007.

107 House of Commons 2006, Column 367W.

108 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2007.

109 Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2007b.

110 Jakobsen 2005, 17.

111 Canadian Ministry of National Defence 2007.

112 Patrick & Brown 2007, 1–6.

113 Abbaszadeh et al. 2008, 7.

114 Stapleton 2007, 40.

115 Waldman 2007, 12–13.

116 *Al Jazeera* 2007.

processes as well as creating disharmony between donors.¹¹⁷ The whole-of-government approach through integrated units may thus run counterproductive to the wider “comprehensive approach” of the international community. Two recent reports on Afghan aid and local governance by ACBAR and the World Bank suggest a downscaling of the PRTs and related direct activities in more secure areas and redirecting funds to the government of Afghanistan¹¹⁸.

PRT-driven whole-of-government approaches are also accused of politicising development. Development actors are wary of being perceived as annexed “force multipliers” to the military due to funding links to PRT lead nations. NGOs have become vulnerable to prioritisations and pressure from European capitals¹¹⁹. On the other hand, the politicisation of development in the context of Afghanistan proves extremely difficult to deny. Donors and the UN have pledged their support to the legitimate government and state-building project in Afghanistan. Thus all development aid to Afghanistan is political support in essence. The national development programmes partly implemented by NGOs carry “distinct political overtones,” as Stapleton rightly reminds¹²⁰.

Debate over the political nature of development aid continues between donor governments and NGOs. Canada reviewed its contribution in southern Afghanistan and set up an Independent Panel on Afghanistan to collect experiences and propose a future policy plan in 2007. In its submission to the Panel, Canada’s Coalition to End Global Poverty (CCIC) association criticised the Canadian whole-of-government approach of putting security first and suppressing development and diplomatic efforts on the ground. CCIC claimed that the Canadian approach has militarised peace-building and humanitarian and development assistance. It asked for wider conceptual thinking and a variety of independent non-military tools. Otherwise, a serious risk looms of civilian and military actors being directly associated in the field.¹²¹

6.5 Blurring of civilian and military roles

Responsibilities and activities of the foreign military have been a source of frequent debate in Afghanistan since the winter 2001–2002. Mark Sedra argues that few issues are more divisive for the international community in Afghanistan than the PRTs and their relationships with civilian actors¹²². Criticism arises from a mixture of a demanding security environment, especially in the south and east of Afghanistan, PRT project

activities and whole-of-government approaches exercised by many donor countries.

Save the Children accuses the PRTs of geographical and sectoral duplication with the work of humanitarian agencies. The military do not limit their activities to the idea of filling gaps, but run constant Quick Impact Projects in fields defined as humanitarian by specialised agencies. *Save the Children* claims that the military do not have expertise in humanitarian work.¹²³ Agencies call attention to the international humanitarian principles in all aid: humanity, neutrality and impartiality. Various PRTs with different QIPs hardly observe these principles.

Being highly critical to all PRT project activities, *Save the Children* is afraid of the militarisation of aid. PRT involvement in development runs the risk of blurring military and civilian roles in a conflict zone.¹²⁴ Projects confuse the local population and the government over the division of responsibilities. The aid community is preoccupied with the danger of being perceived as part of a military campaign plan.¹²⁵ *Save the Children* warns of reduced differentiation between military and civilian actors and maintains that the military, due to their projects, are encroaching on the “humanitarian space” of NGOs. The blurring of roles draws attacks on aid workers.¹²⁶ Humanitarian space is a concept coining secure access to a conflict zone, guaranteed by respect and the exercise of humanitarian principles. The diminution of humanitarian space is of great concern to the UN and humanitarian agencies in Afghanistan¹²⁷.

The *Save the Children* report from 2004 still accurately reflects the sentiments of many NGOs and agencies engaged in humanitarian work as well as development in Afghanistan. PRTs are seen as hazardous political efforts that carry more problems and risks than benefit. A sad and extreme case in point was the 2004 pullout of *Médecins Sans Frontières* (MSF) from Afghanistan after five of their aid workers were murdered. MSF was exceptionally concerned about the humanitarian-military relations in Afghanistan and argued that PRT proliferation influenced their decision to withdraw.¹²⁸ The MSF case triggered much discussion of the PRTs and their role in reconstruction and humanitarian aid. This debate somewhat settled down for a few years, but intensified again in 2007 as ISAF has taken over much of the OEF role in fighting the insurgency.

Presumably only few NGOs and humanitarian agencies are completely negative about the PRTs. Most of them apparently wish to live side by side with the PRTs, but also to keep them at a distance. Many are indifferent to PRT efforts, which are perceived as potentially useful, but rather limited in reality.

Throughout the critical reviews, the British model is considered as the most suitable one for NGOs and humanitarian

117 Sky (2006) argues that also the fragmented lead nation approach to security sector reform in Afghanistan may be vastly unconstructive. Five major donors were appointed in 2002 to lead the support for the Afghan National Army (USA), Afghan National Police (Germany), judicial reform (Italy), counter-narcotics (UK) and disarmament (Japan).

118 Waldman 2007, 24; World Bank 2007, 46.

119 Stapleton 2007, 40.

120 Stapleton 2007, 24.

121 CCIC 2007, 1–2, 9–10.

122 Sedra 2004, 1.

123 *Save the Children* 2004, 1–3, 24, 36.

124 *Save the Children* 2004, 40.

125 Dziejczak & Seidl 2005, 5.

126 *Save the Children* 2004, 33–34.

127 *Irinews* 2007b.

128 Sedra 2004, 1.

agencies. This is based firstly on the fact that UN and NGO representatives were interviewed before designing the model, and secondly on following the principle of avoiding duplication with other actors and concentrating on security sector reform.¹²⁹ The otherwise critical *Save the Children* writes that the UK model "stands out in having a more precise 'concept of operations'."¹³⁰ It seems to answer the NGO demand of PRTs withdrawing from humanitarian assistance and extensive project activities, especially in the health, education and water sectors. The most criticised model is the American one. US PRT projects, strong aid conditionality and previously unmarked vehicles and soldiers have raised strong resentment.¹³¹ On the other hand, Gauster argues that PRT-NGO relations are severing more in the north than in the south, where large areas are already impenetrable to NGOs¹³².

ISAF guidance on PRT tasks in the humanitarian sphere remained for a long time thin despite the increasing critique from NGOs. The PRT Terms of Reference do not make a distinction between civil and military personnel and tasks, nor mention UNAMA's lead role in governance, development and humanitarian affairs. The revitalisation of the Executive Steering Committee (ESC) in 2006 has to some extent enhanced guidance. Policy Note 1, adopted in December 2006, specifies PRTs' role in provincial development. It underlines the requisite coordination with and support to provincial governments and their plans. The Note adds to the PRT Handbook statement: "PRT is also not a development agency." Policy Note 3 from February 2007 stipulates PRT intervention in humanitarian assistance, drawing a firm line between civilian actors by and large in charge and the military giving aid only in extreme circumstances. PRTs may conduct humanitarian activities only when requested by UNAMA or the Afghan government. ESC also underlined that humanitarian assistance must not be used for the purpose of "winning hearts and minds."¹³³ Even with these new directives installed, the problem has persisted; not all PRT nations have fully adhered to them.

Steering processes should be strengthened by Guidelines for the Interaction and Coordination of Humanitarian Actors and Military Actors in Afghanistan, which was drafted by a Civil-Military Working Group dually chaired by UNAMA and ACBAR, and consisting of other humanitarian actors, major donors, ISAF, and the Government of Afghanistan. The Guidelines were published in August 2008 amidst growing fears that the conflict has not only severely reduced the access of aid agencies to local populations, but is turning them into targets¹³⁴. The agreed document focuses heavily on the PRTs. Reinforcing earlier guidelines by the ESC and recognising

the problems with the overgrown reconstruction role of the teams, it underlines the provision of security as the prime task of the military – instead of politically or militarily motivated assistance.¹³⁵ But like the earlier guiding principles, these remain just as vulnerable to negligence by the big players.

6.6 PRT as a security provider?

The PRTs are frequently considered as security guarantors in the fashion of a traditional peacekeeping or even active peace enforcement force. Those criticising the PRTs of getting too deeply involved in reconstruction and development issues tend to ask for more robust use of military capabilities. Units are requested more in providing direct security and downsizing other, more civilian types of activities. NGOs demand secure environments for them to operate in.¹³⁶

More precisely, the PRTs should be able to stop clashes between warlords and root out local criminal gangs. *Save the Children* describes the PRTs as the "second-best option for enhancing security," unable and too weak for mediation or reducing the propensity for conflicts. *Save the Children* states that "PRTs have not held warlords accountable for local abuses of authority."¹³⁷ All the more, lightly built PRTs in an environment penetrated by armed politico-criminal networks may themselves need to rest some portion of their security on tolerance by local powerbrokers, i.e. warlords¹³⁸.

Expectations for a PRT role in security and manoeuvring capabilities are ambitious. Stapleton tracks these hopes to the launching phase of the PRT programme when their military muscles were oversold; buffed with capabilities that did not materialise¹³⁹. Accusing PRTs of the inability to intervene in large-scale factional fighting – like the one in Herat 2004¹⁴⁰ begs the question whether PRTs ever were designed to carry out such duties. Expectations seem to run too high in comparison to the PRT mission, tasking and resources. Even if enjoying the ISAF mandate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, PRTs were established according to the light footprint doctrine, which evolved as a compromise between the experiences of Afghan history and lame interest in contributing international troops to the ground.

With their mission of a political nature, the PRTs are devised and tasked to monitor, support, liaise and facilitate plenty of things, but not to run, execute and implement. Dzedzic and Seidl remind that "PRTs were designed to spread a peacekeeping effect without creating a large peacekeeping force. They are the grease, not the wheel."¹⁴¹ When deemed necessary, the PRTs can reach a more robust force from their regional Forward Support Bases or ISAF air capabilities. These provide the PRTs with the last resort deterrence they might need in rapidly escalating situations. The PRTs were created in

129 Stapleton 2007, 16–17; Jakobsen 2005, 22; Sedra 2004, 8.

130 *Save the Children* 2004, 20.

131 Sedra 2004, 6–7, 9. Although, it should be noted that also the UK-Nordic and German PRTs have been criticised for using unmarked, white four-by-four vehicles. See, for example, Gauster 2007, 53.

132 Gauster 2007, 36.

133 ISAF 2007, 3, B-4-1/2, B-5-1/2.

134 *Irinnews* 2008; *Asia Times Online* 2008.

135 Guidelines 2008.

136 Dzedzic & Seidl 2005, 7–8; Stapleton 2007, 11.

137 *Save the Children* 2004, 5, 28–30.

138 Gauster 2007, 15.

139 Stapleton 2007, 11.

140 *Save the Children* 2005, 32.

141 Dzedzic & Seidl 2005, 8.

a relatively low level of conflict and are not best suited for high-level conflict areas with constant battles. Jakobsen underlines that other troops and mechanisms than the PRTs are needed to root out such deep problems of the Afghan conflict as insurgency, the drug business and organised crime¹⁴².

6.7 Integration of capacities

PRTs are welcomed by almost all observers in their capacity to integrate a wide range of civilian and military resources. Even *Save the Children* agrees that the PRTs may be positive in integrating approaches to security and development and in advancing the concept of human security¹⁴³. Godsave notes that civil-military jointness is the most likely element of the PRT experiment to be applied in future stability operations¹⁴⁴. In contrast to these promising prospects, actual civil-military integration within the teams has not been much researched or commented on; Touko Piiparinen reflects his own experiences in a Norwegian-led unit in Meymaneh¹⁴⁵ while Perito and the US interagency report study US practises based on questionnaires and interviews¹⁴⁶.

Integrating civilian and military assets at the field level or in a tactical unit definitely poses a challenge. The US interagency study found that good results are reached only when, tailored to local dynamics, both components work closely together and employ all resources to the full extent in lines of security, governance and development¹⁴⁷. Using the term "integration" begs the question whether civilian and military components are considered equal elements of the whole. What is the striking force or spearhead of a PRT? Are the PRTs "essentially military mechanisms, which have embedded civilians to give them a more holistic approach to their work," as Godsave maintains?¹⁴⁸ A counterargument could underline the existence of civilian-led PRTs in Afghanistan and the evidently civilian orientation that PRTs have adopted in Iraq. On the other hand, one can hardly avoid the conclusion that the balance between civilian and military components in a PRT is decided chiefly in the lead nation capitals. National traditions and policies steer the tasks, resources and mode of cooperation in a unit.

All three commentators list a lack of guidance on roles and responsibilities as the main source of friction in internal PRT civil-military relations. Piiparinen analyses differences in traditions, mental mindsets and concepts between civilian and military officers. These affect the ways of organising a unit's administration as well as interaction with the local population.

The bulk of the criticism is directed to the military's tendency to forget the realities outside its own camp. With only loose external and internal guidelines, the PRTs are "left to their own devices" to organise their mission. A clash of mindsets remains possible and harmony is "ensured only by goodwill on the part of the individuals," Piiparinen concludes.¹⁴⁹ Much relies on personal chemistries. The US interagency paper expresses concern over the finding that "personality played a disproportionate role in determining the direction of PRT activities."¹⁵⁰ Success is laid on ad hoc, trial and error processes instead of well designed organisational processes¹⁵¹.

The role of the civilian personnel in ISAF is rather imprecise in general. While numerous PRT tasks and frequent reporting routines involve civilian activities, civilian experts are not part of the command structure. They are nationally sent specialists who link up with military contingents. How this is implemented technically remains within domestic traditions and legal frameworks. For example, German PRT civilians belong to their ministry staffs and are officially not part of ISAF at all, whereas Finland seconds its "civilian crisis management" experts to ISAF – even if there is no civilian ISAF leadership or command structure in effect.

Reflecting the mixed nature of the PRTs, the US Interagency report warns of the militarisation of PRT activities – including governance and development, which should be civilian-led according to US national guidance. In this matter, the collocation of some of the US PRTs with combat troops has clearly been a negative factor disorienting the PRT mission.¹⁵²

Recruitment to the demanding, stressful and potentially dangerous environment in Afghanistan has proven difficult for many nations. Living in a military camp under heavy limitations on personal freedom is not a particularly lucrative choice. Most of the US civilian representatives collocated with the PRTs have been junior officers or retirees from diplomatic service¹⁵³. Junior officers may face problems in a culture that values age and hierarchy. The US interagency study also reminds that such inexperienced personnel will be working with mid-level military officers with 20 years of service¹⁵⁴. The Nordic countries and new NATO members tend to send younger representatives as well. Another challenge is that Afghans repeatedly prefer military commanders to civilian representatives as their liaison. Mirroring the militarised past of the Afghan society, many officials in the local administration and police force are former soldiers who may perceive a military commander as having more authority than the younger civilian counterparts.

Warning of poor area expertise, Perito demands more pre-deployment training for civilian experts¹⁵⁵. The US Interagency paper suggests joint training for military and civilian components¹⁵⁶. Training should cover not only local culture,

142 Jakobsen 2005, 29, 34–35. It is interesting that from 2007 onwards some PRTs have been forced to assume a counter-insurgency type of duties in western and northern Afghanistan, where there are close to no OEF forces and only limited combat troops of ISAF present. PRT military tasks are widest in such low troop density areas, as noted in Section 4.3.

143 *Save the Children* 2004, 35.

144 Godsave 2007, 18.

145 Piiparinen 2007.

146 Perito 2005; US Interagency 2006.

147 US Interagency 2006, 11.

148 Godsave 2007, 19.

149 Piiparinen 2007, 149–155.

150 US Interagency 2006, 10.

151 Perito 2005, 11.

152 US Interagency 2006, 10, 14.

153 Perito 2005, 11–12.

154 US Interagency 2006, 15.

155 Perito 2005, 11–13.

156 US Interagency 2006, 11.

society and the history of the conflict, but also introduce the ISAF operation, PRT mission and model of civil-military integration, domestic policies, and the introduction of other actors on the ground.

A practical factor further complicating civil-military integration in the PRTs is often a mismatch between the resources of the components. Civilian experts are frequently sent to the field without any administrative, logistical or security assets. Civilians become dependent on the services of the military component, which makes them vulnerable to overruling military priorities and hinders their opportunities to meet local counterparts.¹⁵⁷ Also discrepancies in funding create internal gaps. The US interagency study demands that all civilian functions or agencies represented in a PRT should be furnished with dedicated funds to operate with¹⁵⁸.

157 Perito 2005, 11.

158 US Interagency 2006, 16.

7 The way forward

The PRT experiment in Afghanistan has been depicted as a success by Western governments, while it has met criticism from non-governmental actors. With reality lying somewhere in between, there exists a certain consensus around the need for a thorough reformation of the scheme. The PRTs served well in supporting the DDR process and construction of the post-Bonn political system in Afghanistan. Both projects have been technically successful ventures of state-building. In achieving more qualitative progress of good and efficient governance, the PRTs are less evidently cost-effective.

7.1 Coherence

In the near future two major challenges have to be solved. First, ISAF and NATO need to work out the worst outcomes of the incoherence of the various PRT models. "Synchronisation" and "coherence" have surfaced to PRT seminar agendas both in Afghanistan and Europe. Finding more "unity of effort" was one of the overarching motivations for the PRT Handbook. Even if NATO attempts to overcome diversity by setting better guidelines, it seems a slim chance that the core problem of different lead nation policies in provincial reconstruction would be tackled. Another obstacle rarely observed by commentators are the wide differences in PRTs' military tasks due to the varying presence of combat forces as indicated above.

One of the recent papers to demand effective PRT coordination was the Afghanistan Study Group Report, which called for the new UN SRSG to oversee the PRTs¹⁵⁹. ISAF and UNAMA should indeed be perceived as missions in tandem. In a way, ISAF was established as a military component for a larger international mission in Afghanistan, UNAMA being the political and development hub responsible for humanitarian coordination as well. Even if the organisational structure is less apparent, the arrangement bears resemblance to those practised in UN peace operations. However, the two components have grown somewhat distant from each other since the early days of the mission limited to Kabul. The situation is particularly problematic in the provinces, where the PRTs have gradually self-extended their tasks and activities.

The teams should provide their support in governance and development via UNAMA offices, which unfortunately do not exist in the majority of provinces. If the UNAMA network expands, PRTs could and should hand over part of their activities to the UN. It is even more important to ascertain mutual trust and cooperation between the local UN representation and the PRT for the benefit of commonly shared goals.

Despite the current discussions to find a more coherent comprehensive approach to Afghanistan, there are irreconcilable underpinning factors that prolong the confusion. They can be found in the radically different political-strategic visions of the nations contributing. The United States, the UK and a group of active smaller members of the Alliance perceive the entire mission in Afghanistan as a war, whereas the UN, the EU and some troop contributors to the ISAF approach the situation using crisis management and/or peace-building as a starting point. Are we trying to win a war or build peace?

7.2 Afghanistanisation

In its second challenge, NATO must decide on how to downscale the PRTs eventually; what is the PRT exit strategy? NATO is working to create criteria for an ISAF phase-out, the fourth stage in the Afghanistan campaign plan. It would be a logical choice to start in the north of the country, where the security situation has remained the best and somewhat plentiful development actors enjoy relatively relaxed freedom of movement. The political mission of the PRTs has been fairly successful in northern and central Afghanistan, although partial victories gained in recent years will wither away if a qualitative change of governance continues to be impeded¹⁶⁰. In the south, political action concentrates on negotiations with tribal networks in order to win local support for the central government and split the insurgency into smaller factions. Any exit strategy for the next few years there seems to be improbable. More pessimistic observers say decades. Gauster perceives it as difficult for the PRTs to leave when they are

159 Afghanistan Study Group Report 2008, 20–22.

160 Stapleton 2007, 1–2.

regarded by the local population "as permanently installed international charities, i.e. quasi-job centres."¹⁶¹

The first option for the phasing out of the PRTs is to gradually substitute the military-based units with more Afghans. Jakobsen notes that according to the original plan, the PRT handover to the government of Afghanistan was to be started already in 2005 and concluded in 2007¹⁶². This optimistic plan was soon overridden by the difficult realities of weak government and a more demanding security situation than estimated in the initial phases of the "campaign."

The establishment of liaisons to link the PRTs and the Afghan structures, especially the national security forces, has been proposed¹⁶³. In fact, direct liaison functions have been tried in the US PRTs, to which the Afghan Ministry of Interior has embedded colonel-level officers since 2004¹⁶⁴. Only few other PRTs have such representatives collocated. It must, however, be remembered that the PRT mandate is strongest in supporting the police, with which PRT units (should) have already established frequent and direct liaison. Much vaguer is alignment with the Afghan structures in governance and development, where the PRTs should have a facilitation role, but often run their independent projects.

In terms of Afghanisation, it is remarkable that Afghan opinions and ideas about the development of the teams have not been researched at all. Neither the government of Afghanistan nor domestic NGOs have had much voice in recent studies. This unfortunate disregard toward the Afghan voice was recognised already in 2005 at the NATO conference on PRTs and CIMIC¹⁶⁵. Domestic speakers are usually included in PRT seminars and training courses, but in a minor role.

7.3 *Civilianisation*

Another option available for a gradual PRT transformation is civilianisation. It would make a logical step from military intervention towards longer-term stabilisation, polity building and development. The US Interagency report underlines that the PRT expertise needed may change over time as the mission and conditions evolve¹⁶⁶. Both Perito and McNerney suggest augmenting civilian capacities in the PRTs and compare these to CORDS units in Vietnam in which more than half of the staff were civilian experts in sectors of governance, rule of law, reconstruction and agriculture. McNerney would like to see a wider presence of PRTs across the country, by forming a network of smaller, district-level subunits¹⁶⁷.

A further qualitative step towards civilianisation is full civilian leadership, so far exercised only in two experimental PRTs in Afghanistan. The Princeton study group argues that civilian control would "balance the long-term development

with near-term military imperatives."¹⁶⁸ Civilian leadership, representation and liaison would presumably be warmly greeted by many international civilian actors, such as humanitarian agencies¹⁶⁹. The Canadian Independent Panel on Canadian involvement in Afghanistan suggested a rapid shift to civilian leadership in PRT Kandahar in order to enhance the coordination of national efforts¹⁷⁰.

To analyse the civilian concept one might need to have a closer look at experiences in Panjshir and Vardak as well as units in Iraq. It could also be enlightening to compare the PRT framework to that of integrated UN missions, where a Force Commander works subordinated to a Head of Mission, who is civilian. Such an arrangement could perhaps serve as a model for semi-independent provincial/tactical units as well.

In the case of Afghanistan, the most drastic version of such civilian leadership would be to bestow PRT leadership to local UNAMA offices. UN political oversight instead of various national models should improve the coherence of the PRT network and may be seen as a response to the criticism about the lack of a comprehensive approach by the international community in large. This could perhaps be tested first in northern Afghanistan, where the security situation allows for more pioneering civilian approaches.

Advances towards civilianisation challenge the prevalent thinking. They beg a principal question on the nature of PRTs: are they after all nothing but military units spiced up with a few embedded civilians to gather information and comment on operations and plans? It seems reasonable to say that PRTs started as military installations with just thin guidance on the use of civilian resources. Since then the PRTs have, however, developed more towards civil-military integration on a more equal basis. The ISAF lessons-learning process has placed integration high on the agenda, recognising that embeddedness is not enough. Also, the whole-of-government approach to Afghanistan highlights jointness in provincial units. To use the European Union term "civilian crisis management" in depicting the PRTs would be an overstatement, but they surely include elements that are capable of carrying out activities comparable to that.

7.4 *Future of the integrated concept*

Could the PRTs serve as a model for future missions in similar contexts? The PRTs are rather widely considered to be useful field-level or tactical tools in coordination of military and civilian efforts in the early stabilisation stages of a post-conflict environment. They provide policymakers with unforeseen flexibility and can cover vast geographical areas, demanding only a relatively thin troop presence and modest resources compared to heavier units. In Afghanistan, the main military task of the PRTs has been to maintain modest situational awareness in areas unoccupied by the spearhead forces. Militarily, the PRTs are cheap.

161 Gauster 2007, 9.

162 Jakobsen 2005, 14.

163 Dziedzic & Seidl 2005, 13; Stapleton 2007, 40.

164 McNerney 2005, 42.

165 NATO 2005.

166 US Interagency 2006, 21.

167 Perito 2005, 14; McNerney 2005, 43-45.

168 Abbaszadeh et al. 2008, 16.

169 Sedra 2004, 10.

170 Independent Panel 2008, 26.

On any scale, the progressive core of the PRT concept is civil-military jointness. Experiences from field-level integration will be useful, even if the wider scheme of provincial reconstruction teams are not introduced into any future missions. It could be argued that the military-heavy design of the PRTs in Afghanistan should be revised for future use in other arenas. To that end, there are examples to be analysed both in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, recognising the uniqueness of each conflict, no fixed models should be predetermined for future use.

The PRT experiment stems well with a general tendency to find more coherence between military and civilian assets, methods and efforts in crisis management and peace-building.

PRT experiences from Afghanistan and Iraq¹⁷¹ are entering into US doctrines of stabilisation and reconstruction operations – as well as counterinsurgency. The USA established an Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilisation under the State Department in 2004. It follows the European example in striving to create various kinds of reserves of internationally deployable civilian experts¹⁷². In order to bridge departmental gaps, in 2005 a National Security Presidential Directive on the management of interagency efforts was issued, and an interagency planning doctrine for stabilisation and reconstruction operations was launched¹⁷³. The US Department of Defence anticipates building future civil-military teams on PRT lessons¹⁷⁴.

NATO is looking towards enhancing deployable civilian expertises as well¹⁷⁵. It is foreseeable that NATO will adopt the PRTs as a base model for future integrated crisis management at tactical levels.

The European Union has not thus far undertaken an integrated mission using both sets of capabilities jointly, but has dual and closely coordinated strategic and planning structures for both military and civilian crisis management within the framework of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)¹⁷⁶.

For years civilian and military components have co-formed the UN peace operations, but in those cases integration takes place in the mission headquarters; peacekeeping battalions are not integrated with local UN sub-offices. Considering the nature of the PRTs and the wide criticism from humanitarian-development actors, it is unlikely that UN operations will adopt PRT types of formations.

In conclusion, the PRTs provide many valuable insights into crisis management – but are becoming outdated and are in urgent need of reform. They have offered “potential” but

have also remained “a bit of a muddle.”¹⁷⁷ Closer research into concrete activities on the ground would be needed.

171 There are wide differences in models between the two theatres. Some comparisons of the PRTs in Afghanistan and Iraq are to be found in Drolet 2006.

172 US Department of State 2007b.

173 White House 2005; US Joint Forces Command 2005.

174 US Department of Defence 2008, 6.

175 Howard 2008; San 2008.

176 More on EU internal civil-military coordination in Khol 2006.

177 McNerney 2005, 33, 44.

8 Future research

Based on identified best practises, it could be possible to model an ideal PRT. In his paper from 2005, Jakobsen recommends that Denmark follow the UK model "which is generally considered to be the most successful."¹⁷⁸ It is true that the British model includes features that ISAF considers to be best practises, such as a tightly integrated command group or focusing on security sector reform. Humanitarian agencies and NGOs favour the model for its limited role in reconstruction. The superiority of the UK, or Nordic, model cannot, however, be confirmed with a conceptual or literature-review type of study as reflected in this paper. That would call for more detailed field research. In addition, the original British model has changed substantially since the UK left northern Afghanistan and was deployed to Helmand in south. These changes have not been much researched as of yet.

A sufficient body of conceptual research on the PRTs already exists. What is lacking is a truly comparative study that would examine the real functioning of the models on the ground. An extensive questionnaire and interview process for all 26 PRTs should be organised, in the same fashion as was done with the US PRTs by Perito and the US Interagency study. The results of the project should be made public.

After its initial phase of a conceptual study, also this PRT research project should be directed more towards actual applications of the concept on the ground. More detailed information on organisations, practices of civil-military integration and the activities of the units ought to be collected. Further research would thus necessitate field trips to observe and interview, gather experiences and comments, and to find and verify updated facts. To avoid duplication and a waste of resources, any future Finnish research must be linked to other organisations and international research projects.

Directions for future PRT research could, for instance, be based on studying internal aspects, models, and wider context. A study on the *internal aspects* should include relations between contributing nations and question how the lead nations and other contributors are complementing each other in the PRTs, or what are the possible frictions in multinational units? Also the modes of actual cooperation should be analysed

while answering questions on internal relations: how is the daily civil-military work organised and how do the different organisational cultures relate to each other?

Regarding the *models*, a public comparative study should be carried out covering the analysis of all national models based on interviews and observations in the field. More study is needed beyond the three original models developed by the US, the UK and Germany. For instance, the Dutch, Spanish, Lithuanian and Hungarian models have been less studied internationally. Another question is the Nordic model: how has it developed from the original British one; and how are the Nordic cooperation and collaborative procedures arranged? Is there any complementarity between the models? Another question concerns the civilian-led PRTs. How do civilian-led units function and what are their limitations and opportunities? This analysis could also cover the Iraqi case.


A wider context should also be mapped in relation to PRTs and the whole-of-government approach. What are the strengths and weaknesses of bringing a whole-of-government approach to the provincial/tactical level in Afghanistan? Does the PRT-driven whole-of-government approach endanger the broader, comprehensive approach of the international community? The external relations to other actors in the field necessitate a broader analysis of PRTs and UNAMA. How is this linkage between the political and security missions built in provinces? Could a fusion of the two be a future model? Also the PRT as added value in stabilisation operations needs to be covered. What is the wider importance of the PRT experiment for crisis management in post-conflict contexts? What could be identified as best practise to be utilised in the future? What could be plausible contextual criteria for a similar concept to be launched somewhere else?

Beyond these three study themes, remains the subject of military science and civil-military integration. Which strands in the military tactical and leadership doctrines are supportive of PRT types of activities that integrate military and civilian capabilities and look for enablers and multipliers external to the force itself?

178 Jakobsen 2005, 4.


Annexes

A. ISAF troops





International Security Assistance Force



NATO Mission In Afghanistan: On 9th August 2003, NATO assumed authority for the ISAF mission. The NATO mission consists of 5 phases:

- Phase 1 Assessment and Preparation, including operations in Kabul (completed)
- Phase 2 Geographic expansion (completed)
- Phase 3 Stabilization
- Phase 4/5 Transition / Redeployment

Expansion: In October 2003, the UN Security Council authorized the expansion of the NATO mission beyond Kabul. In October 2004, Stage 1 of the expansion to the North was completed with Stage 2 in the West following in September 2005. Stage 3 of the expansion to include the South was completed on 31 July 2006 and Stage 4 to include the East occurred on 5th October 2006, at which stage the geographic expansion phase was completed.

Troop Contributing Nations (TCN): The ISAF mission consists of the following 41 nations (the troop numbers are based on broad contribution and do not reflect the exact numbers on the ground at any one time).

	Albania	140		Finland	80		Lithuania	200		Spain	780
	Australia	1080		France	2730		Luxemburg	9		Sweden	280
	Austria	1		Georgia	1		Netherlands	1770		The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*	135
	Azerbaijan	45		Germany	3310		New Zealand	155		Turkey	800
	Belgium	420		Greece	130		Norway	455		Ukraine	3
	Bulgaria	460		Hungary	240		Poland	1130		United Arab Emirates	0
	Canada	2500		Iceland	8		Portugal	70		United Kingdom	8330
	Croatia	280		Ireland	7		Romania	725		United States	20600
	Czech Republic	415		Italy	2350		Singapore	0			
	Denmark	750		Jordan	0		Slovakia	70			
	Estonia	120		Latvia	70		Slovenia	70			
										Total (rounded)	50700

* Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name

Current as of 6 October 2008

Source: http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/isaf_placemat.pdf, last accessed 4.11.2008.

B. Generic PRT models

	<i>American</i>	<i>German</i>	<i>British</i>	<i>Nordic</i>	<i>Turkish</i>
Partnering nations	0-1	4-5, Continental European	2, North-European	1, North-European	0
Size (MIL)	40-120	400-500	150	150-200	70
Size (CIV)	3-5	10-20	20-30	8-15	15
Leadership	Military Commander supported by embedded civilian representatives	Dual: Military Commander and Civilian Head, leading respective components	Joint between military, political and development representative	Military Commander in consultation with joint (CIV-MIL) Command Group	Civilian Coordinator
Security activities (MIL; CIV)	Force protection; police training and infrastructure support	Force protection, modest patrols, police infrastructure and training; police mentoring, training and infrastructure support	Extensive patrols; police training and infrastructure support	Extensive patrols, operations, force protection; police training and infrastructure support	Protection to the civilian component; police training and infrastructure support
Governance activities	Regular liaison with key leaders, infrastructure support to local administration	Regular liaison with key leaders, support to justice system	Regular liaison with key leaders, support to justice system	Regular liaison with key leaders, direct support left to the UN and others	Regular liaison with key officials, training & infrastructure support to local administration

	<i>American</i>	<i>German</i>	<i>British</i>	<i>Nordic</i>	<i>Turkish</i>
Reconstruction & development activities	PRT projects through various DoD and USAID flexible funds (infrastructure in education, health and water), other USAID projects external to the PRTs (roads, water infrastructure, local administration training)	PRT support to local planning, PRT CIMIC projects (education, water), PRT external funding to a vivid NGO community (economic development, education, water, energy)	PRT & external support to local planning, PRT refrained to facilitation through newly modest CIMIC projects (water, roads), PRT external DfID aid through NGOs and national programmes (village development, governance, water, education)	PRT & external support to local planning, PRT refrained to facilitation, occasional QIPs by both MIL and CIV, PRT external aid through NGOs and national programmes (village development, governance, water, education)	Development aid and technical support through the PRT (education, health, agriculture)
Provincial aid flow	(Even tens of) Millions of USD annually both through and external to the PRTs. Sums vary drastically between provinces	Some millions of EUR annually, mostly external to the PRTs	Less than one million pounds through the PRT annually, nearly 20 million pounds externally	USD 5-15 million annually, nearly all external to the PRTs	USD 6.5 million through the PRT annually
Operational environment	High risk areas with frequent serious incidents, mostly robust ISAF and OEF combat troops presence, close to non-operational administration and services, few NGOs and limited UN presence	Low to mid level risk, sporadic serious incidents, few ISAF or OEF combat troops, slowly reconstituting administration and services, fairly strong NGO and UN presence	High risk areas with frequent serious incidents, robust ISAF and OEF combat troops presence, close to non-operational administration and services, few NGOs and limited UN presence, gigantic opium production	Low to mid level risk, sporadic serious incidents, few ISAF or OEF combat troops, slowly reconstituting administration and services, fairly strong NGO and UN presence	Mid level risk, sporadic serious incidents, some ISAF or OEF combat troops, slowly reconstituting administration and services, fairly strong NGO and UN presence

	<i>American</i>	<i>German</i>	<i>British</i>	<i>Nordic</i>	<i>Turkish</i>
Special	The first PRT model	Part of the strong German community in the northeast	The only PRT to run active counter-narcotics	Developed from the British model	Civilian PRT with only supportive military component
Rationale	Reconstruction focus with counter-insurgency mindset to win 'hearts and minds'	Stabilisation and reconstruction	Stabilisation through SSR	Stabilisation through SSR	Reconstruction and development
Typical critique	Poor quality of QIPs, inefficient support to local capacity building compared to sums flowing in, PRTs politicising/ militarising humanitarian aid and development	Heavy restrictions on the use of military capabilities, fairly large reconstruction assistance insufficiently aligned with the Afghan government	Local people demand more visible support to reconstruction and development	Local people demand more visible support to reconstruction and development	-

References

Monographs, Papers and Articles

Abbaszadeh, Nima, Mark Crow, Marianne El-Khoury, Jonathan Gandomi, David Kuwayama, Christopher MacPherson, Meghan Nutting, Nealin Parker & Taya Weiss (2008): *Provincial Reconstruction Teams: lessons and recommendations*. Princeton: Princeton University. Available at http://www.princeton.edu/research/pwreports_f07/www591b.pdf, last accessed 27.2.2008.

Afghanistan Study Group Report (2008): *Revitalizing our efforts – rethinking our strategies*. Second Edition. Center for the Study of the Presidency. Available at http://www.thepresidency.org/pubs/Afghan_Study_Group_final.pdf, last accessed 5.3.2008.

Cassidy, Robert M. (2006): "The long small war: indigenous forces for counterinsurgency". *Parameters, US Army War College Quarterly*, Summer 2006, 47-62. Available at <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/06summer/cassidy.pdf>, last accessed 11.12.2007.

CCIC (2007): *Canada's whole-of-government approach in Afghanistan: implications on development and peace-building*. Briefing paper. Submission to the Independent Panel on Afghanistan. Canada's Coalition to End Global Poverty. Available at http://www.ccic.ca/e/docs/002_humanitarian_2007-12_ccic_submission.pdf, last accessed 18.12.2007.

Clark, David J. & Raymond A. Millen (2006): *The vital role of intelligence in counterinsurgency operations*. US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute: Carlisle Barracks. Available at <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil309.pdf>, last accessed 20.11.2007.

Drolet, John D. (2006): *Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Afghanistan vs. Iraq – should we have a standard model?* Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute. Available at <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil333.pdf>, last accessed 20.11.2007.

Dziedzic, Michael J. & Michael K. Seidl (2005): *Provincial Reconstruction Teams and military relations with international and nongovernmental organizations in Afghanistan*. United States Institute of Peace. Special Report 147. Available at <http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr147.pdf>, last accessed 29.11.2007.

Gauster, Markus (2007[2006]): *Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: an innovative instrument of international crisis management being put to the test*. George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. Occasional Paper Series, No. 16. Available at http://www.marshallcenter.org/site-graphic/lang-en/page-pubs-index-1/static/docs/research/static/occpapers/occ-paper_16-en.pdf, last accessed 4.4.2008.

Godsave, Hannah (2007): *The Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) model of post-conflict intervention: progress in Afghanistan and future Prospects*. MA Dissertation. Conflict, security and development programme. London: King's College.

Guidelines (2008): *Guidelines for the Interaction and Coordination of Humanitarian Actors and Military Actors in Afghanistan*. 20 May 2008 – Version 1.0.

Howard, Martin (2008): "CEP's role in Stabilisation and Reconstruction. Editorial". *PerCEPtions Newsletter*, no 5, July 2008, 1-2.

Independent Panel (2008): *Independent panel on Canada's future role in Afghanistan*. Final report. Available at http://www.independent-panel-independent.ca/pdf/Afghan_Report_web_e.pdf, last accessed 26.2.2008.

Jakobsen, Peter Viggo (2005): *PRTs in Afghanistan: successful but not sufficient*. Danish Institute for International Studies, Report No. 6. Available at http://www.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/Reports2005/pvj_prts_afghanistan.pdf, last accessed 28.11.2007.

Khol, Radek (2006): "Civil-military co-ordination in EU crisis management". In *Civilian crisis management: the EU way*. European Union Institute for Security Studies, Chaillot paper No. 90, 123-138. Available at <http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/chai90.pdf>, last accessed 10.12.2007.

Lane, Roger & Emma Sky (2006): "The role of Provincial Reconstruction Teams in stabilisation". *RUSI Journal*, June 2006, 46-51.

McNerney, Michael J. (2005): "Stabilization and reconstruction in Afghanistan: are PRTs a model or a muddle?" *Parameters, US Army War College Quarterly*, Winter 2005-2006, 32-46. Available at <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/05winter/mcnerney.pdf>, last accessed 28.11.2007.

Orsini, Dominique (2007): "Walking the tightrope: dealing with warlords in Afghanistan's destabilizing north". *RUSI Journal*, October 2007, 46-50.

Patrick, Stewart & Kaysie Brown (2007): *Greater than the sum of its parts? Assessing "the whole of government" approaches to fragile states*. New York: International Peace Academy.

Perito, Robert M. (2005): *US experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: lessons identified*. United States Institute of Peace. Special Report 152. Available at <http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr152.pdf>, last accessed 29.11.2007.

Perito, Robert M. (2007): *Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq*. United States Institute of Peace. Special Report 185. Available at <http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr185.pdf>, last accessed 10.12.2007.

Perito, Robert M. (2008): *Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams*. USIPeace Briefing. United States Institute of Peace. Available at http://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefings/2008/0305_prt.html, last accessed 21.7.2008.

Piiparinen, Touko (2007): "A clash of mindsets? An insider's account of Provincial Reconstruction Teams". *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 14. No.1, January 2007, 143-157.

PRT Meymaneh (2007): *Guidelines*. Unpublished paper circulated within ISAF.

San, Burcu (2008): "Stabilisation and Reconstruction: a New Growth Area for NATO?" *PerCEptions Newsletter*, no 5, July 2008, 9-10.

Save the Children (2004): *Provincial Reconstruction Teams and humanitarian-military relations in Afghanistan*. Available at http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/Save_the_Children_UK_-_PRTs_and_Humanitarian-Military_Relations_in_Afghanistan_2004_09.pdf, last accessed 20.11.2007.

Sedra, Mark (2004): *Civil-military relations in Afghanistan: the Provincial Reconstruction Team debate*. Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada. Available at http://www.asiapacificresearch.ca/caprn/afghan_project/m_sedra.pdf, last accessed 21.11.2007.

Stapleton, Barbara J. (2007): "A means to what end? Why PRTs are peripheral to the bigger political challenges in Afghanistan". *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies*, Fall 2007, Vol. 10, Issue 1. Available at <http://www.jmss.org/2007/2007fall/articles/stapleton.pdf>, last accessed 15.12.2007.

US Interagency (2006): *Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: an interagency assessment*. US Department of State, US Department of Defence & US Agency for International Development. Available at http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADG252.pdf, last accessed 23.11.2007.

Waldman, Matt (2007): *Falling short: aid effectiveness in Afghanistan*. Agency Coordination Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR). Available at [http://www.acbar.org/ACBAR%20Publications/ACBAR%20Aid%20Effectiveness%20\(25%20Mar%2008\).pdf](http://www.acbar.org/ACBAR%20Publications/ACBAR%20Aid%20Effectiveness%20(25%20Mar%2008).pdf), 3 last accessed.3.2008.

International organisations

[ISAF 2007] International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) (2007): *Provincial Reconstruction Team Handbook*. Third edition, 3 February 2007. Kabul: ISAF.

NATO (2005): *NATO Provincial Reconstruction Teams: ISAF PRT operations in Afghanistan and the implications and consequences for civil-military relations*. Seminar report, NATO CIMIC Centre of Excellence, 29–30 September 2005. Available at http://www.cimic-coe.org/coe_download/prt_report.pdf, last accessed 29.11.2007.

United Nations Security Council (2001): *Resolution 1386: on the situation in Afghanistan*. Available at <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/708/55/PDF/N0170855.pdf?OpenElement>, last accessed 11.12.2007.

United Nations Security Council (2003): *Resolution 1510: the situation in Afghanistan*. Available at <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/555/55/PDF/N0355555.pdf?OpenElement>, last accessed 11.12.2007.

UNODC (2008): *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2008. Executive Summary*. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Available at http://www.unodc.org/documents/publications/Afghanistan_Opium_Survey_2008.pdf, last accessed 5.9.2008.

World Bank (2007): *Service delivery and governance at the sub-national level in Afghanistan*. Available at <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOUTHASIAEXT/Resources/Publications/448813-1185293547967/4024814-1185293572457/report.pdf>, last accessed 25.3.2008.

Government sources

BMZ (2007): *Afghanistan > Cooperation*. German Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development. Available at <http://www.bmz.de/en/countries/partnercountries/afghanistan/cooperation.html>, last accessed 13.12.2007.

Canadian Ministry of National Defence (2007): *The Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team activities*. Available at http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/kprt-eprk/act_e.asp, last accessed 11.12.2007.

DfID (2007): *Afghanistan programme*. Department for International Development. Available at <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/countries/asia/afghanistan-programme.asp>, 14.12.2007.

Dutch Ministry of Defence (2007): *Uruzgan*. Available at <http://www.mindef.nl/missies/afghanistan/uruzgan/>, last accessed 11.12.2007.

Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2007): *Development aid spending in Afghanistan*. Available at <http://www.minbuza.nl/en/themes,international-cooperation/afghanistan/afghanistan-in-ontwikkeling/Development-Aid-spending-in-Afghanistan.html>, last accessed 11.12.2007.

GTZ (2007): *GTZ in Afghanistan*. German Agency for Technical Cooperation. Available at <http://www.gtz.de/en/weltweit/europa-kaukasus-zentralasien/670.htm>, last accessed 13.12.2007.

House of Commons (2006): *Commons Hansard written answers text for 31 October 2006*. Available at <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmhansrd/cm061031/text/61031w0023.htm>, last accessed 28.11.2007.

Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2007): *Norwegian led PRT in Faryab*. Available at <http://www.norway.org.af/prt/faryab/faryab.htm>, 18.12.2007.

US Department of Defence (2005): *Reconstruction Team opens in Panjshir*. Panjshir, 21 November 2005. Available at <http://www.defendamerica.mil/articles/nov2005/a112105ms3.html>, last accessed 13.12.2007.

US Department of Defence (2008): *Statement of Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defence for Policy Ryan Henry*. Statement before House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. Washington, DC, 14 February 2008. Available at http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/OI021408/Henry_Testimony021408.pdf, last accessed 27.2.2008.

US Department of State (2007a): *Fact sheet on Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)*. Available at http://iraq.usembassy.gov/iraq/20060223_prt_fact_sheet.html, last accessed 10.12.2007.

US Department of State (2007b): *Stabilization and reconstruction operations: learning from the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) experience*. Coordinator for Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization. Statement before House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. Washington, DC, 30 October 2007. Available at <http://www.state.gov/s/crs/rls/rm/94379.htm>, last accessed 21.11.2007.

US Joint Forces Command (2005): *US Government Draft Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation*. J7 Pamphlet Version 1.0. Available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/training/crs_pam051205.pdf, last accessed 3.1.2008.

White House (2005): *National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-44*. December 7, 2005. Available at <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-44.html>, last accessed 18.8.2008.

News

Al Jazeera (2007): "Nation building key in Afghanistan". 23 December 2007. Available at <http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/8346FBA2-39E2-42A3-88B4-077E794B71DA.htm>, last accessed 2.1.2008.

Asia Times Online (2008): "In Afghanistan, blurred lines cost lives". August 20 2008. Available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/JH20Df02.html, last accessed 5.9.2008.

Irinnews (2007a): "PRTs accused of spending unequal amount on development". Kabul, 4 May 2007. Available at <http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=71949>, last accessed 12.12.2007.

Irinnews (2007b): "Humanitarian space must be regained – UNAMA". Kabul, 17 December 2007. Available at <http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=75902>, last accessed 30.1.2008.

Irinnews (2008): "Afghanistan: Some 1,000 civilians killed since January - NGO body". Kabul, 1 August 2008. Available at <http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=79565>, last accessed 10.8.2008.

IWPR (2007): "Northern governor lashes out at NATO". Institute of War and Peace Reporting. Mazar-e Sharif, 23 July 2007. Available at http://iwpr.net/?p=arr&s=f&o=337318&apc_state=henh%20, last accessed 12.12.2007.

Reliefweb (2003): "The Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Afghanistan and its role in reconstruction". 31 May 2003. Available at <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/OCHA-64BGJ7?OpenDocument>, last accessed 13.12.2007.

Authors

Mr. **Oskari Eronen** currently works as an Advisor for Security and Development in the Political Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland. Previously, he acted as a joint researcher for both the Crisis Management Centre Finland and the Finnish Defence Forces International Centre (FINCENT). He has served as a Political Advisor in two Provincial Reconstruction teams of the ISAF operation in northern Afghanistan in 2006–2007. He holds a Master of Social Sciences (Pol.Sc.) from the University of Jyväskylä, Finland.

Ms. **Kirsi Henriksson** is the Head of Research and Development at the Crisis Management Centre Finland. She has a Master of Arts in General History from the University of Tampere, Finland. Previously, she has worked as a Researcher in the Tampere Peace Research Institute, as well as a Researcher and Lecturer at the Department of History, University of Tampere. Since 2006 she has worked as Chief Editor of a scientific journal published by the Finnish Peace Research Association, Kosmopolis. Her regional expertise lies within North-Africa, especially with Algeria.

Dr. **Ari Kerkkänen** has Ph.D. from the University of Helsinki (2001). Currently, he works as Director of the Crisis Management Centre Finland. His former appointments are as follows: University Researcher (University of Helsinki, 2006), Political Advisor (Multinational Task Force North, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 2005), War Crimes Intelligence Analyst (UN International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 2002–2005), Political Monitor and Senior Operations Officer in Serbia (EUMM 2001–2002), UN Military Observer (UNPROFOR 1994–1995), UN Staff Officer (UNPROFOR, 1993) and UN Operations Duty Officer (UNIFIL, 1991–1992). His regional expertise lies within the Middle East and the Western Balkans.

Mr. **Jari Mustonen** is on leave of absence from the post of a Senior Researcher at the Crisis Management Centre Finland. Currently he works as an Associate Strategic Planning Officer in the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) at the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission. Mr. Mustonen holds a Master of Arts in General History from the University of Joensuu, Finland. He has served in peacekeeping operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina (SFOR 2001–2002, EUFOR 2005–2006) and in Afghanistan (ISAF 2004).

Mr. **Hannu Rantanen** is the Research Director at the Emergency Service College of Finland. He holds a Lic.Phil. in Information Technology which he received in 2003 from the University of Kuopio, Finland. He has 12 years experience at the Emergency Services College, before which he spent 15 years at the Finnish State Computer Centre. His main area of expertise is in the use of information technology in emergency response. In addition, he is a member of UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination team, with particular knowledge of large scale international emergencies. Over the last 30 years he has worked on a number of international assignments, mainly in the Middle East.

Ms. **Olivia Šetkić** is the Research Coordinator (recruitment and training) of Crisis Management Centre Finland. She holds a Master of Arts degree from the University of Helsinki, Finland. Ms. Šetkić has served ECMM/EUMM as a Political Monitor and as a Senior Operations Officer in Bosnia-Herzegovina 1999–2000. In 2002 she assisted in the implementation of the Early Voting System in Kosovo for the OSCE. She has served in the Balkans in several elections as a Short Term Observer and Election Supervisor for the OSCE/ODIHR and the CoE.

Mr. **Jari Sundqvist** is on a leave of absence from the post of Research Coordinator (technology) at the Crisis Management Centre Finland. Previously he has worked for the Ministry of Defence of Finland. He holds a Lic.Tech. and Master of Security from the Helsinki University of Technology, Finland. Currently he works as an Advisor to the KPS Directorate for IT & Communications in EULEX Kosovo, seconded by Finland.

Ms. **Tanja Tamminen** is on a leave of absence from the post of Researcher at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs. She has a Master of Social Sciences (Pol.Sc.) from the University of Turku, Finland. Currently, she works as a Reporting Officer in EULEX Kosovo, seconded by Finland. Her regional expertise lies within Western-Balkans, especially in Kosovo.

CMC Finland YEARBOOK 2008 on Civilian Crisis Management Studies

CMC FINLAND CIVILIAN CRISIS MANAGEMENT STUDIES IN THIS VOLUME:

Coordination and Cooperation on Tactical and Operational Levels: Studying EU-ESDP
Crisis Management Instruments in Bosnia and Herzegovina
JARI MUSTONEN

Recruitment and Training in Civilian Crisis Management: Learning from the
ECMM/EUMM Experiences
OLIVIA SETKIC

Building Capacity for the Palestinian Civil Police: EUPOL COPPS and Communications Project
ARI KERKKÄNEN – HANNU RANTANEN – JARI SUNDQVIST

Human Security in Post-Status Kosovo: a Shared European Responsibility
TANJA TAMMINEN

PRT Models in Afghanistan: Approaches to Civil-Military Integration
OSKARI ERONEN

ISBN 978-952-67127-0-3

ISSN 1797-2140

CMC Finland Civilian Crisis Management Studies

CMCFinland

Kriisinhallintakeskus
Crisis Management Centre

Hulkontie 83, PO Box 1325, FI-70821 Kuopio, Finland tel. +358 (0)71 875 0341 fax +358 (0)71 875 3650 www.cmcfinland.fi