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Reintegration in Aceh Indonesia; Opinions of the Finnish Civilian Crisis Management Workers about the Reintegration in Aceh

The purpose of this article is to examine the opinions of the Finnish civilian crisis management workers in Aceh about the reintegration of the ex-combatants in Aceh. This article is based on interviews conducted during autumn 2006. *In the interviews I wanted to find out how the Finnish civilian crisis management workers understood the concept of the reintegration in the light of its subjects, methods and goals.* Civilian crisis management is still a new area where there may not be a common understanding behind the used terms. This is especially true in a multicultural working environment. There might be a danger that people understand the goal of their work differently. Another question that I intend to answer in this article is the question about the success of the reintegration in Aceh. *Do the Finnish civilian crisis management workers find the reintegration in Aceh as a failure or success?*

This article is divided into four parts. In the first part I will shortly go through what is meant by reintegration as a part of a DDR-process that includes also disarmament and demobilisation. In the second part of the article I will open up the method that I used in this study and give some background information about the conflict of Aceh and about the AMM (Aceh Monitoring Mission) operation. In the third part I will go through the opinions of the civilian crisis management workers about their understanding of the reintegration. In the last and the fourth part I will answer the question, did the Finnish civilian crisis management workers find the reintegration of ex-combatants in Aceh as a failure or a success?

Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration

Peace building in conflict torn societies is always a complicated task. The problem is that one needs to work in an environment that is characterised by weak political and social structures, uncertainty and insecurity. In this situation the aim of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration is to strengthen the overall security situation.¹ Normally disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration are referred to with the abbreviation DDR. In the long run the aim of the DDR-process is to create

¹ UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations 1999, 16.

stability in post-conflict societies.² Today DDR-processes are an important part of many peacekeeping and reconstruction programs in post-conflict areas.³ Despite the fact that disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration are linked to each other, it should not be thought too strictly as a continuum where disarmament is followed by demobilisation and demobilisation by reintegration. DDR should be understood more flexibly because it might be necessary to continue disarmament even if some group of combatants is already demobilised.⁴

In disarmament phase arms, ammunition and explosives are collected, controlled and disposed. The objects of disarmament can be both combatants and civilian population. The aim of the disarmament is to reduce the numbers of weapons in the society. In this way it tries to diminish the threat of violence. On a wider scale disarmament is seeking to build an environment that facilitates the transition from conflict to peace. Disarmament is normally happening during a period when the parties giving up arms and the local population are still partly unsure of the durability of peace.⁵ It should also be kept in mind that by giving up their arms civilians and especially combatants are also giving up the physical and economic security that the arms can have guaranteed so far. When giving up the arms they are hoping that peace and its possibilities are better than continuing the conflict.⁶

Demobilisation means the formal discharge of active combatants from the armed forces or from an armed group. The numbers of armed forces are cut or they are disbanded as a part of a bigger transition from conflict to peace. To the combatants themselves demobilisation means that they are giving up the combatant identity. They are giving up their uniform, if they have one, and become a civilian. The target groups for disarmament and demobilisation are in many cases overlapping but they are not identical.⁷ Demobilisation can happen in many ways. Typically combatants are collected to demobilisation camps that are built for the demobilisation. In other cases demobilisation can simply mean turning over the uniform and a ceremony that symbolises the transition from the military life to civilian life. Demobilisation can also happen without any formal process. After a conflict the members of an armed group can simply leave their arms and unit.⁸

² Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament Demobilisation Reintegration 2006, 13-14.

³ Gleichmann & Odenwald & Steenken & Wilkinson 2004, 12; Knight & Özerdem 2004, 499; Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament Demobilisation Reintegration, Final Report 2006, preface.

⁴ Nilsson 2005, 31-33. UN Security Council 2000: 8.

⁵ Gleichmann & Odenwald & Steenken & Wilkinson 2004, 29.

⁶ Knight & Özerdem 2004, 506.

⁷ Gleichmann & Odenwald & Steenken & Wilkinson 2004, 45-47.

⁸ Gleichmann & Odenwald & Steenken & Wilkinson 2004, 45-48.

The third part of the DDR-process is the reintegration. At first reintegration referred to the programmes dealing with the economic assimilation of the demobilised combatants. Later, more emphasis has been put on the social aspects of reintegration. The integration of the combatants to the local civil society was considered important. One of the last improvements in thinking about the reintegration has been the recognition of the importance of political reintegration.⁹ Therefore, the goal of the reintegration can be considered as a societal process aiming at the economic, political and social assimilation of ex-combatants and their families into civil society.¹⁰

Originally, DDR-process was understood as a military question. Emphasis was put on the disarmament and demobilisation parts of the DDR. In the end this was insufficient to ensure, the integration of the combatants into the civilian society. This is why a development focus was added to the process.¹¹ Today reintegration is connected to both development and security questions. Because of this the problems and questions connected to the reintegration are more diverse than in the disarmament or in the demobilisation. The themes connected to reintegration are the economic growth and development, the training of the combatants, the issues that arise when communities are receiving the returning combatants, and the issues that arise with the reintegration groups that have special needs, for example women and children.¹²

The main subjects of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration are the combatants. For example, the criteria that define who will get the reintegration benefits, is based on the definition of combatant. A Combatant can be a government soldier, a rebel, a cook or a prostitute. Normally, peace agreements¹³ define which armed groups are part of the DDR-process, but they do not define what is meant with combatant.¹⁴ In cases where the combatants are a clearly distinct group and these groups have their clearly defined command structures, the definition of combatant is not a problem. In modern wars this is hardly the case. In this situation, the same person can be a combatant, a robber or a civilian depending from the point of view.¹⁵

The opinions of how extensively a combatant should be defined, can be divided in two. The supporters of the broader definition are saying that the goal, building human security with DDR,

⁹ Nilsson 2005, 22-28.

¹⁰ Nilsson 2005, 26-28.

¹¹ Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament Demobilisation Reintegration, Final Report 2006, 9.

¹² International Peace Academy 2002, 2.

¹³ Look for example the peace agreement between the government of Sierra Leone and RUF from the year 1999 at <http://www.sierra-leone.org/lomeaccord.html>.

¹⁴ Eronen, Linden 2006, 8.

¹⁵ Specht 2003, 77.

means that combatant should be defined as broadly as possible. The definition of the combatant should cover all the people who have been part of the fighting forces as combatants, or in supporting roles.¹⁶ These supporting roles can be logistical or administrative functions but also something else outside of modern day military organisation. If this is not done, there may be a situation where a sex slave does not get the benefits that their captors are getting.¹⁷

For example, Anders Nilsson supports the narrower definition. According to him, only the ones who have participated in direct fighting and their families should be considered as combatants who are eligible to the reintegration benefits. Refugees, communities who are receiving the ex-combatants, and the people who have not participated in direct fighting should not be counted as beneficiaries in reintegration programmes or counted as combatants. In conflicts, different groups have different needs and problems. If these different groups are squeezed under the topic “ex-combatant”, then the allocation of reintegration benefits is difficult. The broad definition of ex-combatant weakens the effectiveness of the aid. Other groups than the direct combatants should be helped via other relief programmes.¹⁸

Aceh and AMM

Indonesia changed the Aceh’s official name to Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam in 2001.¹⁹ In this article, the name Aceh is used because it is more widely recognised, and also the peace agreement²⁰ uses the name Aceh. Aceh is situated on the north-western part of Sumatra. The population of Aceh is around four millions and the capital is Banda Aceh. The most common spoken language is Aceh and the official language is Bahasa Indonesia. Aceh is a Muslim province and the practised Islam is regarded as more conservative than elsewhere in Indonesia.²¹ Sumatra is one of the richest parts of Indonesia in regard to its natural resources. Especially in Aceh there are both oil and natural gas. Despite these natural resources, Achenese people have experienced that they have not had their share of the incomes from the natural resources. The population of Aceh is one of the poorest in Indonesia.²²

¹⁶ Specht 2003, 77.

¹⁷ Gleichmann & Odenwald & Steenken & Wilkinson 2004, 15.

¹⁸ Nilsson 2005, 25-26.

¹⁹ Amnesty International 2004, summary.

²⁰ Memorandum of Understanding.

²¹ Building Human Security in Indonesia.

²² The World Factbook; Building Human Security in Indonesia.

From early on Sumatra was an economically vivid area and most likely the first of Indonesia's islands that had connections with rest of the world. Islam arrived on the island during the seventh and eight century with Muslim traders. The first Islamic kingdom was founded during the eight century. The so called golden age of Aceh was during the reign of the Sultan Iskander Mudak during 1607-1636. During that time Aceh was the most dominant state in the area and it controlled both trade and economy. The influence of colonial powers can be found in Aceh from the sixteenth century onwards. In 1873 Aceh became part of the Dutch empire. This started the so called Aceh war that lasted until 1903. During that year the sultan was forced to give his crown to the Dutch. Despite this, sporadic resistance continued for years to come.²³

Indonesia declared its independence in 1945 after the Second World War and Japanese had pulled out. Eventually also the Dutch accepted the independency. When Indonesia declared its independency Aceh became a province of Indonesia. This caused some trouble, because some of the more conservative Muslims opposed the creation of a secular state. In 1953 Darum Islam and Achenese rebel group campaigned that Indonesia should be a state governed by the Islamic law. Even though this was not successful in 1959 president Sukarno made Aceh a special region. The purpose of this was to grant Achenese more autonomy. In practice this was never implemented and many thought that government had betrayed its promises.²⁴

In 1976 a new rebel group, The Aceh Freedom Movement (GAM), was founded. GAM's goal was Aceh's independency from Indonesia. GAM lacked resources and it was poorly coordinated and by the year 1979 it was not an issue any more. 1989 saw the new coming of GAM and Indonesia's central government was swift to act. Aceh was declared as an area of military operation which gave wide authority to Indonesia's army to handle with the movement. This led to many alleged human rights violations and in 1998, after the resignation of the Suharto, Jusuf Habibe became the president of Indonesia and nullified the military operation status. Despite this, violence continued in Aceh. New hope for the peace emerged when GAM and Indonesia's government signed a peace agreement in December 9, 2002. The peace agreement promised autonomy and free elections if GAM gave up their weapons. Neither of the parties compiled with the agreement. After this Indonesia's army declared a martial law and started a military offensive against GAM. GAM declared that they were fighting for full independency.²⁵

²³ Building Human Security in Indonesia.

²⁴ Building Human Security in Indonesia.

²⁵ BBC News (a).

In 2004 elected president Yudhoyono wanted to solve the conflict of Aceh by peaceful negotiations. Also the tsunami in December 26, 2004 changed the political and humanitarian situation in Aceh. Because of the catastrophe, international help was needed, which led to the opening of the previously closed area. These changes gave a possibility to Indonesia's government to provide help to the Achenese and in this way to enhance its popularity among the local population.²⁶ Quickly after the Tsunami the government of Indonesia opened unofficial talks with GAM's representatives in Finland, with the help of Finnish Juha Christensen. From January 2005 onwards the peace negotiations had gone through five negotiation rounds. The last of these was concluded July 17, 2005. Both the government of Indonesia and GAM agreed that the member states of EU and ASEAN would be most suitable to form an independent control commission. The tasks of the commission were defined in the peace agreement.²⁷

According to the agreement, the government of Indonesia had to pull out its non-organic²⁸ military and police forces from Aceh in four stages. This withdrawal was to happen in parallel with the submission of GAM's 840 weapons that also happened in four stages. In the Memorandum of Understanding, parties also agreed that they would draft a new law for the governing of Aceh. After this law had come into force, local elections were supposed to be held. In addition to this, in the Memorandum of Understanding there was an agreement about the legal issues of Aceh, human rights, security arrangements, amnesty, and the establishment of AMM and its functions.²⁹

In addition to this there is a chapter on reintegration in the Memorandum of Understanding. The chapter states that the government of Indonesia and the authorities of Aceh will take measures to assist persons who have participated in GAM activities to facilitate their reintegration into civil society. These measures included economic facilitation to former combatants, pardoned political prisoners and affected civilians. According to the agreement, these groups were to receive suitable farming land, employment or, in the case of incapacity to work, adequate social security from the authorities of Aceh. Also all persons that had been granted amnesty or released from prison or detention were to have all political, economic and social rights. Also the rehabilitation of public and

²⁶ Council of the European Union, 2005.

²⁷ Council of the European Union, 2005.

²⁸ Non-organic troops meant troops that were situated in Aceh temporarily from other areas of Indonesia.

²⁹ Memorandum of Understanding.

private property destroyed or damaged as a consequence of the conflict was part of the reintegration.³⁰

The Aceh Monitoring Mission, disarmament and demobilisation in Aceh

According to MoU (Memorandum of Understanding) the tasks of the monitoring mission were the following.³¹

- a) monitor the demobilisation of GAM and decommissioning of its armaments,
- b) monitor the relocation of non-organic military forces and non-organic police troops,
- c) monitor the reintegration of active GAM members,
- d) monitor the human rights situation and provide assistance in this field,
- e) monitor the process of legislation change,
- f) rule on disputed amnesty cases,
- g) investigate and rule on complaints and alleged violations of the MoU,
- h) establish and maintain liaison and good cooperation with the parties.

About thirty Finns have been working in the mission. Of these thirty, fifteen have mainly been working with disarmament and fifteen have been working as monitor, reintegration or human rights experts or in other functions. In this article the latter part has been the focus of my studies. The ones who have only been involved with the disarmament have been involved with only one part of the DDR. Because this study is about the reintegration I have interviewed the people who had been working with the reintegration issues.

AMM's Decommissioning Branch that included an office at AMM HQ + 4 Mobile Decommissioning Teams were responsible for the disarmament in Aceh. According to the peace agreement, GAM had to turn over 840 weapons to Aceh Monitoring Mission. This happened in four stages and in every stage 210 weapons were submitted.³² Disarmament ended in December 20, 2005 when GAM had handed in 840 weapons. During the final round of the peace negotiations the negotiators did not have enough time to conclude what was the proper definition of a weapon. In the AMM, weapon was defined as being working, lethal and operational. The government of

³⁰ Memorandum of Understanding 3.2-3.2.7.

³¹ Memorandum of Understanding 5.2.

³² AMM HQ Decomm Office 2005.

Indonesia did not agree with this definition and they did not accept the grenade rifles that GAM had been manufacturing in the jungle as weapons.³³ In practice, disarmament happened in places that GAM had previously announced. In these places GAM submitted their weapons to AMM. AMM then checked the functioning and condition of the weapons. Also the representatives of the Indonesian army approved the weapons. After this the guns were destroyed by cutting them into three pieces. AMM also took care of the disposal of explosives and ammunition.³⁴

When the last weapons were submitted, Indonesia pulled out 25,890 soldiers and 5,791 police. Officially, GAM demobilised itself and ceased to be an armed actor in December 2005.³⁵ Therefore, disarmament can be regarded as a success in Aceh. Despite of the GAM's official declaration of its demobilisation it is still unsure if demobilisation was a success. In DDR, demobilisation means that a combatant gives up their fighter identity and old military command structures disappeared.³⁶ In some cases the members of GAM spent their time as a separate group and did not want to assimilate to the normal population.³⁷ Also according to the interviewed Finns the group identity among the members of GAM was still strong.

The interview and analysis

One of the main methods used in conducting research about DDR is an interview.³⁸ Also my own research uses interviewing. It can be defined as a discussion that is planned beforehand and is goal oriented. The main difference between an interview and a conversation is that the aim of the interview is to collect information and it serves a purpose that has been decided in advance. Typically a conversation is about subjects that are interesting to both parties. Interviewer decides the topics of the conversation.³⁹

Interviews can be divided into form interviews, theme interviews and deep interviews.⁴⁰ Also group interviews and phone interviews can be consider as separate interview types.⁴¹ With these different kinds of interviews it is possible to conduct research on various topics. There are two main

³³ Merikallio 2006, 168-185.

³⁴ Merikallio 2006, 167-169.

³⁵ The World Bank 2006, 2.

³⁶ Gleichmann & Odenwald & Steenken & Wilkinson 2004, 45-48.

³⁷ The World Bank 2006, 26.

³⁸ Look for example Conaway & Martínéz 2004; Brett & Specht 2004.

³⁹ Jokela 1994, 10.

⁴⁰ Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2002, 76; Hirsjärvi & Hurme 1980, 43.

⁴¹ Eskola & Vastamäki 2001, 25.

differences between these different types of interviews. First is the strictness of interview questions: how narrowly they have been defined. How much the interviewer structures the interview is another. It is possible to talk about the standardisation of questions and the structuration of situation.⁴²

The form interview is a method of quantitative research. In the form interview both the questions and the implementation of the research are wholly structured. The aim of the form interview is to have an answer within the given options and in the order of the interview.⁴³ The deep interview or the open interview is a wholly unstructured interview method. In the deep interview open questions are used. Only the topic of the interview is defined. Open questions themselves do not mean a deep interview. The aim of the interviewer is to deepen the information they have got by constructing the following interviews, so that they are based on the information from previous interviews. In the deep interview the aim of the research is to open the research topic as profoundly as possibly. Often only few persons can be interviewed many times. In a deep interview the conversation cannot be about any topic. The topic of the interview has to relate to the research question. The task of the interviewer is to keep the interview in its topic but also to let the interviewee speak freely.⁴⁴

Theme interview is somewhere between the deep interview and the form interview. Typical to the theme interview is that it has certain themes that are then deepened. Theme interview is a half-constructed method, because the topics of the interview, the theme areas, are already known. It does not have the rigid form and structure of questions as in the form interview.⁴⁵ In theme interviews the themes that have previously been decided on guide the process of the interview. One tries to find valuable answers in the light of the research question of theme interviews. The interview themes are based on the frame of a research and on the previous knowledge about the research subject. The theme interview is not a formula that has to be followed precisely. The relation of the interview questions to the research frame do vary from allowing the intuitive findings to keeping to the questions previously decided.⁴⁶

Theme interview suited this article best. The subject is treated in a way that makes the form interview difficult. Opinions are hard to be presented in the form interviews. In this method I would

⁴² Hirsjärvi & Hurme 1980, 43

⁴³ Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2002, 76-77.

⁴⁴ Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2002, 78.

⁴⁵ Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2002, 51.

⁴⁶ Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2002, 76-78.

have had to choose the possible answers beforehand and there would not be space for the new opinions. A deep interview does not fit into my purposes either, because the research frame does not control the direction of the interview. Here, the research frame is already clear: the opinions of the interviewees about the reintegration in Aceh.

As stated above, in theme interview the interviewer has certain amount of topics, or themes, which they want to discuss with every interviewee. There are several ways how these themes can be found. Typical way is that themes are found with the help of intuition. Another way is that themes are taken from literature. In this case the researcher takes a look at the previous research and looks at what themes can be found. From this material it is possible to construct the themes that are used in the interviews. The third option is to take the themes from a theory. Theoretical concepts are changed so that it can be measured that these are the interview themes. These different ways of finding them are not excluding and in good research all of these ways are used.⁴⁷

It can be said that reintegration still lacks theory. Most of the texts about reintegration are case studies and compilations of lessons learned without emphasis on building a reintegration theory.⁴⁸ Therefore, the themes discussed here did not emerge from some reintegration theory, but they still emerged from literature about the reintegration. The first theme, the goal of the reintegration, emerged because there is still some disagreement about it.⁴⁹ I wanted to find out how the Finns saw it. The second theme was the subjects of the reintegration. In the reintegration literature there is an extensive discussion about the subjects of the reintegration,⁵⁰ which was to be the second theme. Thirdly and most significantly, there is always discussion about the methods of the reintegration in the reintegration literature.⁵¹ What should be done and how? This was the third theme. As for the fourth and fifth themes, the success and failures of the reintegration, I wanted to know how the interviewees felt about the reintegration in Aceh.

The first selection of the interviewees happened in Finland's Ministry of the Interior. Originally there had been fifteen Finns working in Aceh as monitors, reintegration or human rights specialists. From the Ministry of the Interior I received a list of twelve people. From these twelve I finally

⁴⁷ Eskola & Vastamäki 2001, 33.

⁴⁸ Nilsson 2005, 35.

⁴⁹ Nilsson 2005, 22-29; Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament Demobilisation Reintegration 2006; Background Studies 2006, 20-28.

⁵⁰ Look for example Nilsson 2005, 14; Specht 2003, 76-81; Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament Demobilisation Reintegration 2006; Background Studies 2006, 28-32.

⁵¹ Look for example Gleichmann & Odenwald & Steenken & Wilkinson 2004, 77-90; Specht 2003, 94-102; Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament Demobilisation Reintegration 2006; Background Studies 2006, 33-45;

interviewed eight. Some of these people worked abroad during the research, so I was unable to interview them or the interview was not possible for other reasons. The interviews mainly took place between November and December 2006 and the last interview was conducted February 8, 2007. The interviews happened mainly in cafes or at interviewee's homes. A typical interview took about 30-45 minutes. All interviews were recorded and transcribed. The interviews⁵² followed the same themes although their structure varied. I could for example go through the themes in different order depending on the answers.

One of the tools for the arrangement and description of interview material is the content analysis. Content analysis is the verbal description of the content of the analysed documents. The material of the research represents the phenomenon in question. The point of the analysis is to create a verbal and clear presentation of the phenomenon in question. The aim of the content analysis is to organise the material into a compact and clear form without losing its information. With analysis it is possible to make clear conclusions about the phenomenon in question. The qualitative treatment of the material is based on logical reasoning and interpretation, where the material is divided into smaller parts, conceptualized, and coded in a new way to a logical entity.⁵³ With the content analysis it is then possible to create a verbal, compact and clear picture about the research material, which here was formed by the interviews of the Finnish civilian crisis management workers.

The analysis of the material collected in the theme interviews was done following the instructions of Jari Eskola's article. In this article he discusses the use of the content analysis.⁵⁴ I followed his instructions in the analysis. In a theory bound analysis there are certain theoretical connections that are not directly based on the theory. A theory can work as help when conducting the analysis. In theory bound analysis the units of analysis are taken from the research material, but previous knowledge guides and helps in the analysis. In this way the previous knowledge can be recognised from the analysis, but the meaning of the previous knowledge is not to test a theory but to open up new thoughts. In the theory bound analysis the researcher tries to connect the already existing models and the research material.⁵⁵

⁵² look appendix 1.

⁵³ Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2002, 109- 110.

⁵⁴ Eskola 2001.

⁵⁵ Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2002, 98-99.

After the transcription⁵⁶ the first phase in the analysis is to arrange the material into different themes. In practice this means that the material that fits into certain theme is picked from every answer. The interview has not always logically progressed from one theme to another. This means that answers to and comments on a certain theme can be found all over the interview.⁵⁷ In this case I collected all the material that was linked with one theme into a separate file. After I had divided the material into these files according to their themes, the actual analysis phase started. During this period I read the material several times through in order to get an idea of it. During this time I wrote the first commentaries about the material. After this I proceeded according to the themes. In this stage the answer that is regarded as best or most valuable is chosen from the theme. This answer is then studied. Next, all the other answers are studied until the whole material has been analysed. This process can be described as a snowball technique. First a hard core is built and then more information is added from the other answers. In this stage the best bits from the last stage's analysis are written open. Put differently, the material is interpreted in own words. The material and the own thinking of the researched are combined.

This is not the end of the analysis and the interpretation's connections to the used theories and previous research has to be presented.⁵⁸ In the analysis part this is shown with the way how I have borrowed from other research material to connect the interviews to the previous research. This is done in two ways. Firstly, the analysis is connected to the general reintegration literature by quoting it when suitable. Secondly, the Aceh specific research material is used to illuminate more clearly the situation in Aceh and in order to give some background to the interviewees' comments.

In this analysis any numerical values are not used, such as: "3 was of this opinion and 5 of this." Terms like "majority" and "minority" are used more. This was done because the analysis is my interpretation of the texts and wholly categorical opinions were hard to find in the texts. Therefore, for example the term majority gives a better picture about the material. In the analysis I did not use the interviewees' real names, as agreed with them beforehand. When quoting someone directly, I use abbreviations like I1, I2 and so on. I have listed the interviewees so that the listing does not match the chronological or alphabetical order of the interviews. The numbers 1, 2, etc. is just referring to their random order.

⁵⁶ I recorded the interview material to a tape or to a file. In transcription I left out some of the expletives, for example "you know". I did this in a way that the content stayed intact. In transcription I did not mark the gaps or the stresses because they were not important to the research.

⁵⁷ Eskola 2001, 141-145.

⁵⁸ Eskola 2001, 146-152.

With the content analysis the material can be organised for the conclusions.⁵⁹ Several researches have been criticized because of this incompleteness. A researcher may have described the analysis very carefully but they may not have been able to draw any sensible conclusions and they are representing the organised material as results.⁶⁰ In this research this problem is acknowledged and I solve it by bringing out a concrete result that the opinions about the reintegration can be divided in two categories. In this way I do not settle with only describing the content of the interview material. Also the analysis of the article is a picture that I have drawn based on the interview material. Even though I have tried to be impartial and tried to work without prejudices, it still is a subjective picture. Like Richard Rorty, also I believe that historical facts define what people's believes, desires and opinions are.⁶¹ So I do not suppose that reality is an independent entity from us.

Reintegration in Aceh

“I think it was and it is a quite good mission, but we have a lot to learn from it and if we especially speak about this reintegration side then this is one of those things.”⁶²

In this chapter I will answer how the interviewees understood the reintegration. First I will discuss the objective of the reintegration. After this I will go through their opinions about the subjects of the reintegration in Aceh and what were the methods used in reintegration in Aceh. This division is artificial and the answers cannot be wholly separated from each other; however this separation clarifies and facilitates the analysis. Finally I will answer the question of did the interviewees think that the reintegration in Aceh was a success or a failure?

The AMM-operation lasted from August 2005 to December 2006.⁶³ One of the tasks of AMM was to monitor the process of the reintegration. Responsible for the reintegration was the government of Indonesia. Because AMM was there for little over a year, it could not monitor the whole reintegration process. Reintegration is a process and its results should rather be controlled after ten years from the beginning than after little more than one year from it. Because of this the opinions of the Finnish civilian crisis management workers give a picture of how they understood and saw the

⁵⁹ Grönfors 1982, 105.

⁶⁰ Tuomi – Sarajärvi 2002, 105.

⁶¹ Rorty 1991, 191.

⁶² I5, translation by the author.

⁶³ AMM homepage.

reintegration in its beginning. The length of AMM's mandate was rather short when thinking about the whole length of the reintegration. Because of this it was considered important inside AMM that it should help to build a working reintegration system in Aceh before its exit.⁶⁴

The objective of the reintegration and its targets

The aim of the reintegration is the social, economical and political reintegration of the combatants and their families into civil society.⁶⁵ The Memorandum of Understanding is not wholly unambiguous about the targets of the reintegration. Strictly interpreted it says that reintegration is only meant for the ex-combatants of the GAM⁶⁶. According to the MoU the government of Indonesia and the authorities of Aceh will take measures to assist persons who have participated in GAM activities to facilitate their reintegration into civil society. These measures also included economic facilitation to former combatants, pardoned political prisoners and affected civilians.⁶⁷ The interviewees placed emphasis especially on the reintegration of the combatants. All but one agreed that integration of GAM's members and the combatants was part of the reintegration. *"It was like; place these combatants back to civil society."*⁶⁸ I3 On the other hand some of the interviewees did not separate the objects and means of the reintegration. In this situation the object of the reintegration was, for example, to provide economic help and support to the combatants returning to society. One of the interviewees thought that the aim of the reintegration was the things stated in the MoU. *"Officially the things mentioned in the Memorandum of Understanding were understood as reintegration. To the guerrillas, coming from the mountains, was promised money, land and education."*⁶⁹ Generally, in the views of the interviewees was a consensus that the aim of the reintegration was the integration of the combatants back to society. Also in the UN there is a

⁶⁴ AMM Special Report 074, 7.

⁶⁵ Nilsson 2005, 26-28.

⁶⁶ GAM's members were not only combatants that carried guns. GAM was also a civilian organization. Some of the active GAM members were responsible for the logistics, part of them were a kind of a police and part of them trained to be combatants. Major part of the combatants, 75 %, was from age group from 18 to 35. Pardoned political prisoners were older, although major part of them were also from the age group from 18 to 35. In GAM there were hardly any combatants that were under eighteen. Some of the combatants claimed that they had joined GAM when they were sixteen or seventeen, but when the World Bank was conducting its research, combatants under eighteen were not found. GAM used children as messengers, guards or as certain kinds of scouts for gathering the information. About 4 % of GAM's combatants were women. The women combatants were also younger than the male combatants, because 60 % of them were under 25 years old. (The World Bank 2006, 12-14.)

⁶⁷ Memorandum of Understanding 3.2.3.

⁶⁸ I3, translation by the author.

⁶⁹ I5, translation by the author.

growing consensus that focusing on the combatants is essential in the reintegration, despite the fact that the combatants may get disproportionate benefits after the conflict.⁷⁰

The significance of the reintegration to society divided the opinions of the interviewees. These opinions can be divided into two opposites according to how extensively and within what time frame the reintegration is viewed. According to the first opinion the reintegration in Aceh should be looked through the MoU. Reintegration should be understood as the parties have agreed it to be in the peace agreement and no external elements should be introduced. This view sees reintegration more as a technical process and as a work that has to be done immediately. Reintegration ties the fighters into work and gives them something else to think. From this point of view reintegration is seen as a rather narrow field that is followed by another kind of help. The other view sees reintegration as a wider process that is connected to other events and changes in society. Reintegration is understood as a long time process and results cannot be achieved in a short time.

According to the MoU the targets of the reintegration were people that had taken part in GAM activities. Part of the reintegration was the economic facilitation to former combatants, pardoned political prisoners and affected civilians. These groups were to receive an allocation of suitable farming land, employment, or, in the case of incapacity to work, adequate social security from the authorities of Aceh.⁷¹ All the interviewees consider the ex-combatants of GAM or those who had participated in the fighting as participants of the reintegration. At the same time majority brought out pardoned political prisoners and affected civilians as the targets of the reintegration. Although in the case of affected civilians it is not possible to talk about reintegration in a same way as with the combatants and the pardoned political prisoners because they were never separated from society as these two groups were.

The question about women caused biggest differences among the interviewees. The opinions were split in two and this separation followed the separation that existed previously on the question about the length and object of the reintegration. The question about women was problematic in a sense that in MoU combatants are mentioned but there is not any definition of the content of this definition.⁷² The parties of MoU, the government of Indonesia and GAM, in practice excluded women outside the reintegration process. They did not bring out the status of women combatants

⁷⁰ United Nations Development Programme 2005, 34.

⁷¹ Memorandum of Understanding, 3.2.5.

⁷² Memorandum of Understanding, 3.2.3 - 3.2.5.

although there were women combatants in Aceh.⁷³ Because of this the reintegration focused on men combatants and women combatants did not receive the reintegration benefits. About half of the interviewees thought that the exclusion of women was a problem. *"In my understanding the women combatants having been left out of this whole reintegration process as beneficiaries, is a central problem."*⁷⁴

Part of the interviewees did not discuss the issue of women combatants. To these interviewees, women were mainly thought as affected civilians. One saw that the women combatants had adapted as men had. Another interviewee was not even sure if there had been women combatants in Aceh. Also, these interviewees did not consider the issue important in the reintegration. It was thought that reintegration is part of the first phase in the containment of the crisis. The women issue should only be presented in the most acute phase of the containment of the crisis. *"It is painful to strengthen the status of women in this stage. It doesn't bring a good result."*⁷⁵

Another difference among the interviewees was the issue of how well the target group was defined. At the beginning it was intended that reintegration benefits would be given to 3,000 combatants. In addition, benefits would be given to the pardoned prisoners and affected civilians. GAM and Indonesia's government had decided these numbers already during the negotiation phase of the MoU, after which it was written to the MoU. So the number of the beneficiaries had been decided before the start of the reintegration programme. According to the interviewees, the GAM combatants who had surrendered before the signing of the MoU were not included in these numbers. The conflict had continued at different levels of intensity for about 30 years, so a large number of combatants were in danger of being excluded from the reintegration assistance that was meant for the combatants. A confused process in the distribution of the reintegration funds and in the organisation that was responsible for it, the Babel Reintegrasi dan damai Aceh BRA, led to an increase in the number of the beneficiaries. In March 2007 the groups that had received or were to receive integration benefits were the GAM combatants, the civilian members of GAM, political prisoners, the GAM members that had surrendered before the signing of the MoU, the militia that had fought against GAM, and the affected civilians. The affected civilians did not receive the money directly but the money was distributed to different villages. Also separate assistance was given to invalids in housing and in using health services. In total, the government of Indonesia was

⁷³ AMM Special Report 074, 6-7.

⁷⁴ I8, translation by the author.

⁷⁵ I6, translation by the author.

to use about 150 million dollars to these benefits during the period of 2005-2007.⁷⁶ So the target group for the integration benefits has widened from what was originally agreed in the MoU.

When the issue was the definition of the subject group of the reintegration in the MoU, minority of the interviewees considered it a success. *“It should be clearly defined what is the target group.”*⁷⁷ Majority though it as a failure. Those who thought it as a success thought that in the reintegration process there should be a clearly defined target group like there was in Aceh. In this way the reintegration process was easier to observe from the monitors’ point of view. The measurability of the reintegration was thought important. Also the lack of distinct target group was considered as making the possible reintegration more difficult.

From another point of view the definition had been a failure because the target group had grown during the reintegration process. *“First of all the number of the combatants had been agreed to be 3,000 in the MoU that was total nonsense and everybody knows that there were a lot more.”*⁷⁸ In the same way a categorical definition was not considered as the best starting point for the reintegration because there were a lot more that needed the help. Part of the interviewees thought that it would be better if the assistance had been given to communities. The communities and villages would have been given the money meant for reintegration benefits and they could have decided how to use this money. In the end this happened with the benefits targeted at the affected civilians.⁷⁹ This approach was considered as more important because after a long conflict majority of the population can be regarded as victims. Also this kind of approach was thought to help prevent problems caused by envy. Part of the Achenese saw the reintegration benefits that were given to the combatants as rewards and this caused envy. For a reintegration programme to be successful, the benefits should be balanced so that it fulfils the expectations of the combatants but it is not seen as rewarding. In conflicts where the combatants have committed atrocities the supporting of combatants is easily seen as rewarding. Then it can be hard for the local population to accept the distribution of the reintegration benefits to the combatants.⁸⁰

According to one of the interviewees, an option to the categorical approach would be an idea where the starting point would not be different groups of people but the needs of the people. In this way a

⁷⁶ Aceh Conflict Monitoring Update 2007, 4.

⁷⁷ I4, translation by the author.

⁷⁸ I8, translation by the author.

⁷⁹ Aceh Conflict Monitoring Update 2007, 4.

⁸⁰ International Peace Academy 2002, 4.

reintegration programme should start from the needs of the people. First step would be a survey of the needs that people have. The reintegration programme or programmes should be based on these needs. Those interviewees that did not thought the categorical approach as the best possible solution were the same persons that supported the wider definition of the combatants and saw the exclusion of women as a problem. Despite this some of these interviewees said that they understood the categorical definition through the budget logic because the resources of the government of Indonesia were limited.

The methods of the reintegration

The methods of the reintegration in a general level were asked in the interviews. Despite this, all interviewees linked their answers to their experiences in Aceh. Many of them said that they cannot say so much in a general level but based their answers on the experiences that they had in Aceh. Nevertheless, many of them brought methods from outside the MoU's framework. The methods that were most strongly brought were employment, education and financial help.

According to the MoU, part of the reintegration was economical assistance, but also the allocation of suitable farming land, employment, or, in the case of incapacity to work, adequate social security provided by the authorities of Aceh.⁸¹ In AMM it was also thought that part of the reintegration was also the vocational training and health care. In practice, employment, vocational training and health care were not emphasised enough and they did not have a big impact on reintegration. In AMM it was thought that the low overall level of the social security and poor employment situation in Aceh were the main reasons for this. Part of the MoU was also the possibility that the people who had renounced their Indonesian citizenship during the conflict had the possibility to regain it. In the interviews this did not come out because the question of the citizenship was not important to the parties. The biggest Acehenese community abroad was in Malaysia and they had not given up their citizenship. The Acehenese living in Europe and the United States did not have immediate need to come back. In practice, the MoU's main focus in the field of reintegration was on the economic assistance.⁸²

An interview research that was made by the World Bank found out that the biggest need that the GAM combatants had was the capital. Housing, health care, vocational training, and elementary

⁸¹ Memorandum of understanding 3.2.5.

⁸² Tardioli (2007), AMM Deputy Head of Mission with special mandate on Amnesty, Reintegration and Human Rights.

schooling came in importance after this. Capital was needed to start up productive activities like small businesses. They also needed money for their everyday life. However, the biggest need was the capital that they could use to buy land or to start up their own businesses.⁸³ Another research, coordinated by the International Organization of Migration, said that 85 % of the people whose minority were the ex-combatants had problems in supporting their families and 90 % had difficulties in finding work. Also 72 % had problems in finding enough food. In this research, 600 people were interviewed in the districts of Pidien, Bireuen and Aceh Utara⁸⁴

In the answers, economical assistance was not considered as a very important method in reintegration. This was partly surprising because a major part of them thought that the problems with the distribution of the reintegration assistance were one of the major problems in the reintegration and in practice the main focus in the reintegration was in the economical assistance. The assistance was thought to help the ex-combatants to survive immediately after the conflict. *“In the first stage the economical assistance that people don’t need to steal or do other crimes in order to get the daily food.”*⁸⁵

On the other hand, the reintegration was criticised for being too focused on the distribution of the money. Many saw the poverty as a problem, but considered that it could not be fixed only by giving economical assistance. So the criticism was not targeted at the fact that money was given. It was thought, however, that economical assistance diverted the focus from other kind of help and they were not helping to create longstanding prerequisites for the reintegration. Other kind of action was needed. Also the amount of money was thought to be relatively small and this can be one explanation to the fact that the interviewees did not think that the economical assistance was very significant. It was thought that wider actions were needed to alleviate the poverty. These actions were not very precisely identified but emphasis was put on the perseverance of the reintegration work. *“Easily if you give money and then the money, when you don’t necessarily have know-how, then the money is nice but it can be that it goes only to paying loans or buying food.”*⁸⁶

Giving jobs was a theme that came up in most of the interviews. This is supported by the fact that combatants saw the unemployment and the lack of money as their biggest problem.⁸⁷ Normally, the

⁸³ The World Bank 2006, 40-41.

⁸⁴ IOM 2006, 19.

⁸⁵ I4, translation by the author.

⁸⁶ I8, translation by the author.

⁸⁷ The World Bank 2006, 41.

armed conflicts affect the functioning of the employment markets. Especially ‘new wars’⁸⁸ diminish domestic and foreign investments. The functioning of markets is disturbed by the destruction of the infrastructure and the industry may stop functioning. These effects may not disappear after the peace. For example, different kinds of physical and mental injuries can make working harder and reduce the amount of work force after the conflict. Unemployment rates are normally very high in areas where there has been a conflict.⁸⁹

There was some variation in the opinions of the interviewees of why they saw employment as important. The first viewpoint considered it important to create jobs because big unemployed group of people can cause problems. By giving them jobs it would be possible to give them something else to think. *“That is like the foundation of everything, when a person is employed in some way than he doesn’t have time to think about what to do.”*⁹⁰ Also the other viewpoint agreed that employment was important in reintegration. But the main value was that it made possible for the people to integrate into society. With a job it was possible to earn money and get a hold of a normal life. Employment was not a way of keeping the ex-combatants out of trouble.

Normally, many of the people who have been employed in a work that is connected to a conflict will be unemployed after the conflict. This is particularly the case with the combatants. What adds up to the problem is that these people do not necessary have education and those mechanisms that could provide education and training have disappeared or been destroyed.⁹¹ All the interviewees mentioned that education was one way to reintegrate the people. Special emphasis was put on training that would give people professional skills, for example apprenticeships in work places. This kind of training was seen as giving the possibility of reintegration through work. Training programmes that have been done after a conflict have shown that vocational training in itself does not create jobs but it improves people’s possibilities to find them. Typically, insufficient attention is given to training in post-conflict societies. Also in many cases many of those social institutions that have taught social skills have been destroyed.⁹² This came out in the interviews in a way that emphasis was also placed on the importance of education and its civilizing value. Importance was

⁸⁸ According to Mary Kaldor during the 1980s and 1990s a new type of organized violence developed especially in Africa and in Eastern Europe. These wars she describes with the term new war. What is new is the blurring of the distinctions between war, organised crime and large-scale violations of human rights. (Kaldor 1999, 1-3.) It can also be said that there is not that much new in these ‘new wars’. Same kind of things can be found throughout the history of conflicts. (Newman 2004, 174-175.)

⁸⁹ Krishnamurty 2003, 53-55.

⁹⁰ I4, translation by the author.

⁹¹ Krishnamurty 2003, 56-57.

⁹² Barcia & Date-Bah 2003, 211.

given most to vocational training. Major part of the interviewees thought that the level of education of the combatants was low. In reality, the education levels of the GAM members did not differ from the education level of an average Acehenese.⁹³ In this case, the interviewees thought that higher education would be one method of reintegration. *“Firstly the best way is to educate them in some way, train them in some profession and then to society.”*⁹⁴

Some of the interviewees introduced the idea of economical counselling along with the employment and training. In Aceh, support was given to the combatants to start economic activities. According to the interviewees the fighters had founded fish farms and other type of small businesses. These new small businesses were seen to have problems because the fighters did not have enough knowledge of the markets or adequate business skills. Thus, economical counselling was considered important. Also market research that would give information to the combatants and training that had to do with marketing was thought as important.

According to the MoU, the government of Indonesia was to allocate funds for the rehabilitation of public and private property destroyed or damaged as a consequence of the conflict.⁹⁵ Many of the Achenese had problems with housing.⁹⁶ Some interviewees presented the issue of rebuilding the destroyed homes. Many people had been forced to leave to other areas of Aceh because of the destruction caused by the conflict. They said that for the Achenese it was shameful to live in other people’s homes. It was seen that the abolition of this problem would be important to social reintegration.

Farming land was to be allocated according to the MoU.⁹⁷ Aceh is mainly an agricultural community and the allocation of the farming land is an easy way to employ people. Those interviewees that saw that the work would keep people out of trouble also thought the allocation of the farming land to be an important way to employ people. Part of the combatants that had made their living from farming before did not want to go back to agriculture after the conflict.⁹⁸ Therefore, some of the interviewees saw that the efforts to get the combatants back to farming were problematic. In practice, the question was theoretical because according to those interviewees farming land was not allocated during the time when AMM was there.

⁹³ The World Bank 2006, 15.

⁹⁴ I7, translation by the author.

⁹⁵ Memorandum of Understanding 3.2.4.

⁹⁶ IOM 2006, 19.

⁹⁷ Memorandum of Understanding 3.2.5.

⁹⁸ The World Bank 2006, 41-42.

The interviews included ideas about strengthening the civil society, better providing information, and making the MoU better understood among the combatants. Also building trust was thought important. Those who understood reintegration broadly were also supporting the change of those structures in society that were seen as structural reasons for the conflict. In the end the main focus in the interviews were work, training and financial assistance.

Two viewpoints

Two viewpoints emerged from the interviews. Different opinions are easier to bring out with this kind of separation, which may have affected the analysis here. Also the differences in opinions may have been caused by the fact that some interviewees looked at the reintegration process from inside the AMM's mandate, while some interviewees looked at reintegration more generally. Despite this, two points of views can be found in the interviews. All of the interviewees are not in the extremes and some are in the middle of the scale. However, the scale does not represent normal distribution and the differences in opinions are clear.

These views are labelled here as “technical” and “broad” view. According to the technical view, reintegration is a process that happens within certain timeframe. The technical view sees reintegration as a shorter process than the wide one. According to it, the targets of the reintegration should be clearly defined. Prime targets are then the combatants. Also the reintegration itself has to be defined, its length, targets and so on. In reintegration, the targets should be bound to work and training, so that they do not have time to cause trouble. Issues concerning sex and helping physically and mentally sick are important, but they should not be included in the actual reintegration and they follow after it. This view is supported by the controllability of the process and the possible limits of the reintegration budget.

The broad view understands reintegration more widely than the technical view. It also sees the reintegration as a longer process than the technical view. Further, the targets of the reintegration are seen more widely. The targets of the reintegration are not only the combatants but also other actors that have supported the armed action even if they did not actually carry weapons during the conflict. The issues of women and children are also considered as important. The methods of the reintegration are also seen more widely and the distinction between the reintegration and development aid becomes blurred.

This separation can partly be understood in the way that the technical view saw the reintegration strictly through the mandate of the operation. It did not think that the women issue was important because it was not mentioned in the mandate. On the other hand, the question about what is pursued with the reintegration is probably more significant. If the goal of the reintegration is to simply strengthen the overall security situation, then the fast employment of the combatants without thinking of their real needs can be a justified way to proceed. If the goal of the reintegration is economical, social and political reintegration, then the technical view cannot be considered adequate. Then, a broader view is needed, where the needs of the combatants and their families are taken into consideration.

As mentioned earlier, reintegration is also about security. According to Bill McSweeney, security can be seen as positive or negative. Negative security sees security as the absence of something negative, for example as an absence of war or violence. Negative security is security from something to which it is connected: objects that can be seen, weighted or measured. In this case the objects are protecting and preventing something from happening. Positive security is freedom from something. It is a question of making something possible. In this case it is referring, for example, to human security.⁹⁹ In the technical and broad views these same features can be found. The technical view emphasises the measurability of the reintegration. It also sees that the success of the reintegration is more about the absence of negative things, like the absence of violence. This is indicated by the idea that people should be employed in a way that they do not have to cause trouble. Then again, the broad view has more in common with the positive security. It emphasises the tackling of structural problems, wider definitions of the subjects of the reintegration, and making the communities as part of the process.

The successes and failures of the reintegration in Aceh

Failures

Most of the interviewees had returned from Aceh during the early autumn 2006. Since then, part of those problems that had been brought out in their interviews had been solved. These problems are also brought up, because during that time there were real problems and, according to the

⁹⁹ McSweeney 1999, 14-15.

interviewees, obstacles to the reintegration. Also bringing out these problems sheds some light to the reintegration process in Aceh. When I asked in the interviews if the reintegration was a success or a failure, then the failures and problems of the reintegration were of main concern, which was surprising. Before the interviews I had been under an impression that the start of the reintegration process had been a success. One reason for this can be that the EU wanted to build a success story out of Aceh. During the interviews I got a dimmed picture of the situation. However, the opinions of those civilian crisis management workers who had been in Aceh for longest were more positive. This suggests that the reintegration process had created some progress in Aceh.

One reason for the certain negativity can be the fact that the official reintegration process had not really started during the interviewees' stay in Aceh and they mainly brought up problems that were related to this. On the other hand, the social reintegration had been successful. The combatants had returned to their villages and towns and they had mainly been received well. There had been incidents between the parties after the signing of the MoU but these had been resolved with the help of the AMM. Peace has lasted. Majority of the interviewees were concerned about the future of the reintegration process. However, it has to be kept in mind that the success of the reintegration should be estimated rather ten years from now than only after the first year.

The definition of the subjects of reintegration is wide in Aceh, because combatants, pardoned prisoners, and affected civilians are part of it.¹⁰⁰ One way to go through the successes and failures of the reintegration is to go through it separately with one of these groups at a time. Now, afterwards, I have to admit that this separation was not made in these interviews and only one of the interviewees made this separation in his answers. Because of this, I discuss the problems that emerged from the interviews one at a time. To conclude, I will bring out the things that were seen as a success.

The government of Indonesia demanded that the members of GAM should register before they would provide reintegration assistance to this group. This caused problems because the members of GAM considered the lists as a security risk if the peace process turned out to be a failure. This dispute led to a stop in the distribution of the government's reintegration assistance. About half of the interviewees brought this up. At the same the dispute on the name lists was seen as part of a wider structural problems in Indonesia's administration. However, some interviewees did not bring

¹⁰⁰ Memorandum of Understanding 3.2.3.

out this problem. Partly, this can be explained by the fact that some interviewees had been in Aceh for so long that this problem had already been solved. Biggest reason for this was the building of trust. Because of the distrust, GAM was too afraid to give up the names. After the trust had been rebuilt, the lists were not an issue anymore. Then the reintegration could proceed with the combatants.¹⁰¹

BRA was the organization of Indonesia's government that had been established for the distribution of the reintegration assistance. Also, it was meant to work in cooperation with a common forum called Forum Bersama. Members of this common forum were representatives of the government of Indonesia, GAM, international organizations, and local civic organizations.¹⁰² In June the representatives of government, GAM, and civic organizations withdrew from this agreement because tension had built between them.¹⁰³ Many of the interviewees brought out the problems connected with functioning of BRA as major problems in the reintegration. Inside BRA there had been among others a political power struggle. At the same time there were problems in BRA's reintegration programmes that were caused by poor planning and corruption.¹⁰⁴ The interviewees particularly brought out the problems with the distribution of the reintegration assistance. When the news about the possibility of getting reintegration assistance from the funds meant for the affected civilians through BRA reached the people, about 40,000 – 50,000 applications were submitted. The organization of BRA could not handle these applications and it became paralyzed. Also it was clear that some of these applications were unfounded. Among the interviewees BRA was seen as a bureaucratic organization that was hard to take measure of and did not work properly.

Majority of the interviewees saw that the problems connected with the local administration was making the reintegration harder. These problems were slowness, ineffective administration, corruption, and bad communication. This was seen particularly with issues connected to BRA, and also the interviewees considered this as a wider problem. Bad administration and the lack of good governance were seen as making the reintegration more difficult. Also the interviewees were unsatisfied with the slow progress of the reintegration. " *you are always left with an impression that someone is always foot-dragging and there is always some explanation why something hasn't happened.*"¹⁰⁵ Related to this issue, some brought up the bad communication. It was seen that there

¹⁰¹ Kokkarinen (2006), Aceh Political Advisor, Consilium, EU.

¹⁰² AMM Special Report 058, 4-5.

¹⁰³ Aceh Conflict Monitoring Update June-July 2006, 2.

¹⁰⁴ AMM Special Report 087, 4.

¹⁰⁵ 18, translation by author

was not enough discussion about reintegration and enough information was not given about the reintegration. Also to the information and public relations work of BRA was considered weak. The information did not spread from BRA's central office to the district offices and in small villages they were not always aware of the progress of the reintegration. Also the flow of the information was seen as a problem inside GAM.

As discussed above, women were neglected in the official reintegration and they were not part of the institutions that decided about the reintegration, even though there had been women fighters in Aceh.¹⁰⁶ Because of the reasons stated above, the interviewees were divided whether this was a problem in Aceh or not. If the reintegration process is looked at from outside the AMM's mandate, this can clearly be considered as a problem in the reintegration. Themes that almost all brought out in the interviews, although in different ways, were poverty and difficulties in finding work. Majority of the combatants were unemployed, and some interviewees considered that because of the unemployment and the lack of other basic needs criminality was growing. Since the signing of the MoU the criminality has been growing and this growth has concentrated on the areas that were previously pivotal to GAM.¹⁰⁷

Many interviewees emphasised the lack of housing. Many Achenese had problems with housing.¹⁰⁸ Homes had been destroyed during the conflict, which forced many to move to other places in Aceh and to live with their relatives or rent an accommodation. This was seen a problem through the social reintegration because people did not have a home or they had to leave in unfamiliar environment. According to the interviewees one of the problems was the lack of trust between the ex-combatants of GAM and representatives of the government, the police and army. Also there was a lack of trust between civilians and the police and army. It was seen that one of the reason for this was the fact that main part of the military personnel and the police in Aceh was from other parts of Indonesia. In spite of peace there still was not real trust between the parties. *"Of course the trust to the government and to those officials was really bad, among the civilians and GAM."*¹⁰⁹

As brought out earlier, the lack of economical knowledge or the lack of this kind of help was seen as a problem in the reintegration. In Aceh it was possible to get reintegration assistance to different kinds of common projects and the combatants had established, for example, fish farms with this

¹⁰⁶ AMM Special Report 074, 6-7.

¹⁰⁷ Aceh Conflict Monitoring Update June-July 2006, 2.

¹⁰⁸ IOM 2006, 19.

¹⁰⁹ II, translation by the author.

money. The interviewees saw that the lack of knowledge about the functioning of the markets and economy caused failures in these projects. *“These combatants needed this kind of supported. A crass-root level supported about what is reasonable and what kind of economic activity would have prerequisites for longlasting entrepreneurship.”*¹¹⁰

Also some interviewees were concerned about the way the economy of Aceh and the former combatants were steered. Firstly, the way the combatants were directed to agriculture was set in doubt. In a research done by the World Bank, 27 % of the combatants wanted to find new kind of work. 30 % of the combatants and 43 % of the political prisoners had been farmers, which had been the biggest occupational group.¹¹¹ With this background it is understandable that not everyone wanted to be a farmer. Some interviewees argued that in a place where agriculture was dominant the people should be directed to agriculture because this is one of the easiest ways to employ a person.

The problems that the interviewees presented were close to each other. Majority of the interviewees saw especially considered as the biggest problems the name lists and the action of BRA. Those who brought out the status of women combatants saw this as a central problem in the reintegration. The opinions of the interviewees about the problems of the reintegration were mainly similar. Things that only one interviewee brought out were few.

Successes

The only thing that the interviewees brought out in a larger scale was the successful return of the combatants to their communities. So the social reintegration can be regarded as a success in Aceh. Almost 90 % of the combatants had not faced problems in their return to their homes.¹¹² During the conflict many of the combatants kept contact with the local population. Therefore, the differences between the local population and GAM are not big, which explains the successful return to the communities.¹¹³ The opinions of those who had stayed in Aceh for the longest were more positive than the opinions of those who had left earlier. These interviewees saw that the reintegration had made some progress. There were also territorial differences and in some areas there had been little progress. A concrete example of the progress was the rebuilding of the houses that had been

¹¹⁰ 18, translation by the author.

¹¹¹ The World Bank 2006, 41-42.

¹¹² The World Bank 2006, ix.

¹¹³ The World Bank 2006, 23.

destroyed during the conflict. *“This BRA built a lot of houses during the end of the year. They built quite a lot, there were these villages. This BRA started to work finally.”*¹¹⁴

The targets of the reintegration in Aceh were the three groups: political prisoners, ex-combatants, and affected civilians. The reintegration of the pardoned political prisoners was seen as more successful than the reintegration of the combatants. The issue about the name lists that delay the distribution of the reintegration assistance had not touched the prisoners. Majority of the interviewees were not in Aceh during the local elections in December 11, 2006.¹¹⁵ The feelings of those interviewees that stayed until the elections were generally positive about the political process and the reintegration of the combatants. According to them, the political statements had been conciliatory before the elections. Closer to the elections the importance of the political reintegration was increasing. The combatants were considered as well informed about the political situation. The political reintegration can be regarded as a success during that time, because in Aceh successful elections were held where the Acehenese and among them the combatants and the pardoned political prisoners were able to vote.

If the reintegration is looked at as a whole in Aceh then according to the interviewees the economic reintegration can be considered as a failure during the time when AMM was there. On the other hand, the political and social reintegration were successful. The successful social reintegration here means that the combatants had returned to their villages without considerable problems. Without work or living and in an atmosphere of possible mistrust, the success of the social reintegration can be threatened in the future. Due to reintegration being a long process only the passing of time can give right answers to these questions.

Conclusion

What were the results of this article? First, I wanted *to find out how the Finnish civilian crisis management workers understood the concept of the reintegration in the light of its subjects, methods and goals*. The goal of reintegration was generally understood to be the return of the combatants to society. The question of who were the subjects of the reintegration evoked disagreement. Especially the status of women divided the opinions. According to the interviewees, the main methods for the reintegration were employment, training and economical assistance. The

¹¹⁴ II, translation by the author.

¹¹⁵ BBC News (b).

opinions about the reintegration can be divided roughly into two categories: the broad and the technical views. The technical view saw reintegration more as a clearly defined process where the subjects and time schedule of the reintegration should be clear. This view had points of contact with the negative security where the security was seen as the absence of some threat. The broad view did not emphasize clear categories as the technical did. The broad view also saw the gender issue as significant to the reintegration. Further, they emphasized the connection of the reintegration to the whole society. In this case their view has more in common with the positive security where security is seen as a freedom to do something.

Another question for which I wanted to find an answer was that did *the Finnish civilian crisis management workers find the reintegration in Aceh as a failure or success?* Those civilian crisis management workers that left from Aceh in autumn 2006 saw the reintegration in a negative light. Those who left Aceh in December 2006 saw the reintegration more positively. The biggest problems in reintegration were seen in the economical side. The distribution of financial assistance had continued and unemployment was high. Nonetheless, many interviewees brought out examples how the combatants had started small businesses, with varying success, with the funds they had received from the reintegration programme. The interviewees, who were in Aceh during the elections, considered it successful. So the political reintegration had proceeded well. Social reintegration had been a success, at least in the beginning, because the combatants had returned to their villages and cities mainly without problems. The lack of employment and money was seen as a problem that can cause problems in the future. The economical reintegration was the least successful of the three parts of the reintegration. Especially the slowness and problems of the management were seen as problematic.

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Appendixes

Appendix 1.

The interview outline

1. What did you do and how long were you in Aceh?

2. How do you understand the reintegration?

2.1 What is the goal of the reintegration

2.2 Who are the subjects of the reintegration

If the interviewees didn't bring out the issue of women I brought it out intentionally.

2.3 What are the means of the reintegration? How the reintegration should happen?

Quite often I also asked that what do people need after the conflict.

3. Was the reintegration a success or a failure in Aceh?

With additional questions I tried to clarify reasons for this.