

An introduction to Integrated Crisis Management

Cedric de Coning

Integrated Crisis Management is one approach to manage crisis and enhance peacebuilding in a coordinated and sustainable way. This article analyses the conceptual framework of peacebuilding and crisis management activities as well as describes different approaches and conceptual definitions related to these activities. The major outcome of this article is the critical analysis on the limits of coordination and different approaches in a challenging environment of international peacebuilding and crisis management operations.¹

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1 A change from peacekeeping to peacebuilding

The international response to conflict, as developed in the context of the United Nations, is to try first to prevent conflict (conflict prevention). If that fails, the next step is to make peace, by facilitating negotiation among the parties with a view to reaching a cease-fire or peace agreement (peacemaking). In some cases, a stabilisation operation may be deployed to protect civilians and secure the delivery of humanitarian assistance whilst negotiations are underway to secure a peace agreement. If a ceasefire or peace agreement is reached that includes a neutral third-party monitoring role, the UN, or a regional organisation authorised by the Security Council, would typically deploy a peacekeeping mission to monitor the ceasefire, and to support the implementation of the peace agreement. Once the conflict zone has been stabilised and a peace process has been agreed upon, the international community would shift its focus from emergency assistance to post-conflict reconstruction. This phase is focused on rebuilding and reconciliation, with the aim of consolidating the peace process by addressing the root causes of the conflict so as to prevent it from re-occurring again (peacebuilding).

In the post-Cold War era, the focus of international crisis management is increasingly shifting from peacekeeping, which was about maintaining the status quo, to peacebuilding, which has to do with managing change. The nexus between development and peace has become a central focus of peacebuilding thinking and practice over the last decade.

Peacebuilding operations are international interventions that support the process of reconciliation and reconstruction in post-conflict societies. In the short term they are designed to assist and consolidate peace processes, and prevent a relapse into conflict, but their ultimate aim is to address the root causes of a conflict, and to lay the foundation for social justice and sustainable peace.

It is clear, however, that despite a growing awareness in the last two decades that the security, socio-economic, political, and reconciliation dimensions of post-conflict operations are inter-linked, the agencies that undertake these operations have been finding it extremely difficult to meaningfully integrate these different dimensions into coherent country strategies. Coherence can be understood

as the effort to ensure that the peace, security, humanitarian, and development dimensions of a peacebuilding intervention in a particular crisis are directed towards a common objective.

The failure to effectively coordinate the political, governance, development and security dimensions of peacebuilding systems, has been identified as a serious cause for concern by most major evaluations and best-practice studies undertaken in recent years. For instance, the Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding, that analysed 336 peacebuilding projects implemented by Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Norway over the last decade, has identified a lack of coherence at the strategic level – what it terms a “strategic deficit” – as the most significant obstacle to sustainable peacebuilding. The Utstein study found that more than 55 % of the programmes it evaluated did not show any link to a larger country strategy.

Integration and coordination are thus critical elements in any peacebuilding process, without which it would be impossible to achieve an overall state of mutual coherence among the different policies and actions of the various agencies engaged in a given peacebuilding operation.

2 Definition of peacebuilding

Peacebuilding is a holistic concept that provides for simultaneous short, medium and long-term programmes to prevent disputes from escalating, to avoid relapse into violent conflict and to build and consolidate sustainable peace. It requires a coherent and coordinated multidimensional response by a broad range of role-players including government, civil society, the private sector and international agencies.

These various actors undertake a range of interrelated programmes that span the security, political and governance, socio-economic development and reconciliation dimensions of society, and that collectively and cumulatively addresses both the causes and consequences of the conflict and, in the long-term, establish the foundations for social-justice and sustainable peace and development.

The UN Policy Committee, in its May 2007 deliberations, approved a useful definition of peacebuilding, namely:

Peacebuilding involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict, to strengthen national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development. Peacebuilding strategies must be coherent and tailored to the specific needs of the country concerned, based on national ownership, and should comprise a carefully prioritised, sequenced, and therefore relatively narrow set of activities aimed at achieving the above objectives.

Peacebuilding aims to consolidate and institutionalise peace by undertaking a range of actions that go beyond preventing violence (negative peace). It aims to address the underlying root causes of conflict and to create the conditions for a just social order (positive peace). In this context, it may be useful to revisit the distinction between preventative peacebuilding and post-conflict peacebuilding, as much of the conceptual confusion comes about when these two distinct perspectives of peacebuilding are muddled together.

Preventative peacebuilding refers to activities, or programmes, aimed at addressing short to medium term conflict factors that may result in a lapse, or relapse into violent conflict. Some donors now have funds specifically earmarked for peacebuilding, and those funds would

most likely be used to fund specific programmes in this category. The time frame for preventative peacebuilding is necessarily short- to medium-term, because it is focussed on immediate or imminent threats to the peace process. Examples of preventative peacebuilding programmes include conflict resolution training and capacity building. The development of institutional capabilities needed for conflict prevention, such as the Peace Commission in southern Sudan or a local capacity, such as the Ituri Pacification Commission. Support for civil society or women's groups to participate in peacemaking initiatives, and support for national reconciliation initiatives, including aspects of transitional justice. Some donors would also support specific programme activities that form part of, or support, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), Rule of Law (RoL) and Security Sector Reform (SSR), out of their peacebuilding funds.

Some donors do not earmark funds specifically for peacebuilding, but prefer to encourage a Conflict Sensitive Development approach when working in conflict-affected countries. Conflict Sensitive Development programmes have a developmental objective, for example, poverty reduction, but is sensitive to the conflict environment within which they operate, in that specific steps are taken in the design and management of the programme to either avoid aggravating the situation, or to proactively support conflict prevention efforts.

An important pre-requisite for a Preventative Peacebuilding approach is an understanding of the risks to the peace process, and the conflict factors that characterise the conflict system. A Post-Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) is, or should be, typically undertaken as part of the process leading up to the design of appropriate Preventative Peacebuilding programmes. It is thus important to work towards a common understanding of what the conflict factors in a particular context are, from the earliest planning stages and continuously throughout the life cycle of the peacebuilding system. Funding for, and capacity building towards, effective participation in a PCIA approach would also be regarded as a Preventative Peacebuilding activity.

Post-Conflict Peacebuilding on the other hand refers to the total combined effort of the peacebuilding dimensions

(e.g. those listed below), and may exist in the form of an overall agreed process that are usually described in a strategic framework. There may be specific processes and structures that facilitate the development, management and monitoring of such peacebuilding frameworks, and these may be specifically funded, but in general support for Post-Conflict Peacebuilding occurs in a highly fragmented manner in that the various agencies that participate in, and contribute to, the overall process, each independently design, manage, monitor and evaluate and secure funding for their activities. These activities are not necessarily identified as, or funded as, peacebuilding activities at the programme level. Instead, they would, for instance, be considered and funded as independent peacekeeping, development, human rights, or Rule of Law activities. Including some specific Preventative Peacebuilding activities that would be explicitly programmed and funded as peacebuilding activities, such as the ones described in the previous section. It is when these activities are considered together, in the context of their combined and cumulative effect, over time, that their Post-Conflict Peacebuilding identity emerge.

A strategic or integrated framework, that is aimed at an overall strategic vision for the post-conflict peacebuilding process, such as a conflict sensitive Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS), or similar frameworks, such as the earlier Results Focussed Transitional Framework in Liberia and the more recent Integrated Peacebuilding Framework in Burundi, sketch out the overall priorities and objectives of the post-conflict peacebuilding strategy for a particular country. The individual activities described above become part of the Post-Conflict Peacebuilding process when they contribute to, and is considered as part of the overall effort directed towards achieving the objectives set out in the strategic vision. In some cases the individual agencies and activities may be conscious of their role in the overall framework, but in most cases this linkage is drawn only at the systemic level, for instance in strategic evaluations or in annual PRS reports. This does not imply that the connections are artificial, but rather that those at the programme level are not always aware of the degree to which their individual activities contribute to an overall Post-Conflict Peacebuilding framework.

Table 1: A list of peacebuilding dimensions

Security & Rule of Law	Providing a Safe and Secure Environment
	Protection of Civilians
	Security Sector Reform
	Disarmament & Demobilisation
	Police, Corrections & the Judicial Reform (Rule of Law)
Political & Governance	Support the Peace Process & Oversee the Political Transition
	Political Participation, National Dialogue & Reconciliation
	Government institutions & Civil Service Capacity Building (Governance)
	Extend State Authority Throughout the Territory
	Conflict Management Capacity
Socio-economic Recovery	Physical Infrastructure: Roads, Ports, Airports; Electricity; Telecommunications
	Social Services: Health, Education, Social Welfare, Population Registration, Civil Society
	Stimulating and Facilitating Economic Growth
	Strengthen Civil Society
Human Rights	Human Rights Education, Advocacy and Monitoring
Humanitarian Assistance	Emergency and Early Recovery Services in the areas of Food, Water & Sanitation, Shelter, Health, Refugees/IDPs and Protection

3 Peacebuilding phases

Peacebuilding is situated in the time-period between the cessation of violent conflict and the return to a normal development process. It is possible to identify three phases that may be generally applicable to most peacebuilding processes: namely, the stabilisation phase; the transitional phase; and, the consolidation phase. However, these phases should not be understood as clear, distinct phases with identifiable boundaries. They are rather loosely identifiable phases through which most (not all) post-conflict transitions progress. They overlap and one country can experience different phases at the same time in different regions, e.g. one can argue that the peace process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is in the transitions phase, but that the Kivus are still experiencing many characteristics of the stabilisation phase. The Sudan can be argued to be in the transitional phase in the context of the North-South Comprehensive Peace Agreement, but in the stabilisation phase in the context of the Darfur conflict. Afghanistan should be in the transitional phase, but has regressed back into the stabilisation phase.

Stabilisation phase

The stabilisation phase is the emergency period that precedes, or follows immediately after the formal ending of hostilities, and typically focuses on: (1) establishing a safe and secure environment; and, (2) responding to the consequences of the conflict through emergency relief operations. In some cases, for instance in the case of the AU (African Union)/UN Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID) or the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the stabilisation mission has been deployed prior to a cease-fire or peace agreement in order to protect civilians and secure humanitarian assistance whilst a political process seeks an end to the conflict. In others, for instance the UN missions in Liberia (UNMIL) and Burundi (ONUB), peace operations has deployed to assist with the implementation of a peace agreement, but even in these cases the initial phase of the mission will be focused on stabilisation.

Transitional phase

The transitional phase typically starts with the appointment of an interim government, followed by, in the shortest reasonable period, some form of election or legitimate traditional process to elect a transitional government, constituent assembly or some other body responsible for writing a constitution or otherwise laying the foundation for a future political dispensation. The transitional stage typically ends with an election, run according to the new constitution, after which a fully sovereign and legitimacy elected government is in power.

Consolidation phase

The consolidation phase is aimed at supporting the newly elected government and civil society with a broad range of programmes aimed at fostering reconciliation, boosting socio-economic recovery and supporting ongoing processes of change and development. An example could be security sector and judicial sector reform processes.

The transition from the peacebuilding process to a normal development process is gradual and it will typically be very difficult to pinpoint the exact period when such a transition occurred. The peacebuilding process can generally be said to have come to an end when a newly elected government is in a position to ensure the human security of all its citizens without extraordinary external assistance; the government has extended its control and protection throughout its territory; and, the foundation of the rule of law and social justice has been firmly established. The new society can thus reasonably be expected to continue on the path to sustainable peace and development without undue internal or external threats to its stability.

4 Peacebuilding actors

When considering the different actors in peacebuilding operations we can make a distinction between internal and external actors.

INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL PLAYERS

The internal actors are comprised of the government of the day, the parties to the conflict, the private sector and civil society in all its different varieties.

The external actors are the peace operation, the UN Country Team, international NGOs, regional and sub-regional organisations like the EU, AU or ECOWAS and donor agencies.

4.1 External actors

There are a number of external actors that need to be considered in the peacebuilding context. Key among these is the peace operation, the UN Country Team, international NGOs and donor agencies.

In many post-conflict situations the UN, the AU or a sub-regional organisations like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), or the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in the Horn of Africa will deploy a peace operation to stabilise the situation and to monitor and support the peace process. The bulk of a peace operation's effort and resources will be focused on ensuring a safe and secure environment so that the rest of the peacebuilding work can be carried out without fear of disruption.

UN COUNTRY TEAM
UNCT typically includes:

- RR/RC/HC
- UNDP
- World Bank
- UNHCR
- WFP
- UNICEF
- WHO
- UNIFEM
- OCHA
- ... and others.

The different members of the UN System in a given country are commonly referred to as the UN Country Team (UNCT). The UNCT is headed by a Resident Representative. The Resident Representative (RR) is also the Resident Coordinator (RC) of the UN System in

the country and usually also the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC). The members of the UNCT may include the UN Development Programme (UNDP), World Bank (WB), UN High Commissioner of Refugees (UNHCR), World Food Programme (WFP), UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), World Health Organization (WHO), UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and others.

All of these agencies, funds and offices have their own mandates, budgets and programmes and the RC/HC's function is to ensure that the UNCT develops a coherent programme in support of the needs of the country where they are based. The members of the UNCT meet on a regular basis and use various coordination mechanisms to harmonise their policies and programmes.

The members of the UNCT and the Government of the country where they operate usually agree on a common strategic framework, called the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), that specify how the UN system will support the Government over a given time-frame, typically 3 to 5 years. The UNDAF is typically aligned with an even broader strategic framework that encompass the Government and all the external actors, including beyond the UN the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the donor countries. This overall strategic framework is usually called the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP).

The international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) include a broad range of independent not-for-profit organisations that work in the humanitarian assistance and development spheres. Most NGOs have developed a specific field of specialisation. Some like Médecins sans Frontières (Doctors without Borders) focus on the health sector. Oxfam is known for its work in the water & sanitation and preventive health sectors. Others, like Care International and World Vision have a more cross-cutting approach and may be involved in food distribution, agriculture projects and support of refugees or internally displaced persons. In some cases, these NGOs will execute programmes for which they have obtained their own funding, whilst in others they may

act as implementing partners for UN agencies like UNHCR (refugees) or WFP (food distribution).

The donor community includes multilateral donor agencies such as the European Union (EU) and European Commission (EC/ECHO), and bilateral donor agencies like JICA (Japan), USAID (USA), DFID (UK), GTZ (Germany), NORAD (Norway), SIDA (Sweden), CIDA (Canada), GOAL (Ireland). Most of these donor agencies are usually present at the country level, but they don't execute programmes themselves. They provide the resources for the UN system and the NGOs that do the actual work. Many UN agencies subcontract the actual work to NGOs, so approximately 80 % of all the programmatic activity in the field is carried out by NGOs.

4.2 Internal actors

The internal actors are comprised of the government of the day, the parties to the conflict, the private sector and civil society in all its different varieties. In principle, the host government and other internal actors should play the lead role in the reconstruction process, since it is their own future that hangs in the balance. Unfortunately, in many cases, the capacity of the internal actors has been so severely diminished by the conflict that they are unable to fulfil this role. As a result, the international aid community often, by default, plays more of a leading role than would otherwise be desired. At a minimum, coordination processes should ensure that the host community participates in all decisions that effect them, and that there is a process in place to support them to develop the capacity to play their rightful role. As the peacebuilding process develops, the internal actors should play an increasingly important role.

5 Tools of peacebuilding

A key characteristic of the peacebuilding process is that all its dimensions are inter-linked and interdependent. The various programmes and activities, and the agencies that carry them out, are interdependent in that no single programme can achieve the goal of the peacebuilding operation – addressing the consequences and causes of the conflict and laying the foundation for social justice and sustainable peace – on its own. It is only if their combined and sustained effort proves successful in the long term that the investment made in each individual programme can be said to have been worthwhile.

or international organisation can manage it on its own. In response, a wide-range of agencies, governmental and non-governmental, and regional and international organisations have each begun to develop specialised capacities to manage different aspects of these emergencies, and together they have been able to respond with a broad range of interlinked activities.

The distributed nature of this multi-dimensional and multi-disciplinary response has been able to manage some of the highly dynamic crisis environments reasonably well. In

Table 2: Convergence around three core dimensions of peacebuilding

Whole-of-Government	NATO Counterinsurgency Doctrine	World Bank	United Nations
Defence	Clear	Security	Security
Diplomacy	Hold	Governance	Political
Development	Build	Development	Economic and Social Reconstruction

The project cycles of the different dimensions, clusters and programmes need to be synchronised with each other and with the overall peacebuilding strategy. Individual programmes need to continuously adjust their planning to the feedback received from elsewhere in the system, to ensure that the combined effect on the society is positive, consistent and produced at a rate that can be absorbed by the internal actors.

It is the total collective and cumulative effect of all the programmes undertaken in all these dimensions and sectors that slowly builds a positive momentum towards sustainable peace. The timing, prioritisation and sequencing between these dimensions and sectors are thus very important. This is why integration and coordination is a critical success factor in peacebuilding operations.

The search for a Comprehensive Approach should be understood in the context of an increasingly complex and interdependent international conflict management system. The scope of the crisis faced by the international community is often of such a scale that no single agency, government

others, however, the degree to which the international conflict management system lack coherence and coordination among the diverse international and local actors that make up the system, resulted in, amongst others, inter-agency rivalry, working at cross-purposes, competition for funding, duplication of effort and less than optimal economies of scale. All of which, taken together, contributed to an overall poor success rate, measured in the sustainability of the systems that came about as a result of these international interventions.

In order to address these shortcomings and improve the overall success rate of the international conflict management system, various agencies, governments and organisations have started exploring, independently from each other, with a range of models and mechanisms aimed at improving the overall coherence, cooperation and coordination of their conflict management systems. All these initiatives have a similar aim, namely to achieve greater harmonisation and synchronisation among the activities of the different international and local actors, across the analysis, planning,

implementation, management and evaluation aspects of the programme cycle. The core aim is to bridge the security-development divide and to integrate the political, security, developmental, economical and other dimensions required to ensure a system-wide response to any specific conflict system. The term Comprehensive Approach is used here as an umbrella concept for these different initiatives.

At the national level, a number of Governments have been experimenting with improving the cooperation among their own ministries or departments, both with a view to improving the management of their respective national and international challenges. These initiatives are now collectively known as so-called Whole-of-Government approaches. The United Kingdom's (UK) joined-up approach under the Blair years is probably one of the leading examples of the emergence of this trend at the national level.

In the context of international conflict management a number of national-level Whole-of-Government approaches should be mentioned. The Canadian Government developed the so-called 3D (diplomacy, development and defence) concept, and many others have since used the 3D model as the foundation of their own approaches. In fact, the 3D concept has become a general catch phrase for the Comprehensive Approach because it so concisely captures the main security-development axis and the need for an inter-connectedness among these different dimensions of Government.

The UK also applied its' joined-up approach to the international arena and created an inter-agency unit, first called the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU), and later re-named to the Stabilization Unit. It brought together the Ministry of Defence, the Department for International Development (DFID) and the Foreign Ministry, and, amongst others, managed a joint funding pool. The United States of America developed something similar, namely the Office for the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), but it has not, to date, achieved the same degree of inter-agency cohesion and participation as the UK initiative. Instead it is now focused on coordinating the different civilian agencies of the US Government engaged in international crisis management, and the development of a civilian standby roster or resource pool that is aimed at improving the ability of the US Government to deploy civilian experts.

Various other Governments such as Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands have experimented with their own national coherence initiatives. Most of them involve inter-departmental coordination meetings, some at various levels ranging from the Ministerial to the working level. In some cases more Ministries or departments, such as Justice, Correctional Services, the Interior/Home Affairs, etc. have been engaged, and in many cases these initiatives have been aimed at better managing specific deployments. In fact, all of the countries mentioned thus far are deployed in Afghanistan, and most participate in, or lead, a specific Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). The PRT concept is, in itself, a Whole-of-Government experiment, in that each PRT is meant to consist of, apart from its security

(military) element, political advisors, development advisors and police advisors. The PRT concept thus provides for the combined deployment of several Government departments, with the premise that this will result in an improved Whole-of-Government approach, that will have a more system-wide or multi-dimensional impact on the stabilisation and reconstruction goals and objectives of the international intervention, within each PRT's area of operation. We will come back to the success, or rather lack of success, that the PRT model, and thus the Whole-of-Government approach has had in the case of Afghanistan in the next chapter, when we will analyse the coherence dilemma and related challenges experienced by the international community.

At the multilateral level the United Nations, European Union, African Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are each also engaged in various initiatives aimed at improving the coherence within the different parts of their own organisations, as well as between their organisations and the other international and local stakeholders they work with in the international conflict management context.

The European Union has developed a sophisticated Crisis Management capability, including military, police and civilian capacities, but have not yet deployed integrated missions where these three dimensions operate together as one mission, with one budget and one mandate. Instead, they have until now been deployed in parallel missions, alongside other EU presences in the same countries, such as election monitoring missions, development and humanitarian missions, and political/diplomatic EU Council and EU Commission representations. The EU has, however, developed a specific civil-military coordination tool (CMCO) to manage the coordination among these Crisis Management actors. It has not yet, however, developed a capacity to integrate its Crisis Management, development and humanitarian missions, and it will be unable to do so until the new treaty comes into force, as it requires the integration of Council and Commission responsibilities, which is not possible under the current system. The EU has established a working relationship with the UN, especially in the context of the operations where it has a close working relationship with UN peacekeeping operations. The European Union Force (EUFOR) operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and in Chad/Central African Republic are the two most recent examples. Cooperation in this context included joint assessment missions, joint planning, joint after action reviews and close cooperation for the handover of the EU mission's responsibilities to United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) in March 2009.

NATO has developed the Effects Based Approach to Operations (EBAO), but it is still unclear whether NATO regards the EBAO as its "comprehensive approach" doctrine, or whether NATO sees EBAO as the military component of a larger international 'comprehensive approach' effort. However, NATO is essentially a military alliance, and can only deploy as such. Any civilians, e.g. political and developmental advisors it deploys are there to

serve and advise the Commander, so that (s)he can better fulfil the military mission. NATO can thus only participate in a larger 'comprehensive approach', as it is incapable of achieving a system-wide effect on its own. NATO has entered into a working relationship with the UN and efforts are underway, for instance in the Afghanistan context, to work more closely under UN leadership to achieve a more comprehensive effort. This represents a marked departure from the past where the United States and NATO actively worked to undermine and limit the role of the United Nations in Afghanistan, and is reflective of the realisation that has emerged among the NATO member states in 2007 and 2008 that it will not be able to achieve its objectives in Afghanistan through military means alone. Instead, there is a growing recognition that it is only through a system-wide, multidimensional response – the so-called Comprehensive Approach – that the international community can assist Afghanistan to achieve greater stability and work towards a sustainable political future, and it is in this context that NATO has now formerly agreed to coordinate its work under the overall direction of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG) in Afghanistan.

The African Union is also committed to a Comprehensive Approach in its policy positions and overall strategic relations, but it is constrained in realising such an approach for a number of reasons. Firstly, the AU is primarily a political and security organisation with very limited capacity to play a meaningful role in the humanitarian, developmental and peacebuilding areas, except for mustering political support and participating in enabling frameworks. Secondly, the three peace operations that the AU has undertaken to date, in Burundi, Darfur and Somalia, has been primarily military operations, with a sizeable police component in Darfur and small civilian components. This is both because the civilian dimension of peace operations is still underdeveloped in the AU, and because these have all been stabilisation-type operations that have less scope for civilian roles. Thirdly, in the African Standby Force (ASF) context there is a concerted effort underway to develop the civilian dimension of the ASF, but these efforts have to be understood in an environment where peacekeeping is still viewed primarily as a military responsibility. For instance, the ASF initiative is steered by the AU Ministers of Defence and Security, and whilst they are broadly supportive of the civilian dimension, their natural interest and focus lies with the military dimension of peace operations. Lastly, the AU has developed and adopted a policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development, but this policy has not resulted yet in tangible action, mainly for the reasons highlighted in the first point raised above, and has also not yet been integrated into AU operations for the second reason discussed earlier. The AU has a good working relationship with the UN, EU and NATO, both in terms of support and cooperation with existing operations, e.g. in the context of the hybrid UN/AU operation in Darfur, and in terms of capacity building for the future in the context of the ASF.

Among the various multilateral bodies discussed here, the United Nations has perhaps made the most progress with achieving a Comprehensive Approach to date. It has developed a sophisticated multidimensional and Integrated Approach model that has been refined over the last two and a half decades in more than 20 peacekeeping operations. These initiatives have gained further momentum since the World Summit in 2000. On the one hand the UN system is piloting – under the slogan "Delivering as One" - recommendations by the high-level panel on system-wide coherence that has looked into coherence among those members of the UN family working in the humanitarian, development and environmental areas. On the other hand, the UN has been implementing an initiative to integrate the UN's political, security, developmental, human rights and humanitarian agencies under one Integrated Missions structure when the UN deploys a multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation. These developments deserve closer scrutiny, and as the UN's experiences with coherence and coordination will form a major part of the empirical information that will be addressed throughout this study, the next section will deal with the UN's experiences in this regard in greater detail.

6 The United Nations Integrated Approach

The United Nations (UN) system has responded to the series of complex challenges it was facing by the late 1990s by commissioning a series of high-level panels and working groups that considered various aspects of this dilemma, and by experimenting with a number of strategic and operational coordination models. These efforts culminated, over the last half-decade, in the Integrated Approach. The Integrated Approach refers to a specific type of operational process and design, where the planning and coordination processes of the different elements of the UN family is integrated into a single country-level UN system, when it undertakes complex peacekeeping operations.

UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan first described the concept as follows:

An Integrated Mission is based on a common strategic plan and a shared understanding of the priorities and types of programme interventions that need to be undertaken at various stages of the recovery process. Through this integrated process, the UN system seeks to maximize its contribution towards countries emerging from conflict by engaging its different capabilities in a coherent and mutually supportive manner.²

The Note of the Secretary-General on Integrated Missions establishes the Integrated Approach as the guiding principle for the design and implementation of complex UN peace operations in post-conflict situations and for linking the different dimensions of peacebuilding (political, development, humanitarian, human rights, rule of law, social and security aspects) into a coherent support strategy. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon has reaffirmed the Integrated Approach as the guiding principle for all conflict and post-conflict situations where the UN has a Country Team and a multidimensional peacekeeping operation, or a political of peacebuilding office, regardless of whether these missions are structurally integrated or not.

The Integrated Missions concept refers to a type of mission where there are processes, mechanisms and structures in place that generate and sustain a common

strategic objective, as well as a comprehensive operational approach, among the political, security, development, human rights, and where appropriate, humanitarian, UN actors at country level.

The 2008 Secretary-General's decision on integration introduces the notion of the Integrated Approach. It differs from the Integrated Missions concept in that it does not require structural integration, although it provides for it, where appropriate. Instead, the Integrated Approach refers to a strategic partnership between the UN peacekeeping operation and the UN Country Team that ensures that all components of the UN system operate in a coherent and mutually supportive manner, and in close collaboration with other partners.

An Integrated Approach requires:

- (1) A shared vision of the UN's strategic objectives,
- (2) closely aligned or integrated planning,
- (3) a set of agreed results, timelines and responsibilities for the delivery of tasks critical to consolidating peace, and
- (4) agreed mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation.

The core features of the UN's Integrated Approach can be summarised as follows:

- Context: Multidimensional and system-wide UN family support to the stabilisation of a conflict or the implementation of a comprehensive peace process in a post-conflict setting, i.e. actions to establish a meaningful peace process, or where such a peace process is in place, support to the parties with the implementation of this process;
 - Purpose: The main purpose of the integrated approach is to maximize the individual and collective impact of the UN's response, concentrating on those activities required to consolidate peace;
- Dimensions: Recognition that a comprehensive approach requires a system-wide process, that covers the political, security, development, human rights, rule of law and where appropriate, humanitarian, dimensions;

² UN 2006a, 4.

- **Participating UN Agents:** Understanding that in order for all these dimension to be brought into play in a synchronised, appropriately sequenced and coherent fashion, the UN family, which consist of a diverse range of departments in the Secretariat, independently constituted funds, agencies and programmes, and the Bretton Woods institutions, need to operate as one integrated UN system at country level;
- **Operational Coordination:** Establishment of a range of processes, mechanisms and structures that will generate common assessments, integrated plans, operational coordination mechanisms, common monitoring tools and an ability to evaluate the overall effect and impact of the Integrated Approach that has been brought about among all the relevant elements of the UN system.

The assumption of the Integrated Approach is that a more coherent model, that manages to produce a comprehensive and coordinated UN system-wide effort, will have a more relevant, effective, efficient and sustainable impact on the peace process.

Within the UN system there are various semi-autonomous agencies, funds, offices and programmes that have a humanitarian and development mandate, as well as departments of the UN Secretariat that has the responsibility for peace operations. Although the core of the UN integration effort will be aimed at achieving system-wide coherence among these members of the UN system, the comprehensive approach is not meant to be limited to the members of the UN family. The members of the UN system that participate in the UN Integrated Approach, should facilitate and participate in, various other coordination initiatives aimed at promoting overall harmonisation among the external actors, and alignment between the internal


and external actors in any given country or regional conflict system.

The Integrated Approach thus need to be understood in a wider international context where coherence is being pursued at national level among government departments (Whole-of-Government), and internationally among donors (harmonisation), between donors and recipients (alignment), within the UN development, humanitarian and environment dimensions (system-wide coherence), and between the peace, security, human rights, humanitarian and development dimensions of the UN system at country level (Integrated Missions).

Integrated Missions has now been officially accepted in the UN System as the mission structure of choice. It will be the dominant management structure for UN peacekeeping operations in the near- to mid-term, and it may have a significant influence the way the European Union (EU), NATO, and the African Union (AU) are managing their own respective integration and comprehensive approach initiatives.

However, one needs to be mindful that integration in a non-UN context refers to multidimensional integration, rather than system-wide integration. For instance, the AU's Integrated Planning Task Force (IPTF) refers to a mechanism where the military, police and civilian planning functions are integrated, as opposed to the UN's Integrated Mission Task Force that refers to the coming together of planners from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), UN Department of Field Support (DFS), UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA), UN Development Group, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and others in the UN system. The former remains a peace and security focused process, although it is now multi-dimensional, where as the latter refers to the integration of the political, peacekeeping, humanitarian and development dimensions, thus working towards system-wide integration.

Table 3: A typical UN Integrated Mission where one of the DSRSGs is also the RC/HC3



7 Coordination

7.1 Coordination with the military

The primary role of the military component of a peacebuilding operation is to ensure a safe and secure environment within which the rest of the external and internal actors can operate. The secondary role of the military component is to make its resources available to external and internal actors in support of the overall mission objectives. For instance, in the context of a DDR programme, the military component may be in a position to provide transport, medical services, camp-building, weapons storage and/or weapon destruction services, over and above its security function. Similarly, in the context of an UN-supported election, where a UN peace operation is deployed, the military component may be in a position to assist with the identification of suitable sites for polling stations; engineering support in terms of building or re-habilitating structures that can be used during the election as well as rehabilitate or build roads and bridges that provide access to polling stations; and the provision of transport, manpower, and equipment – over and above its security function.

The use of military assets in the peacebuilding context differs from the use of military assets in the humanitarian context. Humanitarian actors operate on the basis of the humanitarian principles – humanity, neutrality and impartiality – and these principles is meant to ensure their independence from political interference. Their work is purely focused on assisting those affected by the conflict. They are not in any way involved in resolving the conflict itself. Humanitarian-military coordination thus needs to be undertaken in such a way that it does not harm the humanitarian principles. In the peacebuilding context, however, the civilian agencies that undertake peacebuilding work is directly engaged in resolving the conflict and there is thus no assumption of independence. This does not necessarily mean that they are not impartial, but it means that they are openly working to manage or resolve the conflict, and that these civilian actors should not be confused with humanitarian actors.

In the peacebuilding context, for example in a DDR or elections programme, both military and civilian partners are understood to be engaged in an activity aimed at bringing

about a specific outcome that will fundamentally change the dynamics of the situation. Those opposed to an election, for instance, will be opposed to all that are involved in the electoral process, regardless of whether they are civilian or military. The close cooperation between military and civilian partners in the peacebuilding context does thus not have the same implications for the security of the civilian partners, or beneficiary population, as it would have in the humanitarian context. One must thus be careful, when referring to civil-military coordination, to distinguish between humanitarian-military and peacebuilding-military coordination.

Civil-Military Coordination (CIMIC) refers to a specific branch of the military force that is responsible for liaison between the military force and its civilian partners, as well as for coordinating the support provided by the force to its international partners and the local community. CIMIC actions should be integrated into the larger mission effort and should be coordinated with all partners and stakeholders. For instance, community support actions should be aimed at helping the local community. They must be based on the need of the community (needs driven as supposed to supply driven) and the community should be encouraged to take ownership of, and direct, these projects. CIMIC actions should be coordinated with all partners and stakeholders (e.g. in the case of a military unit rehabilitating a school, such services should be coordinated with the appropriate civilian authorities: local education authorities; local community leaders; UNICEF; OCHA; NGOs working in the education field, that may be active in the area, etc.) so that the actions of the military unit are complementary to the actions (humanitarian and development) that are being undertaken by appropriate civilian and humanitarian actors. For instance, a CIMIC school rehabilitation project should not be in competition with, or undermine, the activities of these civilian actors. It should be undertaken in support of a larger school rehabilitation programme, so that the school that is rehabilitated through CIMIC action will be integrated into, and supported by, the larger programme – the larger programme may, for instance, support the national and/or local education authorities and ensure that there are

teachers and school material available – thus ensuring longer-term sustainability

7.2 What does coordination mean?

The Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English explains that cooperation means "working together for a common purpose," whilst coordination means "making things, people and parts function together efficiently and in an organised way." The Collins English Dictionary provides an insight into coordination that seems even more relevant for our purpose. It defines coordination as "the organisation of the activities of two or more groups in such a way that each may work more efficiently and be aware of what the other group(s) are doing."

The most authoritative definition of coordination appears to be that coined by Minear & Chellia:

Coordination is the systematic utilization of policy instruments to deliver humanitarian assistance in a cohesive and effective manner. Such instruments include: (1) strategic planning; (2) gathering data and managing information; (3) mobilizing resources and ensuring accountability; (4) orchestrating a functional division of labour; (5) negotiating and maintaining a serviceable framework with host political authorities; and, (6) providing leadership. Sensibly and sensitively employed, such instruments inject an element of discipline without unduly constraining action.⁴

7.3 The dimensions of coordination

There are many factors that frustrate coordination, but two deserve particular attention. The first is the sheer number of international and local actors involved, and the second is the wide-ranging scope of activities undertaken by these actors. The interaction among this large number of actors and the interplay among the multiple dimensions explain the complexity inherent in post-conflict reconstruction operations. To these we can still add an infinite number of complicating factors including, amongst others: the language and socio-cultural gaps between those undertaking post-conflict reconstruction programmes and the beneficiaries they are intended to assist; and, the inconsistencies and selectivity of the neo-liberal international policy regime that serve to compound existing global inequalities⁵.

The information revolution has multiplied the number of actors involved in post-conflict reconstruction operations. It has amplified the influence of the media, nurtured a more educated and better informed public, and increased the number of institutions and agencies engaged in peace, security, relief and reconstruction actions.

7.4 Separating coordination and management

There should be a clear distinction between management and coordination. Decision-making takes place in the management function, whilst the coordination function is used to exchange information. If these two functions are separated, coordination will not pose a threat to any unit or programme. This is because each individual agent will retain full control over their own decision-making function.

For coordination to be palatable to defensive institutional cultures, it has to be non-threatening. And for it to be non-threatening it has to be voluntary, and free of any decision-making power over the participating agency.

4 Minear & Chellia 1992, 3.

5 Pugh & Cooper 2004, 197.

8 From strategy to evaluation

8.1 Strategic direction

One of the prerequisites for a coherent peacebuilding operation is a clearly articulated overall strategy against which individual units, offices and programmes can benchmark their own plans and progress. The overall country strategy is produced by the cumulative and collective planning efforts of all the units, offices and programmes in the system.

The peace and security aspects of such an overall strategy are derived from the UN Security Council resolutions that determine the mandate of the mission and the strategic plans developed by the SRSG to implement that mandate. The humanitarian and development community's strategies are derived from common assessment and appeal processes that may result in a Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP), a Common Country Assessment (CCA), a UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) or a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) – depending on the specific case.

The peace operation, the UN Country Team and other external actors, such as the NGO and donor community, need to work closely with the internal community, including both government and civil-society representatives. This is done with a view to developing one common country strategy.

8.2 Planning and assessments

In order to achieve the desired level of synergy it is now becoming common practice to enrich planning at the higher or home headquarters level through integrated planning mechanisms and joint assessment missions. For example, in the UN Secretariat in New York, planning for peace operations now benefit from an Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP) system that bring various UN departments

and agencies together to provide input into the planning process. It is also now common practice to undertake joint assessment missions that assist in ensuring that there is a common understanding of the problems that need to be addressed.

At the field headquarters or mission management level, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) and other senior managers coordinate with the representatives of government, parties to the peace process, heads of the various agencies, organisations, diplomatic missions and international organisations. They use various regular and ad-hoc meetings to achieve their coordination objectives. The senior managers also make use of a number of strategic planning instruments to encourage a broadly cohesive approach within the peace, security, humanitarian and development community – and to ensure that this approach supports the needs and priorities of the host community.

Apart from the common strategic planning frameworks introduced above, missions also use various other mechanisms to exchange information and ensure integration among components at the mission HQ level. The Joint Mission Analysis Cells (JMAC) is one example. The JMAC is a jointly staffed unit where the information gathered by various components (military units, military observers, police, political affairs, civil affairs, human rights, etc.) is collated and analysed. In this way the mission management benefits from one consolidated information picture about the mission and the peace process that has been informed by all the different perspectives within the mission.

8.3 Mobilising resources

The international community has developed various tools to mobilise resources. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) coordinates the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP). The CAP is first and foremost a strategic planning and coordination tool. The humanitarian community sees the CAP as the main strategy-setting tool in responding to man-made and other slow-onset disasters.

In the development dimension, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) or the World Bank will typically take the lead to coordinate fundraising for common priorities through donor conferences. The donor conference for Afghanistan in January 2001 and the conference for Liberia in February 2004 are two such examples.

In some cases transitional appeals are launched on the basis of a Common Country Assessment (CCA), and then serve as the foundation for a UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) and/or a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), as appropriate. Once the funds have been allocated the coordination shifts to implementation and operational coordination.

In the case of UN peace operations, the missions are funded through assessed contributions. Part of the work of the CIMIC Officer will be to understand how these different funding mechanisms work, and which mechanisms within and outside the mission budget can be accessed to facilitate specific projects, e.g. Quick Impact Projects.

8.4 Monitoring and evaluation

The country strategy initiative should be supported by a monitoring and evaluation system. Such an inter-agency initiative should not only provide feedback on individual and overall progress, but also encourage programmes and agencies to participate in the overall coordination process. All actors should be requested to report on the steps they took to synchronise their plans and operations with the others in the system, and with the overall objectives of the mission. In this way the evaluation process becomes normative: it encourages and rewards behaviour that enables coherence; it discourages and sanctions behaviour that inhibits coordination.

Another important element is the ability of the system to monitor the effect it is having on its environment. The project-cycles of the different programmes and agencies need to be synchronised, to ensure that their combined and cumulative effect on the host society is positive. Projects must be consistent and delivered at a rate that can be absorbed by the local communities. When the ultimate aim of the international operation is sustainable peace, then the overall strategy and the pace of its implementation has to reflect the optimal relationship between delivery and absorption.

9 The limits of coordination, integration and the comprehensive approach

Those that favour a comprehensive and integrated approach share a number of broad, not always explicitly stated, policy assumptions, such as:

- (a) Following a comprehensive approach will result in more efficient and more effective interventions, with a more sustainable outcome;
- (b) It is possible to integrate the political, security, human rights, developmental and humanitarian dimensions because, at the end of the day, they have the same goals and objectives;
- (c) There is sufficient willingness amongst the different agencies to work together to achieve a comprehensive approach; and
- (d) There is sufficient structural flexibility to allow the different agencies to work together, and where obstacles are identified, there is a willingness to address any such impediments.

Although these initiatives are all fairly recent, initial indications from the field, and past experiences with coordination, indicate however, that at the operational and tactical levels many of these assumptions are, at best challenged, and at worse, flawed. In the next few sections we will look into some of the major challenges that a comprehensive or integrated approach will need to manage.

9.1 Conflicting values and principles

The practical application of the comprehensive approach concept differs widely depending on the actual context, but one can conclude that one of the most important indicators of the degree to which meaningful coherence can be achieved, is the degree of hostility that is present in the conflict system. The organisational values and operating principles that guide the human rights and humanitarian actors, for instance, are more likely to be in conflict with the values and principles of the political and security actors, in contexts where some of the international and local actors are hostile to each other. This tension will be especially acute in situations where an international intervention has to deal with a hostile host Government, e.g. in the case of Darfur in Sudan, or where an international intervention has

to deal with an insurgency, e.g. in the case of Afghanistan, or is engaged in forcefully disarming rebel or militia groups, e.g. in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

This implies that coherence may be more difficult in the early phases of an intervention where there is a dual security (stabilisation) and humanitarian focus. However, this tension is equally in evidence in situations that have developed into the transitional and consolidation phases, but where pockets of instability remain, or where instability flairs up after a period of relative calm. The phase of the intervention is thus not as much of an indication as the degree of hostility.

The tension is derived from the fact that the operating principles of the humanitarian agencies require them to demonstrate their neutrality between all parties perceived to be in dispute, including those parts of the international community that are, or are perceived to be, using force or other coercive means against one or more of the parties in the conflict system.

Such fundamental differences in values and principles are not, however, limited to hostile environments. There are also other instances where the values and principles of the various actors could be in conflict. The different actors may have different views with regard to which aspects to prioritise. Political and security actors may typically prefer to focus on stabilising a situation before addressing human rights violations, or to deal with corruption, black market trading, racketeering or narcotics, especially if actors they perceive to be the key to stabilising the situation is suspected of being responsible for such human rights atrocities or criminal behaviour.

In some cases the timetable of one dimension may be in conflict with the principles of another. One case in point is the election time-table in Liberia (2004–2006) which motivated those responsible for the election to encourage the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Monrovia to return to their original communities so that they can be registered there to vote. The UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) pressurised those agencies responsible for reintegration to persuade the IDPs to return, and to start offering them reintegration support. However, these agencies disagreed with the return timetable suggested by UNMIL, because their assessments

informed them that the conditions was not yet sufficient to provide alternative sustainable livelihoods for the returnees in their home locations. This situation caused tension between the political and developmental/humanitarian actors because their respective goals, short term vs. long term, and operating values and principles brought them into direct opposition with another.

Another example would be situations where political and security actors may wish to reward certain political or military actors for their cooperation with humanitarian assistance or developmental projects. In some contexts, for instance in counter insurgency doctrine, communities that cooperate with the Government and international forces should be rewarded with aid to show them that cooperation with the Government and international forces bring them more benefits than cooperation with the insurgents. Such a winning the hearts and minds approach could result in the political and military actors placing undue pressure on the development and humanitarian actors to provide services in selected areas, or the political and security actors could use their own means to provide services that appear to be developmental and humanitarian in action. At the same time the Government and international forces may discourage those developmental and humanitarian actors that provide services in areas under the control of the insurgents. All of these variations will result in blurring the distinction between political/military and humanitarian action, and thus undermine the independence, neutrality and impartiality of the humanitarian actors, in the eyes of the local communities and the insurgents, and this will result in severe tensions within a comprehensive approach community, or in the inability to achieve a comprehensive approach.

The assumption that there is a sufficient level of shared values, principles, goals and objectives is thus not supported by the evidence from the field. This is not to say that it is impossible to achieve meaningful coherence and coordination across the various dimensions under a comprehensive approach umbrella. Rather, the point is that there will be times and situations where it is not possible to have a common approach. Instead of assuming that there will always be room for a common approach, reality dictates that there will have to be trade-offs, second-best solutions, compromises and even sometimes an inability to come to any kind of agreement. In all of these circumstances, however, it is preferable to have pre-agreed mechanisms for dialogue and coordination – even if only aimed at de-confliction - where the different view points can be raised and where the different actors can inform each other of their respective principles, goals, objectives and approaches, so that when these tensions occur they can be discounted in a transparent and well informed manner.

9.2 Conflicting rules, regulations and resource management processes

There are also structural impediments to coherence and cooperation that, although technical, are significant obstacles at the field-level as they are:

- (a) typically imposed by higher order processes and thus not changeable in the field,
- (b) they require considerable political will and institutional effort to change,
- (c) they typically take a long time to change as they are subject to negotiation among various stakeholders and the decision-making processes required to change them usually takes place only once a year, or even less.

These structural impediments fall into two broad categories, namely administrative rules and regulations, and resource management processes. In the rules and regulations category we find organisational procedures that discourage cooperation. These are typically instances that, for instance, prohibit UN peacekeeping personnel from allowing any non-UN peacekeeping personnel into UN vehicles, due to insurance coverage and indemnity issues, or prohibit personnel from a military force from moving around without arms, which impede the ability of liaison personnel to attend civilian meetings, etc. In other words they are often tactical level practical arrangements that have a high impact on the ability of people to work together in the field, but the rules or regulations themselves have been established at a higher level, typically at the higher-headquarters level, and for different reasons, e.g. insurance or security of personnel, and it is thus very difficult to change in the short term.

Another example, in the UN context, is the lack of flexibility that agencies have to share resources. For good operational reasons, most UN agencies will have their own telecommunications, information technology, transport and other resources. However, each of these agencies have developed these over the years independently from the others, and the interoperability of these various systems is a problem in the field. Often, especially in the early stages of a crisis, some agencies have resources in the field whilst others are still waiting for theirs to arrive. In these circumstances better cooperation among the agencies to share the resources available would seem logical, but organisational rules and regulations, and complicated reimbursement processes has resulted in sub-optimum sharing of resources. Another case in point is air services.

Very often the underlying cause in these cases relates to financial management issues. For good and sound financial reasons, organisations have to budget for resources, and once allocated, have to use the resources as planned. Where deviations occur they have to pre-cleared and reported. Although these systems make for good financial management, and need to be especially vigorous as public funds are at stake, they do not make it any easier for field level managers to operate in highly dynamic situations. Each agency has its own budget and financial rules and regulations, and these typically do not easily provide for pooling of funds or resources, sharing resources, or other forms of cooperation. One area that is particularly sensitive

relates to the remuneration of personnel. People from all kinds of agencies and background work closely together, but are rewarded at different scales and have different benefits. In some cases these differences are significant, especially among local and international staff. This causes tension, resentment and mobility among people working together, but is very difficult to harmonise as these benefits are determined at higher-headquarters, and as the people involved fall into so many different categories. It is, for instance, very difficult to compare the remuneration and benefits of a military officer, who is employed nationally, and thus only receives an additional field allowance, with that of a civilian UN staff member who is employed on a short-term contract, and whose field-level salary represents their total income.

Those organisations that rely on voluntary funding also often need to be able to show the funding agency how their specific contributions have had an impact, and as this becomes very difficult in cooperative ventures, such organisations are often under pressure to act independently.

There are thus a range of structural issues that discourage coherence and cooperation among agencies in the field, and many of these are very difficult, or may take a long time, to change. Many personnel in the field are on short-term contracts and have been hired specifically for field-level positions without prior service at the headquarters level, and they feel disempowered to influence these higher-level decision-making processes. This is one of the reasons why personality, or individual leadership, plays such an important role in these contexts. Some managers, especially those that have long-term career ambitions in a specific organisation, choose to follow the organisational rules and regulations, regardless of their side-effects, and are afraid to alert their higher-headquarters of such negative side-effects, in case it affects their future career prospects. Others choose to fight the system, and may make short-term gains, but generally seem to become frustrated with the system and leave. The most successful group seem to strike a balance between these extremes, and seems to develop coping mechanisms to find ways around some rules and regulations whilst, at the same time, maximising the leverage they can get out of others. These managers learn how to use the system to their advantage, and are capable of coping – or even to thrive – in these highly challenging environments.

9.3 Inappropriate management philosophies, processes and tools

Such personalities are, however, in short supply and we cannot rely on them to overcome the shortcomings of the system. We need to recognise the inadequacies of the current dominant management philosophies, policies and processes to deal with the highly dynamic, complex and interdependent comprehensive approach context, and develop new management models designed to cope with the particular management needs in this environment. The current model is based on independent inward looking

closed-loop project cycle and budget-based systems. Managers are meant to ensure that projects are managed against goals and objectives, according to pre-approved budgets and inputs, to produce pre-determined outputs. Any deviations from the project plan are frowned upon, will draw unwanted scrutiny, and will require thorough motivation. The model ensures that the project is carried out according to plan and within budget. It makes no or little provision for coordination with other projects, or adaptation to a highly dynamic environment.

A comprehensive approach context requires, however, that each programme understands not only its independent reality, but also its interdependent reality. Each programme is independent in that it is executed under the auspices of a certain bureaucratic organisation that exist as a legal entity, that has its own budget and the authority, and responsibility, to manage the programme. The traditional project management model has been designed to serve this independent reality. Each programme is, however, also interdependent in that its meaning is derived from its part in the larger system, i.e. it contributes to achieving a specific effect that only makes sense if you take into account that others are contributing towards other effects, and the total combined effect is necessary to achieve momentum towards peace. For instance, a specific developmental programme may provide vocational training as part of a larger DDR programme in a post-conflict context, but that programme only makes sense (have meaning) if it is understood in its overall context as being part of a larger peace process that includes a DDR programme, in which several organisations are taking part, and the vocational training programme can only considered to be a success if others identify, register and disarm combatants, and if others work toward sustained livelihoods and economic recovery which will create the environment within which the vocation can be applied. In such a context a programme manager needs to be able to establish and maintain a network that ensures that the particular programme is connected with other programmes that may have an influence on its outcome, and that will result in it being able to adjust to changes elsewhere in the system. In other words it is not just about managing the independent reality, but also the interdependent reality of being part of a highly dynamic complex system, that requires that the individual programme needs to be coherent with, at least some aspects of the larger system and that coordination with others, and adaptation to changes elsewhere in the system, become additional requirements. In this context changes to the plan should not be frowned upon but expected, and managers should be expected to plan for and report on their efforts to ensure coherence, coordination and adaptation.

The comprehensive approach also requires a culture change within the higher headquarters that would require those responsible for developing policy, as well as those planning and managing specific interventions, to recognise and counter the tendency of their own bureaucracies to be self serving, and to be pre-occupied with self-preservation, and instead to encourage an organisational culture, both

at headquarters and in the field, that embraces both the independent and interdependent realities of working in this highly dynamic and complex environment.

9.4 Unintended consequences

It is also important to recognise that no intervention in a complex system can have only one effect. Complex systems are dynamic and respond to interventions in a nonlinear fashion. We may be able to anticipate some of the ways in which a complex system will respond to an intervention, including the responses we intended to stimulate through our actions. However, the system will also respond in ways that we could not anticipate. If we accept that unintended consequences are a natural outcome of the dynamic nature of complex systems, then we also have to recognise that they cannot be avoided altogether. Some unintended consequences should have been foreseen or anticipated, especially if they have occurred under similar circumstances in the past, whilst others may be totally unexpected. We have to recognise that unintended consequences are a predictable side-effect of peacekeeping operations, i.e. the likelihood that there will be unintended consequences is predictable, but the specific unintended consequences are not always predictable. This possibility should therefore be factored into the planning, coordination and monitoring of peacebuilding systems.

10 Conclusion

Integrated Crisis Management and Peacebuilding is an all-encompassing concept that incorporates a wide variety of responses aimed at supporting the rehabilitation, recovery and reconstruction of the many facets of a society recovering from conflict. It seeks to alter the conditions that led to the conflict in the first place. Ultimately, peacebuilding is aimed at establishing the conditions necessary to ensure social justice and sustainable peace and development.

The key characteristic of peacebuilding operations is that all the different dimensions are interrelated and interdependent. It is the total collective and cumulative effect of all the programmes undertaken in these different dimensions that slowly builds positive momentum towards sustainable peace. The timing, prioritisation and sequencing between these dimensions are thus very important. This is why coordination is a critical success factor in peacebuilding operations.

Good coordination requires a web of coordination structures at all levels, working both from the bottom up, and from the top down. This is necessary to ensure feedback in both directions. At the strategic level coherence among the UN, AU, ECOWAS and the donor community is key. At the operational and tactical level a vast network of liaison and coordination mechanisms exist. The network is feeding the system with the information it needs to remain focused on those areas that require the most effort, whilst staying true to the overall goals and objectives of the mission.

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