Jari Mustonen

Coordination and Cooperation on Tactical and Operational Levels

Studying EU-ESDP Crisis Management Instruments in Bosnia and Herzegovina
CMC Finland Civilian Crisis Management Studies

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<td>AMIS</td>
<td>African Mission in Sudan</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>BiH</td>
<td>Bosna i Hercegovina, (Bosnia and Herzegovina)</td>
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<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>Civil-Military Co-operation</td>
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<td>CIVCOM</td>
<td>Committee of Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management</td>
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<td>CIVMIL CELL</td>
<td>Civil-Military Cell</td>
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<td>CMCO</td>
<td>Civil-Military Co-ordination</td>
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<td>CMCOORD</td>
<td>UN Humanitarian Civil-Military Co-ordination</td>
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<td>CML</td>
<td>Civil-Military Liaison</td>
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<td>COREPER</td>
<td>Council of Permanent Representatives</td>
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<td>CPCC</td>
<td>Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<td>ECMM</td>
<td>European Community Monitor Mission</td>
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<td>EUMM</td>
<td>European Union Monitoring Mission</td>
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<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<td>EUFOR</td>
<td>European Union Force</td>
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<td>EUMC</td>
<td>European Union Military Committee</td>
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<td>EUMS</td>
<td>European Union Military Staff</td>
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<td>EUPM</td>
<td>European Union Police Mission</td>
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<td>EUPOL COPPS</td>
<td>EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories</td>
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<td>EUSR</td>
<td>European Union Special Representative</td>
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<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
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<td>ICTY</td>
<td>International Criminal Tribune for the Former Yugoslavia</td>
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<td>IFOR</td>
<td>Implementation Force</td>
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<td>INFO OPS</td>
<td>Information Operations</td>
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<td>IPTF</td>
<td>International Police Task Force</td>
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<td>IPU</td>
<td>Integrated Police Unit</td>
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<td>KFOR</td>
<td>Kosovo Force</td>
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<td>LOT</td>
<td>Liaison and Observation Team</td>
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<td>MIP</td>
<td>Mission Implementation Plan</td>
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<td>MONUC</td>
<td>UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<td>MSU</td>
<td>Multinational Specialised Unit</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<td>OHR</td>
<td>Office of the High Representative</td>
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<td>PIC</td>
<td>Peace Implementation Council</td>
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<td>PSC</td>
<td>Political and Security Committee</td>
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<td>RCC</td>
<td>Regional Coordination Centre</td>
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<td>SFOR</td>
<td>Stabilisation Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>SG/HR</td>
<td>Secretary-General / High Representative</td>
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<td>UN DPKO</td>
<td>UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<td>UNIFIL</td>
<td>UN Interim Force in Lebanon</td>
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<td>UN OCHA</td>
<td>UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>UNMIS</td>
<td>UN Mission in Sudan</td>
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Coordination and Cooperation on Tactical and Operational Levels
Studying EU-ESDP Crisis Management Instruments in Bosnia and Herzegovina

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The article examines the coordination and cooperation between the EU-ESDP missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The EU has, under the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina a Special Representative (EUSR), a police mission (EUPM) and a military mission (EUFOR Althea). Coordination between the different missions is of utmost importance, and experiences from co-existence of the missions have revealed some inconsistencies in the comprehensive approach of the EU in Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, in a process of learning by doing, the relationship and coordination between the different missions, at least on the operational level, has significantly improved.

1 Introduction

Towards the turn of the century, the demands for crisis management and crisis management operations have been changing. Since the end of the Cold War, most armed conflicts or wars have been intra-state, and thus in many cases have been more complex and more challenging for international community intervention than “traditional” inter-state wars. For this reason, crisis management operations have also become more complex and multidimensional. Operations may include different actions and phases, varying from conflict prevention and resolution to post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction operations.

Actions related to rehabilitation more and more often encompass aspects of state-building. As a result, the military, traditionally seen as the primary actor in crisis situations, has in many operations been deployed in parallel with civilian actors. The presence of various international actors representing the military and

¹ The article was finished in March 2008. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the views of the Crisis Management Centre Finland.
different civilian organisations and agencies means that civil-military interaction is a crucial element of operations, and that coordination and coherence between civilian and military organisations is one of the keys to the success of such operations.

The EU has developed its crisis management capabilities as a part of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The Petersberg tasks, incorporated into the EU in the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999, included both military and civilian crisis management tasks, even though in the beginning the role of military crisis management was more visible than that of civilian crisis management. Nevertheless, the appropriate structures for deploying operations according to the ESDP were established by the end of 2001, and in January 2003 the EU launched the first ESDP operation, the European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM).²

As Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter Bosnia) “represents a key challenge for the European Union”³, the EU engagement in Bosnia has steadily increased. The EU presence in Bosnia dates back to the European Community Monitor Mission (ECMM), operational in former Yugoslavia from 1991 to 2000, and the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM), operational since 22nd December 2000. Prior to launching the EUPM, the EU appointed Lord Paddy Ashdown as the European Union High Special Representative (EUSR) in Bosnia in March 2002.⁴ In December 2004, the EU deployed its largest military mission so far, EUFOR Althea, to Bosnia.⁵ The EU has also expressed its willingness and readiness to increase its presence in Bosnia after the closure of the Office of the High Representative (OHR).

Bosnia became the first theatre of operations in which the EU was operating, within the framework of the ESDP, both a civilian and a military crisis management mission. In this respect, the issue of coordination and coherence between different EU actors became evident. Currently Bosnia is still the only area where the EU has a civilian, a police and a military mission deployed. As the future engagement of EU in Bosnia seems even about to expand, the need for coordination among the different actors, whether civilian or military, is crucial. As eloquently set out in the European Security Strategy (ESS)⁶, combining the different instruments of crisis management at its disposal has become increasingly important for the EU, especially now that it is deploying the largest civilian crisis management operation so far in Kosovo.

This case study examines the coordination and cooperation between EU-ESDP actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina: the EUSR, the EUPM and the EUFOR Althea. Even though the coordination in practice also encompasses relations between the ESDP operations and the Commission delegation, the scope of this paper will be lim-

³ ESS-BiH 2004.
⁴ “Council Joint Action (2002/211/CFSP)”.
⁵ “Council Joint Action (2004/570/CFSP)”.
⁶ ESS 2003.
limited to the examination of intra-pillar coordination and coherence between the ESDP actors. Consequently the Commission delegation will not be included in this study.

This study will examine coordination on the decision-making, operational and tactical levels. The main focus will be on the operational and tactical levels, since the coordination on the Brussels level and implementation of comprehensive concepts and new institutional arrangements of crisis management have been quite widely examined, as has the ESDP as a whole. Naturally, coordination on the strategic level must not be ignored, but in this study this coordination is only involved insofar as it provides the framework for the study.

The primary question of the study is: how is cooperation and coordination between the ESDP missions operating in Bosnia? Key issues to be considered are how the coordination is regulated or directed in the mandates of the operations, and how the mandates have been altered as EU engagement has been expanded and prolonged. In respect of the mandates of the operations and concepts for coordination, the study examines what kinds of solutions the actors have developed for mutual coordination and cooperation in the theatre, and how the coordination and cooperation between the missions has developed through the years. Finally, the current situation of the cooperation and coordination between the ESDP missions is addressed.

As interviews of personnel deployed in the missions provide a crucial source of information for this study, a short field trip was conducted in May 2007. In addition, personnel who have previously been deployed in these missions have been interviewed for the study. In total 36 persons of 8 nationalities, from field level to senior management of the missions, have been interviewed for the report, to all of whom the author wishes to express his gratitude. The interviewees will be referred to anonymously, with only a mention of the organisation the person represents or represented. Nevertheless, as the random sample of the interviews is rather limited and the majority of the interviewees represent the Northern part of Europe, the results are only indicative, but certain tendencies in the development of the cooperation and coordination between the ESDP missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina emerge. The author of this study himself served with EUFOR as a Liaison Officer between December 2005 and June 2006.

The issue of coordination between the different EU organisations in Bosnia, and especially the role of the Commission, was brought out in many of the interviews conducted within the framework of this study, and thus would constitute a topic for a separate paper. Most of the interviewees believed that co-locating the EUSR and the EC Delegation would offer added value for the EU and particularly for the united image of the EU among the local population. Further, in the case of EUSR replacing OHR without Bonn Powers (the right to remove from office public officials and to impose laws), closer cooperation with the Commission Delegation would increase the possibilities available for EUSR to use “carrot” instead of the traditional “stick”. Interviews in Sarajevo, May 2007.

On this, see Penksa 2006; Khol 2006; Juncos 2006; Juncos 2007.
2 Civil-Military Coordination in EU Crisis Management: Concepts and Structures

2.1 Civil-Military Cooperation vs. Civil-Military Coordination

Given the complex nature of crisis management operations and the requirement for different types of crisis management instruments within the operations, civil-military interactions are nowadays a crucial element of EU operations. Even though Bosnia and Herzegovina is the first and, currently, only area of operations where the EU has both civilian and military missions, many civilian ESDP operations take place in an environment in which an ongoing military mission exists, under the lead of NATO, the United Nations (UN) or the African Union (AU). It is imperative to draw a clear distinction between the two terms, “Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC)” and “Civil-Military Coordination (CMCO)”, which apply to this area and often become confused. Both concepts also exist within the framework of EU activities in crisis management operations.

Civil-Military Cooperation or CIMIC has many definitions, depending on the organisation. Civilian, humanitarian and military communities have developed different concepts of CIMIC, and the concept has been interpreted in different ways at national and international levels.

NATO’s definition of CIMIC – greatly influenced by the organisation’s experience of the peacekeeping operations IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina – is as follows:

“the co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies.”

The NATO CIMIC doctrine also defines the purpose of CIMIC, and mainly presents CIMIC as a tool for the commander and a tactical doctrine, not as a strategy for coordination as such.

The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has developed a UN doctrine for peace operations, Civil-Military Co-ordination Policy, but nonetheless most UN peace operations still use the abbreviation CIMIC to avoid the con-

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9 The ongoing military ESDP operations (as of February 2008) are EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina and EUFOR Chad/RCA in Eastern Chad and North Eastern Central African Republic. Of the civilian ESDP operations, EUPT Kosovo (soon EULEX Kosovo) and EUPOL Afghanistan, for instance, are interacting with NATO-led military operations, and the ESDP missions in DRC alongside UN-led MONUC and EUPOL COPPS with UN-led UNIFIL.
12 NATO 2001.
13 UN DPKO 2002.
fusion of adopting a new acronym. Within the UN, the term “Civil-Military Liaison (CML)” has been introduced, but not yet approved by the DPKO. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) abandoned the concept of CIMIC and created new guidelines for cooperation between military and civilian actors, also adopting the term “Civil-Military Coordination (CMCoord)”.

The EU demonstrated its perception of CIMIC by adopting the “CIMIC Concept for EU-led Crisis Management Operations” in 2002. The EU definition of the term is:

“Co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between military components of EU-led Crisis Management Operations and civil role-players (external to the EU), including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies.”

Even though the EU definition of CIMIC resembles the NATO concept, the EU perspective is wider, highlighting the selection of civilian and military instruments at its disposal in crisis management operations. EU has also declared its ambition to develop both civilian and military crisis management capabilities, and in this respect has developed a concept for internal coordination – Civil-Military Coordination.

The European Union’s definition of Civil-Military Coordination is as follows:

“Civil-Military Co-ordination (CMCO) in the context of CFSP/ESDP addresses the need for effective co-ordination of the actions of all relevant EU actors involved in the planning and subsequent implementation of the EU’s response to the crisis.”

In general, CIMIC is primarily a support function to the military mission and covers the cooperation with external actors in the field on the tactical or operational level, whereas CMCO was primarily designed for internal coordination, covering planning, political decision-making and implementation of EU actions in crisis management. The purpose of this study is neither to limit itself to examining actions related to the concept CIMIC, nor explicitly focus on CMCO as defined by the EU, but rather to investigate the coordination and cooperation between the EU actors in a broader sense, using a comprehensive approach, and including interactions between the different civilian crisis management instruments. As the term

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14 de Coning 2007, 12.
15 UN OCHA 2003.
16 de Coning 2006, 103.
18 Khol 2006, 125.
20 Ibid.
“CMCO” has until recently described the relationship and coordination between civilian and military actors within EU crisis management, this acronym will be used in the study and so first presented briefly.

2.2 Development and structures for civil-military coordination in the EU

The importance of developing instruments and procedures for effective civil-military coordination in the ESDP context has been emphasized throughout the history of ESDP since 1999. A concrete landmark in developing the CMCO was the adoption of the Action Plan for further strengthening of civil-military co-ordination in EU crisis management in the autumn of 2002. The Action Plan contained both tools and guidelines for civil-military coordination, such as an improved Crisis Management Concept, inclusion of CMCO aspects in training and EU exercises and improving institutional coordination in Brussels. Although the Action Plan provided advice on internal coordination in different phases of conflicts, it introduced no mechanisms for enhancing such coordination.21

The Council adopted a document Civil Military Co-ordination (CMCO) in November 2003, which, in its own words, suggested some fundamental principles to provide a framework for civil-military coordination.22 Instead of emphasizing the structures or procedures of coordination, the document highlighted that “CMCO as a culture of co-ordination is an essential element in ensuring overall coherence in the EU’s response to crisis.” This culture of coordination should be created at the earliest possible stage of an operation and for the whole duration of the operation, and is based on continuous cooperation and common political objectives.

In addition to the concept of a culture of coordination, the document also provides some fundamentals of CMCO in operations, both in the planning and operational phases. The status of the Secretary-General/High Representative as the initiator of the EU response to crisis is recognised, and the Political and Security Committee (PSC) is given a central role in ensuring the coherence of the EU’s response to crisis. The cooperation between the Council General Secretariat and the Commission in the planning and implementation phase of an operation is also emphasized.

On the operational level, the EUSR, if appointed, maintains oversight of all the EU activities within an area of operations. The EUSR acts under the direction of SG/HR and receives strategic guidance from the PSC. The EUSR’s activities are closely coordinated both with the Presidency, Commission and diplomatic Heads of Mission and with the Force Commander, the Police Head of Mission and the Heads of Mission for other civilian operations. A central task of the EUSR is to chair a Co-

ordination Group comprising all the EU actors in the field. Even if CMCO primarily deals with internal coordination within EU, it also serves as a prerequisite for cooperation with external actors engaged in resolving the crisis.\textsuperscript{23}

Despite the fundamentals laid down by the CMCO on a documental level, there are some practical constraints that complicate the coordination and hamper the creation of a culture of coordination within the EU, such as the different national cultures of civil-military relations. Even though the military and civilian staffs at the Council Secretariat Directorate-General E in Brussels share the same premises, the different institutional cultures aggravate coordination efforts. Much of the coordination still takes place through informal meetings at a lower level, as the formal guidelines directing this coordination are less effective. The emphasis of EU crisis management efforts has for a long time been on developing the military capacity, and the fact of the imbalance of resources between military and civilian components is demonstrated by constant understaffing on the civilian side, and especially in the Police Unit.\textsuperscript{24}

To assist in strategic planning and operational tasks in both civilian and military operations, the European Council in December 2003 decided to create a Civilian Military Cell (CivMil Cell) within the EU Military Staff (EUMS). The central role designed for the CivMil Cell is to develop a capability rapidly to set up an Operations Centre (OpCen) for any operation. The establishment of the CivMil Cell was postponed as the negotiations concerning the Operations Centre delayed the process.\textsuperscript{25} However, the CivMil Cell has now been established, and the facilities for the Operations Centre have also been ready since 1\textsuperscript{st} January 2007.\textsuperscript{26}

One “structural handicap” of the CivMil Cell, even though it consists of both civilian and military staff, might lie in the fact that as part of the EUMS, it represents the military side of ESDP, which could once again emphasize the military approach in operations. Nevertheless, the CivMil Cell and the OpCen have been loaded with high expectations, especially in the field of strategic planning for joint civilian/military crisis management operations. The Cell can also contribute to the development of doctrines and concepts to further enhance civil-military interaction. In addition, the Cell can also act as an interlocutor between the civilian and military components, since it reports to both the Committee of Civilian Aspects in Crisis Management (CIVCOM) and the European Union Military Committee (EUMC), and has a permanent link to the Commission.

\textsuperscript{23} Ibid. Even though the acronym CMCO refers to the coordination between the civilian and military crisis management instruments, it should be interpreted more broadly to encompass also coordination between all of the different civilian EU actors, from Brussels to the mission areas.

\textsuperscript{24} Khol 2006, 127–128; Juncos 2006, 8.

\textsuperscript{25} Khol 2006, 131.

\textsuperscript{26} Solana 2007, 4.
The CivMil Cell is also in the position to conduct joint lessons learnt from both civilian and military missions ongoing in the same territory, as well as from EU exercises. Civil-Military Coordination has been included in two training programmes, one in use by the Commission since 2001 and the other by the Council since 2004. In December 2004 the PSC approved the EU Training Policy in the ESDP Concept, in which the civil–military area is considered an important aspect of training at both strategic and operational levels. In general, the training requirement for CMCO and inter-pillar aspects has been highlighted as a result of the experience from Operation Althea in Bosnia.27

In June 2007 the European Council decided to establish the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC), a civilian equivalent to EU military staff, responsible for planning and conduct of civilian ESDP operations. The CPCC, which functions within the Council Secretariat, is headed by the Civilian Operations Commander, who exercises strategic level command and control over civilian ESDP operations.28 The purpose of creating the CPCC was to systematize planning and command of civilian crisis management operations, but how it can contribute to the coordination of the use of civilian and military ESDP instruments remains to be seen.

With regard to the future of CMCO, and further coordination of civil–military interactions within EU, the CivMil Cell is at the centre of expectations concerning the planning of joint civil–military operations and the development of concepts and procedures. Deploying a joint operation containing all the different instruments of EU crisis management seems to be the next great challenge. Several lessons concerning co-ordination between the different EU actors have already been identified on the basis of the experiences from Bosnia and Herzegovina, but a thorough follow-up study of coordination between operations still needs to be conducted.

2.3. Framework for coordination between the EU–ESDP actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina

The elements of coordination between the civilian and military components in the case of EU operations in BiH were crystallised on a conceptual level in the European Security Strategy – Bosnia and Herzegovina/Comprehensive Policy, adopted by the Council in June 2004.29 At the time the document was adopted, the EU engagement in Bosnia was being further enlarged with a military component, EUFOR Althea, which took over from the NATO-led military mission Stabilisation Force (SFOR). Some experience of cooperation and coordination between EU actors had already been obtained, mainly between the EUSR and EUPM that had co-existed for a year and a half. With respect to the European Security Strategy and the deploy-

29 ESS – BiH 2004.
ment of EUFOR, the need for a comprehensive approach to Bosnia and Herzegovi-
na was increasingly apparent and embodied in the adoption of the document.

According to the Comprehensive Policy,
“all EU actors/instruments, whether political, military, police-related or
economic, will contribute to implementing this overall EU policy towards
Bosnia and Herzegovina.”

The overall coherence of EU actions is highlighted, because,
“given the magnitude of the EU involvement, a key challenge will be to ensure
close co-ordination and coherence of the EU actors/instruments in Bosnia and
Herzegovina.”

In order to promote this coherence, a number of arrangements were suggested,
both at the Brussels and Sarajevo levels.

In ensuring the maximum coherence of the different actors on the strategic lev-
el, the Council and the Council of Permanent Representatives (Coreper), as its pre-
paratory organ, have a strong role, as has the SG/HR together with the European
Commission. The political control and strategic direction of the ESDP missions is
the responsibility of the PSC, which will remain in direct contact with EU missions
in Bosnia.

On the Sarajevo level, “the EUSR will promote overall EU political co-ordination
in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” The EUSR will assist the SG/HR and the PSC in their
task, and also provide political advice for the EU Force Commander, without preju-
dice to the chain of command. In relation to the EUPM, the EUSR belongs to the
chain of command and is therefore in a position to co-ordinate the interaction of
these two actors. The role of the EUSR is also emphasized in respect of internal
EU coordination, as the EUSR is to chair regular meetings of EU Heads of Missions
(including participation or representation from the EUSR, EUMM, EUPM and EUFOR
Heads of Mission). Further, informal meetings between the operational actors in
Bosnia (EU Force Commander, EUPM, Commission Delegation, EUMM and EU Presi-
dency) are also to be chaired by the EUSR.

It has to be realized that the Comprehensive Policy in its time only set out cer-
tain preconditions for coordination and cooperation between the EU actors. The
mandates of the respective organisations also included coordination elements,
and have since been amended to better meet the requirements or set out the con-
ditions for coordination.
3 The ESDP missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina – mandates and modalities for cooperation and coordination

The EU’s involvement in the country has steadily increased, which has been motivated by many factors. Firstly, the European Community’s inability to prevent or stop the fighting in the heart of Europe, in the former Yugoslavia between 1991 and 1995, has been seen by some critics as resulting in a “guilty conscience” which needs to be appeased. Secondly, the development of the EU as a crisis management actor has created the need to strengthen the ESDP capabilities further, and for this purpose Bosnia and Herzegovina has served as a useful “testing ground”.

In the following, the missions and mandates of the three EU-ESDP actors under consideration in relation to coordination are presented in the order of their appearance in the theatre. The purpose here, in short, is to present the tasks reserved for the organisations in their mandates and also highlight the preconditions and modalities for cooperation or coordination made public in the mandates, if applicable.

3.1 The European Union Special Representative

The basis of the existence of the European Union Special Representative EUSR lies significantly in the Office of High Representative (OHR), an ad hoc institution responsible for overseeing implementation of civilian aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995. The position of the High Representative was created in Annex 10 of the Dayton Peace Agreement, which also defined the mandate of the OHR.

In order to expand the EU engagement in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to further facilitate the country’s integration into the EU, the Council appointed the High Representative, Lord Ashdown, as EU Special Representative in March 2002. When this appointment was made, it was emphasised that the role of EUSR should not prejudice the mandate of the High Representative, but the EUSR would preserve the role of coordinating the activities of all civilian organisations and agencies and perform other additional duties.

To serve the EU’s intentions, the EUSR was mandated to maintain oversight of the activities related to Rule of Law and, as deemed necessary, provide advice to the SG/HR and the Commission. The coordination role of the EUSR also included a specific authority to give direction to the Head of Mission/Police Commissioner of the EU Police Mission, which was introduced to replace the United Nations Inter-

30 Juncos 2006, 5.
national Police Task Force (ITPF) from 1st January 2003 onwards.\textsuperscript{32} From the beginning, the role of the EUSR in relation to EUPM was significant, owing to the fact that EUPM reported to SG/HR through the EUSR.\textsuperscript{33}

The EUSR operated under the terms of the mandate of the OHR until July 2004, when the Council adopted a Joint Action on the revised mandate for the EUSR.\textsuperscript{34} The new mandate reflected both the EU Comprehensive Policy for Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Council decision to deploy an EU military mission in BiH, in which the role of the EUSR was further emphasised. As the military mission increased the number of CFSP/ESDP instruments, the mandate of the EUSR needed to be modified accordingly.

According to the first mandate, the EUSR’s main tasks were to offer the EU’s advice and facilitation in the political process and to promote overall EU political coordination in BiH. The EUSR was also mandated to contribute to the reinforcement of internal EU coordination and coherence in Bosnia and Herzegovina, to which end he/she would have authority to give direction, as necessary, to the Head of Mission/Police Commissioner of the European Union Police Mission and provide local political advice to the EUFOR Commander.\textsuperscript{35}

Many aspects of the EUSR mandate reflected the mandate of the OHR, and also the relations between the OHR and the NATO-led military missions, which meant that the mandate was to a certain extent out of date from the beginning. The main amendment in the mandate referred to the increased need for internal coordination and coherence of EU activities in the region, but gave no specific direction on implementation on the operational or field level. The mandate made clear the position of the PSC as the primary point of contact for the EUSR with the Council. The EUSR was to report in person to the SG/HR and to the PSC, and also to other relevant working groups and to the Council, on the recommendation of the SG/HR or the PSC.

The mandate also regulated the issue of the provision of an EU dedicated staff within the office of EUSR/OHR. When Lord Ashdown was given the double-hat as EUSR/OHR in 2002 for the first time, no EU staff was appointed to his office, which obviously hampered his performance of his duties as EUSR. According to the new mandate, staff projecting EU identity should be assigned to assist the EUSR and to contribute to the coherence and effectiveness of the EU action in BiH. In practice, the EUSR staff was appointed well after the mandate came into force.

Regarding the coordination in the field, the central role of the EUSR was reinforced in the mandate. According to the first EUPM mandate, the EUSR belongs to the chain of command of the EUPM and acts as a link between the EUPM and the

\textsuperscript{32} “Council Joint Action 2002/211/CFSP”.
\textsuperscript{33} “Council Joint Action 2002/210/CFSP”.
\textsuperscript{34} “Council Joint Action 2004/569/CFSP”.
\textsuperscript{35} “Council Joint Action 2004/569/CFSP”, Article 4.
SG/HR. On the other hand, direction from SG/HR to EUPM also passes through the EUSR.\textsuperscript{36}

In relation to EUFOR, the EUSR was mandated to provide political advice to the Force Commander, \textit{without prejudice to the chain of command}. Even though the EUSR is outside the chain of command of EUFOR, military operations should be coordinated with the EUSR to ensure consistency in EU actions in the field.

The mandate of the EUSR was amended in November 2005, mainly with the addition and review of tasks related to coordination with the other EU actors.\textsuperscript{37} In particular, issues related to the local police and tackling organised crime had created problems in cooperation and coordination between EUPM and EUFOR, which is reflected in the revised mandate. The EUSR was thus given the additional task of promoting overall EU coordination of the fight against organised crime, even though the leading role in policing activities remained with the EUPM.

In his role in the chain of command of EUPM, the EUSR was also required to provide the EUPM Head of Mission with local political guidance. The policing aspect was emphasised overall in the revised mandate, as the EUSR was to provide support for reinforcing the Bosnian criminal justice/police interface and restructuring the local police force. The EUSR’s role in EUFOR and involvement in matters related to the Integrated Police Unit (IPU) was now mandated to be carried out in agreement with the (EUFOR) Force Commander, which again reflects the obvious need for cooperation between all the actors.

The mission of Lord Ashdown as the High Representative and EUSR came to an end in January 2006, and Mr. Christian Schwarz-Schilling was appointed OHR/EUSR with effect from 1\textsuperscript{st} February 2006.\textsuperscript{38} In anticipation of the closure of the OHR office, the mandate of the EUSR was amended in July 2006. As the preparations to reinforce the EUSR office needed to be made in parallel with the closing down of the OHR office, the EUSR was mandated to support planning related to this closure.\textsuperscript{39} The mandate of the OHR was, however, extended until 30\textsuperscript{th} June 2008 by the Peace Implementation Council’s (PIC) Steering Board.\textsuperscript{40}

The mandate of the EUSR was amended again at the beginning of February 2007. The mandate of Mr. Schwarz-Schilling was also extended until 30\textsuperscript{th} June 2007. These amendments to an extent reflect the recent political development, as the duties of the EUSR now include providing political advice on the process of constitution reform, and engaging with local authorities on their full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Co-ordination between the EU actors was again highlighted in the revised mandate, as

\textsuperscript{36} “Council Joint Action 2002/210/CFSP”, Article 7.  
\textsuperscript{37} “Council Joint Action 2005/825/CFSP”.  
\textsuperscript{38} “Council Joint Action 2006/49/CFSP”.  
\textsuperscript{39} “Council Joint Action 2006/523/CFSP”.  
\textsuperscript{40} \textit{Communiqué by the PIC Steering Board}, February 27, 2007.
“in support of the EU crisis management operations, the EUSR, with other EU actors present in the field, shall improve the dissemination and sharing of information by EU actors in theatre with a view to achieving a high degree of common situation awareness and assessment.”

As the mandate of Mr. Schwarz-Schilling came to an end on 30th June, Mr. Miroslav Lajčák was appointed the new High Representative and European Union Special Representative for the period until 29th February 2008. The mandate of the new EUSR remained at first the same as that of his predecessor, but was significantly expanded in November 2007. The biggest changes in the mandate concern the EUSR’s role in relation to EUFOR, as he/she is now mandated to offer the EU Force Commander political guidance, and not only political advice. The EUSR is in the position to give EUFOR political guidance on military issues with a local political dimension, particularly concerning sensitive operations, relations with local authorities and the local media. In return, the EUSR is to consult with both the Commander of EUFOR and the Head of the EUPM before taking political actions which may affect the security situation.

Setting the mandates aside, the actual functions of the EUSR have depended to a large extent on the staff and resources available. As already stated, the first EUSR Lord Ashdown had no EUSR-dedicated staff until 2005, but only double-hatted OHR/EUSR personnel, limiting his opportunity to execute the mandate as effectively as might have been needed. By 2005 there were three officials working exclusively for the EUSR, and in early 2006 there were five EUSR employees. The number of personnel then increased so that in October 2007 the number of staff within the EUSR was 28, of whom 22 were EUSR-dedicated.

The EUSR structure is concentrated in Sarajevo. The EUSR has no field presence of its own, and the OHR’s field presence is also limited to Regional Offices in Mostar and Banja Luka, the Brcko Final Award Office and a field office in Bratunac. Thus

41 “Council Joint Action 2007/87/CFSP”. Improving situational awareness in EU crisis management operations was visibly promoted during the Finnish Presidency in the latter half of 2006. The Finnish Presidency organised a seminar “Improving Situational Awareness in EU Crisis Management Operations” in Brussels in September 2006, at which the emphasis was laid on the lessons of cooperation in the field, especially from Bosnia, as of the two case studies available, the first concentrated solely on BiH. Representatives from EUSR, EUPM, EUFOR Althea and the Commission took part in the panel discussion, and the results of an Audit to BiH, organised by the Presidency and the Secretariat, were also presented. Among the seminar findings, the situational awareness, information sharing and also strengthening the role of the EUSR were highlighted, which can be seen reflected in the revised mandate of the EUSR.

42 “Council Joint Action 2007/427/CFSP”.
43 “Council Joint Action 2007/748/CFSP”.
45 EUSR Organisation Chart, October 2007.
the EUSR’s ability to coordinate directly EU activities on the field level is rather restricted.

Within the last two years, the resources and staff of the EUSR have steadily been increased, which has enabled the EUSR to fulfil the mandate better and to act as the coordinator of EU activities in the country. The future prospects of the EUSR depend greatly on the closure or continuation of the OHR in June 2008. In case of the closure of the OHR, the EUSR is to take over the functions of OHR, and its role is likely to be further strengthened and mandate widened.

3.2 European Union Police Mission

One of the features of the Dayton Peace Agreement was the provision of a safe and secure environment for the local population, and in order to assist the local authorities in meeting their obligations, a United Nations International Police Task Force (IPTF) was established. The IPTF was operational from 1996 until the end of 2002 when it was replaced by the European Union Police Mission EUPM.

The deployment of EUPM formed part of the EU approach of addressing the whole range of the Rule of Law, in line with the general objectives of Annex 11 of the Dayton Agreement. The mission was launched with the aim of establishing sustainable policing arrangements under Bosnian ownership in accordance with best European and international standards. The EUPM was expected to reach its goals through monitoring, mentoring and inspecting, originally by the end of 2005.

The mission and the structure of the EUPM were defined by the Council in March 2002. As described in the Mission Statement, the three-year EUPM was to concentrate on:

- Preserving, through continuity with the achievements of the IPTF mission, the existing levels of institutional and personal proficiency;
- Enhancing, through monitoring, mentoring and inspecting, police managerial and operational capacities; to this end, to focus on delegation of power and quality-oriented management principles as well as improving operational planning capacity based on analysis;
- Strengthening professionalism at high level within the ministries as well as at senior police officers levels through advisory and inspection functions;
- Monitoring the exercise of appropriate political control over the police.

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48 “Council conclusions on International Police Task Force (IPTF) Follow-on”, 18/19.2.2002. From the point of view of the EUPM, it was supposed to follow, not replace, the IPTF, with a substantially different mandate. See Collantes Celador 2007, 8.
49 “Council Joint Action 2002/210/CFSP”.
As the mandate of the EUPM was in practice created in parallel with the mandate of the EUSR, the culture and modalities for coordination between these two actors were to some extent already defined. This also enabled the formation of a joint command structure, which evidently improved the coherence. Nevertheless it was stated in the mandate that “coordination arrangements in Brussels and Sarajevo are required”, reflecting the need for further clarification of the procedures for coordination.

When the mandate of the EUPM was nearing its end, the Council of the European Union decided in July 2005 that in order to complete its current mandate, the EUPM was to continue its action, with adjusted mandate and size. In the second phase of EUPM (so called EUPM-II), it was to concentrate on three pillars:

- Supporting the local police in the fight against organised crime;
- Conducting inspections and monitoring of police operations;
- Supporting the implementation of police restructuring.

The revised mandate reflected a lesson identified from the first phase of the EUPM, as it directed the EUPM to take

“the lead in the coordination of policing aspects of the ESDP efforts in the fight against organised crime, without prejudice to the agreed chains of command”.

The clarification of the roles of the actors refers to the EUPM’s and EUFOR’s differing interpretations of the mandates, which emerged in relation to tackling organised crime. The fact that the actors had diverging understandings of their own mandate and the mandate of the other organisation caused confrontation that needed to be settled. Even though the mandate of the EUPM itself did not significantly change, the actual perception of the limits set by the mandate altered, thus widening the role and possible actions of the EUPM on policing matters. Furthermore, the focus of the mission changed after it had concluded its contribution to police reform by the end of 2006. In 2007, the mission concentrated on supporting the fight against major and organised crime.

The contents of the mandate in relation to coordination remained somewhat similar. With regard to coordination, the Council stated that “arrangements already exist in the Mission area as well as in Brussels”, which implies that the modalities for cooperation, which three years earlier had to be developed both in Sarajevo and Brussels, were now established not only in Sarajevo but on the field level as well – a fairly optimistic statement at that stage, especially from the point of view of the field level.

EUPM replaced IPTF with a significantly smaller organisation. During its first mandate, the personnel of EUPM encompassed an international staff of approxi-
mately 550 persons, both police officers and civilians, working in the field in 33 co-
locations.\textsuperscript{54} As EUPM-II, starting at the beginning of 2006, was to fulfil its mission
with a modified mandate and size, the strength of international police officers and
civilians was reduced to approximately 200, which is also the current figure.\textsuperscript{55}

When the mandate reached its end on 31\textsuperscript{st} December 2007, the Council further
extended the EUPM mandate for another two years, until the end of 2009. The con-
tent and the mission statement of the mandate remained largely unchanged, and
the major change in the mandate is related to management of the mission. The
Council of the European Union approved in June 2007 Guidelines for Command
and Control Structure for EU Civilian Operations in Crisis Management. These
guidelines provide that the Director of the CPCC within the Council Secretary will
be the Civilian Operation Commander for all civilian crisis management opera-
tions, \textit{inter alia}, for EUPM.

In general, the Civilian Operation Commander exercises command and control
of the EUPM on the strategic level, while the Head of Mission retains command
and control on the theatre level. As a result of the new structure, the EUSR no
longer belongs to the chain of command for the EUPM, while remaining able to
provide local political direction. The Civilian Operation Commander and the EUSR
are, however, to consult each other when required. According to the Concept of
Operations, there will be no changes in the structure or personnel of the mission
in the near future.\textsuperscript{56}

\section{3.3 EUFOR Althea}

To assist the international community in the territorial and other militarily related
provisions of the Dayton Peace Agreement, a multinational military Implemen-
tation Force (IFOR) was established in December 1995. The NATO-led IFOR with
60,000 troops completed its mandate of implementing the military annexes of the
Peace Agreement within one year and was replaced by Stabilisation Force (SFOR)
in December 1996.

As the name implies, the overall role of SFOR with its initial strength of 32,000
soldiers was to stabilise the peace and contribute to a safe and secure environ-
ment in Bosnia. With this robust military force, SFOR was in general able to fulfil
its mission of maintaining the peace. Over the years, the improved security situa-
tion allowed for restructuring the mission and reducing the troop numbers, first to

\textsuperscript{54} Reports to the European Parliament by the OHR and EU Special Representative for BiH, Jan-
\textsuperscript{55} Weekly establishment of EUPM personnel by countries, as of 26\textsuperscript{th} October 2007; Report
to the European Parliament by the OHR and EU Special Representative for BiH, February
some 20,000 in 2000, then to 12,000 in 2003 and finally to some 7,000 in 2004.\textsuperscript{57}

To further develop the crisis management “toolbox” of ESDP, the EU heads of state expressed their willingness and readiness to lead a military operation to follow SFOR as early as 2002.\textsuperscript{58} In December 2003, the Council confirmed the EU’s readiness for a military mission in Bosnia, in anticipation of NATO’s decision to end the SFOR mission.\textsuperscript{59} Consequently, NATO announced during its June 2004 summit in Istanbul that an EU-led peacekeeping force would replace SFOR before the end of the year. The fact that a European Union Force (EUFOR) would continue as the organisation with primary responsibility for maintaining peace in Bosnia reflected the opinions of both EU and NATO about the improved security situation in the country and the belief in the EU’s ability to lead a military operation robust enough for the purpose.\textsuperscript{60}

Following the Council decision on 12\textsuperscript{th} July 2004 and UN Security Council Resolution 1575, a military operation named EUFOR Althea was launched on 2\textsuperscript{nd} December 2004. According to the mandate, EUFOR is to:

- provide deterrence, and continued compliance with the responsibility to fulfil the role specified in Annexes 1.A and 2 of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in BiH;
- contribute to a safe and secure environment in BiH in line with its mandate, and to achieve core tasks in the OHR’s Mission Implementation Plan and the Stabilisation and Association Process.

In the EUFOR mandate, the other ESDP instruments had been taken into account with respect to the coherence and coordination of EU activities on the ground. The EU Force Commander was to receive local political advice from the EUSR and liaise, as appropriate, with the EUPM. The Commander also needed to coordinate closely with the EUSR the consistency of military operations in the context of EU operations.\textsuperscript{61}

When deployed, EUFOR comprised some 6,200 troops from 22 EU member states and 11 other countries, which means that it was roughly the same size as SFOR.

\textsuperscript{57} ICG 2001; ICG 2004.

\textsuperscript{58} Presidency Conclusions, Copenhagen European Council 12 and 13 December 2002.

\textsuperscript{59} Summary of the Report by Javier Solana, EU High Representative for CFSP, on a Possible EU Deployment in BiH, 23 February 2004.

\textsuperscript{60} ICG June 2004. Even though the SFOR mission ended in 2004, NATO still has a small Headquarters in Sarajevo, in co-location with EUFOR Headquarters in Butmir. The role of NATO in Bosnia is to assist BiH to meet requirements for the NATO Partnership for Peace (PFP) program and eventually membership in the NATO alliance. NATO will also undertake certain operational tasks, including counter-terrorism, support of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, with regard to the detention of persons indicted for war crimes (PIFWCs), and intelligence sharing with the EU.

\textsuperscript{61} “Council Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP”. The EUFOR operation is carried out with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, under the “Berlin Plus” arrangements.
EUFOR also adopted the structure of SFOR, with three regional Multinational Task Forces covering the entire country, and a headquarters (HQ) and Integrated Police Unit (IPU) situated in the main camp in Sarajevo. Under the Multinational Task Forces operated the Manoeuvre Battalions and Liaison and Observation Teams (LOT) which formed “the eyes and ears” of EUFOR on the ground.\footnote{Report to the European Parliament by the OHR and EU Special Representative for BiH, January–June 2005.}

In November 2005 the EU Council of Ministers extended the EUFOR mandate, leaving its force structure unchanged for 2006. However, in accordance with the second mission review, EUFOR was to align its operations more closely with EUPM and play a less active role in the fight against organised crime. EUFOR was to continue to prepare to support the local law enforcement agencies in operations directed against organised crime, and also to participate actively in the Crime Strategy Group, a body chaired by the EUSR to maximise the ESDP efforts in support of the Bosnian authorities’ fight against organised crime.\footnote{Report to the European Parliament by the OHR and EU Special Representative for BiH, June–December 2005.}

As the security situation in the country remained calm, it was decided that EUFOR should further alter its role from deterrence to reassurance. In practise, this meant reorganisation of the force and troop reductions in spring 2007. The Task Force structure, dating back to IFOR, was dismantled and the field presence of EUFOR operational forces decreased respectively.

Restructured EUFOR reached full operational capability at the end of April, and is now deployed with some 2,500 troops on the ground. The new structure is based on a Headquarters, Integrated Police Unit and manoeuvre element (Multinational Manoeuvre Battalion) in Sarajevo, and a revised situational awareness matrix with 45 Liaison and Observation Teams, under five Regional Coordination Centres (RCC), covering the entire country. Under the new structure, the operation continues its organised crime.\footnote{“Operation ALTHEA”, 2007; In case of a deteriorating security situation, the Manoeuvre Battalion can be deployed throughout the country. In relation to the decreased number of troops, the readiness for the use of Over-the-Horizon Forces has been improved. Interviews in Sarajevo, May 2007.}

4 Experiences of coordination and cooperation

4.1 The difficult debut of ESDP in Bosnia

In Bosnia, the coexistence and simultaneous use of ESDP instruments began in practice when the EU police mission was deployed at the beginning of 2003. As described earlier, Lord Ashdown had been appointed EUSR in March 2002 and, in accordance with his mandate, now belonged to the EUPM chain of command. At that point, the
need for coherence in the “EU family” referred to the relations between the EUSR and EUPM, as EUMM had been deployed in the country for over a decade and was following its specific mission, on which the deployment of the new EU actors had no effect.\textsuperscript{65}

EUPM, as the first ESDP operation, had a difficult beginning. Neither the organisational structure itself nor the infrastructure were completely organised at the beginning of the mission. EUPM encountered severe delays in procurement and personnel which initially reduced the efficiency of the mission. Moreover, the handover from IPTF was not seamless, as not all the necessary documentation was received.\textsuperscript{66}

The biggest challenge for the mission, however, was the interpretation of the mandate, “to monitor, mentor and inspect”. It was not completely clear what this meant in practice even at HQ, and there were voices demanding that EUPM should have a more operational, executive mandate, rather than the intended advisory role. In addition, problems were caused by the so-called program design, through which the objectives of the mission were supposed to be pursued, as few of the personnel were acquainted with longer-term programmatic thinking. Many of the first police officers had an IPTF background, and in practice did not always act in accordance with the advisory mandate, but continued as they had been used to.\textsuperscript{67}

The fact that there was confusion at the EUPM HQ about implementing the mandate meant that there were no clear operating procedures or guidelines for the personnel at the regional and field levels to follow. At worst, this created a situation in which the police officers in the field had no idea what they were supposed to do, and so “developed their own private missions”, according to their best knowledge.\textsuperscript{68} In short, the most crucial internal failings at the start of the mission were inadequate implementation of the mandate, inadequate instructions to the field and non-functional communication and reporting structures. For the coherence of EU actions in Bosnia, the beginning of the police mission was not easy, “because even the coordination within EUPM did not exist.”\textsuperscript{69}

In addition to internal confusion, the status of the double-hatted OHR/EUSR was sometimes unclear. The basic problem was that the mandate of EUSR was broad

\textsuperscript{65} Interview with a former EUPM official, 16 February 2007. Relations between EUPM and EUMM were close and practical from the deployment of the planning team for EUPM, to which EUMM offered logistical and material support. Many of the EUMM personnel also joined EUPM later on. As there were no pressing issues between the two missions, in many interviews the relations between EUPM and EUMM were described as informal and “friendly exchange of information”.

\textsuperscript{66} Penksa 2006, 4–5, 10; Interviews with former EUPM officials, 30 March 2007 & 18 April 2007.

\textsuperscript{67} Ibid; Collantes Celador 2007, 10. The amount of police officers that moved from the IPTF to the EUPM was 119 according to Michael Merlingen and Rasa Ostrauskaite (as cited by Collantes Celador 2007, 9).

\textsuperscript{68} Interview with a former EUPM official, 18 April 2007.

\textsuperscript{69} Interviews with former EUPM officials, 30 March 2007 & 18 April 2007; Penksa 2005, 11.
and quite comprehensive, but “ironically, you turned Lord Ashdown into a EUSR but you gave him no staff to execute that mandate.”\textsuperscript{70} From the EUPM point of view, the High Representative was occupied with many functions of the OHR, and without dedicated EUSR staff, it was felt that “he was the right person for the job... but he never really was the EUSR”.\textsuperscript{71} Also the reporting from EUPM to Brussels varied: on some occasions, the reports went directly from the Commissioner to the Police Unit, and sometimes the EUSR was in the middle of the reporting chain. So from the point of view of EUPM, double-hatting the OHR sometimes created the situation that the High Representative used his status as EUSR only when it suited his purposes, rather than comprehensively. As one of the informants bluntly put it, in the first year of EUPM “the EUSR position was essentially irrelevant.”\textsuperscript{72}

The role of EUSR within the chain of command and providing political advice for EUPM became more relevant during 2004 and 2005. One of the issues that provoked discussions between EUPM and EUSR/OHR was the status of legal and political elements in EUPM. The EUSR proposed that EUPM II would no longer have political, media or legal functions of its own, but that these should be merged with the office of the EUSR.\textsuperscript{73}

From the viewpoint of coordination between the organisations and sending a unified European Union message to the field and the local population, combining these activities might have been a useful solution. However, from the point of view of the police mission, it was imperative to have so-called “in-house advisors” to be able to provide more technical knowledge and guidance concerning the political and legal aspects of policing. The fear was that without legal and political elements, EUPM would become merely a ‘hammer’ for the EUSR and over-influenced by the political aspirations. On this issue, opinions even within EUPM varied considerably, as a balance was sought between following the political agenda and conducting the professional “monitoring, mentoring and advising”.\textsuperscript{74}

With the deployment of the military component, EUFOR Althea, at the end of 2004, the need for coherence and coordination of EU activities in Bosnia became more evident. As Bosnia now became the first area in which the EU had its own Special Representative, police mission and military mission in the field, without having planned or deployed these missions simultaneously, problems concerning internal coherence started to emerge from the beginning. Quite soon it became clear that neither the modalities nor structures for coordination described in the

\textsuperscript{70} Interview with an EUSR official, 15 May 2007.
\textsuperscript{71} Interview with a former EUPM official, 18 April 2007.
\textsuperscript{72} Interviews with former EUPM officials, 30 March 2007, 18 April 2007 & 6 June 2007. One factor that the EUPM HQ felt was affecting the performance of the EUSR was the American influence in the OHR, as the Americans did not fully support the creation of EUPM with the non-executive mandate. On this, see further Penksa 2006, and Potter 2005.
\textsuperscript{73} Interviews with former EUPM officials, 16 February 2007 & 6 June 2007.
\textsuperscript{74} Interviews with former EUPM officials, 16 February 2007 & 6 June 2007; Penksa 2006, 13.
mandates of the missions, nor the EUSR were able to prevent the problems encountered.

4.2 Fighting organised crime: the bottleneck

From the point of view of EUFOR, keeping the takeover period from SFOR as short as possible was a priority. To this end EUFOR started launching operations in line with its mandate as early as December 2004. Operations that were often conducted together with local law enforcement agencies included actions against organised crime, such as illegal logging, weapons' smuggling and human trafficking.

The main cause of disagreements and problems between EUFOR and the EUPM was that both had been mandated to have a role in fighting organised crime. As the mandate of EUPM limited its functions to monitoring and mentoring the local law enforcement agencies’ activities on this issue, EUFOR with its executive mandate was able to take actual measures and launch operations aimed at fighting organised crime. This was interpreted by some observers as EUFOR searching for a mission for itself, and EUPM hiding behind its lack of an operational mandate. In other words, the fact that the EUPM’s mandate disallowed direct participation in policing activities was seen by EUFOR as an opportunity to gain justification for its mission. Some EUPM personnel also considered that the “Programme Design” approach drew attention away from actual policing, such as focusing on organised crime, and gave EUFOR the chance to have a role.75

The proactive role of EUFOR in fighting organised crime was to a large extent due to interpretation of the mandate. The first EUFOR Force Commander, Major-General Leakey, was encouraged by High Representative Javier Solana to emphasize EUFOR’s mission as distinct from that of SFOR. Fighting organised crime, which was originally intended to be a support task for EUFOR, thus became the military mission’s fundamental task. From the EUPM point of view, EUFOR was exceeding its mandate and its actions were interfering with the EUPM mandate. Because of the criticism EUFOR faced in relation to its operations, Major-General Leakey raised the issue before the PSC on many occasions, pointing out that the actions of EUFOR were in accordance with its mandate and taken for the improvement of the overall security situation.77

Even though EUFOR was, according to their own interpretation, executing their task of supporting the fight against organised crime, the methods employed raised

75 Penksa 2006, 20. As Hansen (2002) points out, “the division of labour between the military and the police has been a source of debate throughout the history of civilian police contributions to peacekeeping.” Further on the military-police cooperation, see Hansen 2002.


77 Juncos 2007, 59; Kupferschmidt 2006, 18. Major-General Leakey also urged that the initiative had to come from Brussels and that the mandates had to be changed to adjust the roles of EUPM and EUFOR. Interview of a CIVCOM official, 12 March 2007.
considerable criticism in the EUPM. The overall principle that in most Western European countries, organised crime is not usually fought with military force but by regular law enforcement agencies was frequently put forward by EUPM. This was also recognised by General Leakey, who regarded the antipathy to military engagement as originating “from the leadership downwards”\textsuperscript{78}. The other major cause for complaint was that even though it was EUPM’s task to monitor the performance of the local police, this was impossible owing to the fact that they were not informed about the local police’s operations with EUFOR. On many occasions EUPM received information about EUFOR’s operations from the local police, not directly from the military.\textsuperscript{79}

EUFOR’s active participation in disrupting organised crime was also problematic with regard to the results of the operations. Even though EUFOR was in some cases able to apprehend persons suspected of criminal activity, the fact that the operations were not executed in compliance with the procedures required by local law in general nullified the results, as the evidence EUFOR had found could not be used in court. Relating to this, some EUPM personnel accused EUFOR of an excessively robust and visible appearance in the course of these operations, which aimed at promoting their publicity about taking action against the problems encountered. Another concern with the EUPM was that EUFOR was in fact doing the job of the locals, and thus crushing the idea of enhancing local ownership, promoted by the EUPM.\textsuperscript{80}

EUFOR conducted its operations throughout the mission area, in all the Task Forces and with almost all the operational assets in its possession. However, one specified asset of EUFOR, the Integrated Police Unit (IPU), was often used in this connection and thus became a source of discord between EUFOR and the EUPM. IPU is a Gendarmerie type of military police force, with a strength of approximately 500 troops, which functions under the Commander EUFOR and can be used throughout the country. The task of IPU is to provide support to maintaining a safe and secure environment, and it can also be used in civil disturbance operations and police-like operations, including investigations.\textsuperscript{81}

Most of the criticism of IPU actions touched upon the manner in which IPU executed its actions aimed at organised crime. From the perspective of EUPM, IPU often conducted its operations without any prior notice to EUPM or the local authorities, and frequently employed an excessive amount of force.\textsuperscript{82} Rather surprisingly, such opinions were echoed even within EUFOR. From the military point of

\textsuperscript{78} Leakey 2006, 144.

\textsuperscript{79} Interviews with former EUPM officials, 16 February 2007 & 22 May 2007.

\textsuperscript{80} Interviews with former EUPM officials, 16 February 2007, 30 March 2007 & 22 May 2007.

\textsuperscript{81} IPU took over from its predecessor in SFOR, the Multinational Specialized Unit, MSU, which was seen a useful type of asset also for EUFOR. However, deploying the IPU under EUFOR and creating a constabulary force – with executive powers – under military command raised considerable opposition among some of the member states. See further Juncos 2005, 5, and Hansen 2002, 70–73.

\textsuperscript{82} Interviews of former EUPM officials, 22 May 2007 & 1 August 2007.
view, the significance of IPU was and is recognised, taking into account its capabilities and the task of EUFOR. However, in early 2005, some IPU operations took place without the Task Force commanders of being aware of them, which created problems within the organisation itself.\footnote{Interviews of former EUFOR officers, 19 April 2007 & 25 April 2007; Interviews of former EUPM officials, 16 February 2007 & 18 April 2007. Another point that the interviewees, representing both former EUPM and former EUFOR personnel, brought out concerning the coordination of EUFOR activities in relation to tackling organised crime was that, especially in 2004 and 2005, some of the troops belonging to the Task Forces were not operating completely in line with the guidance from HQ EUFOR, but following their own agendas.}

\section*{4.3 Field level interface}

Examining cooperation and coordination between EU and ESDP actors at the tactical or field level means in practice examining relations between EUPM and EUFOR, the organisations that actually have a field presence.\footnote{At the regional level, EUPM is represented by the regional headquarters and SIPA regional offices. At EUFOR regional level, until spring 2007 there were Task Forces and later on the Regional Coordination Centres (RCCs). At the field level, EUPM has local police co-location offices and Border Police field offices, while EUFOR is mainly represented by the Liaison and Observation Teams and, prior to the restructuring, also the Manoeuvre Battalions. In this context, both the regional and field levels are included when referring to field presence or coordination in the field.} Even though coordination and coherence at the top – in this case Sarajevo – level is crucial for the success of such missions, it is equally important how the actors in the field implement and interpret the guidance received from above. The severe difficulties faced by the organisations at the operational level must have been reflected at lower levels. On the other hand, actions in the field were a manifestation of the mission’s policy and mandate, both towards the HQ level and also towards the local society, and consequently it was important for the operational level to be in control of these actions.

From the field level perspective, the change from SFOR to EUFOR was not too great, as EUFOR inherited its field structure from SFOR largely unchanged. Also most of the their shoulder badge.\footnote{Kupferschmidt 2006, 18.}

Having been operational for almost two years before the deployment of EUFOR, EUPM had been able to create its connections and liaison towards SFOR and other actors on the ground. The EUPM headquarters had liaison officers posted to each of the Task Forces to guarantee close cooperation. However, immediately prior to EUFOR deployment, the EUPM Head of Mission at that time, Commissioner Kevin Carty, decided to withdraw the liaison officers from the Task Forces, leaving the liaison responsibility to the regional headquarters. The lack of organic liaison officers became apparent when EUFOR replaced SFOR, and in many cases the connection to EUPM re-
gional and field offices was cut. As one member of a regional centre of EUPM stated, in some areas the relationship between EUPM and SFOR had been much better than that between EUPM and EUFOR, at least during the first year of their coexistence.\footnote{Interviews with former EUPM officials, 26 March 2007 & 1 August 2007.}

The lack of organic liaison between EUPM and EUFOR slowed down the creation of relationships in the field. When the responsibility to act as the focal point for EUFOR was left to the EUPM regional offices, which lacked direct guidance or instructions about how to perform this, it became purely a matter of each person’s judgement how important this relationship was. In practice, this was interpreted as meaning that there was no direct obligation to liaise with EUFOR, which was then used as an excuse not to contact the military and create a liaison structure. As there were no procedures, in many cases the relationship between EUPM and EUFOR started on a national basis. For this reason, relations between EUPM and EUFOR in the field varied greatly. In some areas the actors, despite or even because of the lack of guidance, were able to create good contacts and relationships with their counterparts and find local solutions to the problems.\footnote{Interviews in Sarajevo, May 2007; Interviews with former EUFOR officers, 19 April 2007 & 5 June 2007; Interview with former EUPM official, 1 August 2007.}

In general, the EUPM was initially not very active towards EUFOR, as EUPM was engaged in various projects which in no way included EUFOR participation. Moreover, the fact that the organisations lacked a matching regional or field structure made it difficult to find the right counterpart. However, the need for coordination to extend to the field level became an issue when the same cooperation problems faced in Sarajevo also became apparent on the ground, as EUFOR pursued an active role against organised crime. The Task Forces and IPU were conducting their operations without informing the EUPM, who were mainly learning about these operations from the local police. IPU did take the initiative and contact the EUPM at the regional level, but only in order to gain information for their operations, not to provide information about them.\footnote{Interview with former EUPM official, 1 August 2007.}

The LOTs are the primary EUFOR actors responsible for liaison with EUPM at the field level. In addition to observing and maintaining situational awareness, the tasks of the LOTs include contacting the local authorities, inter alia, the local police, customs officials and Border Police. After EUFOR deployment, LOTs were directly contacting the local police and other local authorities, which in some areas irritated the local EUPM office, as they saw contact with the local authorities as exclusively their responsibility. In order to solve this problem, different local solutions were implemented. In some cases, LOTs were able to contact local police freely, informing EUPM only about possible operations which included the local police.\footnote{Interviews with former EUPM officials, 26 March 2007, 1 August 2007; Interview with former EUFOR officer, 7 June 2007.}

\footnote{Interviews with former EUPM officials, 26 March 2007 & 1 August 2007.}
\footnote{Interviews in Sarajevo, May 2007; Interviews with former EUFOR officers, 19 April 2007 & 5 June 2007; Interview with former EUPM official, 1 August 2007.}
\footnote{Interview with former EUPM official, 1 August 2007.}
\footnote{Interviews with former EUPM officials, 26 March 2007, 1 August 2007; Interview with former EUFOR officer, 7 June 2007.}
What created confusion among the local police and EUPM was the fact that the LOTs were not the only representatives of EUFOR who were directly contacting the local authorities. Even though it was the responsibility of the LOTs to maintain liaison and in this way coordinate EUFOR actions in the field, the Manoeuvre Battalion and IPU were also active in contacting local authorities. A frequent occurrence, for example, was that after an incident, the local Chief of Police would receive visitors from the LOT, the Manoeuvre Battalion and possibly the IPU, all wearing the same EU flag but asking one after another the same questions.90

From the point of view of EU coherence in Bosnia and Herzegovina, almost the entire first year of coexistence of EUFOR and EUPM was characterized by the controversies in relation to the mandates and tasks of the missions. In addition to the conflicting mandates, there were some personal clashes at the top level which were also reflected in the cooperation. Even though the actors were operating under the same flag, there was no actual planned coordination between the missions. The role of the EUSR in mediating the disputes was relatively small in the early phase, but increased in the final months of 2005.91 In this respect it can be said that the EUSR was unable to act according to the mandate to “contribute to reinforcement of internal EU coordination and coherence in BiH.”

4.4 From Seven Principles to Common Operational Guidelines

As the difficulties in the cooperation and delineation of tasks with regard to fighting organised crime became ever more apparent, and appropriate mechanisms from the Brussels end were still lacking, the actors themselves took the initiative to improve the situation. The leading mission in this respect was EUPM, for whom the situation at that time was the least satisfactory. In September 2005 EUPM, EUFOR and EUSR agreed on the documents Seven Principles and Guidelines for Increasing Co-operation between EUPM-EUFOR and EUSR.92

According to these documents, the organisations agreed on strengthening their complementary and coordinative roles in tackling organised crime, and that the EUSR would take responsibility for the overall coordination. To this end, the EUSR established a new body under EUSR chairmanship, the Crime Strategy Working Group, to ensure the coordination of EU-ESDP actors in support of the local authorities’ fight against organised crime and corruption. EUPM and EUFOR were also to participate in the Working Group. The agreement gave EUPM the leading role in coordinating policing activities in the country by monitoring and mentoring the planning of counter-organised-crime operations. EUFOR was to change its role from a proactive to a clearly support role and align its operations with EUPM. The aim was to enhance local

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90 Interview with a former EUFOR officer, 7 June 2007.
91 Interview with a former EUFOR officer, 5 June 2007.
authorities’ initiative in tackling organised crime and request operational support from EUFOR if necessary, but with EUPM assessing the need for assistance.  

Agreement on the Seven Principles was the first official step towards delineation of the tasks of the organisations. These principles were reaffirmed in the revised mandates for both EUSR and EUPM in November 2005, thus confirming the roles. Even though the revised mandates now included modalities and defined tasks for EUPM and EUFOR at the operational level, implementing the new practices at both operational and field levels demanded time and effort, and in practice the change did not happen overnight. EUPM was also busy finalising their programmes and projects as the mandate was ending by the end of 2005, which meant that the Seven Principles became effective at the field level only during the next mandate, starting in 2006. The principles created no clear structures for liaison and coordination as such, and the cooperation between EUPM and EUFOR at the field level continued to depend greatly on personalities.

The implementation of the Seven Principles and the revised EUPM mandate in the field again varied in different regional and field offices. In certain areas, EUFOR LOTs were able to maintain their liaison and continue their activities with the local authorities in the same way as before, as the guidance from EUPM did not actually change. Some problems occurred, however, concerning the instructions the local police had received from EUPM. These instructions were in some cases interpreted as meaning that the local police were not permitted to deal with EUFOR without first consulting with EUPM. As a result, the local police on the basis of these instructions refused to meet representatives of EUFOR and urged them to contact EUPM for permission. These situations were corrected through coordination with EUPM at the regional level and, at least in the area in question, the procedure that was followed concerning the relationship between EUFOR and local authorities before the Seven Principles remained the same.

Reflecting the need to further clarify and even detail cooperation and coordination, EUFOR and EUPM agreed on Common operational guidelines for EUPM – EUFOR support to the fight against organised crime in May 2006. The guidelines specified the procedures and methods to be used in cases of EUFOR support to local law enforcement agencies. In order to promote local ownership and at the same time reduce the need for EUFOR engagement, the support from EUFOR to local police was restricted to those cases in which the local police lack the capacity, or the confidence to use the existing capacity, and the need for EUFOR assets is determined to be essential by EUPM.

94 Council Joint Action 2005/824/CFSP; Council Joint Action 2005/825/CFSP.
95 Interviews in Sarajevo, May 2007; Interview with a former EUPM official, 1 August 2007.
A significant change in comparison with the earlier Seven Principles was the inclusion of cooperation at tactical level under the Guidelines, a solution that was more than necessary to ensure that the improved coordination and cooperation between the missions on the HQ level would also reach the actors on the field level, that is, EUPM and EUFOR. Implementing the Guidelines naturally caused some problems, especially within EUFOR, but as confirmation that the Guidelines were found to be mutually beneficial, when the agreement was jointly reviewed by the actors in October 2006 and again during autumn 2007, only slight changes to the agreed practices resulted. The Guidelines will be updated again in spring 2008, following the renewed mission of EUPM.98

4.5 Cooperation and coordination at the present time

All the actors involved in the creation of the Common Operational Guidelines emphasise the current good coordination and cooperation between the EUSR, EUPM and EUFOR, three years after the beginning of the coexistence of the missions. It is similarly emphasised that the improved coherence is largely due to the Guidelines that now regulate the relationships. Especially from the point of view of EUPM, their relation with EUFOR has been continually improving since spring 2006, after the Guidelines were first signed.99

A practical example of improved coordination is the use of EUFOR assets in support of the local authorities, which used to be one of the critical points. EUPM assesses the need for support and makes the request to EUFOR, which then decides whether it will provide the support or not. The supporting unit then coordinates its actions directly with EUPM and local police. The Integrated Police Unit, IPU, is often used in this context as it possesses, for example, technical resources that local police forces lack.100

The use of IPU, which previously caused problems, especially between EUPM and EUFOR, has also been regulated under the Guidelines and is now quite widely accepted as functional. When operating under the EU flag, IPU actions are coordinated and in line with the guidance from EUPM. On the other hand, IPU has also performed operations under NATO command; in these cases IPU is not bound by the Common Operational Guidelines. Nevertheless, IPU operations are no longer an issue.101

Moreover, the coordination structures between the missions have evolved and are now regarded as quite comprehensive. At the Heads of Missions level, the Board of Principals, a weekly coordination meeting chaired by the OHR, brings together the most significant international organisations in Bosnia. For EU operations, the EU

98 Email interview with EUPM official, 28 November 2007.
Heads of Missions weekly meeting should coordinate the actions of the missions and
of the EU Presidency, which generally chairs the meeting. The EUSR usually holds an
additional EU Heads of Missions meeting once a month for a briefing on prevailing
key issues.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}}

On the lower level, there are several regular meetings. The weekly ESDP meeting
gathers together the senior political and media advisers of the entire “EU family”. The
ESDP meeting is chaired by the Head of EUSR’s Political Department and cov-
ers key political events and developments, common policies, police and media
issues. The same organisations meet again in the INFO OPS Working Group, which,
under the EUSR’s Head of Communications, convenes to discuss the press and me-
dia functions. In the fight against organised crime, the most important meeting
is the bi-weekly EU Coordination Board (the former EU Targeting Board), at which
EUPM, EUFOR, EUSR, and the State Prosecutor’s Office define concrete targets in
tackling organised crime. Different sections of the missions also convene on ac-
hoc basis, whenever the need requires.

The liaison arrangements between the missions have become closer over the
past year. Both EUPM and EUFOR have their representation at the EUSR morning
meetings. Respectively, the Politico-Military Officer from EUSR attends the weekly
EUFOR Chief of Staff and Commander’s Update meetings, and one of the political
advisers participates in the two weekly executive meetings at EUPM. The EUPM Li-
aison Officer also attends EUFOR Chief of Staff meetings, while the EUFOR Liaison
Officer is present at appropriate meetings at EUPM.

With the above mentioned coordination and liaison structures in place, it was
stated by interviewees of all the missions that the regular contacts between EUPM,
EUFOR and EUSR are on a good level. It was also commonly noted that with more
structured coordination, the end result might actually deteriorate, because merely
sitting in a meeting or having a liaison officer from another mission does not equal
coordination. It is also noticeable that cooperation makes sense only up to a cer-
tain point: all of the existing procedures need to have a purpose, and the aim of
the cooperation and coordination is practical, deriving from the actual need.\footnote{Inter-
views in Sarajevo, May 2007.}

Even though the relations between the missions in the headquarters level have
significantly improved during the three years of coexistence, the level of coopera-
tion and cooperation in the field still varies considerably. The Common Opera-
tional Guidelines have in many areas been successfully passed on down to the regional
and field levels of EUFOR\footnote{When referring to present field presence of EUFOR, the random sample of the study
only covers the area of operations Regional Coordination Centre 4, the North-East cor-
ner of the country.} in practice the Regional Coordination Centres and the
LOTs, at least concerning the present delineation of tasks. This means that EUFOR
LOT personnel in the field have accepted the fact that EUPM has the leading role
with respect to organised crime. Implementing the Guidelines has, on the other hand, caused some misunderstanding between the missions, as the instructions for EUFOR LOTs on how to deal with local authorities have varied. For instance, in some areas all direct LOT contacts with local police must first be approved by EUPM.\textsuperscript{105}

The EUPM policy towards coordination and cooperation on the field level very much depends on their own interests. The aim of the EUPM is to act according to its mandate and, by coordination with the other actors in the field, to seek to prevent others from interfering with its mission and mandate. Some interviewees actually give their opinion that “EUPM officers should focus on other things in the field than cooperation with the LOT Houses”.\textsuperscript{106} Also from the point of view of EUFOR, the focus of EUPM on the field level has shifted almost exclusively towards tackling organised crime, which leaves fewer issues to be coordinated between EUPM and EUFOR on that level. In many cases, the coordination and cooperation between EUPM and EUFOR is limited to occasional sharing of information and social calls, as EUPM personnel are unable to share information on most of their activities. In areas where there is no EUPM presence, the relationship is even more distant.\textsuperscript{107}

The status of the EUSR in coordinating the activities of both EUPM and EUFOR has become more significant, especially with the revised mandate and the ability to provide EUFOR with political guidance. However, the fact of the EUSR giving political guidance to EUFOR does not actually change the status quo because of the existing close relations, and in practice these arrangements have already existed for some time. The mandate confirmed the position of the EUSR as ‘convener’ for coordination arrangements that are already in place. Also the role of the EUSR in relation to the criminal justice/police interface and to developing and monitoring the prosecutorial system was affirmed, to which end the cooperation with the EUPM has also become closer.\textsuperscript{108}

Regarding the future prospects of the coordination and cooperation between the different EU actors in Bosnia, many of the informants stated that the challenge no longer concerns inter-ESDP relations, but the relations between ESDP missions and the Commission Delegation. Combining or co-locating the EUSR and EC Delegation offices seems to be the natural step forward, which the structures and personnel in Sarajevo are more ready and willing to take than Brussels. The decisions concerning the OHR also affect the coordination between the EU actors in the future, as “the longer OHR continues, the less the EUSR develops”.\textsuperscript{109}

\textsuperscript{105} Interviews with EUFOR officers, May 2007.
\textsuperscript{106} Interviews in Sarajevo, May 2007.
\textsuperscript{107} Interviews with EUFOR officers, May 2007.
\textsuperscript{109} Interviews in Sarajevo, May 2007.
5 Conclusion

The improvement of cooperation and coordination between the EU-ESDP missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been a process of learning by doing. In the first phase, the differences between the missions were mainly related to differing interpretations of the mission mandates, both within EUPM and EUFOR. The mandates were broad and overlapping, giving both organisations a role in fighting the organised crime that emerged as the critical issue between EUPM and EUFOR. In addition, some conflicting personalities within the missions created a situation in which there was very little or no coordination of operations.

One lesson which has been identified is that the mission mandates need to be sufficiently clear and precise to be able to provide an undisputed delineation of tasks. However it has been observed, especially by the political elements of the missions, that the mandates should be broad enough to leave some room for action by the Heads of Missions on the operational level. Having clear mandates would in this respect also enable the Heads of Missions to concentrate on leading their own organisations, instead of having to create their own mission.

Another factor that has been identified is that initially the mandates took insufficiently into account the need for structures and modalities for coordination. There were some rather general directions concerning how to coordinate the EU-ESDP activities, but in practice there were neither clear structures nor guidelines for coordination and liaison, nor clear delineation of tasks between the missions. It very soon became evident that when left solely up to the will of the actors to liaise and coordinate their activities, the cooperation and coordination were inadequate and highly dependent on personalities and personal contacts. This was the main issue on the regional and field levels.

Clear structures for coordination of the activities and cooperation between the missions are required. If such structures are not included at the mandate level, then mutually approved procedures, for instance, would reduce the chances of overlapping or conflicting actions. The need for such structures is first encountered and responded to by the actors in the field, but the creation of structures and modalities for cooperation should already have been taken into account at the strategic level before mission deployment. The implementation of clear structures would also mean clearly defined responsibilities for the actors in the field to liaise with other organisations. Naturally it is every mission member’s task to cooperate with the other actors when required, but having clearly defined responsibilities would ensure better fulfilment of the task of liaison and cooperation.

According to the mandates of the ESDP missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is the EUSR’s responsibility to coordinate the ESDP activities in the theatre. In the beginning, the EUSR was in no position to execute his mandate, mainly due to the lack of capacity or willingness to do so. As the mandate of the EUSR was quite extensive from the beginning, there were many expectations for the EUSR to imple-
ment the coordination function when the problems in the field became obvious. The functions of the OHR were, however, clearly the primary task for the EUSR/OHR, and in this sense double-hatting the OHR has not been a successful solution. The EUSR clearly needs full operational capability to be able to act in accordance with the role of the coordinator of ESDP missions, and to this end the EUSR’s position needs to be strengthened. OHR, and in this sense double-hatting the OHR has not been a successful solution. The EUSR clearly needs full operational capability to be able to act in accordance with the role of the coordinator of ESDP missions, and to this end the EUSR’s position needs to be strengthened.

One of the factors that have been identified as having hindered cooperation was poor knowledge of the other actors and their mission, especially at the field level interface. As the mandate and mission of the counterparts were unclear, it was hard to find common ground for cooperation. The missions have step-by-step increased the training given to their personnel, one of the aims of which is to enhance the knowledge of other actors in the field. In this respect, the situation has already improved since the beginning. One solution to further systematize the training would be to introduce common induction training for key ESDP personnel, in which the EUSR could take the leading role. In connection with improving preparedness to liaise and interact with other organisations, the need to increase training of civil-military relations in the pre-mission training has also been acknowledged.

The creation of the Seven Principles and later on the Common Operational Guidelines is a good example of how building up the cooperation and coordination is a never-ending process. The case of Bosnia, where the actors in the field were compelled to initiate such a process, also revealed the inability of the EU structures at that time to react promptly to the problems. This inability also becomes evident when the changes in the mandates of the missions are examined; every time, these changes seem to reflect the procedures and structures that the missions have already adopted or that already exist in the field, which means that the practice is guiding the mandates, rather than the other way around.

With the Common Operational Guidelines, the missions have mutually agreed on the delineation of tasks and coordination structures that now regulate their interactions. Because of these procedures and structures, coordination and cooperation between the EUSR, EUPM and EUFOR on the operational level in Sarajevo has improved over the past year and a half. At the regional and field level, the tactical level, the cooperation and coordination have also improved owing to the guidance the field presence receives from above. As each mission’s tasks differ significantly, the need to cooperate in their field activities is not as imperative as at the operational level. From the point of view of speaking with one EU voice, however, a certain amount of coordination and cooperation is required.

Even though the relations and cooperation between the missions have improved and are considered good, this does not imply that there is no room for further im-
provement. Even though the missions operate under the same EU flag and same policy, nevertheless certain handicaps, such as national agendas, conflicting personalities, language problems, different nationalities and cultural background, are factors that have to be taken into consideration in the cooperation, as with any other international organisation or mission. However, the EU is in a unique position to develop its capacities in crisis management, as many of these handicaps seem to be less apparent owing to the relatively united approach of the EU missions.

Bosnia and Herzegovina has sometimes been referred to as a ‘testing ground’ for the ESDP, from the point of view of planning and coordinating the different EU crisis management instruments. After a rocky start, numerous lessons have been identified, and some even learnt, in developing EU crisis management in general. With regard to the coherence and coordination of civilian and military crisis management, the next great challenge for the EU lies in Kosovo, where the cooperation between the future EULEX Kosovo mission and NATO-led KFOR is one of the key issues. This challenge has been taken seriously, and the actors involved have already agreed on the guiding principles for their cooperation and mutual interactions. It remains to be seen how effectively these guidelines will be implemented on the ground. As the tasks of the missions are significantly different, the issue this time should not be the coordination of activities in the field, but rather reinforcing a credible and united international presence in Kosovo.
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