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Recruitment and Training in Civilian Crisis Management

Learning from the ECMM/EUMM Experiences

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CONTENT

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Learning from the ECMM/EUMM Experiences

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Monitoring is one of the European Union's civilian crisis management priority areas. This article contributes to the discussion of the quality of international mission personnel by examining the personnel serving the European Community Monitor Mission (ECMM) and its successor, the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM). Research results are mainly based on interviews of monitors and they highlight the lessons learned of the ECMM/EUMM experience. In general, the training and recruitment recommendations given in this article provide valuable tools to all those engaged in planning and assessing European Union Security and Defence Policy's monitoring missions.

1   Introduction

The fall of Yugoslavia with the subsequent wars in the heart of Europe have acted as a catalyst for the European Union to develop and strengthen its role as an actor and its involvement in crisis management.[2] Following the EU's identification of its four initial priority areas[3] within civilian crisis management at the European Council of Feira in 2000, an agreement was reached to make available a certain number of experts for each of these priority areas. This list of priorities was prolonged with two additions in 2004, namely monitoring and support for the EU Special Representative.[4] Adding monitoring as an EU priority area has been claimed to be a consequence of the success of the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM).[5]

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[1] The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the views of the Crisis Management Centre Finland.

[2] See, for example, Langinvainio 2006.

[3] The initial four EU priority areas within civilian crisis management were Police, Rule of Law, Civilian Administration and Civil Protection, as identified in the Santa Maria da Feira European Council, 19 and 20 June 2000, Presidency conclusions.

[4] Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of ESDP 2004, 4 & 6.

[5] Brief guide to the European Security and Defence Policy 2005, 37.

As the quantity of available experts was achieved, and even exceeded already in 2002[6], the discussion came to focus increasingly on the *quality* of experts. The training centres that have been set up in several European states to provide experts with civilian crisis management training is an attempt to improve the quality of staff seconded to missions.

This article contributes to the discussion of the quality of international mission personnel by examining the personnel serving the European Community Monitor Mission (ECMM) and its successor, the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM). After introducing the mission in section two, the article continues by describing the recruitments (chapter three) made by some seconding nations, followed by a description of whatever training has been available for the future mission members by their seconding nations on the one hand, and by the mission itself on the other hand (section four). Both sections three and four highlight some factors challenging the recruitment and making the training less than comprehensive. Section five is based on the interviewees' reflections on the performance in the field, whereas section six gives a list of recommendations based on identified shortcomings in the recruitment, training and performance of ECMM/EUMM monitors.

The article is based on facts, views and opinions as expressed by 50 informants, who can be divided into the following three categories:
- recruitment and/or training officers (11),
- mission personnel (31) consisting of
    - six Heads of ECMM/EUMM,
    - 24 active and former (at the time of the collection of data) ECMM/EUMM monitors,
    - one former ECMM interpreter,
- representatives of the recipient of the ECMM and the EUMM reports (8) including
    - Western Balkans Desk officers at their respective ministries for foreign affairs,
    - embassies in the EUMM area of responsibility,
    - one representative to the EU Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management, CivCom.

The same informant may represent two different categories, in which case he/she has been listed according to where most emphasis of the interview has been placed. Active monitors were interviewed in the EUMM headquarters, with the exception of one telephone interview. In all cases but one had they previously been assigned to teams as field monitors. Several of the interviewed monitors had served the ECMM or the EUMM on more than one occasion.

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[6] Solana 2002.

Whenever possible, respondents were interviewed in person, in which case the interview was recorded on tape (with one exception), and later transcribed into written text for analysis. If this was not feasible, the interview was conducted by telephone, with due notes taken. In other cases responses were collected by a questionnaire via email, with possible follow-up questions made when applicable. Informants will not be identified as most chose to remain anonymous, and in a few cases due to the frequent rotation of recruiting personnel, the actual informant has in fact relied only on forwarded information as to how things have been done previously, but not done any recruiting for ECMM or EUMM in person.[7]

All the interviews were conducted and questionnaires collected between February and December 2007. The respondents represent eleven different participating nations of the ECMM/EUMM, with emphasis given to countries seconding civilians and one interpreter locally employed in the mission area.

The writer's own experience of serving the ECMM has been stated to the informants, and this insight into the mission is also reflected in this article.

A restriction in the research has been that with the EUMM reports being classified material, they have not been made available for review for this article. Neither have the ECMM presidency reports nor the EUMM annual reports from the past years been available as source material.

2   The European Union Monitoring Mission

2.1   The development from ECMM to EUMM

The European Community Monitor Mission was inaugurated in Slovenia in 1991 in accordance with the Brioni Declaration.[8] The first concrete objective was to monitor the withdrawal of the Yugoslav Peoples' Army from Slovenia through Croatia to Serbia. The mission was set up to give the European Community speedy and unaltered information about the developments in the region from a reliable source, something which the embassies being located in Belgrade were unable to do.

After the commencing of activities, the mission actively monitored the developments of the 1990s, which led *inter alia* to the declaration of independence of five ex-Yugoslav republics, to the wars in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina which eventually led to the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords in December 1995, as well as the mass exodus from Kosovo in 1999, the NATO bombings in Serbia and Montenegro, and the post-conflict rebuilding of society up to late 2000. The monitoring continued for another seven years, but as a result of the Council Joint Action, and to emphasise how the mission was perceived as part of the Common

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[7] All source material collected is archived at the Crisis Management Centre Finland, Kuopio.
[8] Brijunska deklaracija 1991.

Foreign and Security Policy, the mission changed its name to the European Union Monitoring Mission[9]. After 16.5 years of operation, the EUMM was finally dissolved at the end of 2007, on the very eve of the Kosovo Status decision.[10]

As the circumstances under which the mission operated changed significantly, the mission had to change its *raison d'être*. The focus of the mission shifted over the years, and the geographical coverage decreased a number of times. The number of international staff deployed varied from an initial 30 to a maximum of 420 monitors in 1996–1997, and nearing the closure of the mission in 2007 down to less than 60 monitors. With the number of monitors on the field shifting according to the degree of relative stability, the level of monitoring coverage focused either on local politics or on higher levels of politics. By so doing, the mission managed to respond to the changing needs of the EU and the states participating in the mission[11], and the operation got new extensions annually. These extensions were not, however, automatic, as pointed out by one informant, but rather the result of long and heated discussions.

2.2   The EUMM mandate

The last Council Joint Action regarding the EUMM of 30 November 2006, which extended and amended the mandate of the EUMM, stated that the mission shall:

- *monitor political and security developments in the area of its responsibility, with a particular focus on Kosovo and Serbia, and neighbouring regions that might be affected by any adverse developments in Kosovo;*
- *give particular attention to border monitoring, inter-ethnic issues and refugee return;*
- *provide analytical reports on the basis of tasking received;*
- *contribute to the early warning of the Council and the confidence building, in the context of the policy of stabilization conducted by the Union in the Region.*

The Council may also initiate specific tasking in co-ordination with the Secretary General/High Representative and in consultation with the Commission.[12]

Successfully implementing these tasks by giving background information and up-to-date information and analysis about trends in the region, he EUMM was to contribute to the formulation of a common EU policy towards the region. The reports went simultaneously to Brussels and to the capitals of all participating nations.

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[9] Council Joint Action 2000/811/CFSP.

[10] Council Joint Action 2006/867/CFSP.

[11] Except for the Member States of EU, Slovakia (before becoming an EU member) and Norway.

[12] Council Joint Action 2006/867/CFSP, 1.

Although not explicitly written in the EUMM mandate, one feature of any monitoring mission is seen to be to show the EU flag in the region[13]. More importantly, it is stated how the mere presence tends to lower tensions, as people do not feel neglected or forgotten.[14] The importance of these features have, nevertheless, decreased on the one hand as the region has achieved relative stability, and on the other hand as the EU has increased its representation and presence by other means.

2.3   The EUMM methodology

The method which EUMM utilised was to deploy field teams of at least two international monitors representing different nationalities to cover a given geographical area of responsibility. The teams also consisted of a local, EUMM-affiliated interpreter. The teams had significant freedom in planning their activities and in choosing their interlocutors themselves, as long as they operated within the mission mandate.

The recommendations were for a team to conduct two meetings a day.[15] These meetings were the principal way information was collected. Due to the form in which these meetings were conducted, and their anticipated outcome, it would be more appropriate to refer to them as interviews. The team would have prepared questions for the meeting, focusing on some particular area of interest that was in line with the team's short-term and strategic long-term plan for monitoring.

After the meetings, the team returned to their team site to analyse the gathered material and to write a short daily report about the most significant findings. The accuracy of controversial, if not all, material, should ideally have been verified from different sources. It would be fair to say that the core of the daily tasks thus resembled investigative journalism.

Once the report was finalised by the team, it was forwarded to the mission headquarters in Sarajevo. The headquarters used the reports of the mission's entire area of responsibility as the bulk of information that it analysed and from which it compiled an assessment, which was then forwarded to Brussels and to the capitals of the participating states on a weekly (previously daily) basis. The reports on the local level were also forwarded to other international players on the ground as well as to the embassies representing the participating states. In addition to the daily reports, the teams also produced speedy incident reports, more analytical special reports and weekly assessments.

The teams not only finalised their reports at the team site, a rented house among the local population, but most often also used it for accommodation. This feature meant that being an EUMM monitor did not only equal having a day job in a post-

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[13] Concept for EU Monitoring Missions 2003, 6.
[14] Ibid.
[15] EUMM introduction CD.

conflict region, but being attracted to such a way of living would call for certain life values. Although circumstances during the EUMM time were not harsh, they would be unusual and different from what the monitor was used to in his or her respective home country.

For most of the mission, the monitors would have worn a white uniform with visible EU insignia, with some regional exceptions to this practice. All monitors were unarmed throughout the mission.

Although EUMM officially was a civilian mission, it is interesting to note that mission personnel with a civilian background, Heads of Mission included, tended to describe the mission as mostly a military one, with some civilian elements. Mission staff with a military background, however, described the mission as civilian, unmilitary, or even antimilitary.

2.4　The EUMM List of Qualifications

At the beginning of the mission, all field staff was recruited from the military. The circumstances at the time meant open war and the monitored issues were such that a military background was needed at that time.

However, after a certain level of stability had been achieved, the focus shifted from monitoring activities related to warfare, to humanitarian issues and those of human rights as well as to monitoring the building up of a civil society. During the EUMM times, the focus shifted once again to fit the needs of the report reader, meaning that little attention was given to municipal level matters and all the more to middle and high level politics. The EUMM reports included more analyses of the meaning and significance of the monitored issues, than the ECMM reports ever did.

EUMM listed some basic qualifications and requirements[16], which it has forwarded to the participating states and Brussels, as an aide to help identify suitable monitors to be seconded to the mission. This document lists the following:

1. Personal requirements
  - citizen of EU member state (after 01 May 2004 only exception: Norway)
  - graduated from university/equivalent (major in international politics, political history, law, economics etc.) or graduated from military academy (minimum rank of a captain – major/equivalent or higher ranking) [exceptions for some specified EUMM HQ administrative and technical/ personnel functions
  - seconded for a minimum period of one year
  - previous working experience for a minimum of two years

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[16] EUMM SOP Annex 4H/2.

- proper physical condition (national medical check)

- fluency in English (written and oral)

- computer literate

- driver license

2. Practical skills or training in:
   - first aid

   - mine awareness

   - radio voice procedures and

   - driving of four wheel drive vehicles

As the ECMM was renamed the EUMM, the most visible change was the decrease in the number of personnel, dropping from 239 to 110 in a year's time.[17] Despite this reduction of personnel, the job description and the area of coverage basically did not undergo a corresponding modification. With such a significant reduction in the number of personnel, the quality of the existing personnel naturally took on a new degree of importance; as a reflection of this, some of the participating member states did, indeed, take a closer look at the recruitments they made.

One could question if the number of personnel after the Council Joint Action of 2000 was sufficient for successfully implementing the mandate. However, this article does not take a stance on the number of monitors, but rather examines the quality of personnel reflected in the job description and the circumstances in which the job was being done.

3.   The recruitment of monitors

Currently nine out of ten mission members in EU civilian operations are seconded by their national governments.[18] In the EUMM, all internationals but three[19] were seconded. Contrary to the practice of recruiting to the ESDP missions, where the seconding nations nominate candidates to be selected centrally, for the EUMM the seconding states had the full right to choose and deploy anyone of their liking. The above-mentioned EUMM List of Qualifications served as a guideline for re-cruitment. The EUMM emphasised how there was also bilateral dialogue between the mission and the sending states, in order to point out the importance of the listed qualifications being met.

The recruiting of monitors to the ECMM/EUMM fell under different authorities in different participating states, this partly reflecting on who has been eligible for the

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[17] ECMM/EUMM Personnel Strength 2006.
[18] The role of the EU in Civilian Crisis Management 2006, 5.
[19] Head of Mission, Chief of Personnel and Chief of Procurement.

assignment. In many cases the recruiting responsibility underwent some change, meaning two or three different bodies may have been involved over the years.

In most of the participating states, the recruiting was typically done either by the Ministry of Defence, the Defence Forces, or the Ministry for Foreign Affairs or through a combination of some of the above. In some cases where the recruiting fell under some other ministry or was outsourced to another body, a representative from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs might have interviewed some short-listed candidates, been present at the interviews, or at least given their final blessing on the nomination. This practice served as a means of ensuring the seconded monitors were of the calibre expected by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.[20]

Despite the fact that the EUMM List of Qualifications allowed for very broad recruiting, openly advertising posts in newspapers or other fora was rare.[21] Most participating states restricted their recruitment to a "pre-selected" group of people. Thus, if the Ministry of Defence or the Defence Forces was recruiting, the posts would typically only be available to military personnel. Even in the case of seconding civilians, most countries restricted their secondments to a group of individuals somehow known to the recruiters[22], or in the last years the candidates would be sought from a roster of experts. Such rosters have been set up in many EU countries, to cater to the ever-growing need of sending crisis management experts on

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[20] An often stated opinion among monitors interviewed for this article was that more often than not, the recruiting personnel had poor knowledge of what circumstances and what duties the recruited monitors faced in the field. Another perception that was raised was the failure of the recruiters to pay attention to the need of their "real customers", those relying on the good quality of EUMM reports to facilitate them in their respective jobs.

[21] Only in the case of one nation was there an annually repeated announcement of vacancies in the daily newspapers and on the internet, meaning that the recruiting personnel annually went through some 200 applications to fill six EUMM posts. Some states paid special attention to the recruitment at the time of their respective EU presidency, but lessened their efforts at other times.

[22] With participating states nominating their own monitors, a fairly frequently stated criticism was that it allowed those in charge of appointing the recruits to favour their own preferred candidates. As some informants brought up, this "buddy-buddy system" was also felt within the mission, where senior management staff was able to favour their own national colleagues in turn, and little or no attention was paid to the motivation and skills of the appointed person, meeting the needs for a particular function. At the time before the Joint Action, this system was the prevailing one, where the state holding the EU presidency, had the overall responsibility for the mission, and was eager to promote its own nationals to as many key posts as possible. Some time after the Council Joint Action, this practice practically ceased to exist within the mission.

missions abroad.[23]

The rosters came in handy, as the turnover of recruiters was quite high in many cases, and on the other hand the recruitment process often had to be finalised in a matter of days to fill a post that unexpectedly became vacant, not leaving too much time for a comparison of candidates. Although there was no particular hurry, it seems that not too much time, money or effort, was to go into the recruitment process.[24]

The number of people on the roster and the inclusion criteria varies highly between rosters, from having to attend special training before being admitted to the roster, to simply filling in an electronic form with personal data and employment history and thereby being included. Despite the existence of rosters with pre-trained candidates, there has been an experience of rosters being too limited and being unable to present any such candidates that would be considered suitable for the EUMM according to the standards set nationally. In such a case better candidates were actively sought, found outside the register and consequently nominated as EUMM monitors.

Most of the interviewed monitors had been selected 1–2 months before deployment, a period of time perceived by the monitors as short, not allowing for other preparation than taking care of practical issues. Only one seconding nation completed their selection process up to or even exceeding one year before deployment. At best this meant that a motivated monitor had covered a given list of reading material and was thus well prepared. At worst the motivation of the secondee had gone through a significant change in that time, leaving some intended monitors withdrawing their commitment on short notice and others performing poorly in the field.

Although elaborated recruitment strategies were not displayed, different participating states demonstrated quite a varied attitude towards their recruitment. This resulted in secondments varying from sending more senior and well experienced staff to sending very young people on their first-ever assignment abroad to gain experience and to grow professionally. One approach was to send people capable enough to get senior positions. Some stated historically and geographically close relations to the Balkans, others the promotion of the national image as a reason to send the best possible candidates to the mission. One voice raised the moralistic

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[23] For thorough coverage of rosters, see Gourlay 2006. Also worth noting is how Glazebrook (2006, 56–58) points out how expert databases have been viewed negatively. Firstly, without constant management, they are not functional, secondly with the likelihood of getting a job through a roster being perceived as small, applicants lack confidence in these, which could reflect the fact that often these databases lack valuable information about the qualities of candidates.

[24] Glazebrook (2006, 54) points out two occasions where crisis management personnel was sought, and how some applications was seen as a "flood", so open advertising was seen as being more work than it was worth.

issue of the amount of money being spent on the mission being a reason not to fall back on lethargy, but to pay close attention that the right people are sent to the right mission in order to do a top quality job. On the other hand, one stated reason for disinterest in the recruitments to the EUMM was the fact that for the several years the mission had been expected not to get further extension, and thus directing resources there was not seen as worthwhile.

When asked to identify what factors had led to being recruited to serve in the EUMM, the lion's share of those interviewed with a military background stated only two things: having the necessary minimum rank and having the necessary knowledge of English – as identified by the recruiting body.[25] When asking monitors from civilian walks of life, among the most commonly cited factors were communication skills and previous international experience, quite often from the Balkans, and the ability to write a report.

The decision to extend the contract of monitors was a solely national issue, and most of the times was done without consulting the mission.

It is worth noting that at no point was there any mechanism for quality control of the seconded monitors at the end of the ECMM or EUMM.[26] The mission did not want to be selective when the seconding states were paying the salaries of the monitors, which led to the fact that any secondee was welcomed, even though he/she did not fulfil the requirements listed by EUMM[27].

Although there were differing opinions, generally speaking, the heterogeneity of the staff was seen as an asset making the mission stronger[28]. The practice of mixing military and civilian monitors has thus, according to one interviewee, been given as a recommendation for the Aceh Monitor Mission.

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[25] The perception of the necessary level of English for an EUMM monitor varied greatly, with some seconding states requiring only a basic level. Differences were also apparent in the rating of the knowledge, at times giving quite a misleading picture of the ability to use English professionally.

[26] Without a system for quality control of the personnel, at the very worst, the mission on occasions found itself receiving a monitor who had in fact admittedly been sent away to sort out his or her family- or drug-abuse-related problems.

[27] Although participating states did agree to the criteria listed in chapter two, in reality they often failed to deliver. The requirement to be seconded for a minimum of one year was not met by a number of participating states that second military personnel only. In the closing year, approximately 30% of the monitors served only for a period of six months.

[28] In the final years of operation, the balance between military and civilian personnel had come close to half-and-half, with some emphasis always remaining on the military side.

4   The training of monitors

This chapter demonstrates how most of the training provided was limited to general crisis environment, leaving out both mission-specific and function-specific trainings.

4.1   Pre-mission training

Generally speaking, the practice of nationally provided training for monitors to the mission was inadequate, and in the case of quite a number of interviewed monitors, they had had no training whatsoever prior to deployment. Most of the times the lack of training would be due to the shortage of time between recruiting and deployment and/or the fact that even if there was more time, no training sessions would be set up for possibly just one secondee at a time.

In the cases in which training was provided prior to deployment, it was ordinarily 1–2 weeks in length. The training for the ECMM/EUMM was in most cases identical or very similar to that of UN military observers. Much of the training focus was given to managing in the potentially hostile or dangerous environment and circumstances in which the job is done, thus focusing on issues related to personal security and safety, the use of hand radios, driving four-wheel drive vehicles, and first aid. These four issues are what the EUMM, in fact, expected monitors to have already been trained in, according to the Standard Operating Procedures.

In very few cases, the training included mission-specific knowledge, typically restricted to a brief overview of the Balkans. Function-specific training was even more rare, thus the following issues were hardly ever covered: topical issues to be monitored in light of the current state of the Balkans, the interrelationship between different issues, how to address parliamentarians, interviewing techniques, what sort of data to collect, how to analyse the data in a wider former Yugoslavian context, identifying trends and being able to give an early warning of some undesired developments, and summarising the most important issues in a report written in good English. Hardly any emphasis was put on the larger EU context in which the mission operated, or on the impacts or results the monitoring was anticipated to have.

Although basic courses in civilian crisis management were organised during the last years of the EUMM in a number of training centres,[29] only one monitor had learned about such a course in time to attend prior to deployment.

One informant said how the official training stood for 30% of his training, whereas the self-initiated meeting of a couple of previous monitors represented the remaining 70% of useful information.

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[29] The European Commission launched a project on Training for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management, with the aim of creating national pools of pre-trained experts. One of the training programmes developed is a concept core course covering a multitude of issues relevant for every field worker. See more on www.eutraininggroup.net

The EUMM produced a Training CD which was envisaged to be handed over to future monitors prior to their arrival to the mission. The training CD included some PowerPoint presentations with monitoring and report-writing guidelines, some texts about Balkan history and a list of recommended reading.[30] Only in the most exceptional cases was this CD handed over to the monitor before his/her arrival. Instead, the monitors received it in their induction training.

4.2   The EUMM induction training

When a new monitor arrived at the headquarters of the mission in Sarajevo, he or she underwent EUMM induction training before going to his or her final destination. Although it was known that not all monitors were trained nationally, the induction training of one or at most two days was not envisaged to be training *per se*, but as the brevity indicates, rather a tool to refresh knowledge and skills that the monitor had previously been trained in.

The monitors interviewed for this article rated the usefulness of the induction training from very poor to good. Not surprisingly, monitors with a military background appreciated different parts of the training than those with a civilian background. However, as a result of listing the training issues that were perceived as the most useful, the training curriculum was actually rebuilt almost in its entirety. To give an example, for some it was most useful to learn of the EUMM organisation, for others it was to learn how to put on snow chains, while quite a few considered the role play "Attending a meeting" most useful. The last-mentioned topic divided the opinions greatly, as some of the interviewed monitors found it ridiculous and even misleading to use a set-up of negotiating to exchange prisoners of war, saying it gave an archaic picture of what the monitors do and therefore was completely unhelpful. Many a monitor felt that meeting the people from the Analysis Section and hearing about one's own area of responsibility was the most useful part of the induction training. For some, this exchange of information was, however, a matter of minutes.

Although the EUMM relied heavily on people learning on the job, and no one was expected to be completely operational regardless of how much training he/she had had before deployment, it became evident that more and better training was needed in order to achieve a higher degree of understanding of one's tasks and specific features of the area of responsibility, as well as in order for monitors to achieve a higher level of confidence. Some monitors suggested that even the same amount of information should be spread out over three days, as digesting the lot felt like a task too difficult to do in just two days.

4.3   Learning on the job

Once the monitor had reached his or her geographical area of responsibility, he/she was be in the hands of the team leader, who was expected to guide the new-

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[30] EUMM Introduction CD.

comer and have him/her follow the work for some time, before "imitating" it. The EUMM relied heavily on all its monitors to undergo a similar "learning on the job" process and to be fit to take upon themselves the role of the new team leader a few months after arrival. As long as the team produced its daily reports, there was hardly any micromanagement of the teams from the Regional or Mission Office or the mission headquarters. Despite an improvement in the final years, the lack support instructions and feedback from the senior levels in the organisation was still a major disappointing factor for most interviewed monitors.

When asked when the monitors felt comfortable about understanding their task and fulfilling it in accordance with expectations, the answer would without exceptions reflect the length of the monitor's expected tour of duty. Thus, monitors who served the EUMM for a total of six months, would ordinarily state that they were fully operational after two months. Monitors serving for two years or more would, on the other hand, consider the entire first year a period of learning, stating how the importance of understanding nuances only comes with time and experience, and stated the disbelief that anyone could really grasp the whole picture in a matter of weeks or even months.

4.4   Remedial training

The Regional and Mission Offices (RO) of the EUMM arranged monthly meetings of all teams within their area of responsibility, in order to provide remedial training. The interviewed monitors did not, however, on a single occasion raise this as a supporting means to improve one's performance. In fact, some suggested there should be some further training along the way, but the same persons did not connect or identify the RO meetings as being such, or as meeting the needs he/she had in mind.

Monitors willing to make the most significant possible contribution to the mission were keen on getting further training about the desired contents of reporting rather than the format of it. A few thematic training needs that had not been covered or covered insufficiently were training in interviewing techniques, training in the specific stages of the process from the collection of data to the sending of the reports to Brussels and the capitals, including how the reports were modified in headquarters, and general large-scale Balkan developments. It was suggested that among the mission members there ought to be competence enough to train in most og the subjects.

5   Identifying gaps weakening the field performance

This chapter analyses the major gaps identified by either field monitors working on the grass roots level, analysts in headquarters, Heads of Mission or representatives of the recipient of the reports. A number of interviewees were of the opinion that educational background and previous working experience were of no real significance. If a monitor was only flexible enough, knew English and had the right

social skills, he or she would swiftly learn all other necessary skills, and do a good enough job. Report readers, however, desired more specific qualities, resulting in a list which incidentally exhibits great resemblance to those qualities identified in the Concept for EU Monitoring missions of May 2003.[31]

5.1   Knowledge of English

The one shortcoming almost unanimously identified by all those interviewed was insufficient knowledge of English. The understanding of how advanced knowledge was required for the mission varied between the seconding nations. A poor command of English affected the mission negatively in many ways. Firstly, when conducting meetings about issues that were not particularly familiar to the new monitor, there was great risk for misunderstanding the message the local interlocutors wanted to convey, or the main points being lost. Second, without the necessary fluency in English, the reports forwarded up the chain were of such poor literal quality, that an unintended large amount of resources had to be directed into polishing the language. With difficulties in understanding the contents of a meeting and in summarising the most essential issues in a readable report, the monitor without professional fluency in English failed to fulfil his/her two central duties. Third, with one monitor not pulling his/her weight, it resulted in his/her peers having to carry an unfairly heavy workload. Time and time again this led to frustration and dissatisfaction within the team, affecting both the team spirit and the quality of the work negatively. Monitors lacking the necessary language skills were not able to realise their full potential regardless of how skilled they were in all other aspects. It is difficult to imagine that a monitor in such a position would find his/her position rewarding and feel professional contentment in serving the mission.

5.2   Interpersonal skills and cultural sensitivity

In addition to professional competence, paying attention to personality was seen as equally important for successful recruiting.[32] The importance of this is demonstrated by the fact that the second-most stated shortcoming among the serving monitors, mentioned in almost every interview, included poor interpersonal skills and a lack of cultural sensitivity. Most EU countries were represented among the EUMM monitors, with a big variation in age, working experience and professional background. Among the seconded monitors were people with vast international

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[31] The Concept for EU Monitoring missions lists the following qualities (notably similar to the list of EUMM identified shortcomings): familiarity with the country/region of operation; interpersonal/negotiating/diplomatic skills; skills in the mission language, as well as, where possible, in local language; report writing skills and, appropriate political analytical skills; for monitoring missions with thematic or sector focus, staff should possess the necessary specialist skills or experience, e.g. on refugee issues, human rights, in military affairs, civil-military relations etc.

[32]   Markkanen 1999, 17.

experience and people to whom serving the EUMM equaled being abroad for the very first time. All these differences in life experience were evident also in different preferences about how to go about doing the job. Without solid interpersonal skills, teams suffered from an inflammatory atmosphere, which in turn affected the quality of and the motivation for the work. Without the skills to get along with peers representing different values than oneself, on occasion the mission had to shift monitors between teams. In the worst cases, skilled monitors left the mission earlier than originally intended.

Interpersonal skills and cultural sensitivity were essential not only within the team, but also when addressing representatives of the local population. A successful team managed to build confidence between the team and the local interlocutors, making the informants feel confident to share relevant information with them. In the best case scenario, the meeting would look like an informal or semi-formal and pleasant dialogue between equals, not like an interrogation, even if the monitor was the one posing questions and not giving answers or sharing views of his/her own or of the EU. Monitors who lacked the skills to address the locals from all walks of life with due respect and understanding for the reigning circumstances, and monitors who treated their informants like instruments or objects rather than subjects, ended up causing irritation and proved less successful in collecting relevant information. Monitors without the necessary cultural sensitivity also caused embarrassment among their peers as they were seen to convey a poor image of the EU.

Among the national recruiters, none but one identified interviewing skills as something mandatory for the seconded monitor to have, despite the fact that it was the one principal thing the monitor was doing during his/her assignment. Successful interviewing is a skill that does not necessarily develop automatically just by conducting a number of interviews. Successful interviewing includes: keeping calm even when meeting interlocutors that one has nothing in common with; understanding the fact that even catching someone telling blatant lies about one thing, does not necessarily mean that he/she is untruthful when talking about another topic; and paying attention to and being able to interpret non-verbal communication. An EUMM monitor was likely to meet a lot of people in functions that he/she would ordinarily not have any contact with in his/her home country. Adapting one's tone to suit each addressed interlocutor was paramount for the successful implementation of the mandate. Developed interpersonal skills and cultural sensitivity were needed when EUMM monitors met with interlocutors that other international actors on the field had declared *persona non grata* and decided not to have any dialogue with.

5.3   Political acumen

As the principal task of ECMM/EUMM monitors shifted from monitoring the political discourse at the municipal level, to that of middle or state level, it meant that all the more political acumen was needed to fulfil the task. With the majority of

the recruited monitors still being military officers and not trained for the task they were employed for, a common – although not unanimous – view was that the mission found itself struggling to maintain quality of the reporting.

Some countries reacted by bringing in academics with theoretical knowledge of state-building or international politics. Having an academic education in political science became the prerequisite to be seconded by some participating states, whereas others used academics from a broader range of fields.

In order to avoid misunderstanding, it is important to note that the EUMM reporting was not of a theoretical but rather of a practical character, i.e. the EUMM delivered assessments which could be translated into enhancing the EU's political decision-making. Nevertheless, the necessary level of political acumen within the mission staff was still mentioned as a significant shortcoming.

It was also noted that very few of the monitors had an understanding of the EU's foreign policy and strategy, or were able to identify the link between the EUMM and the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, or the Commission. Having at least a basic understanding of the larger political framework in which the EUMM operated is believed to affect the reporting positively, making it easier for the monitor to distinguish which of all the collected information was worthwhile to forward up the chain and relevant to the final recipients of the reports.

5.4   Knowledge and understanding of the Balkans

Due to the complexity of the Balkans, no single training with one or more modules reserved for Balkan history and/or Balkan politics has been able to achieve anything greater than giving a polite introduction to the region. The historical, political and cultural complexity of the Balkans has also meant that relying on "learning on-the-job" would not automatically lead to monitors being able to understand how events and developments in their given area of responsibility interlinked or related to a greater picture. Simply getting a picture of what political parties are central in a given area, who the people behind these parties are, and what their discourse is with other local parties, would take some time to understand, let alone how the politics of the local level are linked with that of the state level.

The lack of understanding of the target area among the monitors resulted in the Analysis Section being left with a greater burden than necessary. Particularly the final recipients of the EUMM reports identified the need to recruit monitors with proper understanding of the target area as paramount, in order to achieve an end product that was of value as an additional tool in the policy formulation among all other available sources.

Although infrequent, one view that was presented was that previous knowledge of the Balkans may compromise monitors' neutrality. Curiously enough, only academic knowledge was presented as a significant risk to compromised

neutrality, whereas previous working experience in the Balkans was only seen as an asset.

5.5   Analytical skills

The EUMM was envisaged to provide background information and analysis about development in the Balkans. The analysis was ideally to begin in the teams, with additional value given to it in headquarters. However, team reports were most often seen as a word-for-word repetition of what the interviewed interlocutor had said, lacking comments or an analysis that would put the statements in a context and give them significance. Monitors who proved to be most successful were often transferred to the Analysis Section in the headquarters, given that their time or service was long enough. As the analysis from the teams were from non-existent to scarce, it was the analysis section which was then faced with fulfilling the task, something which was said to be possible only as reporting to Brussels changed from daily to weekly (in 2003), freeing the necessary resources for analysing.

Final recipients who have read the ECMM and EUMM reports for a number of years have stated that only some time after the first Council Joint Action, did the EUMM reports become analytical. Yet most report readers still described the reports as mostly descriptive, rarely or hardly including analysis. Whereas some informants valued the reports especially when they were perceived as being analytical, others felt quite satisfied with the reports as they were, some even stating that the final analysis and significance ought to be left to each individual reader.

The report readers recognised that the higher up the chain the reports came from, the more analysis they included. Nevertheless, the most useful reports were often said to come from the local levels, when interviewing less known interlocutors, noting that the information in the reports of higher levels would typically be available from a number of other sources as well.

When emphasis is put on producing analytical reports, it would require recruiting monitors who could stay in a mission longer, even up to three years.

5.6   Age limit

The juniority of monitors was mentioned a number of times as a factor threatening the credibility of the mission or weakening its performance. Many monitors would put a minimum age limit of approximately thirty years for monitors, among them monitors who themselves felt their youth and inexperience may have hindered them from making a particularly valuable contribution.

5.7   Stress management

Being away from home without one's customary social life, working in a foreign language and being in a potentially dangerous area are often stated as factors that

might cause stress when being on a mission. In that context it is worthwhile to note that the monitors expressing the most stress were those also expressing the strongest keenness to excel in their job and to seek ways to constantly improve their performance. For them the lack of instructions and guidance combined with working with poorly qualified or mediocre colleagues proved to be the most stressful factors in their monitoring functions.

6 Recommendations

It needs to be emphasised that no two missions are alike, and a tailor-made approach to both recruitment and training should be adopted for each separate mission, be it a monitoring mission or any other type of mission. The recommendations below derive from the analysis undertaken above, meaning they are based on the ECMM/EUMM experience. However, most recommendations given here are of a fairly general character and would be applicable even for missions that differ from the EUMM, possibly with slight mission-specific modifications.

6.1 Recruiting recommendations

6.1.1 Detailed qualification criteria and job description

Contrary to the OSCE, the EU lacks detailed standards that the EU civilian crisis management experts in the various fields of expertise should meet; in other words, what sort of profile they should have.[33] In the absence of such, it is essential for each mission to be able to provide the seconding states with a list of qualifications that is far more detailed than that used by the EUMM.

It is important to explicitly state both corporate competencies and personal characteristics that have been identified in the mission as mandatory for the successful implementation of duties. According to the Monitor Efficiency Form in the EUMM Standard Operating Procedures, the monitors are rated in terms of ten qualities: integrity, interpersonal skills, personal behaviour, physical fitness, sense of duty and discipline, initiative, planning and organisation skills, judgement skills, decisiveness/self-confidence and finally communication/reporting skills. Only one of the listed qualities concurs with the list of basic requirements, and that is physical fitness.

Taking into consideration the frequently changing recruitment personnel in charge of selecting national candidates, nothing should be left implicit. It is high-

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[33] OSCE has a 12-point description of the profile for a mission member working in the field of General staff/monitoring functions. The EUMM list of qualifications, in fact, resembles the general minimum requirements expected of any OSCE candidate for any field operation, rather than qualities identified for a particular known function in a given mission; see www.osce.org/employment for a comparison with the EU-identified qualities mentioned on page 14.

ly unlikely that any recruiting officer not exceptionally familiar with the special features of a mission will be able to understand that "proper physical condition" translates into interpersonal skills, cultural sensitivity and ability to work in a team and other social skills, as has been suggested to be included in "proper physical condition" in the EUMM List of qualifications.

In order for no future mission members to be taken by surprise when realising to what sort of mission he/she has been seconded, it is essential to articulate both the environment and the context in which the mission operates, the actual job description and a detailed list of qualities needed to fulfil one's duties. The list of qualities should be extended to include all such areas of expertise, skills and personal characteristics that have been identified as beneficial in a monitor (knowing that no chosen monitor would necessarily fit the entire description), rather than the absolute minimum requirements.

6.1.2 Encouraging self-evaluation

Identifying qualifications including not only educational background and years of working experience, but also desired attitudes and motivation, should be followed by detailing the actual job description and articulating all of this in a written document. This document should be made available for all candidates seeking secondment to support self-selection. In other words, it is not enough for recruiters to be aware of these qualities. Self-evaluation should be an automatic step of each recruiting process, regardless of whether candidates are found on a roster or by other means. If a potential candidate fails to see him-/herself fulfilling a particular job as it is described, and decides not to compete for the post, the first step of self-regulated quality control has been achieved. Whereas roster inclusion is passive, active application is not effortless. Thus any number of applications should be seen as more valuable than screening the same number of roster entries, for whom motivation, timing, family situation and other rapidly changing factors are unlikely to show in the roster.

Following self-selection, mission- or function-specific challenges need to be dealt with again when interviewing candidates and thirdly in training, all in order to reinforce the image of possible challenges awaiting the future mission member, and minimise surprises.

6.1.3 Adjusting profile to changed circumstances

Many participating states have clung to the idea of "one-size-fits-all" and consequently not modified the profile of the seconded monitors from the beginning of the ECMM to the end of the EUMM, despite the circumstances and the monitored issues having undergone quite a significant change during the 16.5 years of operation.[34] In order to ensure getting the right kind of people for the right mission,

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[34] See comparisons with the OSCE by Gourlay (2006, 22) and EUPM as described in the International Crisis Group report: Bosnia's Stalled Police Reform (2005, 13) and in Future of ESDP: Lessons from Bosnia (2006, 1).

it is of utmost importance to update the list of criteria and the job description on a regular basis to fit the current needs and the current vacancies.

It should be recognised that recruiting systems designed to cater for a variety of circumstances are unlikely to be the best choice for any particular mission, but in order for missions to be effective and efficient, seconding states ought to adopt a more tailor-made approach in their recruitments. This is to be emphasised in areas with a long-lasting mission presence, which is the case in the Balkans. As a consequence of the fall of Yugoslavia, member states, particularly their universities, came to produce numerous new experts, for whom secondment has not been possible due to the member states' sticking to a once adopted system of recruitment. The smaller the mission, the more crucial it is that each secondee's contribution can be counted on, as there is little to no room to hide misfits. It is essential to recognise that there are tasks for which a valuable contribution requires secondments exceeding six months or even a year, a limitation which is frequent among military recruitments.

6.1.4 Dialogue and measures

In case the seconding body itself is unlikely to initiate the necessary change in their method of recruiting, it is recommended that the respective foreign ministry in conjunction with the mission and a possible national contingent within the mission take a joint position and make a strong recommendation to allow for mission-specific exceptions.

For diplomatic reasons, the national contingents and seconding states ought to be the driving force behind such change. Nevertheless, when seconding states clearly fail to deliver in accordance with agreements and expectations, the mission must have a mechanism for quality control, which allows it to refuse or send back staff who clearly lack the necessary competence, and to do so without having to fear that new and better candidates will not be put forward. The passing of an English test via telephone prior to deployment should be an easy matter if there is not a massive recruitment taking place at one time. No mission members ought to be seconded without any sort of competition, testing and comparison of candidates. If a certain number of seats are reserved for a particular nationality, it should be advised that a minimum of two or three candidates per seat be presented to the Head of Mission to choose from. All candidates must naturally meet at least the minimum requirements for such a practice to have meaning.

6.1.5 Adding transparency and visibility

The use of rosters has created an image of secrecy rather than transparency in the recruiting process. Some chosen candidates have stated how a lucky personal contact to the right person at the right time has been the reason for secondment. As this may favour returning mission members, it may reflect positively on the quality of secondments. Nevertheless, as rosters need to be managed in order to be

functional, it also calls for some active strategy to ensure the right target groups enrol in the rosters. One particular country's monitors got much praise for being the most qualified ones. This happened after introducing the practice of going the extra mile to look for experts on the target area outside the existing roster. In light of the fact that there has repeatedly been Balkan experts who have not registered themselves onto rosters as seeking crisis management positions, but by some act of fate heard of and ended up in the EUMM, having blind faith in the roster's omnipotence may mean that the greatest experts found nationally never get seconded. Actively attracting new target groups in order to broaden the pool of talent should be part of the strategy to manage rosters.

Equally essential is to recognise that with rosters growing, it becomes more likely that recruiters stop searching for candidates when they find someone "good enough", rather than screening all potential candidates in order to ensure finding the most qualified one. One means to address this is to develop the rosters into an interactive channel of information. Making all posts public to those registered would allow for candidates to do self-evaluation as the first step in the recruiting process. Interactive rosters would further work as a means to inform about related training events, seminars or publications which could be of interest to those registered and add to their competence.

6.1.6 The timing of recruiting

If the time between recruitment and deployment is to be seen as an opportunity to become familiarised with the area, the task and the background, then the recruiting must take place more than 1-2 months ahead of deployment. As a recommendation, it would be useful to aim for the selection to be made 3-4 months ahead of time, which would allow the selected persons to familiarise themselves somewhat with what lies ahead, something many interviewed monitors stated they have had the interest in doing, but lacked the time.

6.1.7 Testing qualities

Qualities and skills which cannot be trained in a matter of one or two weeks, and which should be up to a certain standard when entering a mission, rather than to be developed or improved during it, should be tested nationally. The command of the mission language is something which should unquestionably correspond to the identified level of English needed for the mission or the task. However, one must recognise that test results that are years old tend to give a more flattering picture than what the current command of English in reality is. Therefore, language testing should be made part of the selection process.

The general fluency in English ought to be tested when interviewing short-listed candidates. In order to get the full picture, it is highly recommended to also include a task in writing English, in which the candidate would be faced with a mission-typical text and would need to produce a summary or response to it, as

appropriate. It is essential that the level of English is up to a professional level, including specialised vocabulary.

In case the recruiters are not equipped to assess the sufficiency of knowledge in the written English test, it would be advisory to develop a system where the receiving mission has staff to evaluate the performance as sufficient or insufficient. In such a case, it would be worthwhile to include, for example, the testing of analytical skills or of the knowledge of the target area if applicable, in the same task as when testing English skills. As an alternative, competent returning mission members could be trained to be used as judges of such skills.

Standardised language testing on the candidates' own initiative could be used as an alternative, but is not seen as the best solution, as test results do not age well, and thus candidates may not even themselves be aware of a possible deterioration of their language skills over the years. It is, of course, natural that the knowledge of English will improve according to mission specifics during the time of service. The necessary language knowledge should, however, be gained on refreshed before deployment to avoid losing valuable time in the mission.

6.2   Training recommendations

6.2.1 Sharing responsibility for training

When faced with the lack of guidance, especially right after deployment, interviewed monitors tended to blame the mission for poor training. Few informants recognised that the sending nations could or should have had a greater role in providing or extending the pre-mission training.

Whenever a mission lasts for several years and the rotation of staff can be characterised as high, a good practice would be for the mission and the seconding states to agree on the sharing of training responsibility. As many interviewed monitors said the amount of information given in a short period of time is too overwhelming to absorb, duplication of training should not necessarily be seen as a problem in any other respect than that it uses resources. If the mission is stretched and only allows very little time for training, it becomes essential to focus on mission-specific and function-specific issues, and entrust member states to cover other basic and generic training needs like the unchanging or slowly changing issues, such as the use of radios, how to work with interpreters and stress management.

Giving the seconding nations the responsibility to provide minimum training equalling the time of the mission training, would be a good rule of thumb to use, at the same time recognising that two days of in-mission training is not enough. Pre-mission and in-mission curricula would be developed in tight cooperation between the mission and the seconding states, or ideally the EU would develop a commonly agreed paper with recommendations for standardised pre-mission training. This is not to say that every seconding nation has to develop their own

training sessions, especially if only one or a few people are seconded at a time. A better alternative when the number of recruits is small is to concentrate the training in one or more seconding nations at a time, and for other seconding nations to buy their training services, when unable to provide training themselves.

6.2.2 Additions to training curricula

Depending on who is asked, the most central additions or improvements to the training curricula vary. Monitors in the field recognise particular needs, whereas their superiors recognise different ones; monitors with a military background seek reassurance in other matters than do civilians. One could draw parallels to the anecdote of the replies given by two men asked what they were doing, as they were seen working: one stated he was carrying bricks from one side of the river to the other, whereas the other replied by saying he was building a church.

The issues below have been mentioned in numerous interviews as desired training additions.

Interviewing techniques

As interviewing interlocutors is the main tool for monitors, the most often stated additional training need was to have not only the team leader but a true professional to teach about interviewing techniques. Things that monitors felt would be useful to know particularly included how to read things between the lines, things that are not explicitly said, but things that may be conveyed by not stating something or by non-verbal communication. How to recognise if a source is reliable? How to know what topics to avoid with particular interlocutors? How to interpret what is being said through the corresponding "cultural lens"?

Equally important is to realise that each monitor's own behaviour and communication will affect the success of the interview. Monitors ought to understand how a well prepared set of questions may lead to different outcomes depending on the use of encouragement, interruption and/or silence, as well as the form and order in which questions are being posed.[35] Interviewees may feel obliged to state things they feel the interviewer wants to hear, socially acceptable things that may differ from the actual state of facts.[36] Assessing what the interviewee is stating to his/her position is one way to try to determine the trustworthiness of the interviewed interlocutor.[37]

As many mission members other than just monitors will be using interviewing as a tool in their job, it is recommended that interviewing techniques be added to the curricula for core courses in civilian crisis management. Although both military and civilians recognised the need for training in interviewing skills, civilians often emphasised the need for theoretical knowledge, whereas military

[35] Hakkarainen & Hyvärinen 1999, 99–108.
[36] Kuutti 2002, 118.
[37] Kuutti 2002, 134–135.

emphasised the necessity of practical training in face-to-face interviewing situations.

Working with interpreters versus working with international staff

Almost as often mentioned, but invariably by different informants, typically senior staff not using interpreters on a daily basis themselves, was the need to increase or improve training on how to best work with interpreters.

In addition to training international staff in how to work with interpreters (often including a warning that especially in a newly set up mission, the quality of interpreters may leave much to be desired), it is recommended to develop training for the interpreters on how to work with international staff. It is known that local interpreters may find it difficult to be unbiased. Nevertheless, using their local know-how in conveying impressions received at the interview is still seen as a safer bet than trying to train internationals possibly without previous experience in the target area's culture to read non-verbal signals.

The fact of the matter is that the only guidance given by the ECMM and the EUMM to the local interpreters has been to hand over a Code of Conduct in conjunction with the contract of employment. Thereafter the new monitors inform the interpreters of their own preferred way of working, which has at times meant an adjustment of the style of working every few months. In order to avoid such a lack of uniformity of standards, in order to streamline expectations and to improve the joint team performance, it would be worthwhile to ensure that international staff and interpreters are trained the same way. Rather than having monitors dictate personal preferences regarding the style of interpretation, interpreters could be used to train internationals on how to achieve the best possible result.

Who benefits from the monitoring, how and why?

Questions needing clarification include putting the daily work in a larger context. Several monitors stated that they were there to help the local people, but were not able to elaborate how the monitoring benefited the population. The questions needing answers included: Who reads the reports? What information are they interested in? How are they going to use the information that the mission provides? Whom does the EUMM work for? What is the framework in which the mission operates? Not only field monitors felt a need to get these questions clarified, but also mission members working in the Analysis Section noted that monitors' perception of what Brussels is expecting often differs significantly from theirs.

Whenever possible, it would be advisable for the monitors to meet a representative to personalise "Brussels and the capitals". In the fairly rare cases where a monitor met with someone within their respective Ministry for Foreign Affairs, who in fact received the reports, it has been said to have a motivating effect, especially if the ministry official explained what sort of reporting he/she anticipated. Striving for this to become common practice in

the sending nations is highly recommended. The mission should not count on a brief overview at induction training to make monitors knowledgeable enough about the context in which they work. Such training should be extended and reinforced.

More specifics on the target area and target issues

Even if a monitor had significant background knowledge about the Balkans, the likelihood on him/her knowing the updated specifics of the actual given area of responsibility were slim. Leaving mission members have on a number of occasions proved to be unable or unwilling to give newly arriving monitors a comprehensive picture of the background and of issues relevant to monitor. Monitors have stated that the lack of essential documents to get familiarised with has slowed down their understanding of their target area.

Surprisingly, the monitors interviewed did not mention the need to be trained in specific monitoring issues, such as war crimes, exhumations, issues concerning refugees and internally displaced people, parallel institutions, the privatisation process, property legislation, education, or election implementation, just to mention a few issues many a field monitor would likely have dealt with on their tour of duty but less likely to have dealt with in their ordinary day jobs. There is reason to question how valid the contribution can be, when addressing such a variety of issues, without related background education or training in these issues from a Balkan perspective.

The ECMM/EUMM was an atypical monitoring mission in that it did not have strictly a single focus, like human rights monitoring, media monitoring or border monitoring, but covered a wide variety of issues. The spectrum narrowed, however, during the EUMM times. Although the variety of monitoring issues meant great challenges for any training, it is recommended for future training to increase the focus on what is being monitored, in order to increase monitors' understanding about the field they are monitoring and on which they are expected to report.

Training of trainers and stress management

As the role of guiding newcomers is an essential part of any monitor's duties, it should be included in the job description and duly supported in order to ensure newcomers get the desired systematic and effective reception. The levels above field teams were expected to give far more guidance, instructions and feedback than what was the case. As a method to support new monitors, as a way to compare notes about the politics driven and other monitored issues in a given area and its links and relations to higher level politics or neighbouring areas, it would be useful for superiors from headquarters to visit and talk to field staff more. The need had been acknowledged for a number of years, but had not been addressed due to a lack of resources. As most people are not natural born trainers or leaders, it is recommended to include a training of trainers system focusing not only on training skills and facts, but also on the motivation and reassuring of unconfident monitors.

Although stress management was covered in most training, it was evident in a number of the interviews how the most qualified and motivated monitors had taken upon themselves to bear such a heavy burden, that it was affecting their health. Frustration and exhaustion were mentioned especially when referring to the heavy workload leaving monitors short of achieving their own ambitions about their work. Something especially disappointing was the amount of time and effort having to be directed to motivate and reassure incompetent or unconfident monitors, something which was perceived as an unintended and unwelcome addition to the job load. Therefore it is suggested to add to the job description the assessing of newcomers' competence and their coaching into their new role. Stress management training, particularly related to coping with working with poorly performing staff, needs to be improved.

6.2.3 Individualising training

With mission members being recruited individually more often than in a group, tending to their training needs nationally prior to deployment requires a new way thinking. Although training would ideally include practical exercises with peers, certain training can be arranged without the use of multiple trainers, and it does not necessarily have to be bound to a given time and place.

A recommendation to train repatriated mission members to give an individual briefing to future mission members in accordance with an agreed curricula, is one way to ensure that no one is deployed without any general training at all.

Continuing the development and use of a mission-specific training CD, as the EUMM did, is strongly recommended. However, the distribution needs to be improved in order for selected mission members to familiarise themselves with the content on their own prior to deployment.

6.2.4 Developing new e-learning tools

In order to carry out more effective quality control, it is recommended to develop e-learning modules, which would work especially well in case the time between recruitment and deployment is short.[38] E-learning has the benefit of being rerun at any time the mission member needs to refresh his/her knowledge and in the long-run e-learning is also cost-effective.

If for logistical reasons it is difficult to gather a large number of mission members in one place, thematic e-learning modules could well be developed to be used as a supportive means for remedial training during the mission. E-learning could be used particularly for long-term mission members, as existing face-to-face training tends to cater primarily to the superficial needs of fast-rotating staff members. To

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[38] One good example of an e-learning module is the introduction to ESDP developed by the Geneva Centre of Security Policy, available at http://www.esdp-course.ethz.ch/access/start/index.cfm.

achieve this, missions are recommended to cooperate closely with training institutions with the capability to develop new e-based training material.

7   Concluding remarks

Without questioning the usefulness of training, it is safe to say that no amount of pre-mission or in-mission training affects mission success to the same extent as a proper recruiting process does. Neither core civilian crisis management training, which is first and foremost designed to provide a general introduction to a wide variety of issues, nor function-specific training of a few days, can compete with relevant knowledge and experience gained over a matter of years. Thus, in ensuring mission success, one must start by putting recruitment under the spotlight. For the best possible results, the required qualifications must be set far higher than what the EUMM did. Achieving, or at least getting closer to excellence, requires setting the bar at the highest possible level which will still make it possible to find the necessary number of candidates.

On the other hand, as working with civilian crisis management means dealing with cross-disciplinary issues, no single educational background or working experience will in itself guarantee having a proper understanding of the specifics awaiting mission members in the field. Simply copying one's ordinary working methodology to a mission environment, without paying due attention to the local circumstances, is bound to lead to failure. Therefore, the utmost effort should be made to ensure no one is deployed without due pre-mission training. Furthermore, training provides an excellent opportunity to assess certain essential skills, like how the potential future mission member acts as a member of a group.

Comparing a few national training curricula with what monitors have claimed to be able to take in, remember and use when applicable, there seems to be quite a gap. Although most training will logically take place prior to deployment, it is advisable to see training as a systematic approach to the increasing of competence and as a continuum, rather than a single event, limited to a time and place. Pre-mission and mission induction training should therefore be supported by remedial training. In trying to achieve the greatest possible impact of the working efforts of mission members, a certain amount of investment needs to be made.

A lot of focus is being put on training for the Broader Rule of Law mission in Kosovo. The mission is designed to contribute to an improvement in the local society, not just to report about changes as was the case with the EUMM. In addition to monitoring, selected mission members will have a mentoring and advising role as well (and in some case executive powers). This adds new human requirements to the profile of the ideal mission member and equally adds new challenges for training to cover.

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All the notes and recordings are in the possession of the author at the CMC Finland.

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