

CMC Finland Civilian Crisis Management Studies  
Volume 1: Number 5/2008

Oskari Eronen

# **PRT Models in Afghanistan**

## **Approaches to Civil-Military Integration**

**CMC**Finland

**Kriisinhallintakeskus**  
Crisis Management Centre

ISSN 1797-2140

# CMC Finland Civilian Crisis Management Studies

## **Publication Editor**

- *Kirsi Henriksson*, Head of Research and Development, CMC Finland

## **Editorial Board**

- *Ari Kerkkänen*, Director, CMC Finland
- *Hannu Rantanen*, Research Director, Emergency Services College
- *Jari Mustonen*, Senior Researcher, CMC Finland
- *Senja Korhonen*, Training Officer, CMC Finland
- *Ville-Veikko Pitkänen*, Researcher, CMC Finland
- *Olivia Šetkić*, Research Coordinator, CMC Finland

## **Advisory Board**

- Researcher *Cedric de Coening*, Accord, South-Africa & NUPI, Norway
- Emeritus Professor *Reijo E. Heinonen*, Faculty of Theology, University of Joensuu, Finland
- General Secretary *Kristiina Kumpula*, Finnish Red Cross
- Professor *Liisa Laakso*, Department of Political Science, University of Helsinki, Finland
- Senior Researcher *Kari Laitinen*, The Police College of Finland
- Professor, Director *Tuomo Melasuo*, Tampere Peace Research Institute, Finland
- Docent, Lecturer *Pertti Multanen*, Institute of Development Studies, University of Helsinki, Finland
- Docent *Arto Nokkala*, National Defence University, Finland
- Programme Director *Hanna Ojanen*, The Finnish Institute of International Affairs
- Senior Advisor *Christer Pursiainen*, Permanent Secretariat, Council of the Baltic Sea States, Sweden
- Programme Director *Kristiina Rintakoski*, Crisis Management Initiative
- State Secretary (Political) *Teija Tiilikainen*, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland
- Professor *Jarmo Toiskallio*, National Defence University, Finland
- Docent *Pekka Visuri*, National Defence University, Finland
- Academy Research Fellow *Tarja Väyrynen*, Institute for Social Research, University of Tampere, Finland

© CMC Finland

Cover design: Comma Group Oy

Layout: Kirsi Henriksson



# CONTENT

## Abbreviations

<b>1 Introduction</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>2 Short history of PRTs</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>3 PRT mission and tasks</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>4 Present variety of PRTs</b>	
4.1 <i>Listing PRTs</i>	9
4.2 <i>Institutional framework on the home front</i>	10
4.3 <i>Local conditions</i>	12
4.4 <i>Presence of other troops</i>	13
<b>5 Generic PRT models</b>	
5.1 <i>American</i>	14
5.2 <i>German</i>	18
5.3 <i>British(-Nordic)</i>	20
5.4 <i>Turkish</i>	23
<b>6 PRTs under scrutiny</b>	
6.1 <i>Research on PRTs</i>	24
6.2 <i>Incoherence of models</i>	25
6.3 <i>Capacity in reconstruction and development</i>	27
6.4 <i>Whole-of-government approach</i>	28
6.5 <i>Blurring of civilian and military roles</i>	31
6.6 <i>PRT as a security provider?</i>	33
6.7 <i>Integration of capacities</i>	34

<b>7 The way forward</b>	36
<i>7.1 Coherence</i>	37
<i>7.2 Afghanisation</i>	37
<i>7.3 Civilianisation</i>	39
<i>7.4 Future of the integrated concept</i>	40
<b>8 Future research</b>	41
<b>Annexes</b>	
<i>A ISAF troops</i>	43
<i>B Generic PRT models</i>	45
<b>References</b>	47

## Abbreviations

ACBAR	Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief
AIA	Afghan Interim Administration
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANP	Afghan National Police
CA	Civil Affairs
CERP	Commander's Emergency Response Program
CFC-A	Coalition Force Command – Afghanistan
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation
CJCMOTF	Coalition Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force
CMC	Crisis Management Centre Finland
CMCO	Civil-Military Coordination
CORDS	Civil Operations and Rural Development Support
CSTC-A	Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DfID	Department for International Development
DIAG	Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ESF	Economic Support Funds
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FSB	Forward Support Base
GOA	Government of Afghanistan
IO	International Organisation
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
LGCD	Local Governance and Community Development
MoD	Ministry of Defence
Mol	Ministry of Interior
MOT	Mobile Observation Team
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OHDACA	Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
PRT ESC	PRT Executive Steering Committee
QIP	Quick Impact Project
RC	Regional Command
SAS	Sections Administratives Spécialisées
SCR	Senior Civilian Representative (NATO)
SRSO	Special Representative of Secretary General (UN)
SSR	Security Sector Reform
SU	Stabilisation Unit
ToR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
USACE	United States Army Corps of Engineers
USAID	United States Agency for International Development



# PRT models in Afghanistan

## Approaches to civil-military integration

Oskari Eronen<sup>1</sup>

*Advisor for Security and Development,  
Political Department, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland*

The 26 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in Afghanistan combine military and civilian capacities in crisis management. This article gives an overview of the mission and history of the teams, presenting more closely four generic PRT models. The flexibility of the concept has developed into an incoherent network of lead-nation-driven units which could run counterproductive to Afghan ownership and the comprehensiveness of international efforts. While in need of reform, the PRTs in general provide an interesting and unprecedented model for civil-military integration at the field level.

### 1 Introduction

A NATO-led *International Security Assistance Force* (ISAF) has been operating in Afghanistan since January 2002. Starting from a small task force to secure the capital, Kabul, it has grown to cover the entire country. NATO's prime operation commands 52,000 soldiers and has assumed a broad range of duties from counterinsurgency to stabilisation and reconstruction.

The latter tasks are crystallised in 26 *Provincial Reconstruction Teams* (PRT) that ISAF has across the country. ISAF describes PRT as a joint civil-military unit operating at the provincial level and led by an ISAF member nation<sup>2</sup>. PRTs are intended to monitor their areas of responsibility, support security sector reform and better governance, and enable reconstruction and development. PRT lead nations total 14, which has resulted in a variety of organisations in terms of the functions and resources available. Each PRT has its own recognisable national features, resulting in a vibrant but vexing reality of diverse units. Fashioning novel approaches to civil-military integration, PRTs have become a topic of constant debate.

---

<sup>1</sup> The article was finished in August 2008. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the views of the Crisis Management Centre Finland.

<sup>2</sup> ISAF 2007, 3.

It could be asked whether PRTs remain in the framework of military crisis management or endeavour to establish a wider form of post-conflict stabilisation. Answers to the question vary between different stakeholders: ISAF, PRT lead nation governments and branches of these, the Afghan people and government, NGOs, the United Nations, and independent academia. In numbers, PRTs evidently appear to be military units: on average, civilians make up only some 5% of the total personnel. However, the PRT mission statement goes far beyond the military domain and requires also competent civilian activities.

This paper looks at PRTs from a wide crisis management angle. The main objective is to examine the current PRT concept and various approaches to integrating civilian and military crisis management within a PRT framework. In broader terms, a “PRT model” also includes the ways participating nations organise their development and reconstruction efforts in their PRT geographic areas of responsibility. Four generic PRT models are outlined: American, German, British-Nordic and Turkish. The paper also surveys the field of international research on PRTs and introduces a few topical points of criticism towards PRTs in Afghanistan.

The scope of the paper is limited to only cover PRTs in Afghanistan. The units under the Coalition in Iraq should be studied separately. Although civil-military relations are a source of timely and continuously debated topics, such as the PRTs’ interaction with the local populace, this paper will not address such issues in detail. The focus is on how the PRTs are organised internally with regards to the civil-military integration and how the PRT lead nations apply their integrated approach in provinces. To implement ISAF’s mission in a certain area does not only include running a PRT; it has gradually turned into the building up of a multifaceted support package for the province in terms of development aid, governance support and political lobbying in Kabul.

This study of selected PRT models in Afghanistan is largely based on publicly available research papers, studies, articles and documents from multiple sources written in the last few years. In addition, the author’s personal experiences as a political advisor in PRT Meymaneh<sup>3</sup> and PRT Mazar-e Sharif during 2006–2007 lay the foundations for the study. The actual effectiveness of different models cannot be analysed on these grounds as it would necessitate much more detailed research and interviews in the field. The approach here is consequently more conceptual, looking at how PRTs are designed and depicted. Assessments of the quality of their functions are drawn from other studies.

## 2 Short history of PRTs

Afghanistan made a sudden comeback into the spotlight of international politics in September 2001. Terrorist attacks in the United States were soon tracked down to

---

<sup>3</sup> The great variety of transliterations of Afghan names must be acknowledged. For the sake of clarity, the text will hereafter follow versions used by NATO in the *ISAF PRT Handbook*.



Al-Qaeda, an international network whose top leaders and training centres had been operating in Afghanistan for several years. The Taliban regime's horrifying human rights violations had already broken the news, but it was 9/11 that lifted Afghanistan back to world attention. The Taliban hosted enemies of the only superpower in the world.

To seize the leading Al-Qaeda terrorists and to dismantle the Taliban regime, a US-led coalition called *Operation Enduring Freedom* (OEF) started a military campaign in Afghanistan on 7 October 2001. Taliban fighters rapidly lost control over vast parts of the land, the main ground force being US-backed Northern Afghan militias. Enjoying a UN Security Council mandate, OEF continued fighting remnants of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, especially pursuing Osama bin Laden.

Simultaneously with military success, the political future of Afghanistan remained to be settled. The international community prepared a conference in Bonn, Germany, assembling most of the political and ethnic groups in Afghanistan. As a result, the Bonn Agreement established the *Afghan Interim Authority* (AIA) and cleared the way for the constitutional process in the next three years. Hamid Karzai, an ethnic Pashtun from Kandahar, was inaugurated as Chairman of the AIA.

As requested in the Bonn Agreement and recognising the need to support the fragile political compromise built, the United Nations Security Council issued Resolution 1386 on 20 December 2001. Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, it authorised the establishment

“of an International Security Assistance Force to assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas, so that the Afghan Interim Authority as well as the personnel of the United Nations can operate in a secure environment.”<sup>4</sup>

For almost two years ISAF remained a rather small force of just 5,000 located in Kabul. OEF continued operating throughout the country, though its permanent presence was limited to the Kabul region and a few bigger cities in the east and southeast of the country. Both the UN and the AIA Chairman Karzai proposed an extension of ISAF to cover the entire country. The USA disagreed, arguing that not enough international troops would be available. Unwilling itself to direct more substantial resources to Afghanistan and suffering from the feeble success of the combat operations of OEF, the USA started to develop alternatives<sup>5</sup>. In broad terms, the American thinking was in line with the UN approach, crafted under the term “light footprint” by the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General (SRSG) at that time, Lakhdar Brahimi. PRTs emerged from these discussions of how “to spread the ‘ISAF effect’ without expanding ISAF itself.”<sup>6</sup>

<sup>4</sup> United Nations Security Council 2001.

<sup>5</sup> Gauster 2007, 19.

<sup>6</sup> McNerney 2005, 32.

PRTs presented a light version of a presence deemed to better suit the Afghan context that was not permissive to robust peace-enforcement in any wide projection. The refusal to accept an enduring foreign influence has been recurrent in Afghan history

Even if PRTs appear to be quite a novel remedy to broad problems of instability and acutely immature government in a war-torn country, they are sometimes said to have early ancestors. Robert M. Cassidy has studied counterinsurgency strategies and the use of indigenous forces in a number of post-World War II cases. He asserts that PRTs may have forerunners in Algeria and Vietnam. The French-created *Sections Administratives Spécialisées* (SAS) and the US *Civil Operations and Rural Development Support* (CORDS) are in some respects similar to PRTs in Afghanistan. These early precursors were trained to intervene and support locals in governance, justice, infrastructure and agriculture. CORDS, for example, included USAID experts, just like the American PRTs today. They were to some extent able to win hearts and minds or to “hold the countryside by pacifying and securing the population.”<sup>7</sup>

In somewhat the same fashion, the ISAF PRT Handbook describes a PRT as:

“a civil-military institution that is able to penetrate the more unstable and insecure areas because of its military component and is able to stabilize these areas because of the combined capabilities of its diplomacy, military, and economic components.”<sup>8</sup>

The same Handbook tells that an early PRT concept was borne out of the *Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells* (CHLCs) established already in 2002. CHLCs operated under OEF’s *Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force* (CJCMOTF). Staffed with only 10–12 persons, these military teams provided information on humanitarian needs, coordinated aid with military operations and implemented small projects.<sup>9</sup> Later on, the teams were joined by US Department of State and USAID representatives.

The first concept of a “Joint Regional Team” was developed in November 2002 into “Provisional Reconstruction Teams” which began working in Gardez, Kunduz and Bamian. After a few months in a pilot phase, the name was finally changed to Provincial Reconstruction Teams<sup>10</sup>, deriving reportedly from President Karzai, who said: “Warlords rule regions, governors rule provinces.” The main emphasis was on reconstruction, which Karzai wanted to see PRTs chiefly engaging in.<sup>11</sup> Maybe he even foresaw an opportunity for governors to demand more reconstruction money for their provinces and play the PRTs against each other – as is happening at the very moment<sup>12</sup>.

<sup>7</sup> Cassidy 2006, 53–54, 56.

<sup>8</sup> ISAF 2007, 5.

<sup>9</sup> ISAF 2007, D-2-1.

<sup>10</sup> *Reliefweb* 2003.

<sup>11</sup> McNerney 2005, 36.

<sup>12</sup> *IWPR* 2007; *Irinnews* 2007a.

The first teams were established under US-led OEF in early 2003. As the PRT Handbook remarks, the first four locations were chosen strategically: Gardez (ethnically Pashtun dominated southeast), Kunduz (northern Tajiks), Bamian (central Hazaras) and Mazar-e Sharif (northern Uzbeks)<sup>13</sup>. The latter was launched by the UK in July 2003. The US PRT outreach continued with four other strategically important spots: Bagram, Herat, Jalalabad and Kandahar.

NATO took command of ISAF in August 2003. Two months later, at the request of the AIA and NATO, the UN Security Council issued Resolution 1510 authorising ISAF expansion outside Kabul. Backed up by the Resolution, NATO commenced planning for expansion first to the north. This was to take place through PRTs, a concept OEF had just proved useful. In December 2003 one of the first three pioneering units, PRT Kunduz, was transferred to ISAF command and taken over by Germany. That was, however, not the first PRT handover since the US had turned PRT Bamian over to New Zealand already in September 2003.

The first PRT to be established as part of ISAF was the German-led PRT Feyzabad in the remote and mountainous Badakhshan province. At the same time, UK-led Mazar-e Sharif was absorbed into ISAF command and a new PRT Meymaneh was carved out from its area of responsibility. The year 2004 saw altogether 11 new PRTs being established.<sup>14</sup> Afghan presidential elections in autumn 2004 on their part consolidated PRTs' status as a useful tool in state-building<sup>15</sup>.

ISAF was further expanded to the west in summer 2005. The process put new lead nations onto the ISAF map when Italy, Spain and Lithuania organised their own PRTs. At the same time, the PRT extension was continued with two new OEF units established in the east.<sup>16</sup>

NATO's plan was to spread the ISAF presence to cover all of Afghanistan. Reaching out to the south started already in late 2005 and continued in 2006 as the UK handed over its two units in the north and prepared to concentrate on the southern Helmand province, where it assumed command of an originally US-established PRT in May 2006. Also the Netherlands relocated from the north and Canada from Kabul to take over PRTs under the Regional Command South. The northern PRTs were assumed by Norway, Sweden and Hungary. Finally, ISAF took over responsibility for all the PRTs in Afghanistan in October 2006. Previously OEF-owned PRTs in the east were shifted to the NATO-led operation.<sup>17</sup>

After the three-year process to transform the international military presence in Afghanistan, the majority of operations are now, in autumn 2008, commanded by NATO/ISAF, covering also most of those directed against the Taliban. OEF

---

<sup>13</sup> ISAF 2007, D-2-2.

<sup>14</sup> ISAF 2007, D-2-3, D-3-2.

<sup>15</sup> Stapleton 2007, 24.

<sup>16</sup> ISAF 2007, D-2-3.

<sup>17</sup> ISAF 2007, D-2-3/4.

in Afghanistan has been reduced in numbers and scope of operations, but still operates with a force of thousands. OEF is represented by *Coalition Force Command – Afghanistan* (CFC-A), which includes, for example, the *Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan* (CSTC-A), a strong task force to support the reconstitution of the *Afghan National Army* (ANA) and *Police* (ANP).

In November 2006, the PRT community was expanded by a Turkish newcomer when a civilian PRT was established in the Vardak province. The Czech Republic assumed PRT responsibilities in Lowgar, south of Kabul, in March 2008. Subsequently, two provinces have remained uncovered by a PRT: Daykondi in central Afghanistan and Nimruz in the southwest.

All PRTs are, at this writing, under the ISAF military chain of command. It should be noted, though, that this military chain of command only applies to the military units – not the civilians embedded into the PRT structures. It can also be questioned how much of the central (ISAF) military command structure is actually effective over the nationally commanded troops supporting and stationed in the PRTs. In addition to the Kabul-based military command structure headed by the Commander of ISAF, the echelons closest to PRTs are four *Regional Commands* (RC) established in 2006: RC North, RC West, RC South and RC East. The fifth RC is the Capital (RC C), but there are no PRTs formed in Kabul. The RCs are answerable to ISAF Headquarters in Kabul. The regional echelons command not only the PRTs but also various other units like manoeuvre battalions, logistical units and other support elements. Some of these assets, together with the respective PRTs, may form nation-driven task forces under the RCs, such as the Canadian Task Force in Kandahar.

The PRT concept became truly international in November 2005 when it was adopted in Iraq by the US-led coalition. Since the introduction of the “New Way Forward” plan in Iraq, there currently are 31 PRTs covering all the 18 Iraqi provinces. Manning of the PRTs differs somewhat from those in Afghanistan, units in Iraq being much smaller (26 persons in average) and containing more civilian staff. Altogether 13 PRTs in Iraq are embedded into combat troops (ePRTs), while the rest are led by civilians. These dual features present a substantial alteration from the models used in Afghanistan.<sup>18</sup>

### 3 PRT mission and tasks

The United Nations Security Council amended and expanded ISAF’s mandate to cover regions outside the Afghan capital Kabul in October 2003. By that time, the first PRTs had been operating under the US-led Coalition’s OEF for more than half a year. Although Resolution 1510 did not mention PRTs, it prepared the way for the establishment of the first ISAF PRTs and set ISAF’s mission for the next years. Security Council Resolution 1510 stated:

<sup>18</sup> US Department of State 2007a; Perito 2007, 1–6; Perito 2008.

“Stressing also the importance of extending central government authority to all parts of Afghanistan, of comprehensive disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of all armed factions, and of security sector reform including reconstitution of the new Afghan National Army and Police,

– –

[The Council authorizes the] expansion of the mandate of the International Security Assistance Force to allow it, as resources permit, to support the Afghan Transitional Authority and its successors in the maintenance of security in areas of Afghanistan outside of Kabul and its environs, so that the Afghan Authorities as well as the personnel of the United Nations and other international civilian personnel engaged, in particular, in reconstruction and humanitarian efforts, can operate in a secure environment, and to provide security assistance for the performance of other tasks in support of the Bonn Agreement.”<sup>19</sup>

In short, the Council gave ISAF a mission to expand outside of Kabul in order to create security conditions for aid and to support the slow spreading out of Afghan government authority to provinces that were controlled by warlords armed to the teeth. The latter, in its essence, is a political mission. Following the UN-preferred light footprint approach to Afghanistan<sup>20</sup>, it requires not only military capabilities but skilful local diplomacy and sponsoring of the Afghan government. PRT is a tool of “robust military diplomacy,” Peter Viggo Jakobsen argues<sup>21</sup>. It thus deviates from the neutrality principle of traditional peacekeeping.

Who, then, opposed this mandate? Writing of counterinsurgency strategies, David J. Clark and Raymond A. Millen observe that the creation of PRT webs in Afghanistan and Iraq follows an “oil spot strategy.”

“This technique – – employs pockets of civil-military teams including police, administrators, and soldiers in clusters throughout the country. The object is to gradually expand from these locations by conducting pacification operations in the surrounding areas. In theory, the clusters will become contiguous as the insurgency melts away.”<sup>22</sup>

The oil spot scheme corresponds in its form with realities in Afghanistan, but it might miss the real target of such a strategy. For the UN and the enlarging ISAF, the enemy was not insurgency, but potentially old warlords and criminals that threatened the rule of the Afghan central government and the outreach of its authority to the provinces. ISAF’s master plan from 2003 onwards was to balance and gradually shrink warlords’ powerbases in order for the Afghan security forces and administration to evolve. The PRT concept essentially carries a political mission. Warlords were the opponents (or “spoilers” in military language) to ISAF’s mandate and the post-Bonn

<sup>19</sup> United Nations Security Council 2003.

<sup>20</sup> Jakobsen 2005, 8.

<sup>21</sup> Jakobsen 2005, 12.

<sup>22</sup> Clark & Millen 2006, 20.

regime symbolised by Hamid Karzai. Insurgents emerged a bit later – both in the streets and at the top of ISAF’s list of concerns.<sup>23</sup>

Ironically the same powerbrokers that ISAF tried to play down had been key partners in OEF’s campaign against the hard core of Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Even if the oil spot theory seems to be weak on explaining the expansion of ISAF, it is likely that the counterinsurgency spur was a strong factor behind some of the OEF PRTs, at least in the east and south.

The UN’s broad mission for ISAF was later refined by the *PRT Executive Steering Committee* (ESC), a high-level body co-chaired by the Afghan Minister of the Interior and the Commander of ISAF and consisting of other Afghan ministers, NATO, *United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan* (UNAMA) and EU representatives and ambassadors of the PRT troop-contributing nations. The ESC was established in December 2004 to provide guidance and oversight of PRTs. It approved a document titled “PRT Terms of Reference (ToR)” in January 2005 and gave PRTs a mission to

“assist The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to extend its authority, in order to facilitate the development of a stable and secure environment in the identified area of operations, and enable SSR and reconstruction efforts.”<sup>24</sup>

The mission was still rather general in disposition although the ToR further listed PRT responsibilities with regard to other actors, security, reconstruction and information activities. In all relations the PRTs should aim to extend “the reach and legitimacy of national government.” Besides monitoring the overall situation in assigned areas, the most precise mandate PRTs are given is in supporting the build-up of the Afghan National Police (ANP). Regarding reconstruction activities, the PRTs are steered to primarily create conditions for other actors such as the UN and NGOs. But the PRTs may also run their own projects following the idea of filling the void that others leave. PRT efforts need to be in line with Afghan government activities. To this end, the PRTs are to support the local administration’s development planning in their responsible provinces.<sup>25</sup>

ISAF Headquarters later refined the PRT ToR into a doctrine of three “lines of operations” including security, governance and reconstruction & development. Sometimes also a fourth, cross-cutting dimension of coordination is mentioned. Some activities like the *Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration* (DDR) process of the Afghan Militia Forces have ended, but the list of supporting activities for PRTs has mostly remained the same. Focusing on *Security Sector Reform* (SSR), governance and development PRTs are expected to “provide”, “observe, assess and report.”<sup>26</sup> It may be said, however, that many units have gradually overplayed their role in reconstruction

<sup>23</sup> An astute article on the art of dealing with warlords and state-building in Afghanistan is Orsini 2007.

<sup>24</sup> ISAF 2007, B-1-1/2, B-2-1/2.

<sup>25</sup> ISAF 2007, B-2-1/2.

<sup>26</sup> ISAF 2007, B-2-1/2.

and development and are taking responsibilities in governance support that would more naturally fall within the mandate of UNAMA.

In addition to the UN mandate and the ToR guiding the PRTs, their tasks are frequently reviewed by both the ESC and ISAF Headquarters. ESC issued three Policy Notes in December 2006 and February 2007 defining the PRT role in development, humanitarian aid and disarmament<sup>27</sup>. These documents are *de facto* binding as the decisions have been made by ambassadors of the PRT troop-contributing nations.

ISAF Headquarters, through the military chain of command, frequently tasks PRTs with new duties. In 2007 PRTs were given orders to start monitoring and assessing development levels in districts, including mapping existing infrastructure, new projects, and evaluating the basic conditions and needs in the judicial sector. The latter task came as the international community was preparing for the Afghanistan rule of law conference in Rome in July 2007. It seems the PRTs are conceived as a handy tool available when the international community needs to get something done fast and broadly across Afghanistan. The PRTs are present almost everywhere, they are fairly mobile and are capable of securing themselves. Freedom of movement is combined with civilian expertise able to guide simple fact-finding activities run by the military

## 4 Present variety of PRTs

### 4.1 Listing PRTs

There are currently 26 PRTs across Afghanistan, all somehow different from each other. The same mission and tasks have lent themselves to a variety of implementation in diverging circumstances. Units may be compared against several criteria, for example in light of the ten following factors:

1. Nations contributing;
2. Size of the PRT in numbers;
3. Balance between the military and civilian components in numbers;
4. Leadership of the PRT and integration of the military and civilian components;
5. Security activities and capabilities the PRT has (both military profile and civilian assets such as police trainers);
6. Activities in governance by the PRT itself or its lead nation;
7. Reconstruction and development activities the PRT or its lead nation runs;
8. Funding mechanisms and modalities for reconstruction and development; pattern in distribution of funding via the PRT versus outside of it;
9. Total amount of funds flowing to the area of responsibility in relative and absolute terms;

<sup>27</sup> ISAF 2007, B-4-1/2, B-5-1/2.

10. External environment for the PRT to operate in: security situation, quality of governance and development, presence of the UN and NGOs, *modus operandi* of other troops present.

The list lays heavy emphasis on civilian assets and their integration into the whole framework. In the Foreword to the PRT Handbook from February 2007, the ISAF Commander, UN SRSG and NATO Senior Civilian Representative maintain that

“all effective, well-functioning PRTs have one characteristic in common: they operate as fully integrated civil-military structures, and, as such, bring a comprehensive range of resources to bear in assisting GOA [Government of Afghanistan] to extend its authority and to increase its capacity to govern.”<sup>28</sup>

NATO considers PRT to be a holistic civil-military unit, the achievements of which are dependent on successful cooperation between the civilian and military components. It may well be argued that the tight integration of civilian and military capabilities is the most fruitful innovation of the entire concept. Summarising Anglo-American research on PRTs, Hannah Godsave observes that this integrative core of the organisation has not raised criticism, unlike so many other traits of the PRTs<sup>29</sup>.

The questions above make an extensive list and would necessitate thorough field research in order to come up with a wide-ranging study of the nature of all 26 PRTs in Afghanistan. Although the information base in this research setting (public sources, limited field exposure) remains incomplete, it is certainly possible to draw some general conclusions on how and why PRTs differ so much.

## 4.2 *Institutional framework on the home front*

The most apparent observation is that every PRT is one of a kind. It is often noted that this divergence derives from the capitals and thus occurs not between the PRTs as such, but the 14 lead nations. Having a look at the two German PRTs in the north and especially those 12 led by the USA across Afghanistan, it becomes clear that domestic reasoning is a major force behind modelling a PRT. The American PRTs have a standardized structure – even though they cover such different provinces as Parwan north of Kabul and Ghazni in the southeast of Afghanistan.

The PRTs are a somewhat novel innovation in international crisis management in their way of bringing together different branches of home governments. Assets sent to Afghanistan are dependent on the resources the nation has on the whole. In addition, experts, of course, do not arrive in Afghanistan from any vacuum, but carry along attitudes, bureaucratic traditions and the legal restrictions of their employers back home<sup>30</sup>. Jakobsen argues that both operational approaches and the way cooperation

<sup>28</sup> ISAF 2007, ii.

<sup>29</sup> Godsave 2007, 33.

<sup>30</sup> Insightful text into these dynamics is written by Piiparinen 2007.



between civilian and military components is arranged are predominantly reflections of domestic inheritance<sup>31</sup>. Putting together the military, police advisors, development experts and diplomats carries serious potential for explosion. Luckily, the outcome of the interplay between these living organisational memories and policies written in PRT planning documents guide, but do not determine, the nature of a PRT. National policy rigidities on reconstruction and development or the showing of force are repeatedly loosened on the ground.

The widest disparities emerge from national policies towards reconstruction and the PRT role in it. It was originally thought that PRTs would run only small and short-term projects to rapidly build up their role in provinces and to meet the immediate needs of the local population. This was supposed to take place where and when other development actors would not be available or capable. Many PRTs have over time boosted their reconstruction activities; some due to the non-permissive security situation for NGOs, some for more political reasons.

From the ISAF perspective, these restrictions, or caveats as they are sometimes misleadingly<sup>32</sup> called, are complicating the normal business. Leading a military operation infiltrated so heavily by various national policies and civilian expertises proves difficult. For example, CIMIC (*Civil-Military Cooperation*) branches in higher echelons have been surprised to find out that the two Nordic PRTs in Meymaneh and Mazar-e Sharif do not have any dedicated CIMIC on-the-ground assets available due to national Afghanistan policies – whereas such activities form the military backbone of the American PRT model.

On the other hand, it could be noted that bizarre priorities and constraints favouring one sector, activity or modality over some others may serve a point. Often these arrangements are needed to motivate rigid domestic bureaucracies and induce agencies to any meaningful cooperation. Positively, recent experiences in Afghanistan have set in motion processes of interdepartmental adjustments in many countries.

One more complicating factor in the field is the various partnering nations behind the PRTs. They too have their own institutional rigidities and favoured policies. But adding to those of the lead nation, partners' priorities could well provide needed supplementary assets and flexibility to the PRT. There are altogether 16 PRT partnering nations in ISAF, including Finland<sup>33</sup>.

---

<sup>31</sup> Jakobsen 2005, 28; Perito (2005, 3) makes a point of homeland legal requirements hindering comparisons, evaluations and learning processes between lead nations.

<sup>32</sup> Limitations to PRT functions described above should not be mixed up with the larger scale issue of military caveats and other serious operational restrictions that some ISAF participating nations have notified. The latter, like the German or Italian policy not to send troops to the south, have sparked a fierce debate in NATO over its members' participation in ISAF. Partly because building on outdated information, Godsave (2007, 11–13) falls into a trap of muddling these two matters.

<sup>33</sup> ISAF 2007, D-3-2.

### 4.3 Local conditions

Establishing a unit solely according to bureaucratic circumstances would soon prove to be a futile effort. The real environment certainly has had an impact on how PRTs have been modelled. The PRT concept has been notorious for its flexibility in adjusting to varying and changing needs, challenges and opportunities. The lack of direct guidance from above has resulted in the excessive capacity to bend the model and activities. Many regard this incoherence as a major error of the whole enterprise<sup>34</sup>.

Afghanistan for sure is plagued with bad and weak governance, poor capacities in provinces to plan and administer, low education, a lack of infrastructure, a feeble judicial system and corruption permeating the government at all levels. These vexing problems are common across the country. However circumstances in provinces differ when it comes to the production of narcotics, narco-trade, activities of illegal armed groups and the power of old warlords, or insurgent activities. Helmand province in the southwest produces alone more illicit drugs than any other country in the world, whereas more than half of Afghan provinces are poppy-free<sup>35</sup>.

The security situation in the southern and eastern parts of the country has remained volatile and has affected PRT activities as well. Most clearly it is reflected in the low numbers of NGOs present in most of the provinces that see regular fighting and strikes by insurgent groups. Michael J. Dziedzic and Michael K. Seidl note that the US PRT belt was built in hotspot areas "where there was virtually no IO or NGO presence"<sup>36</sup>. Only the biggest cities like Kandahar and Jalalabad and a few of the provincial centres attract substantial numbers of aid workers.

Similarly poor security is equivalent of incapable and sometimes even totally collapsed local administration, leaving the people without public services. This kind of security situation and level of development challenges lead PRTs in the south and east to take a larger role. They have robust military elements (CIMIC or Civil Affairs<sup>37</sup> type) for reconstruction and their lead nations provide provinces with high sums of development aid.<sup>38</sup>

The security environments for PRTs vary from the rather peaceful northern and central regions to high-risk provinces like Helmand, Kandahar or lately Kunar. This warrants a principal question of whether the PRT concept is at all viable for high-

<sup>34</sup> E.g. *Save the Children* 2007; Perito 2005; Godsave 2007; Stapleton 2007; Gauster 2007.

<sup>35</sup> UNODC 2008, vii.

<sup>36</sup> Dziedzic & Seidl 2005, 4.

<sup>37</sup> American equivalent to CIMIC.

<sup>38</sup> Even if general trends may be tracked, it should be noted that there are no comprehensive statistics available covering every PRT and showing the funds flowing from PRT contributing nations to their responsible provinces. Comparisons from easy-access sources are difficult to make as some governments publicise exact figures, some nothing. Some aggregate estimations of donor contributions to the Afghan provinces can be found in Waldman 2008, 14.

threat-level areas. PRTs were originally established in potentially unstable provinces where low-level conflicts between local militias could be ignited or areas in which PRTs served as part of OEF's post-combat counterinsurgency approach. Godsave terms these territories as "quasi non-permissive areas"<sup>39</sup>, while Robert M. Perito favours "reasonably permissive environments."<sup>40</sup> At the moment some of the PRTs are operating in combat zones. Are they able to accomplish their political mission at all in environments that seriously preclude freedom of movement of units other than those heavily armed?

#### **4.4 Presence of other troops**

Variations in the security situation correlate with combat troop presence. In numerous Afghan provinces ISAF or OEF forces other than a solitary PRT. These include different sorts of task forces or headquarters equipped with manoeuvre battalions, engineering battalions and special forces. Moreover, some PRTs themselves host non-ISAF elements like Police Mentoring Teams of CSTC-A or detachments from the US Army Corps of Engineers in their camps.

Such partners provide PRTs with a set of external resources and assets in force protection, intelligence, reconstruction and security sector reform. An assortment of these capacities around a PRT obviously shapes its own nature. Militarily requirements that PRTs face in Afghanistan vary at least as much as the development levels across provinces. These factors seem to go unrecognised in most of the studies on PRTs. It is by essence a different task to run a unit in north or west Afghanistan or the remote central parts than in the south and east where there are plenty of other ISAF and OEF forces operating.

In the absence of other forces nearby, the PRT is solely responsible for covering its province in terms of the show of presence, intelligence collection and if needed, use of force. The Lithuanian PRT in the extremely remote Ghowr monitors a vast central highlands province on its own. Whereas the southern neighbours, the Dutch in the PRT Tarin Kowt, are surrounded by a full task force of more than 1500 soldiers<sup>41</sup>. The Dutch PRT is able to concentrate on cooperation with local administration, reconstruction efforts and coordination with other actors. Paradoxically, military requirements for PRTs are the highest in areas of relative peace. On the other hand, this is well in line with the limited military muscle the units have and their original design for a "limited range of security challenges."<sup>42</sup>

As a part of ISAF doctrine, all PRTs rely ultimately on Forward Support Bases (FSB) collocated with the Regional Commands. FSBs host a variety of troops deployable across the responsible region. For their protection in extremis, the PRTs may "reach-back" to these assets or ISAF joint air power.

<sup>39</sup> Godsave 2007, 26.

<sup>40</sup> Perito 2005, 15.

<sup>41</sup> Dutch Ministry of Defence 2007.

<sup>42</sup> US Interagency 2006, 6, 11.

The ways in which the PRTs interpret their military role differ. The size of the territory to be covered, the presence of other troops and the security situation lead the units to compose varying military capabilities. PRTs in areas where there are close to no external forces tend to be bigger in terms of both mobile troops and staff. These comparisons should not be taken as criticism. They only highlight the immensely varying nature of the PRTs and the contexts in which they operate in Afghanistan.

## 5 Generic PRT models

Already the first year of PRTs in Afghanistan saw the emergence of distinctive models. PRT Gardez, PRT Kunduz and PRT Mazar-e Sharif started without any uniform guidance or strict regulations of their tasks and organisation. Soon there could be observed recognisable American, German and British models. These generic models are often referred to in the PRT discourse. Whether newer PRTs under the leadership of nations like Spain, the Netherlands, Lithuania or Hungary fall within the old categorisation remains an almost untouched field of research. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to add at least one new model: the Turkish civilian PRT in Vardak opens a new chapter in the short history of the PRTs. A summarising table of these models is provided in Annex B.

### 5.1 *American*

It was the US-established PRT Gardez that began the build-up of the PRT web. In February 2003, the US Embassy in Kabul decided on "Principles Guiding PRT Working Relations with UNAMA, NGOs and Local Government." The paper listed three key objectives for PRTs: to extend the authority of the Afghan central government, improve security, and promote reconstruction. These principles gave initial guidance to all PRT activities in Afghanistan, also setting milestones for later developments under ISAF.<sup>43</sup>

The US PRTs developed under the OEF umbrella until recently. The United States has launched 18 units in Afghanistan altogether, running 11 at the moment. These are mostly located in the east and southeast, along the Pakistan border. Those handed over have mainly been situated in the south and west of the country. The USA has also transferred the PRT concept to Iraq, where it leads 22 units.

A distinctive feature of the American model is that there are nearly no partnering nations involved in the PRTs. The only exceptions have been PRT Qalat in the southern Zabul province and PRT Bagram, supported by Romania and South Korea respectively.

US PRTs are fairly small in size, including on average less than 100 military. The original OEF draft model consisted of 83 military and civilian personnel. Compared to

---

<sup>43</sup> Perito 2005, 2.

the German and British PRT models, the military organisation is built light: planning and intelligence staff is thin and operational assets are directed to Civil Affairs and force protection. Perito also reminds of difficulties in finding enough qualified military personnel, resulting in frequent understaffing. On the civilian side, the American PRTs comprise only two or three individuals. All units include US Department of State and USAID representatives. Some also benefit from the expertise of advisors sent by the US Department of Agriculture.<sup>44</sup>

The American units are led by military commanders. The main organisational vehicle for coordinating between the civilian and military components is the PRT Command Section, which combines civilian representatives with the commander and his/her closest lieutenants. This arrangement is, however, a later improvement replicating the successful joint Command Group model created by the British in the north. Its American precursors were the civil-military boards that guided reconstruction efforts<sup>45</sup>.

Command Sections are designed to feature a forum for the synchronisation of efforts in security, governance and development lines of operation. Civilian experts are also expected to work closely with Civil Affairs teams. Despite this appearance of equal integration, the American model seems to have been plagued with overriding military leadership. Jakobsen portrays civilian representatives as “embedded in military teams” and “all operating under military command.”<sup>46</sup> Perito’s report on PRT lessons learned is based on extensive interviews with US and NGO representatives who have served in Afghanistan. He notes that unclear terms of reference for civil-military interaction inside the organisation have led to varying operational success. Some of the American PRTs have been torn by internal rows whereas the most effective ones have been able to fuse military and civilian components “into a close-knit and mutually supportive team.”<sup>47</sup> Even as late as June 2006, the US Interagency assessment demanded that all PRTs start applying the joint Command Section approach – recognised to be a best practise already earlier<sup>48</sup>. On the other hand, it must be noted that the US model is the only one on which there are collected substantial and public lessons learned.

As an exception to the rule, the United States established a civilian-led PRT in Panjshir in October 2005. This small and historically exceptional area was carved out from the three provinces covered by PRT Bagram. A small military component (approximately 40) is ordered by a commander, who works under the civilian director of the PRT. The director represents the US Department of State and is joined by advisors from USAID and the Department of Agriculture. A “small footprint” approach was chosen deliberately to fit the unique circumstances of Panjshir – an ethnically homogenous valley which has successfully resisted all intruders in the past 30 years. One of the key characteristics of this exercise is to engage the PRT in daily interaction with local

<sup>44</sup> ISAF 2007, D-2-2; Perito 2005, 4–5.

<sup>45</sup> US Interagency 2006, 14.

<sup>46</sup> Jakobsen 2005, 28, 17.

<sup>47</sup> Perito 2005, 11.

<sup>48</sup> US Interagency 2006, 14.

government and its processes.<sup>49</sup> Even if it was called a prototype in 2005, the USA has not adopted the same approach elsewhere in Afghanistan

In the security line of operation, standard US PRTs carry out some mobile military patrols though their direct role as a security force is mainly limited to “force protection.”<sup>50</sup> Jakobsen reduces this feature both to US operational traditions and the demanding security environments in the south and east of Afghanistan<sup>51</sup>. Perito remarks that this narrowed mission has caused disappointments with NGOs and UNAMA<sup>52</sup>. On the other hand, there have on most occasions been other coalition manoeuvre forces in close vicinity of the PRTs. Interestingly enough, fierce verbal collisions have sometimes occurred between commanders of these two types of American units so different in nature and tasks<sup>53</sup>. Also military-military coordination proves to be a challenge in conflict zones.

In line with the longer-term mission of capacity-building amongst the Afghan security forces, US PRTs work on the development of local police forces through Military Police teams<sup>54</sup>. They work together with OEF’s CSTC-A and its police mentors contracted from the DynCorp company. These external resources, often collocated with US PRTs, are used for conducting police training and as a source of donated equipment. CSTC-A Police Mentoring Teams and an infrastructure element implemented by US Army Engineers were not available outside the southern and eastern regions until spring 2007. Since then, they have come into close cooperation and support also non-American PRT efforts in SSR across Afghanistan.

The American support package for governance and reconstruction in a province is built on two legs: PRT projects and USAID activities. Aimed to win “hearts and minds”, CIMIC-type projects are mapped, proposed and supervised by Civil Affairs teams. The first funding source available was the *Defence Department’s Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid* (OHDACA).<sup>55</sup> In the early years 2002–2003, the average project cost in these programmes was \$45,000<sup>56</sup>. Another funding modality is called CERP, *Commander’s Emergency Response Program*. CERP is flexibly utilised in projects implemented by local constructors. Funds provided for different PRTs vary considerably, since they are based on applications and compared to the needs of other units – becoming sometimes difficult to reach. This new modality was introduced in 2004 and it granted commanders up to \$100,000 per month<sup>57</sup>. In the fiscal year

---

<sup>49</sup> US Department of Defence 2005.

<sup>50</sup> It is interesting that the same kinds of restrictions in the early German model have gained so much more negative attention (see Section 5.2).

<sup>51</sup> Jakobsen 2005, 19.

<sup>52</sup> Perito 2005, 7.

<sup>53</sup> Perito 2005, 8.

<sup>54</sup> Perito 2005, 9.

<sup>55</sup> Perito 2005, 10.

<sup>56</sup> Jakobsen 2005, 19.

<sup>57</sup> Stapleton 2007, 21.

2007, CERP provided American PRTs with USD 231 million and its newer supplement *Economic Support Funds* (ESF) totalling USD 216 million<sup>58</sup>

Especially in the early years, rapid spending on projects (schools, clinics, wells) greatly irritated NGOs, who felt their expertise in long-term development and capacity-building was threatened by the reckless and untrained military.<sup>59</sup> Confrontation eased up a bit when all US PRTs finally received USAID representatives during 2004. They provide the second pillar of the American reconstruction effort in PRT areas of responsibility. In conjunction with expertise, USAID offers PRTs *Quick Impact Project* (QIP) funds that can be used in projects in line with provincial development plans, implemented by contracted NGOs or foreign commercial firms<sup>60</sup>. A group consisting of senior military and civilian officers identify and suggest projects that support the whole mission of the unit in its specific area. These project review committees reflect an important lesson learned in the American model: expert vetting needs to be arranged for all projects, also those fulfilling the commander's goal of winning "hearts and minds," in order not to harm work done by NGOs and humanitarian agencies. Committees were for a long time the only formal executive body integrating military and civilian components in US PRTs, highlighting the heavy reconstruction focus of the American model.

USAID funds projects and programmes also independently. The Agency's provincial representatives embedded in the PRTs do not decide on these projects but provide information and monitor them – thus giving the PRTs an opportunity to comment on USAID activities in provinces. USAID typically channels funds to projects in infrastructure (roads, local government premises), water resources and irrigation, local governance training and agriculture. Sums allocated to different PRT areas presumably vary as with CERP. USAID does not publicise provincial figures.

It should be noted that most US PRTs operate in rather small provinces. Many of them are located near the Pakistan border and are essentially those territories where most insurgent attacks and fighting between the Taliban and ISAF-OEF take place. Consequently, there are usually very few NGOs active in the US-observed provinces – with the exception of the significant regional centre Jalalabad in the east. This has probably led the PRTs, and the USA overall, to take a larger role in reconstruction and development than might have been the case in more peaceful areas.

Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the American model has from the beginning focused heavily on a quick impact and reconstruction. The underlying objective of such a modus operandi has been to win the support of the local population, in other words counter-insurgency motivation<sup>61</sup>. This mirrors the suitability of the choice for American strategists in need of tools, but also the environments where US forces have operated in the south and east of Afghanistan. The abundance of reconstruction

<sup>58</sup> Abbaszadeh et al. 2008, 49.

<sup>59</sup> Perito 2005, 10; Dziedzic & Seidl 2005, 9–10.

<sup>60</sup> Perito 2005, 10.

<sup>61</sup> Abbaszadeh et al. 2008, 7.

projects and an unconcealed counterinsurgency association have rendered the US model the most criticised one by non-governmental actors<sup>62</sup>.

Resources to implement reconstruction in provinces have been funnelled to the military, having its echoes in PRT activities. A group of researchers from the University of Princeton – Nima Abbaszadeh, Mark Crow, Marianne El-Khoury, Jonathan Gandomi, David Kuwayama, Christopher MacPherson, Meghan Nutting, Nealin Parker and Taya Weiss – remind that “the agency that controls funding heavily influences PRT priorities.”<sup>63</sup> A slow turn in the American rationale might be expected, however, as QIPs funded through CERP and the newer ESF are gradually scaled down and confer to the *Local Governance and Community Development* (LGCD) programme. The latter mechanism in support of the US PRTs in Afghanistan focuses on long-term governance capacity-building and has since September 2007 enjoyed an annual funding of USD 249 million<sup>64</sup>.

## 5.2 German

Kunduz is frequently mentioned as one of the exemplary cases of a PRT. After only nine months of American leadership, the organisation was adopted by the Germans. Half a year later, Germany established its second PRT in the northeastern Badakhshan province

Germany does not work alone in its two PRTs, but works with a long list of partnering nations: Belgium, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Hungary, Romania, and the United States. Multinationality has been firmly built into the German model.

The small American PRT in Kunduz grew a great deal after being taken over by the Germans. Already in 2003 it contained a military force of 300 soldiers. Despite high numbers, the operational approach was limited by domestic policy pressure to mere, and exceptionally robust, force protection. During 2003–2005 the German PRTs in Kunduz and Feyzabad lacked mobility and presence in outer districts of their provinces. Consequently some of the older studies draw heavy attention to these restrictions and the overcautious approach and hence slander the entire German PRT model<sup>65</sup>.

The German units today demonstrate mightier military muscle. Consisting of 400–450 soldiers, the military components are designed to maintain not only robust force protection but also patrolling in districts and relatively wide CIMIC activities. After the commencing of long-range patrols – though unnecessarily heavy in size – the German model has militarily moved slightly towards the British one. A clear strongpoint of the German military component has from the beginning been that

<sup>62</sup> Gauster 2007, 22–23.

<sup>63</sup> Abbaszadeh et al. 2008, 9.

<sup>64</sup> Abbaszadeh et al. 2008, 49.

<sup>65</sup> See Jakobsen 2005; Perito 2005; on the more recent developments, see also the non-updated Godsava 2007.



information operation capabilities play a pioneering role for all ISAF<sup>66</sup>. A clear weakness of the PRTs is posed by the extremely short rotation cycle of military contingents (regularly four months).

Civilian components in Kunduz and Feyzabad are well staffed, including some 10–20 experts. Germany provides most of them, but some of the other contributing nations send their political, development and police advisors as well. Some critics acknowledge the extensive pre-deployment training of also the civilian component, while reminding of the lack of integration across the civil-military boundary<sup>67</sup>.

A true speciality of the German model is dual leadership. The unit has two chiefs: a military commander and a civilian head, both running their own, independent halves of the organisation. Military components are led by colonels and civilian parts by representatives of the German Foreign Ministry to the provinces. They decide matters concerning the whole PRT collegially and represent the unit on equal bases towards the local population and officials. Initial strict independence and tensions between the components have over time eased off to some extent.

The German PRT type is firmly built on four pillars by the ministries represented:

- Federal Ministry of Defence
- Federal Foreign Office
- Federal Ministry of the Interior and
- Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ)<sup>68</sup>.

Despite certain progress in the institutional framework, there is still some rigidity in the German system of interdepartmental cooperation. Problems reflect the developmental foreign policy tradition, the high degree of independence given to the departments, domestic political pressures and the public mood<sup>69</sup>.

Security is primarily a duty of the military, although it must be noted that police mentors sent by the Ministry of the Interior (Mol) and a strong German Military Police play an important role in supporting the development of local police forces. This has been well in line with Germany being the international lead in building up the Afghan police – taken over in 2007 by the EU Police Mission in Afghanistan.

The civilian part is tasked with governance, reconstruction and development. Within the civilian component, the head is responsible for the general coherence of the broad German approach. However, BMZ has preserved wide operational independence

<sup>66</sup> ISAF 2007, D-2-2.

<sup>67</sup> Abbaszadeh et al. 2008, 27.

<sup>68</sup> Jakobsen 2005, 24.

<sup>69</sup> Abbaszadeh et al. 2008, 26.

due to the fact that it maintains budgetary autonomy<sup>70</sup>. Representatives of other nations are included in the civilian component in coordination with their national directions.

The German approach to reconstruction and development in the provinces is two-fold. The military CIMIC teams map needs and implement QIPs in education, water management and other small infrastructure. BMZ-funded longer term development work is implemented by partners such as the German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ). There is also a considerable number of German-funded NGOs active in northern Afghanistan. In Kunduz the German community is among tens of actors sharing a common "German house" in the city centre<sup>71</sup>. Sectors prioritised through these various channels and modalities are economic reconstruction, education, water, energy, governance and rule of law<sup>72</sup>. The German impact on the northeastern provinces has grown so extensive that Markus Gauster believes there to be a risk of becoming counterproductive to the building up of local capacities and institutions<sup>73</sup>. On the other hand, a Local Development Initiative has been established in each province which integrates German military and civilian representatives with the local Afghan government in order to prioritise and decide on projects funded by Germany.

### 5.3 *British(-Nordic)*

Of the three original PRT models, the British one has probably witnessed most adjustment. The United Kingdom established its first PRT in the northern centre, Mazar-e Sharif, in July 2003. This first non-US PRT originated under the OEF command, but was transferred to ISAF in summer 2004. At the same time, the UK launched its second PRT in Meymaneh, Faryab province, detaching it from PRT Mazar's huge area of five provinces. Meymaneh and Mazar-e Sharif were later handed over to Norway and Sweden respectively as the UK headed south. There, it took over the PRT in Helmand from the Americans in May 2006.

Recognising certain changes over time, the paper at hand adjusts the name of the third generic model from the traditional British into British-Nordic. This is due to the fact that Nordic countries have all along the way been functional partners to the British leadership, providing both military and civilian resources. The old contributors and currently lead nations Sweden and Norway have continued with the British-initiated model, developing it further. They have been supported by Finland, Denmark and Latvia, of which group Denmark has recently opted for the south, being now in Helmand with the UK and Estonia. Another smaller contributor to the British-Nordic PRTs is the United States with its civilian resources.

<sup>70</sup> Abbaszadeh et al. 2008, 27.

<sup>71</sup> Recent collocation with the PRT commander's new city office has raised some tensions in the NGO community. (Abbaszadeh et al. 2008, 28)

<sup>72</sup> BMZ 2007; GTZ 2007; more detailed information of German aid by Gauster 2007, 45–47.

<sup>73</sup> Gauster 2007, 42.

In size, the early British PRTs were much closer to the American than the German model. With a military force of 50–150, they put a heavy emphasis on SSR. The PRT Handbook praises the British mitigation of conflict between two rival warlords in the north: General Dostum and General Atta.<sup>74</sup> Following the policy of disarmament and mediation, conflict resolution between power brokers via diplomacy and cooperation with local authorities has been typical for the British model<sup>75</sup>. From the very beginning, the British PRTs have maintained capabilities to operate in all corners of their provinces with small and lightly armed Mobile Observation Teams (MOT)<sup>76</sup>. A territorially wide presence has supplemented the endeavours of the civilian components to build up the capacities of the local police force through training and infrastructure projects.

The British-Nordic PRTs have been reinforced over time and are now the size of about 150–200 soldiers. PRT Mazar-e Sharif is notably bigger (over 400), but on the other hand covers four provinces – an area five times that of Kosovo. Civilian capacities have been strengthened significantly from the original three representatives including a political, development and police advisor. The PRTs in Lashkar Gah, Meymaneh and Mazar-e Sharif sponsor now, in autumn 2008, a number of civilian specialists, whose expertise covers, for instance, political affairs, governance, development, civilian police, the penitentiary system and counter-narcotics. By far the best resourced is the UK PRT in Lashkar Gah, Helmand, which incorporates 28 civilian experts, covering some 15% of the total personnel in that unit<sup>77</sup>.

In the original British model, PRTs are led by a triumvirate consisting of the principals of three agencies: the *Ministry of Defence* (MoD), *Foreign and Commonwealth Office* (FCO), and the *Department for International Development* (DfID). Cooperation of the three resembles the German model on paper, but has in practise resulted in much more tightly knit teams. The triumvirate discusses plans and activities in all three lines of operation and seeks to make decisions unanimously. This early innovation of the British in Meymaneh and Mazar-e Sharif was later adopted as an ISAF best practise and promoted to all PRTs under the term “integrated command group”. The new UK PRT in Lashkar Gah is represented by a joint command group as in the north, but reports now to a Kandahar-resident regional coordinator appointed by the FCO<sup>78</sup>, hence making the PRT effectively civilian-supervised.

Michael J. McNerney appraises the British mode of civil-military integration as the finest example of interagency jointness on a tactical level in Afghanistan.<sup>79</sup> Jakobsen notes that interconnecting military and development resources on the ground necessitates institutional arrangements back home. He attributes the British success

<sup>74</sup> ISAF 2007, D-2-2.

<sup>75</sup> Jakobsen 2005, 21–22.

<sup>76</sup> Covering vast and remote areas, both the PRT Bamian led by New Zealand and the Lithuanian PRT Chaghcharan have adopted somewhat the same mode of mobility. In this respect, they resemble the UK model though deviating from it in other ways.

<sup>77</sup> Abbaszadeh et al. 2008, 46.

<sup>78</sup> Abbaszadeh et al. 2008, 46.

<sup>79</sup> McNerney 2005, 45.

to Conflict Prevention Pools, which are joint mechanisms for bringing together assets in foreign affairs, defence and development.<sup>80</sup> Another key arrangement to institutionalise coordinated planning and leadership on the capital level has been the interdepartmental Stabilisation Unit (SU), integrating members from the FCO, DfID and the MoD. SU is organically present also in the field, having six officers in the PRT Lashkar Gah.<sup>81</sup>

The Nordic PRTs have deviated from the triumvirate model and have become ostensibly led by a military commander. In any case, they have upheld close cooperation between military and civilian components, integrated in the Command Groups. A Nordic PRT Command Group consists of the senior military officers and the civilian component. Even if internal consensus is a common objective, the commander is the leading figure outside the PRT. There has been some tendency to promote a political representative or advisor to a senior position in the civilian component as a sort of counterpart to the commander, but not as manifestly as in the German model, in which a PRT is a dually headed, two-pillar organisation. More apparently, the Nordic PRTs seem to depict all civilian representatives as embedded advisors in slightly the same fashion as in the American model. Despite these relative changes, the Command Group model still continues to be strong and fairly equally integrative<sup>82</sup>.

The transformation has probably more to do with strengthened military capacities and the organisational culture of these PRTs than direct instructions from the respective capitals. The divergence between the UK and the Nordic countries also reflects the different stages in integrating the government branches in the capitals. The installation of an integrated approach to planning, follow-up and leadership is proceeding at varying paces.

The British-Nordic PRTs have not taken as strong a role in governance and development as they have in security. They have largely been limited to a facilitator role, sharing information, advising and coordinating with UNAMA. Trying to avoid duplication with NGO efforts, direct funding via PRT has been made available only for infrastructure and capacity-building projects in the security sector and local administration. DfID provided an annual £1 million pounds of funding for the PRTs in 2003–2006.<sup>83</sup>

With regards to reconstruction, the British PRT in Lashkar Gah has transformed the established model and implements now QIPs. Also the PRT external troops of the Royal Engineers have been deployed to upgrade police and water infrastructure.<sup>84</sup> In addition to previously used funding modalities, the British Ministry of Defence

<sup>80</sup> Jakobsen 2005, 32.

<sup>81</sup> Abbaszadeh et al. 2008, 43. The SU was formerly known as the *Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit* (PCRU).

<sup>82</sup> An updated Nordic version of integrated thinking on PRT organisation and activities is offered by PRT Meymaneh 2007.

<sup>83</sup> Jakobsen 2005, 22–23.

<sup>84</sup> House of Commons 2006, Column 367-8W.

has introduced what Barbara Stapleton calls the “CERP-equivalent” fund. It furnishes the PRT Commander with a maximum £40,000 pounds a month for “hearts and minds” types of projects.<sup>85</sup> The introduction of QIPs may be seen as a response to the particularly demanding security situation in Helmand.

The Nordic edition of the British model has evolved as well. Policymakers in Stockholm and Oslo have decided to refrain from allowing any project activities by the military and have opted for directing aid to the region solely through NGOs and multinationally funded development programmes. Sums funnelled through these arrangements are increasing. Representing a partner nation, the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs has funded SSR-oriented projects implemented by using local employment and supervised by the civilian component of the PRTs in Meymaneh and Mazar-e Sharif.

The British-Nordic PRTs in northern Afghanistan have not run notable CIMIC projects, only occasional and small force-protection ventures. PRT commanders have raised this issue repeatedly and asked for a small, flexible and swiftly obtainable tool for them to be able to react at a fast pace to changes in their area of operations. From 2008 onwards, Finland is directing an annual sum of €100,000 to €150,000 to QIPs watched over by a civilian development advisor.

The original model of a light footprint in reconstruction has been changing mostly in the same direction. All three lead nations following the British-Nordic model bring more development to their provinces, but for the most part still externally to the PRT. Each lead nation has adopted a joint approach to their areas of responsibility – thus approaching the broad German model in Kunduz and Badakhshan. Home governments are not only looking to the PRTs, but plan for a comprehensive presence in a province.

#### **5.4 Turkish<sup>86</sup>**

Vardak province west of Kabul got its own PRT in November 2006. Turkey did not emulate any existing model, but wished to create one of its own. PRT Vardak was launched as a civilian-led organisation, concentrating on governance and development.

The civilian component of the Turkish organisation is robust. The PRT is led by a Civilian Coordinator, a mid-level diplomatic officer. Under him civilian experts run the business. Advisors in governance and development mentor and train local administration, as well as implement projects in education, infrastructure, health care and agriculture. A team of police advisors is working to train the local police force and to upgrade its facilities. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs provided funds to PRT projects totalling \$6.5 million in both 2006 and 2007.

<sup>85</sup> Stapleton 2007, 21–22.

<sup>86</sup> Based mostly on personal communication with the Turkish Consulate General in Mazar-e Sharif.

There are about 70 soldiers in the PRT, all Turkish. Their role is merely to provide logistics, communications and protection. The PRT has no regular military presence outside the provincial centre unless civilian experts wish to visit some of the outer districts. As such, the PRT does not have its own military operations. Since insurgent activities are spreading also to Vardak province, other forces than the PRT are needed to counter them.

Like the US PRT in Panjshir, the unit in Vardak is a small organisation focused on reconstruction and governance capacity building. It is not taking a role in the daily security business. In the security line of operation, it concentrates on longer-term investment in developing police forces. Doing so, it seems to neglect immediate security-related duties of patrolling and support for the government outreach to terrains held by combinations of tribal leaders, illegal militias and local powerbrokers/old warlords. This type of PRT undoubtedly necessitates the more robust presence of other forces in any “normal” Afghan context. PRT Vardak is thus a truly special venture, seeing the whole PRT mission and tasking differently. Panjshir province is an exceptional, and easier, case of “natural” security in this regard. Vardak resembles more closely the thinking behind PRTs in Iraq and could set an example for civil-military integration in less hostile environments.

## 6 PRTs under scrutiny

### 6.1 *Research on PRTs*

Professional debates on the transformation of peacekeeping, a comprehensive approach to conflict management or the humanitarian-military relationship often bring up the case of PRTs in Afghanistan. Nearly all observers have an opinion on the PRTs. In contrast to the popularity of this theme, PRTs are a fairly understudied concept in peace support. No broad and public study exists that compares the characteristics of all 26 PRTs. Research papers tend to focus on one PRT model or summarily measure the three generic models: US, UK, German. This paper is no exemption to the rule.

Many of the papers study only models and concepts as portrayed by contributing governments; just few truly try to examine how PRTs function in reality. Some of the studies are barely more than distant comments and may have a strong bias towards or against the PRTs in general or certain national models.

PRT research has been conducted chiefly by individual researchers and commentators in various countries. Often they have professional experience in Afghanistan, be it in diplomatic or military service or work with NGOs and international organisations. Military studies of operational and strategic scope make up a large share of PRT research. The US Army War College publishes several master’s theses concerning Afghanistan every year in which the PRTs are scrutinised from counter-insurgency and stabilisation operation perspectives.

Research on the PRTs remains fairly scattered. Researchers are not networked to extend over professional boundaries of government bureaucracies, military, research institutes, UN agencies, academics, and NGO representatives. PRT conferences and seminars are normally organised by governmental actors or NATO and tend to exclude wide participation.

Despite a moderate body of research, one single best model of PRTs in Afghanistan cannot be identified. There seems to be, however, some common understanding across the PRT literature that the British model is probably the closest approximation of a well-built provincial reconstruction team.

Nevertheless, it is more important to recognise the difficulty of PRT best practise identification. If nothing else, PRT research unanimously agrees on the lack of instruments to measure success and even any impact of the PRTs. How to assess what the teams are doing or have achieved?<sup>87</sup> Lessons learned and evaluation processes in ISAF have been weak and seriously distracted by the heavy lead-nation drive behind the PRT network. Supporters of each national model are convinced of their case without tools to back up their argument, according to the critics of the Save the Children organisation<sup>88</sup>. Judgments are too often built on anecdotal evidence and impressions. McNerney warns of “smiles on Afghan faces” methodology<sup>89</sup>. Another easy solution is to list inputs instead of analysing impacts. The Americans have tried to quantify their work in wells, schools and clinics built, but that can hardly mirror success in such a multidimensional state-building task as that of the PRTs. Indeed, the very political nature of the PRT mission may render it nearly impossible to assess its impact in a time frame of a couple of years.

Recent research raises many critical challenges for the working and future development of the PRTs. Godsave describes the discussion as a “heavily critical scholarly debate.”<sup>90</sup> Here some of the key topics in this battle for the “hearts and minds” of the international audience will be briefly introduced.

## 6.2 *Incoherence of models*

One of the key characteristics of the PRTs is flexibility. Adaptation to local circumstances in Afghanistan’s wide countryside was part of the original idea<sup>91</sup>. However, localised flexibility was soon overridden by lead nation policies, traditions and bureaucracies. This has resulted in an imbalanced network of provincial units, whose performance in governance and development is not controlled by ISAF. The Headquarters in Kabul has effective command only of the core security (military) activities of the PRTs.

<sup>87</sup> Save the Children (2004, 38–39) and McNerney (2005, 39) propose some parameters for measuring effects.

<sup>88</sup> *Save the Children* 2004, 37.

<sup>89</sup> McNerney 2005, 39, 43.

<sup>90</sup> Godsave 2007, 43.

<sup>91</sup> McNerney 2005, 37.

Altogether 14 nationally designed models determine how the PRTs execute their mission to support the Afghan government. The most critical incoherence of PRT models is manifested by the relative weight they give to their role as *Reconstruction Teams*. As project funds derive from domestic budgets, the ISAF operation maintains no control over them, but can only observe national priorities being promoted under the ISAF flag.

The establishment of Regional Commands (RC) to bridge the PRTs and ISAF Headquarters in 2006 tightened the military command and probably enhanced military coordination. Various sorts of reporting have boomed to cover also a wide range of governance and development-related matters, thus incorporating civilian expertise into the ISAF command structure to a higher extent than previously. Increased reporting is a result of the demand of aggregated information by the international community in Kabul, as well as NATO Commands requiring ever wider situational picture.

Real-life PRTs out in the provinces have evolved into many and diverse endeavours. The Terms of Reference issued by the PRT Executive Steering Committee (ESC) in 2005 attempted to set some guidelines for reconstruction activities. ISAF soon realised the need to further explicate and guide the activities on the ground. In order to get a grip on the PRTs, NATO held a series of seminars on the matter and work on publishing a PRT Handbook started. The first edition came out in October 2006 as part of a larger scheme to develop mission training and lessons-learned-processes within ISAF. It coincided with ISAF's expansion to cover the whole Afghan territory and absorb the remaining OEF PRTs. Since autumn 2006, PRT pre-deployment training courses have been arranged for both military and civilian officials at the NATO School in Germany. ISAF Headquarters hosts quarterly PRT conferences in Kabul and distributes a bulletin called *ISAF PRT Weekly*, presenting a collection of news sent in by PRT civilian officers. The CIMIC branch at the ISAF Headquarters has been reinforced with additional military and civilian staff to better engage and support the PRTs. On a political level, PRT ESC and its Working Groups were reactivated in late 2006, which led to the issuing of three policy notes that give direct guidance to PRT activities in development, the humanitarian sphere and disarmament.

Clarifying the tasks is not enough. What is even more troublesome is that Afghans are confused by the seemingly chaotic PRT presence. Precisely how the different PRTs work is not well known to the Afghan government, which is wishing to better coordinate development activities. A US interagency study on PRTs warns that flexibility in funding bewilders organised national development process; PRTs, operating in their responsible provinces, may choose project priorities that are not in line with Afghan planning<sup>92</sup>.

---

<sup>92</sup> US Interagency 2006, 9.



### 6.3 *Capacity in reconstruction and development*

PRT Terms of Reference (ToR) stipulate that units “may conduct Quick Impact Projects [QIP] in their areas to gain the consent of the local population to support operational priorities.”<sup>93</sup> The loose guidelines of the ToR have been utilised in various nationally driven models to expand PRT reconstruction activities. QIPs have turned into the building of schools, clinics, roads, wells, and water channels.

Assuming wider activities poses PRTs with the challenge of development capacity. Are PRTs equipped with the knowledge necessary for becoming development actors? Critics claim that the units deal with too many things, lacking the skills needed<sup>94</sup>. Development should be left to the Afghan government, aided by NGOs and the UN. PRTs are not effective in their reconstruction activities, due to deficient training, skills and experience. There are systemic deficiencies in military organisations stepping into the development sphere: the tendency to plan and act in the short-term and a lack of transparency and accountability.

The selection of QIPs in the PRTs is not based on the same kind of criteria as with development agencies and NGOs. Stapleton reminds that military and political objectives influence the selection of projects. Also the capacity to oversee project implementation has remained low, resulting in poor quality.<sup>95</sup> A US interagency study repeats the emblematic accounts of how American PRTs have built local infrastructure in health and education without paying attention to realities around the walls. Clinics and schools do not bring much development if the local government is not able to maintain these installations by securing the purchase of medicine and books, or lacks the funds to employ competent doctors and teachers.<sup>96</sup>

Examining the recent critique, Godsave suggests that PRTs should turn from QIPs towards longer term infrastructure and the development of local institutions<sup>97</sup>. McNerney points out that PRTs have performed fairly well in security sector capacity-building. He would like to see resources channelled also to governance, where PRTs could have great potential, so far unexercised.<sup>98</sup> There seems, however, to be some obscurity as to how to actually operationalise the vague PRT mandate in terms of governance. The PRT Handbook does not give a clear answer. Roger Lane and Emma Sky list the PRT tasks in governance as being regular engagement with local government and people’s representatives, the promotion of Afghan leadership, the bridging of information gaps between centre and periphery, and training and mentoring in administration and the judicial sector<sup>99</sup>. Stapleton takes a more

<sup>93</sup> ISAF 2007, B-2-2.

<sup>94</sup> For instance, Godsave (2007, 27–28) collects the critical tones.

<sup>95</sup> Stapleton 2007, 23–24.

<sup>96</sup> US Interagency 2006, 9.

<sup>97</sup> Godsave 2007, 28–29.

<sup>98</sup> McNerney 2005, 42.

<sup>99</sup> Lane & Sky 2006, 48–49.

critical stance toward the general idea of the military-minded PRTs “filling gaps” in governance and reconstruction. She maintains that longer term capacity-building depends on how and by whom things are done, not just achieving the immediate, concrete goal.<sup>100</sup>

The various reconstruction and development activities of the 26 PRTs in Afghanistan carry the risk of seriously confusing other actors and further complicating the already challenging task of coordination. PRT activities may raise too high expectations and differing funding modalities put PRTs into competition with one another<sup>101</sup>. A more structural challenge is posed by the often too loose alignment with the national and provincial development planning of the Afghan government<sup>102</sup>. PRTs have their own agendas and plans uncontrollable by Afghans. Stapleton warns of a “parallel development strategy”, which ends up being counterproductive to both local development and the development of a functioning government<sup>103</sup>.

Policy Note 1, issued by the PRT Executive Steering Committee in December 2006, strives for better coordination of activities and underlines the vital need for PRT projects to be in line with local priorities and Afghan national programmes. The paper ranks support for provincial planning as a major PRT task in the development line of operation.<sup>104</sup>

#### **6.4 Whole-of-government approach**

PRT lead nations’ support packages for capacity building in governance are directed through the UN or Afghan national development programmes. Similarly, funding for development and reconstruction is channelled via Afghan programmes or contracted NGOs. What is remarkable is that as large donors the lead nations have managed to bend national-level efforts to allocate resources to their responsible provinces. For example, programmes utilised in the “provincialisation” of aid by Norway, Sweden and/or the UK include the:

- National Area-Based Development Programme (NABDP)
- Afghan Sub-National Governance Programme (ASGP)
- National Solidarity Programme (NSP)
- Microfinance Investment Support Facility for Afghanistan (MISFA)
- National Rural Access Programme (NRAP)

<sup>100</sup> Stapleton 2007, 36.

<sup>101</sup> *Irinnews* 2007a.

<sup>102</sup> World Bank 2007, 27–28.

<sup>103</sup> Stapleton 2007, 23–24.

<sup>104</sup> ISAF 2007, B-4-1/2.

- Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Programme (RUWATSAN)
- Education Quality Improvement Project (EQUIP)<sup>105</sup>

Overall investments of lead nations in provinces are increasing rapidly. The British development agency DfID has started a three-year programme to fund some of the above-mentioned national efforts in Helmand – with a total cost of £30 million<sup>106</sup>. Considering all the channels used, the British assistance to Helmand totals up to £20 million per year<sup>107</sup>. This is equivalent to \$40 million. In 2007 Norway channelled 82.8 million Norwegian krone to Faryab, equivalent to nearly \$15 million<sup>108</sup>.

It should be noted that the UK, Norway and Germany are not the only ones in Afghanistan to apply what could be called a (provincial) “whole-of-government” approach to post-conflict stabilisation. After deploying in the south, also the Dutch and Canadian governments now follow this line of heavily supporting their responsible provinces both through and outside the PRTs, combining military elements, local diplomatic efforts, development activities and humanitarian aid. The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs planned to direct €24.5 million to Uruzgan in 2007, mostly external to the PRT<sup>109</sup>. In their previous area of responsibility, Baghlan province in the north, the Dutch had only a small budget for humanitarian projects<sup>110</sup>. The Canadian counterpart has pledged up to \$20 million to Kandahar<sup>111</sup>. The United States has during the past few years employed a somewhat similar scheme in its PRT provinces.

Other governments and lead nations are moving towards an integrated, interdepartmental approach as well. Whole-of-government thinking – or “3D” as it is sometimes called after Diplomacy, Development and Defence – is clearly the predominant new trend in PRT concept development in Afghanistan. This reflects a wider policy change in major donor nations’ approaches to fragile states. The whole-of-government idea seeks national policy coherence and has emerged as an answer to new global and local realities of the security and development environment.<sup>112</sup> In Afghanistan, the approach is for the first time reaching a provincial or tactical level with the co-presence of various tools. Success on the ground necessitates institutional integration in the donor capital. For example, some critics note that poor strategic coordination in Rome has seriously maimed the Italian PRT in Herat<sup>113</sup>.

The concentration of national efforts on single provinces triggers criticism. Stapleton refers to this phenomenon as the “Balkanisation” of aid, since development

<sup>105</sup> Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2007; DfID 2007.

<sup>106</sup> DfID 2007.

<sup>107</sup> House of Commons 2006, Column 367W.

<sup>108</sup> Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2007.

<sup>109</sup> Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2007b.

<sup>110</sup> Jakobsen 2005, 17.

<sup>111</sup> Canadian Ministry of National Defence 2007.

<sup>112</sup> Patrick & Brown 2007, 1–6.

<sup>113</sup> Abbaszadeh et al. 2008, 7.

becomes geographically scattered and dependent on the priorities of each donor<sup>114</sup>. Also the recent report by ACBAR, the *Agency Coordination Body for Afghan Relief*, seriously criticises the immense disparities in the aid different provinces receive<sup>115</sup>. “Balkanised” Afghanistan is unevenly divided into donor areas of responsibility, resulting in ineffectiveness and uncoordinated fractures in sectors such as police, justice and counter-narcotics, warned the outgoing NATO Senior Civilian Representative Daan Everts in an interview by *Al Jazeera* in December 2007<sup>116</sup>. The whole-of-government approach is intended to increase policy coherence, but being so tied to selected provinces, it also runs the risk of becoming disaligned from Afghan policy processes as well as creating disharmony between donors.<sup>117</sup> The whole-of-government approach through integrated units may thus run counterproductive to the wider “comprehensive approach” of the international community. Two recent reports on Afghan aid and local governance by ACBAR and the World Bank suggest a downscaling of the PRTs and related direct activities in more secure areas and redirecting funds to the government of Afghanistan<sup>118</sup>.

PRT-driven whole-of-government approaches are also accused of politicising development. Development actors are wary of being perceived as annexed “force multipliers” to the military due to funding links to PRT lead nations. NGOs have become vulnerable to prioritisations and pressure from European capitals<sup>119</sup>. On the other hand, the politicisation of development in the context of Afghanistan proves extremely difficult to deny. Donors and the UN have pledged their support to the legitimate government and state-building project in Afghanistan. Thus all development aid to Afghanistan is political support in essence. The national development programmes partly implemented by NGOs carry “distinct political overtones,” as Stapleton rightly reminds<sup>120</sup>.

Debate over the political nature of development aid continues between donor governments and NGOs. Canada reviewed its contribution in southern Afghanistan and set up an *Independent Panel on Afghanistan* to collect experiences and propose a future policy plan in 2007. In its submission to the Panel, *Canada’s Coalition to End Global Poverty* (CCIC) association criticised the Canadian whole-of-government approach of putting security first and suppressing development and diplomatic efforts on the ground. CCIC claimed that the Canadian approach has militarised peace-building and humanitarian and development assistance. It asked for wider conceptual thinking

<sup>114</sup> Stapleton 2007, 40.

<sup>115</sup> Waldman 2007, 12–13.

<sup>116</sup> *Al Jazeera* 2007.

<sup>117</sup> Sky (2006) argues that also the fragmented lead nation approach to security sector reform in Afghanistan may be vastly unconstructive. Five major donors were appointed in 2002 to lead the support for the Afghan National Army (USA), Afghan National Police (Germany), judicial reform (Italy), counter-narcotics (UK) and disarmament (Japan).

<sup>118</sup> Waldman 2007, 24; World Bank 2007, 46.

<sup>119</sup> Stapleton 2007, 40.

<sup>120</sup> Stapleton 2007, 24.

and a variety of independent non-military tools. Otherwise, a serious risk looms of civilian and military actors being directly associated in the field.<sup>121</sup>

## 6.5 *Blurring of civilian and military roles*

Responsibilities and activities of the foreign military have been a source of frequent debate in Afghanistan since the winter 2001–2002. Mark Sedra argues that few issues are more divisive for the international community in Afghanistan than the PRTs and their relationships with civilian actors<sup>122</sup>. Criticism arises from a mixture of a demanding security environment, especially in the south and east of Afghanistan, PRT project activities and whole-of-government approaches exercised by many donor countries.

*Save the Children* accuses the PRTs of geographical and sectoral duplication with the work of humanitarian agencies. The military do not limit their activities to the idea of filling gaps, but run constant Quick Impact Projects in fields defined as humanitarian by specialised agencies. *Save the Children* claims that the military do not have expertise in humanitarian work.<sup>123</sup> Agencies call attention to the international humanitarian principles in all aid: humanity, neutrality and impartiality. Various PRTs with different QIPs hardly observe these principles.

Being highly critical to all PRT project activities, *Save the Children* is afraid of the militarisation of aid. PRT involvement in development runs the risk of blurring military and civilian roles in a conflict zone.<sup>124</sup> Projects confuse the local population and the government over the division of responsibilities. The aid community is preoccupied with the danger of being perceived as part of a military campaign plan.<sup>125</sup> *Save the Children* warns of reduced differentiation between military and civilian actors and maintains that the military, due to their projects, are encroaching on the “humanitarian space” of NGOs. The blurring of roles draws attacks on aid workers.<sup>126</sup> Humanitarian space is a concept coining secure access to a conflict zone, guaranteed by respect and the exercise of humanitarian principles. The diminution of humanitarian space is of great concern to the UN and humanitarian agencies in Afghanistan<sup>127</sup>.

The *Save the Children* report from 2004 still accurately reflects the sentiments of many NGOs and agencies engaged in humanitarian work as well as development in Afghanistan. PRTs are seen as hazardous political efforts that carry more problems and risks than benefit. A sad and extreme case in point was the 2004 pullout of *Médecins Sans Frontières* (MSF) from Afghanistan after five of their aid workers were murdered. MSF was exceptionally concerned about the humanitarian-military

<sup>121</sup> CCIC 2007, 1–2, 9–10.

<sup>122</sup> Sedra 2004, 1.

<sup>123</sup> *Save the Children* 2004, 1–3, 24, 36

<sup>124</sup> *Save the Children* 2004, 40.

<sup>125</sup> Dziedzic & Seidl 2005, 5.

<sup>126</sup> *Save the Children* 2004, 33–34.

<sup>127</sup> *Irinnews* 2007b.

relations in Afghanistan and argued that PRT proliferation influenced their decision to withdraw.<sup>128</sup> The MSF case triggered much discussion of the PRTs and their role in reconstruction and humanitarian aid. This debate somewhat settled down for a few years, but intensified again in 2007 as ISAF has taken over much of the OEF role in fighting the insurgency.

Presumably only few NGOs and humanitarian agencies are completely negative about the PRTs. Most of them apparently wish to live side by side with the PRTs, but also to keep them at a distance. Many are indifferent to PRT efforts, which are perceived as potentially useful, but rather limited in reality.

Throughout the critical reviews, the British model is considered as the most suitable one for NGOs and humanitarian agencies. This is based firstly on the fact that UN and NGO representatives were interviewed before designing the model, and secondly on following the principle of avoiding duplication with other actors and concentrating on security sector reform.<sup>129</sup> The otherwise critical *Save the Children* writes that the UK model “stands out in having a more precise ‘concept of operations’.”<sup>130</sup> It seems to answer the NGO demand of PRTs withdrawing from humanitarian assistance and extensive project activities, especially in the health, education and water sectors. The most criticised model is the American one. US PRT projects, strong aid conditionality and previously unmarked vehicles and soldiers have raised strong resentment.<sup>131</sup> On the other hand, Gauster argues that PRT-NGO relations are severing more in the north than in the south, where large areas are already impenetrable to NGOs<sup>132</sup>.

ISAF guidance on PRT tasks in the humanitarian sphere remained for a long time thin despite the increasing critique from NGOs. The PRT Terms of Reference do not make a distinction between civil and military personnel and tasks, nor mention UNAMA’s lead role in governance, development and humanitarian affairs. The revitalisation of the Executive Steering Committee (ESC) in 2006 has to some extent enhanced guidance. Policy Note 1, adopted in December 2006, specifies PRTs’ role in provincial development. It underlines the requisite coordination with and support to provincial governments and their plans. The Note adds to the PRT Handbook statement: “PRT is also not a development agency.” Policy Note 3 from February 2007 stipulates PRT intervention in humanitarian assistance, drawing a firm line between civilian actors by and large in charge and the military giving aid only in extreme circumstances. PRTs may conduct humanitarian activities only when requested by UNAMA or the Afghan government. ESC also underlined that humanitarian assistance must not be

<sup>128</sup> Sedra 2004, 1.

<sup>129</sup> Stapleton 2007, 16–17; Jakobsen 2005, 22; Sedra 2004, 8.

<sup>130</sup> *Save the Children* 2004, 20.

<sup>131</sup> Sedra 2004, 6–7, 9. Although, it should be noted that also the UK-Nordic and German PRTs have been criticised for using unmarked, white four-by-four vehicles. See, for example, Gauster 2007, 53.

<sup>132</sup> Gauster 2007, 36.

used for the purpose of “winning hearts and minds.”<sup>133</sup> Even with these new directives installed, the problem has persisted; not all PRT nations have fully adhered to them.

Steering processes should be strengthened by Guidelines for the Interaction and Coordination of Humanitarian Actors and Military Actors in Afghanistan, which was drafted by a Civil-Military Working Group dually chaired by UNAMA and ACBAR, and consisting of other humanitarian actors, major donors, ISAF, and the Government of Afghanistan. The Guidelines were published in August 2008 amidst growing fears that the conflict has not only severely reduced the access of aid agencies to local populations, but is turning them into targets<sup>134</sup>. The agreed document focuses heavily on the PRTs. Reinforcing earlier guidelines by the ESC and recognising the problems with the overgrown reconstruction role of the teams, it underlines the provision of security as the prime task of the military – instead of politically or militarily motivated assistance.<sup>135</sup> But like the earlier guiding principles, these remain just as vulnerable to negligence by the big players.

## 6.6 *PRT as a security provider?*

The PRTs are frequently considered as security guarantors in the fashion of a traditional peacekeeping or even active peace enforcement force. Those criticising the PRTs of getting too deeply involved in reconstruction and development issues tend to ask for more robust use of military capabilities. Units are requested more in providing direct security and downsizing other, more civilian types of activities. NGOs demand secure environments for them to operate in.<sup>136</sup>

More precisely, the PRTs should be able to stop clashes between warlords and root out local criminal gangs. Save the Children describes the PRTs as the “second-best option for enhancing security,” unable and too weak for mediation or reducing the propensity for conflicts. Save the Children states that “PRTs have not held warlords accountable for local abuses of authority.”<sup>137</sup> All the more, lightly built PRTs in an environment penetrated by armed politico-criminal networks may themselves need to rest some portion of their security on tolerance by local powerbrokers, i.e. warlords<sup>138</sup>.

Expectations for a PRT role in security and manoeuvring capabilities are ambitious. Stapleton tracks these hopes to the launching phase of the PRT programme when their military muscles were oversold; buffed with capabilities that did not materialise<sup>139</sup>. Accusing PRTs of the inability to intervene in large-scale factional fighting – like

<sup>133</sup> ISAF 2007, 3, B-4-1/2, B-5-1/2.

<sup>134</sup> Irinnews 2008; *Asia Times Online* 2008.

<sup>135</sup> Guidelines 2008.

<sup>136</sup> Dziedzic & Seidl 2005, 7–8; Stapleton 2007, 11.

<sup>137</sup> Save the Children 2004, 5, 28–30.

<sup>138</sup> Gauster 2007, 15.

<sup>139</sup> Stapleton 2007, 11.

the one in Herat 2004<sup>140</sup> – begs the question whether PRTs ever were designed to carry out such duties. Expectations seem to run too high in comparison to the PRT mission, tasking and resources. Even if enjoying the ISAF mandate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, PRTs were established according to the light footprint doctrine, which evolved as a compromise between the experiences of Afghan history and lame interest in contributing international troops to the ground.

With their mission of a political nature, the PRTs are devised and tasked to monitor, support, liaise and facilitate plenty of things, but not to run, execute and implement. Dziedzic and Seidl remind that “PRTs were designed to spread a peacekeeping effect without creating a large peacekeeping force. They are the grease, not the wheel.”<sup>141</sup> When deemed necessary, the PRTs can reach a more robust force from their regional Forward Support Bases or ISAF air capabilities. These provide the PRTs with the last resort deterrence they might need in rapidly escalating situations. The PRTs were created in a relatively low level of conflict and are not best suited for high-level conflict areas with constant battles. Jakobsen underlines that other troops and mechanisms than the PRTs are needed to root out such deep problems of the Afghan conflict as insurgency, the drug business and organised crime<sup>142</sup>.

## 6.7 *Integration of capacities*

PRTs are welcomed by almost all observers in their capacity to integrate a wide range of civilian and military resources. Even *Save the Children* agrees that the PRTs may be positive in integrating approaches to security and development and in advancing the concept of human security<sup>143</sup>. Godsave notes that civil-military jointness is the most likely element of the PRT experiment to be applied in future stability operations<sup>144</sup>. In contrast to these promising prospects, actual civil-military integration within the teams has not been much researched or commented on; Touko Piiparinen reflects his own experiences in a Norwegian-led unit in Meymaneh<sup>145</sup> while Perito and the US interagency report study US practises based on questionnaires and interviews<sup>146</sup>.

Integrating civilian and military assets at the field level or in a tactical unit definitely poses a challenge. The US interagency study found that good results are reached only when, tailored to local dynamics, both components work closely together and employ all resources to the full extent in lines of security, governance and

<sup>140</sup> *Save the Children* 2005, 32.

<sup>141</sup> Dziedzic & Seidl 2005, 8.

<sup>142</sup> Jakobsen 2005, 29, 34–35. It is interesting that from 2007 onwards some PRTs have been forced to assume a counter-insurgency type of duties in western and northern Afghanistan, where there are close to no OEF forces and only limited combat troops of ISAF present. PRT military tasks are widest in such low troop density areas, as noted in Section 4.3.

<sup>143</sup> *Save the Children* 2004, 35.

<sup>144</sup> Godsave 2007, 18

<sup>145</sup> Piiparinen 2007

<sup>146</sup> Perito 2005; US Interagency 2006.



development<sup>147</sup>. Using the term “integration” begs the question whether civilian and military components are considered equal elements of the whole. What is the striking force or spearhead of a PRT? Are the PRTs “essentially military mechanisms, which have embedded civilians to give them a more holistic approach to their work,” as Godsave maintains?<sup>148</sup> A counterargument could underline the existence of civilian-led PRTs in Afghanistan and the evidently civilian orientation that PRTs have adopted in Iraq. On the other hand, one can hardly avoid the conclusion that the balance between civilian and military components in a PRT is decided chiefly in the lead nation capitals. National traditions and policies steer the tasks, resources and mode of cooperation in a unit.

All three commentators list a lack of guidance on roles and responsibilities as the main source of friction in internal PRT civil-military relations. Piiparinen analyses differences in traditions, mental mindsets and concepts between civilian and military officers. These affect the ways of organising a unit’s administration as well as interaction with the local population. The bulk of the criticism is directed to the military’s tendency to forget the realities outside its own camp. With only loose external and internal guidelines, the PRTs are “left to their own devices” to organise their mission. A clash of mindsets remains possible and harmony is “ensured only by goodwill on the part of the individuals,” Piiparinen concludes.<sup>149</sup> Much relies on personal chemistries. The US interagency paper expresses concern over the finding that “personality played a disproportionate role in determining the direction of PRT activities.”<sup>150</sup> Success is laid on ad hoc, trial and error processes instead of well designed organisational processes<sup>151</sup>.

The role of the civilian personnel in ISAF is rather imprecise in general. While numerous PRT tasks and frequent reporting routines involve civilian activities, civilian experts are not part of the command structure. They are nationally sent specialists who link up with military contingents. How this is implemented technically remains within domestic traditions and legal frameworks. For example, German PRT civilians belong to their ministry staffs and are officially not part of ISAF at all, whereas Finland seconds its “civilian crisis management” experts to ISAF – even if there is no civilian ISAF leadership or command structure in effect.

Reflecting the mixed nature of the PRTs, the US Interagency report warns of the militarisation of PRT activities – including governance and development, which should be civilian-led according to US national guidance. In this matter, the collocation of some of the US PRTs with combat troops has clearly been a negative factor disorienting the PRT mission.<sup>152</sup>

<sup>147</sup> US Interagency 2006, 11.

<sup>148</sup> Godsave 2007, 19.

<sup>149</sup> Piiparinen 2007, 149–155.

<sup>150</sup> US Interagency 2006, 10.

<sup>151</sup> Perito 2005, 11.

<sup>152</sup> US Interagency 2006, 10, 14.

Recruitment to the demanding, stressful and potentially dangerous environment in Afghanistan has proven difficult for many nations. Living in a military camp under heavy limitations on personal freedom is not a particularly lucrative choice. Most of the US civilian representatives collocated with the PRTs have been junior officers or retirees from diplomatic service<sup>153</sup>. Junior officers may face problems in a culture that values age and hierarchy. The US interagency study also reminds that such inexperienced personnel will be working with mid-level military officers with 20 years of service<sup>154</sup>. The Nordic countries and new NATO members tend to send younger representatives as well. Another challenge is that Afghans repeatedly prefer military commanders to civilian representatives as their liaison. Mirroring the militarised past of the Afghan society, many officials in the local administration and police force are former soldiers who may perceive a military commander as having more authority than the younger civilian counterparts.

Warning of poor area expertise, Perito demands more pre-deployment training for civilian experts<sup>155</sup>. The US Interagency paper suggests joint training for military and civilian components<sup>156</sup>. Training should cover not only local culture, society and the history of the conflict, but also introduce the ISAF operation, PRT mission and model of civil-military integration, domestic policies, and the introduction of other actors on the ground.

A practical factor further complicating civil-military integration in the PRTs is often a mismatch between the resources of the components. Civilian experts are frequently sent to the field without any administrative, logistical or security assets. Civilians become dependent on the services of the military component, which makes them vulnerable to overruling military priorities and hinders their opportunities to meet local counterparts.<sup>157</sup> Also discrepancies in funding create internal gaps. The US interagency study demands that all civilian functions or agencies represented in a PRT should be furnished with dedicated funds to operate with<sup>158</sup>.

## 7 The way forward

The PRT experiment in Afghanistan has been depicted as a success by Western governments, while it has met criticism from non-governmental actors. With reality lying somewhere in between, there exists a certain consensus around the need for a thorough reformation of the scheme. The PRTs served well in supporting the DDR process and construction of the post-Bonn political system in Afghanistan. Both projects have been technically successful ventures of state-building. In achieving

---

<sup>153</sup> Perito 2005, 11–12.

<sup>154</sup> US Interagency 2006, 15.

<sup>155</sup> Perito 2005, 11–13.

<sup>156</sup> US Interagency 2006, 11.

<sup>157</sup> Perito 2005, 11.

<sup>158</sup> US Interagency 2006, 16.

more qualitative progress of good and efficient governance, the PRTs are less evidently cost-effective.

## 7.1 *Coherence*

In the near future two major challenges have to be solved. First, ISAF and NATO need to work out the worst outcomes of the incoherence of the various PRT models. "Synchronisation" and "coherence" have surfaced to PRT seminar agendas both in Afghanistan and Europe. Finding more "unity of effort" was one of the overarching motivations for the PRT Handbook. Even if NATO attempts to overcome diversity by setting better guidelines, it seems a slim chance that the core problem of different lead nation policies in provincial reconstruction would be tackled. Another obstacle rarely observed by commentators are the wide differences in PRTs' military tasks due to the varying presence of combat forces as indicated above.

One of the recent papers to demand effective PRT coordination was the Afghanistan Study Group Report, which called for the new UN SRSG to oversee the PRTs<sup>159</sup>. ISAF and UNAMA should indeed be perceived as missions in tandem. In a way, ISAF was established as a military component for a larger international mission in Afghanistan, UNAMA being the political and development hub responsible for humanitarian coordination as well. Even if the organisational structure is less apparent, the arrangement bears resemblance to those practised in UN peace operations. However, the two components have grown somewhat distant from each other since the early days of the mission limited to Kabul. The situation is particularly problematic in the provinces, where the PRTs have gradually self-extended their tasks and activities. The teams should provide their support in governance and development via UNAMA offices, which unfortunately do not exist in the majority of provinces. If the UNAMA network expands, PRTs could and should hand over part of their activities to the UN. It is even more important to ascertain mutual trust and cooperation between the local UN representation and the PRT for the benefit of commonly shared goals.

Despite the current discussions to find a more coherent comprehensive approach to Afghanistan, there are irreconcilable underpinning factors that prolong the confusion. They can be found in the radically different political-strategic visions of the nations contributing. The United States, the UK and a group of active smaller members of the Alliance perceive the entire mission in Afghanistan as a war, whereas the UN, the EU and some troop contributors to the ISAF approach the situation using crisis management and/or peace-building as a starting point. Are we trying to win a war or build peace?

## 7.2 *Afghanisation*

In its second challenge, NATO must decide on how to downscale the PRTs eventually; what is the PRT exit strategy? NATO is working to create criteria for an ISAF phase-

---

<sup>159</sup> Afghanistan Study Group Report 2008, 20–22.

out, the fourth stage in the Afghanistan campaign plan. It would be a logical choice to start in the north of the country, where the security situation has remained the best and somewhat plentiful development actors enjoy relatively relaxed freedom of movement. The political mission of the PRTs has been fairly successful in northern and central Afghanistan, although partial victories gained in recent years will wither away if a qualitative change of governance continues to be impeded<sup>160</sup>. In the south, political action concentrates on negotiations with tribal networks in order to win local support for the central government and split the insurgency into smaller factions. Any exit strategy for the next few years there seems to be improbable. More pessimistic observers say decades. Gauster perceives it as difficult for the PRTs to leave when they are regarded by the local population "as permanently installed international charities, i.e. quasi-job centres."<sup>161</sup>

The first option for the phasing out of the PRTs is to gradually substitute the military-based units with more Afghans. Jakobsen notes that according to the original plan, the PRT handover to the government of Afghanistan was to be started already in 2005 and concluded in 2007<sup>162</sup>. This optimistic plan was soon overridden by the difficult realities of weak government and a more demanding security situation than estimated in the initial phases of the "campaign."

The establishment of liaisons to link the PRTs and the Afghan structures, especially the national security forces, has been proposed<sup>163</sup>. In fact, direct liaison functions have been tried in the US PRTs, to which the Afghan Ministry of Interior has embedded colonel-level officers since 2004<sup>164</sup>. Only few other PRTs have such representatives collocated. It must, however, be remembered that the PRT mandate is strongest in supporting the police, with which PRT units (should) have already established frequent and direct liaison. Much vaguer is alignment with the Afghan structures in governance and development, where the PRTs should have a facilitation role, but often run their independent projects.

In terms of Afghanisation, it is remarkable that Afghan opinions and ideas about the development of the teams have not been researched at all. Neither the government of Afghanistan nor domestic NGOs have had much voice in recent studies. This unfortunate disregard toward the Afghan voice was recognised already in 2005 at the NATO conference on PRTs and CIMIC<sup>165</sup>. Domestic speakers are usually included in PRT seminars and training courses, but in a minor role.

---

<sup>160</sup> Stapleton 2007, 1–2.

<sup>161</sup> Gauster 2007, 9.

<sup>162</sup> Jakobsen 2005, 14.

<sup>163</sup> Dziedzic & Seidl 2005, 13; Stapleton 2007, 40.

<sup>164</sup> McNerney 2005, 42.

<sup>165</sup> NATO 2005.

### 7.3 *Civilianisation*

Another option available for a gradual PRT transformation is civilianisation. It would make a logical step from military intervention towards longer-term stabilisation, polity building and development. The US Interagency report underlines that the PRT expertise needed may change over time as the mission and conditions evolve<sup>166</sup>. Both Perito and McNerney suggest augmenting civilian capacities in the PRTs and compare these to CORDS units in Vietnam in which more than half of the staff were civilian experts in sectors of governance, rule of law, reconstruction and agriculture. McNerney would like to see a wider presence of PRTs across the country, by forming a network of smaller, district-level subunits<sup>167</sup>.

A further qualitative step towards civilianisation is full civilian leadership, so far exercised only in two experimental PRTs in Afghanistan. The Princeton study group argues that civilian control would “balance the long-term development with near-term military imperatives.”<sup>168</sup> Civilian leadership, representation and liaison would presumably be warmly greeted by many international civilian actors, such as humanitarian agencies<sup>169</sup>. The Canadian Independent Panel on Canadian involvement in Afghanistan suggested a rapid shift to civilian leadership in PRT Kandahar in order to enhance the coordination of national efforts<sup>170</sup>.

To analyse the civilian concept one might need to have a closer look at experiences in Panjshir and Vardak as well as units in Iraq. It could also be enlightening to compare the PRT framework to that of integrated UN missions, where a Force Commander works subordinated to a Head of Mission, who is civilian. Such an arrangement could perhaps serve as a model for semi-independent provincial/tactical units as well.

In the case of Afghanistan, the most drastic version of such civilian leadership would be to bestow PRT leadership to local UNAMA offices. UN political oversight instead of various national models should improve the coherence of the PRT network and may be seen as a response to the criticism about the lack of a comprehensive approach by the international community in large. This could perhaps be tested first in northern Afghanistan, where the security situation allows for more pioneering civilian approaches.

Advances towards civilianisation challenge the prevalent thinking. They beg a principal question on the nature of PRTs: are they after all nothing but military units spiced up with a few embedded civilians to gather information and comment on operations and plans? It seems reasonable to say that PRTs started as military installations with just thin guidance on the use of civilian resources. Since then the PRTs have, however, developed more towards civil-military integration on a

<sup>166</sup> US Interagency 2006, 21.

<sup>167</sup> Perito 2005, 14; McNerney 2005, 43–45.

<sup>168</sup> Abbaszadeh et al. 2008, 16.

<sup>169</sup> Sedra 2004, 10.

<sup>170</sup> Independent Panel 2008, 26.

more equal basis. The ISAF lessons-learning process has placed integration high on the agenda, recognising that embeddedness is not enough. Also, the whole-of-government approach to Afghanistan highlights jointness in provincial units. To use the European Union term “civilian crisis management” in depicting the PRTs would be an overstatement, but they surely include elements that are capable of carrying out activities comparable to that.

#### **7.4 Future of the integrated concept**

Could the PRTs serve as a model for future missions in similar contexts? The PRTs are rather widely considered to be useful field-level or tactical tools in coordination of military and civilian efforts in the early stabilisation stages of a post-conflict environment. They provide policymakers with unforeseen flexibility and can cover vast geographical areas, demanding only a relatively thin troop presence and modest resources compared to heavier units. In Afghanistan, the main military task of the PRTs has been to maintain modest situational awareness in areas unoccupied by the spearhead forces. Militarily, the PRTs are cheap.

On any scale, the progressive core of the PRT concept is civil-military jointness. Experiences from field-level integration will be useful, even if the wider scheme of provincial reconstruction teams are not introduced into any future missions. It could be argued that the military-heavy design of the PRTs in Afghanistan should be revised for future use in other arenas. To that end, there are examples to be analysed both in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, recognising the uniqueness of each conflict, no fixed models should be predetermined for future use.

The PRT experiment stems well with a general tendency to find more coherence between military and civilian assets, methods and efforts in crisis management and peace-building.

PRT experiences from Afghanistan and Iraq<sup>171</sup> are entering into US doctrines of stabilisation and reconstruction operations – as well as counterinsurgency. The USA established an *Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilisation* under the State Department in 2004. It follows the European example in striving to create various kinds of reserves of internationally deployable civilian experts<sup>172</sup>. In order to bridge departmental gaps, in 2005 a National Security Presidential Directive on the management of interagency efforts was issued, and an interagency planning doctrine for stabilisation and reconstruction operations was launched<sup>173</sup>. The US Department of Defence anticipates building future civil-military teams on PRT lessons<sup>174</sup>.

---

<sup>171</sup> There are wide differences in models between the two theatres. Some comparisons of the PRTs in Afghanistan and Iraq are to be found in Drolet 2006.

<sup>172</sup> US Department of State 2007b.

<sup>173</sup> White House 2005; US Joint Forces Command 2005.

<sup>174</sup> US Department of Defence 2008, 6.

NATO is looking towards enhancing deployable civilian expertises as well<sup>175</sup>. It is foreseeable that NATO will adopt the PRTs as a base model for future integrated crisis management at tactical levels.

The European Union has not thus far undertaken an integrated mission using both sets of capabilities jointly, but has dual and closely coordinated strategic and planning structures for both military and civilian crisis management within the framework of *European Security and Defence Policy* (ESDP)<sup>176</sup>.

For years civilian and military components have co-formed the UN peace operations, but in those cases integration takes place in the mission headquarters; peacekeeping battalions are not integrated with local UN sub-offices. Considering the nature of the PRTs and the wide criticism from humanitarian-development actors, it is unlikely that UN operations will adopt PRT types of formations.

In conclusion, the PRTs provide many valuable insights into crisis management – but are becoming outdated and are in urgent need of reform. They have offered “potential” but have also remained “a bit of a muddle.”<sup>177</sup> Closer research into concrete activities on the ground would be needed.

## 8 Future research

Based on identified best practises, it could be possible to model an ideal PRT. In his paper from 2005, Jakobsen recommends that Denmark follow the UK model “which is generally considered to be the most successful.”<sup>178</sup> It is true that the British model includes features that ISAF considers to be best practises, such as a tightly integrated command group or focusing on security sector reform. Humanitarian agencies and NGOs favour the model for its limited role in reconstruction. The superiority of the UK, or Nordic, model cannot, however, be confirmed with a conceptual or literature-review type of study as reflected in this paper. That would call for more detailed field research. In addition, the original British model has changed substantially since the UK left northern Afghanistan and was deployed to Helmand in south. These changes have not been much researched as of yet.

A sufficient body of conceptual research on the PRTs already exists. What is lacking is a truly comparative study that would examine the real functioning of the models on the ground. An extensive questionnaire and interview process for all 26 PRTs should be organised, in the same fashion as was done with the US PRTs by Perito and the US Interagency study. The results of the project should be made public.

After its initial phase of a conceptual study, also this PRT research project should

<sup>175</sup> Howard 2008; San 2008.

<sup>176</sup> More on EU internal civil-military coordination in Khol 2006.

<sup>177</sup> McNerney 2005, 33, 44.

<sup>178</sup> Jakobsen 2005, 4.

be directed more towards actual applications of the concept on the ground. More detailed information on organisations, practices of civil-military integration and the activities of the units ought to be collected. Further research would thus necessitate field trips to observe and interview, gather experiences and comments, and to find and verify updated facts. To avoid duplication and a waste of resources, any future Finnish research must be linked to other organisations and international research projects.

Directions for future PRT research could, for instance, be based on studying internal aspects, models, and wider context. A study on the **internal aspects** should include relations between contributing nations and question how the lead nations and other contributors are complementing each other in the PRTs, or what are the possible frictions in multinational units? Also the modes of actual cooperation should be analysed while answering questions on internal relations: how is the daily civil-military work organised and how do the different organisational cultures relate to each other?

Regarding the **models**, a *public* comparative study should be carried out covering the analysis of all national models based on interviews and observations in the field. More study is needed beyond the three original models developed by the US, the UK and Germany. For instance, the Dutch, Spanish, Lithuanian and Hungarian models have been less studied internationally. Another question is the Nordic model: how has it developed from the original British one; and how are the Nordic cooperation and collaborative procedures arranged? Is there any complementarity between the models? Another question concerns the civilian-led PRTs. How do civilian-led units function and what are their limitations and opportunities? This analysis could also cover the Iraqi case.


A **wider context** should also be mapped in relation to PRTs and the whole-of-government approach. What are the strengths and weaknesses of bringing a whole-of-government approach to the provincial/tactical level in Afghanistan? Does the PRT-driven whole-of-government approach endanger the broader, comprehensive approach of the international community? The external relations to other actors in the field necessitate a broader analysis of PRTs and UNAMA. How is this linkage between the political and security missions built in provinces? Could a fusion of the two be a future model? Also the PRT as added value in stabilisation operations needs to be covered. What is the wider importance of the PRT experiment for crisis management in post-conflict contexts? What could be identified as best practise to be utilised in the future? What could be plausible contextual criteria for a similar concept to be launched somewhere else?


Beyond these three study themes, remains the subject of military science and civil-military integration. Which strands in the military tactical and leadership doctrines are supportive of PRT types of activities that integrate military and civilian capabilities and look for enablers and multipliers external to the force itself?



## ANNEXES

## A ISAF troops





Source: [http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/isaf\\_placemat.pdf](http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/isaf_placemat.pdf), last accessed 4.11.2008.

## B Generic PRT models

	<b>American</b>	<b>German</b>	<b>British</b>	<b>Nordic</b>	<b>Turkish</b>
<i>Partnering nations</i>	0–1	4–5, Continental European	2, North-European	1, North-European	0
<i>Size (MIL)</i>	40–120	400–500	150	150–200	70
<i>Size (CIV)</i>	3–5	10–20	20–30	8–15	15
<i>Leadership</i>	Military Commander supported by embedded civilian representatives	Dual: Military Commander and Civilian Head, leading respective components	Joint between military, political and development representative	Military Commander in consultation with joint (CIV-MIL) Command Group	Civilian Coordinator
<i>Security activities (MIL; CIV)</i>	Force protection; police training and infrastructure support	Force protection, modest patrols, police infrastructure and training; police mentoring, training and infrastructure support	Extensive patrols; police training and infrastructure support	Extensive patrols, operations, force protection; police training and infrastructure support	Protection to the civilian component; police training and infrastructure support
<i>Governance activities</i>	Regular liaison with key leaders, infrastructure support to local administration	Regular liaison with key leaders, support to justice system	Regular liaison with key leaders, support to justice system	Regular liaison with key leaders, direct support left to the UN and others	Regular liaison with key officials, training & infrastructure support to local administration
<i>Reconstruction &amp; development activities</i>	PRT projects through various DoD and USAID flexible funds (infrastructure in education, health and water), other USAID projects external to the PRTs (roads, water infrastructure, local administration training)	PRT support to local planning, PRT CIMIC projects (education, water), PRT external funding to a vivid NGO community (economic development, education, water, energy)	PRT & external support to local planning, PRT refrained to facilitation though newly modest CIMIC projects (water, roads), PRT external DfID aid through NGOs and national programmes (village development, governance, water, education)	PRT & external support to local planning, PRT refrained to facilitation, occasional QIPs by both MIL and CIV, PRT external aid through NGOs and national programmes (village development, governance, water, education)	Development aid and technical support through the PRT (education, health, agriculture)

	<b>American</b>	<b>German</b>	<b>British</b>	<b>Nordic</b>	<b>Turkish</b>
<i>Provincial aid flow</i>	(Even tens of) Millions of USD annually both through and external to the PRTs. Sums vary drastically between provinces	Some millions of EUR annually, mostly external to the PRTs	Less than one million pounds through the PRT annually, nearly 20 million pounds externally	USD 5–15 million annually, nearly all external to the PRTs	USD 6.5 million through the PRT annually
<i>Operational environment</i>	High risk areas with frequent serious incidents, mostly robust ISAF and OEF combat troops presence, close to non-operational administration and services, few NGOs and limited UN presence	Low to mid level risk, sporadic serious incidents, few ISAF or OEF combat troops, slowly reconstituting administration and services, fairly strong NGO and UN presence	High risk areas with frequent serious incidents, robust ISAF and OEF combat troops presence, close to non-operational administration and services, few NGOs and limited UN presence, gigantic opium production	Low to mid level risk, sporadic serious incidents, few ISAF or OEF combat troops, slowly reconstituting administration and services, fairly strong NGO and UN presence	Mid level risk, sporadic serious incidents, some ISAF or OEF combat troops, slowly reconstituting administration and services, fairly strong NGO and UN presence
<i>Special</i>	The first PRT model	Part of the strong German community in the northeast	The only PRT to run active counter-narcotics	Developed from the British model	Civilian PRT with only supportive military component
<i>Rationale</i>	Reconstruction focus with counter-insurgency mindset to win 'hearts and minds'	Stabilisation and reconstruction	Stabilisation through SSR	Stabilisation through SSR	Reconstruction and development
<i>Typical critique</i>	Poor quality of QIPs, inefficient support to local capacity building compared to sums flowing in, PRTs politicising/ militarising humanitarian aid and development	Heavy restrictions on the use of military capabilities, fairly large reconstruction assistance insufficiently aligned with the Afghan government	Local people demand more visible support to reconstruction and development	Local people demand more visible support to reconstruction and development	–

## References

### *Monographs, Papers and Articles*

- Abbaszadeh, Nima, Mark Crow, Marianne El-Khoury, Jonathan Gandomi, David Kuwayama, Christopher MacPherson, Meghan Nutting, Nealin Parker & Taya Weiss (2008): *Provincial Reconstruction Teams: lessons and recommendations*. Princeton: Princeton University. Available at [http://www.princeton.edu/research/pwreports\\_f07/www591b.pdf](http://www.princeton.edu/research/pwreports_f07/www591b.pdf), last accessed 27.2.2008.
- Afghanistan Study Group Report (2008): *Revitalizing our efforts – rethinking our strategies*. Second Edition. Center for the Study of the Presidency. Available at [http://www.thepresidency.org/pubs/Afghan\\_Study\\_Group\\_final.pdf](http://www.thepresidency.org/pubs/Afghan_Study_Group_final.pdf), last accessed 5.3.2008.
- Cassidy, Robert M. (2006): "The long small war: indigenous forces for counterinsurgency". *Parameters, US Army War College Quarterly*, Summer 2006, 47–62. Available at <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/06summer/cassidy.pdf>, last accessed 11.12.2007.
- CCIC (2007): *Canada's whole-of-government approach in Afghanistan: implications on development and peace-building*. Briefing paper. Submission to the Independent Panel on Afghanistan. Canada's Coalition to End Global Poverty. Available at [http://www.ccic.ca/e/docs/002\\_humanitarian\\_2007-12\\_ccic\\_submission.pdf](http://www.ccic.ca/e/docs/002_humanitarian_2007-12_ccic_submission.pdf), last accessed 18.12.2007.
- Clark, David J. & Raymond A. Millen (2006): *The vital role of intelligence in counterinsurgency operations*. US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute: Carlisle Barracks. Available at <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil309.pdf>, last accessed 20.11.2007.
- Drolet, John D. (2006): *Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Afghanistan vs. Iraq – should we have a standard model?* Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute. Available at <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil333.pdf>, last accessed 20.11.2007.
- Dziedzic, Michael J. & Michael K. Seidl (2005): *Provincial Reconstruction Teams and military relations with international and nongovernmental organizations in Afghanistan*. United States Institute of Peace. Special Report 147. Available at <http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr147.pdf>, last accessed 29.11.2007
- Gauster, Markus (2007[2006]): *Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: an innovative instrument of international crisis management being put to the test*. George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. Occasional Paper Series, No. 16. Available at [http://www.marshallcenter.org/site-graphic/lang-en/page-pubs-index-1/static/xdocs/research/static/occpapers/occ-paper\\_16-en.pdf](http://www.marshallcenter.org/site-graphic/lang-en/page-pubs-index-1/static/xdocs/research/static/occpapers/occ-paper_16-en.pdf), last accessed 4.4.2008.

- Godsave, Hannah (2007): *The Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) model of post-conflict intervention: progress in Afghanistan and future Prospects*. MA Dissertation. Conflict, security and development programme. London: King's College.
- Guidelines (2008): *Guidelines for the Interaction and Coordination of Humanitarian Actors and Military Actors in Afghanistan*. 20 May 2008 – Version 1.0.
- Howard, Martin (2008): "CEP's role in Stabilisation and Reconstruction. Editorial". *PerCEPTions Newsletter*, no 5, July 2008, 1–2.
- Independent Panel (2008): *Independent panel on Canada's future role in Afghanistan. Final report*. Available at [http://www.independent-panel-independant.ca/pdf/Afghan\\_Report\\_web\\_e.pdf](http://www.independent-panel-independant.ca/pdf/Afghan_Report_web_e.pdf), last accessed 26.2.2008.
- Jakobsen, Peter Viggo (2005): *PRTs in Afghanistan: successful but not sufficient*. Danish Institute for International Studies, Report No. 6. Available at [http://www.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/Reports2005/pvj\\_prts\\_afghanistan.pdf](http://www.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/Reports2005/pvj_prts_afghanistan.pdf), last accessed 28.11.2007.
- Khol, Radek (2006): "Civil-military co-ordination in EU crisis management". In *Civilian crisis management: the EU way*. European Union Institute for Security Studies, Chaillot paper No. 90, 123–138. Available at <http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/chai90.pdf>, last accessed 10.12.2007.
- Lane, Roger & Emma Sky (2006): "The role of Provincial Reconstruction Teams in stabilisation". *RUSI Journal*, June 2006, 46–51.
- McNerney, Michael J. (2005): "Stabilization and reconstruction in Afghanistan: are PRTs a model or a muddle?" *Parameters, US Army War College Quarterly*, Winter 2005–2006, 32–46. Available at <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/05winter/mcnerney.pdf>, last accessed 28.11.2007.
- Orsini, Dominique (2007): "Walking the tightrope: dealing with warlords in Afghanistan's destabilizing north". *RUSI Journal*, October 2007, 46–50.
- Patrick, Stewart & Kaysie Brown (2007): *Greater than the sum of its parts? Assessing "the whole of government" approaches to fragile states*. New York: International Peace Academy.
- Perito, Robert M. (2005): *US experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: lessons identified*. United States Institute of Peace. Special Report 152. Available at <http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr152.pdf>, last accessed 29.11.2007.
- Perito, Robert M. (2007): *Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq*. United States Institute of Peace. Special Report 185. Available at <http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr185.pdf>, last accessed 10.12.2007.

- Perito, Robert M. (2008): *Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams*. USIPeace Briefing. United States Institute of Peace. Available at [http://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace\\_briefings/2008/0305\\_prt.html](http://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefings/2008/0305_prt.html), last accessed 21.7.2008.
- Piiparinen, Touko (2007): "A clash of mindsets? An insider's account of Provincial Reconstruction Teams". *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 14. No.1, January 2007, 143–157.
- PRT Meymaneh (2007): *Guidelines*. Unpublished paper circulated within ISAF.
- San, Burcu (2008): "Stabilisation and Reconstruction: a New Growth Area for NATO?" *PerCEPtions Newsletter*, no 5, July 2008, 9–10.
- Save the Children (2004): *Provincial Reconstruction Teams and humanitarian-military relations in Afghanistan*. Available at [http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/Save\\_the\\_Children\\_UK\\_-\\_PRTs\\_and\\_Humanitarian-Military\\_Relations\\_in\\_Afghanistan\\_2004\\_09.pdf](http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/Save_the_Children_UK_-_PRTs_and_Humanitarian-Military_Relations_in_Afghanistan_2004_09.pdf), last accessed 20.11.2007.
- Sedra, Mark (2004): *Civil-military relations in Afghanistan: the Provincial Reconstruction Team debate*. Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada. Available at [http://www.asiapacificresearch.ca/caprn/afghan\\_project/m\\_sedra.pdf](http://www.asiapacificresearch.ca/caprn/afghan_project/m_sedra.pdf), last accessed 21.11.2007.
- Stapleton, Barbara J. (2007): "A means to what end? Why PRTs are peripheral to the bigger political challenges in Afghanistan". *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies*, Fall 2007, Vol. 10, Issue 1. Available at <http://www.jmss.org/2007/2007fall/articles/stapleton.pdf>, last accessed 15.12.2007.
- US Interagency (2006): *Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: an interagency assessment*. US Department of State, US Department of Defence & US Agency for International Development. Available at [http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\\_docs/PNADG252.pdf](http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADG252.pdf), last accessed 23.11.2007.
- Waldman, Matt (2007): *Falling short: aid effectiveness in Afghanistan*. Agency Coordination Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR). Available at [http://www.acbar.org/ACBAR%20Publications/ACBAR%20Aid%20Effectiveness%20\(25%20Mar%202008\).pdf](http://www.acbar.org/ACBAR%20Publications/ACBAR%20Aid%20Effectiveness%20(25%20Mar%202008).pdf), 3 last accessed.3.2008.

## **International organisations**

- [ISAF 2007] International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) (2007): *Provincial Reconstruction Team Handbook*. Third edition, 3 February 2007. Kabul: ISAF.
- NATO (2005): *NATO Provincial Reconstruction Teams: ISAF PRT operations in Afghanistan and the implications and consequences for civil-military relations*. Seminar report, NATO CIMIC Centre of Excellence, 29–30 September 2005. Available at [http://www.cimic-coe.org/ccoe\\_download/prt\\_report.pdf](http://www.cimic-coe.org/ccoe_download/prt_report.pdf), last accessed 29.11.2007.

- United Nations Security Council (2001): *Resolution 1386: on the situation in Afghanistan*. Available at <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/708/55/PDF/N0170855.pdf?OpenElement>, last accessed 11.12.2007.
- United Nations Security Council (2003): *Resolution 1510: the situation in Afghanistan*. Available at <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/555/55/PDF/N0355555.pdf?OpenElement>, last accessed 11.12.2007.
- UNODC (2008): *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2008. Executive Summary*. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Available at [http://www.unodc.org/documents/publications/Afghanistan\\_Opium\\_Survey\\_2008.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/documents/publications/Afghanistan_Opium_Survey_2008.pdf), last accessed 5.9.2008.
- World Bank (2007): *Service delivery and governance at the sub-national level in Afghanistan*. Available at <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOUTHASIAEXT/Resources/Publications/448813-1185293547967/4024814-1185293572457/report.pdf>, last accessed 25.3.2008.

### **Government sources**

- BMZ (2007): *Afghanistan > Cooperation*. German Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development. Available at <http://www.bmz.de/en/countries/partnercountries/afghanistan/cooperation.html>, last accessed 13.12.2007.
- Canadian Ministry of National Defence (2007): *The Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team activities*. Available at [http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/kprt-eprk/act\\_e.asp](http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/kprt-eprk/act_e.asp), last accessed 11.12.2007.
- DfID (2007): *Afghanistan programme*. Department for International Development. Available at <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/countries/asia/afghanistan-programme.asp>, 14.12.2007.
- Dutch Ministry of Defence (2007): *Uruzgan*. Available at <http://www.mindef.nl/missies/afghanistan/uruzgan/>, last accessed 11.12.2007.
- Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2007): *Development aid spending in Afghanistan*. Available at <http://www.minbuza.nl/en/themes,international-cooperation/afghanistan/afghanistan-in-ontwikkeling/Development-Aid-spending-in-Afghanistan.html>, last accessed 11.12.2007.
- GTZ (2007): *GTZ in Afghanistan*. German Agency for Technical Cooperation. Available at <http://www.gtz.de/en/weltweit/europa-kaukasus-zentralasien/670.htm>, last accessed 13.12.2007.
- House of Commons (2006): *Commons Hansard written answers text for 31 October 2006*. Available at <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmhansrd/cm061031/text/61031w0023.htm>, last accessed 28.11.2007.
- Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2007): *Norwegian led PRT in Faryab*. Available at <http://www.norway.org/af/prt/faryab/faryab.htm>, 18.12.2007.



US Department of Defence (2005): *Reconstruction Team opens in Panjshir*. Panjshir, 21 November 2005. Available at <http://www.defendamerica.mil/articles/nov2005/a112105ms3.html>, last accessed 13.12.2007.

US Department of Defence (2008): *Statement of Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defence for Policy Ryan Henry*. Statement before House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. Washington, DC, 14 February 2008. Available at [http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/OI021408/Henry\\_Testimony021408.pdf](http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/OI021408/Henry_Testimony021408.pdf), last accessed 27.2.2008.

US Department of State (2007a): *Fact sheet on Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)*. Available at [http://iraq.usembassy.gov/iraq/20060223\\_prt\\_fact\\_sheet.html](http://iraq.usembassy.gov/iraq/20060223_prt_fact_sheet.html), last accessed 10.12.2007.

US Department of State (2007b): *Stabilization and reconstruction operations: learning from the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) experience*. Coordinator for Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization. Statement before House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. Washington, DC, 30 October 2007. Available at <http://www.state.gov/s/crs/rls/rm/94379.htm>, last accessed 21.11.2007.

US Joint Forces Command (2005): *US Government Draft Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation*. J7 Pamphlet Version 1.0. Available at [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/training/crs\\_pam051205.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/training/crs_pam051205.pdf), last accessed 3.1.2008.

White House (2005): *National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-44*. December 7, 2005. Available at <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-44.html>, last accessed 18.8.2008.

## News

*Al Jazeera* (2007): "Nation building key in Afghanistan". 23 December 2007. Available at <http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/8346FBA2-39E2-42A3-88B4-077E794B71DA.htm>, last accessed 2.1.2008.

*Asia Times Online* (2008): "In Afghanistan, blurred lines cost lives". August 20 2008. Available at [http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South\\_Asia/JH20Df02.html](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/JH20Df02.html), last accessed 5.9.2008.

*Irinnews* (2007a): "PRTs accused of spending unequal amount on development". Kabul, 4 May 2007. Available at <http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=71949>, last accessed 12.12.2007.

*Irinnews* (2007b): "Humanitarian space must be regained – UNAMA". Kabul, 17 December 2007. Available at <http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=75902>, last accessed 30.1.2008.

*Irinnews* (2008): "Afghanistan: Some 1,000 civilians killed since January – NGO body". Kabul, 1 August 2008. Available at <http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=79565>, last accessed 10.8.2008.

*IWPR* (2007): "Northern governor lashes out at NATO". Institute of War and Peace Reporting. Mazar-e Sharif, 23 July 2007. Available at [http://iwpr.net/?p=arr&s=f&o=337318&apc\\_state=henh%20](http://iwpr.net/?p=arr&s=f&o=337318&apc_state=henh%20), last accessed 12.12.2007.

*Reliefweb* (2003): "The Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Afghanistan and its role in reconstruction". 31 May 2003. Available at <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/OCHA-64BGJ7?OpenDocument>, last accessed 13.12.2007.