Seminar Publication

CMC Finland Research Days 2009

Monitoring, Lessons Learned, Evaluation

How to measure Impact of (Civilian) Crisis Management?

CMC Finland, Kuopio
18 and 19 November 2009

Expertise in Civilian Crisis Management – Regional Development Programme 2008–2012

STATE PROVINCIAL OFFICE OF EASTERN FINLAND

CMCFinland

Kriisinhallintakeskus
Crisis Management Centre

CONTENT

1 Foreword

The CMC Finland Research Days were organised second time 18 and 19 November 2009. More than 40 persons contributed to this event of two days which was composed of plenary and working group sessions. *CMC Finland Yearbook 2009 on Civilian Crisis Management Studies* was published during the Research Days.

This year the thematic of Research Days highlighted the impact of peace and crisis management operations. What matters? How to measure? What is the difference between monitoring, assessing and evaluation? Lessons learned, best practices or at least some practices? These questions amongst others were analysed and discussed in plenary session with keynote speakers as well as in working groups. The presentations of the plenary session, the outcomes of the workings groups as well as other material presented during the Research Days are collected to this seminar proceedings publication.

The CMC Finland Research Days are oriented to civil servants, researchers from different academic research institutes and universities, NGO actors, recruited and repatriated secondees, and all those who are interested in peacebuilding, crisis management and humanitarian response activities. The meaning is to provide a forum for above mentioned groups as well as to CMC Finland staff members to further enhance their expertise in their daily work. CMC Finland is not itself an academic research institute and therefore it will not organise academic research conferences or seminars. Those events are organised by relevant universities and institutes and CMC Finland is working in close cooperation with them. An example of this cooperation is the forthcoming Development Studies Conference in February 2010 organised by the Finnish Development Association together with the CMC Finland (more at www.kehitystutkimus.fi/conference). CMC Finland Research Days focus on linking the operational and strategic levels in peacebuilding and crisis management by, for example, giving recommendations to relevant training, recruitment and planning personnel both nationally as well as internationally.

The lively discussion in plenary sessions, working groups and during the pauses between participants with different background confirmed the need for this kind of think-thank event. The added value of the CMC Finland Research Days is to further develop the intellectual discussion around peacebuilding and crisis management activities. It is utmost important that the analytical thinking in its more theoretical form meets the analytical thinking based on lessons identified at the mission level. Otherwise the lessons learned process will not take place.

Kirsi Henriksson
Head of Research and Development
CMC Finland

2 PROGRAMME

CMC Finland RESEARCH DAYS

18 and 19 November 2009
Crisis Management Centre Finland, Kuopio

WEDNESDAY 18.11.

12:00   Plenary Session

Welcoming speech and chair, *Kirsi Henriksson*, Head of Research and Development, CMC Finland

"Concepts and comparison: UN and ESDP operations"
Juha-Matti Seppänen, Director (Acting), Martti Ahtisaari Rapid Reaction Facility, Crisis Management Initiative

"Lessons learned process and ESD operations"
Peter Hedling, DG E 9 – Civilian Crisis Management, Council of the European Union

"Accountability and evaluation"
Risto Nieminen, Head of Sector, Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC), Council of the European Union

"Evaluation in practice: experiences from evaluation projects in conflict and post-conflict environments"
Stefan Jansen, Senior Consultant, Channel Research

Comment on plenary session:
Antti Häikiö, National Coordinator, Civilian Crisis Management, Ministry of the Interior & former Head of Training and Best Practices Office, EULEX Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo

Discussion and division into working groups

15:30-17:00   Working Groups

WG 1: Measuring what matters in peacebuilding and crisis management

Moderator: *Antti Häikiö*, National Coordinator, Civilian Crisis Management, Ministry of Interior
Rapporteur: *Elina Penttinen*, Researcher, Tampere Peace Research Institute

WG 2: Current research in the field of crisis management and peacebuilding

Moderators: *Pirjo Jukarainen*, Senior Researcher, Tampere Peace Research Institute & *Jari Mustonen*, Senior Researcher, CMC Finland
Rapporteur: *Eeva-Maria Siljanen*, Research Assistant, CMC Finland

WG 3: From Crisis Management to Resiliency Management: does it make sense to have "hot spotting" in a multidisciplinary sense?

Moderator: *Jari Vuori*, Professor, Department of Health Policy and Management University of Kuopio
Rapporteur: *Kirsi Hyttinen*, Intern, CMC Finland

18:00   Publishing of CMC Finland's Yearbook 2009, *Kirsi Henriksson*, Head of Research and Development, CMC Finland

THURSDAY 19.11.

8:30   Working Groups continue

10:45   Wrap-up of Working Groups, presentations of WG moderators and rapporteurs
Chair: *Senja Korhonen*, Training Officer, CMC Finland

12:00   Concluding remarks

Ari Kerkkänen, Director, CMC Finland

3   LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

Risto Nieminen	Head of Sector, (CPCC), Council of the European Union
Peter Hedling	DGE 9, Civilian Crisis Management, Council of the European Union
Reijo Heinonen	Professor Emeritus, University of Joensuu
Stefan Jansen	Channel Research
Juha-Matti Seppänen	Crisis Management Initiative
Kalle Sysikaski	Committee of 100 in Finland
Pirjo Jukarainen	Tampere Peace Research Insitute
Elina Penttinen	Tampere Peace Research Insitute
Antti Häikiö	Ministry of the Interior
Thaddeus Ndukwe	University of Jyväskylä
Olli Ruohomäki	Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland
Juha Mäkinen	Finnish Defence Forces
Lauri Siitonen	University of Jyväskylä
Anri Heinonen	Finnish Defence Forces
Johan Ehnberg	Åbo Akademi
Jani Bergström	University of Kuopio
Kari Karanko	Ambassador (retired), Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland
Tuula Vaskilampi	University of Kuopio
Meghan Riley	University of Tampere
Tommi Niemi	University of Helsinki
Antti Hujala	Finnish Defence Forces International Centre
Christian Wallin	Finnish Defence Forces International Centre
Hannu Rantanen	Emergency Services College
Kaarina Karppinen	VTT, Technical Research Centre of Finland
Jarmo Pykälä	Peace Union of Finland
Taina Kurki	University of Kuopio
Jari Vuori	University of Kuopio
Ari Kerkkänen	Crisis Mangement Centre Finland
Kirsi Henriksson	Crisis Mangement Centre Finland
Kirsi Hyttinen	Crisis Mangement Centre Finland
Eeva-Maria Siljanen	Crisis Mangement Centre Finland
Senja Korhonen	Crisis Mangement Centre Finland
Jari Mustonen	Crisis Mangement Centre Finland
Jari Sundqvist	Crisis Mangement Centre Finland
Olivia Setkic	Crisis Mangement Centre Finland
Kaisa Happo	Crisis Mangement Centre Finland
Erja Vesterinen	Crisis Mangement Centre Finland
Eeva Stephens	Crisis Mangement Centre Finland
Annika Launiala	Crisis Mangement Centre Finland

4 BIOS OF KEY NOTE SPEAKERS, CHAIRS, COMMENTATOR, MODERATORS AND RAPPORTEURS

Keynote speakers

Juha-Matti Seppänen is the Acting Director of MARRF (Martti Ahtisaari Rapid Reaction Facility). He oversees CMI's activities in the follow-up of selected country cases, especially the situation in Aceh, Indonesia and other Track Two Diplomacy activities within MARRF. Prior to joining CMI in January 2007 he worked in the Ministry of Defence of Finland as a member of the ESDP team concentrating especially on the Civil-Military Co-operation as well as Crisis Management operations. He has field experience from Afghanistan (2004-2005), where he served first as CIMIC and staff officer and later as Political Representative in the Provincial Reconstruction Team Meymaneh in the ISAF (International Security Assistance Force). Juha-Matti holds a Master's degree in Political Science (University of Helsinki, 2002).

Peter Hedling works in the EU Council Secretariat, the civilian crisis management department of the external relations directorate-general since 2004. He currently works on lessons, strategic planning in the Middle East and exercises. Previously he worked with the European Commission, EuropeAid department, as a co-ordinator towards the United Nations system for EC development aid, and for five and a half years in the Swedish Foreign Office, mainly working on Eastern Europe and spending three years at the Swedish Embassy in Riga, working on ethnic issues and as a point of contact for Swedish development aid.

Peter has a CEMS Master and M Sc from the Stockholm School of Economics, a BA in political science from the University of Stockholm and completed the Swedish diplomatic academy. He worked for one year as a research assistant in the Stockholm Institute for Transition Economies.

Risto Nieminen is Head of Sector, Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC), Council of the European Union.

Stefan Jansen is senior consultant with 15 years professional experience in the peace and security sector analysis in Africa, Asia and Latin America for international donor organisations. He has broad knowledge of the design and management of consultation

processes, the evaluation of peace-building and conflict prevention programmes, as of strategy analysis and design. Mr Jansen has been an Associate Consultant with Channel Research for 5 years. His has worked, among others, in Rwanda, Ethiopia, Lebanon, Afghanistan, Colombia, Guatemala, Indonesia (Aceh) and the Southern Philippines region (Mindanao).

Stefan possesses of long-term field experience as expert advisor in peace-building, reconciliation and civil-military cooperation. He has recently undertaken the mid-term evaluation of the European Commission's support to the Economic Community of Central African States in the field of Peace and Security and was Team Leader for the lessons learnt assessment of the 9th EDF African Peace Facility Programme for the European Commission with a view of preparing the following programme. He has more than 15 years of experience in development cooperation and gained over the last years a profound knowledge of evaluation consultancy, impact analysis and strategy design for peace and security related programmes.

Stefan is trainer at the Academy for Conflict Transformation in Bonn / Germany, where he prepares staff of international organisations for their assignment in conflict or post conflict situations. He regularly participates in international conferences about Peace and Security and is member of the International Sociological Association, the International Political Science Association and the European Evaluation Society.

In 2008, through Channel Research, Stefan was the Team Leader in two consultancies in the sector of Peace and Security for SIDA and the Institute for Security Studies in South Africa. In 2007, he led the evaluation of the USAID financed Northern Uganda Peace Initiative and the Community Resilience and Dialogue Program. He was also expert on a long-term assignment in Guatemala for human rights, peacebuilding and the Truth Commissions between 2000-2003.

Commentator and moderator

Antti Häikiö is National Coordinator of Civilian Crisis Management at the Finnish Ministry of the Interior. He recently returned back from Kosovo where he worked for three years, first for the EU Planning Team for Kosovo and since the launching of the EULEX Rule of Law Mission as a Head of Training and Best Practices Office. Antti has a long experience from Western Balkans since the beginning of 1990s and his contribution to the development of civilian crisis management training both in Finland and in the framework of European Group on Training network has been crucial.

Other moderators

Pirjo Jukarainen is a Senior Researcher in Tampere Peace Research Institute. She is Doctor of Administrative Sciences (Regional Studies) from University of Tampere 2000. Currently she runs a Finnish Academy project: *Gendered Agency in Conflict: Gender Sensitive Approach to Development and Conflict Management Practices*. She is member of CMC Finland 1325 Steering Committee and she is also working for the joint research project with CMC Finland; the project analyses the changing expertise in comprehensive crisis management.

Jari Vuori is Professor of Health Management Sciences at the University of Kuopio. He has been working closely with the CMC since its establishment in 2007. His article on constructing a process model for understanding civilian crisis management will be published at the Civilian Crisis Management Studies series in the beginning of 2010.

Rapporteurs

Elina Penttinen (PhD) works currently in a joint research project (Tampere Peace Research Institute and CMC Finland) titled "Enhancement of expertise in comprehensive crisis management". Her earlier research includes gender-mainstreaming of civilian crisis management, research methodologies and creative analytic writing funded by the Academy of Finland including postdoctoral and doctoral funding. Her doctoral thesis (2004) "Corporeal globalization" was published by Routledge in 2008 with a new title "Globalization, Prostitution and Sex-trafficking: corporeal politics". She has worked in Tampere Peace Research Institute as a researcher and as an adjunct professor at the Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of Tampere, Finland.

Jari Mustonen is a Senior Research at the CMC Finland. He is specialised on civil-military cooperation and comprehensive crisis management. Jari returned recently from United Nations where he worked as a Junior Professional at the United Nations Peace-building Commission.

Eeva-Maria Siljanen works as an Intern at the CMC Finland. She has recently graduated from the University of Kuopio. Her Master Thesis analysed the repatriation of Finnish civilian crisis management personnel.

Kirsi Hyttinen works as an Intern at the CMC Finland. She studies pedagogy at the University of Jyväskylä, Finland.

Chairs

Ari Kerkkänen has Ph.D. from the University of Helsinki (2001). Currently, he works as Director of the Crisis Management Centre Finland. His former appointments are as follows: University Researcher (University of Helsinki, 2006), Political Advisor (Multinational Task Force North, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 2005), War Crimes Intelligence Analyst (UN International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 2002-2005), Political Monitor and Senior Operations Officer in Serbia (EUMM 2001-2002), UN Military Observer (UNPROFOR 1994-1995, UN Staff Officer (UNPROFOR, 1993) and UN Operations Duty Officer (UNIFIL, 1991-1992). His regional expertise lies within the Middle East and the Western Balkans.

Kirsi Henriksson is the Head of Research and Development at the Crisis Management Centre Finland. She has a Master of Arts in General History from the University of Tampere, Finland. Previously, she has worked as a Researcher in the Tampere Peace Research Institute, as well as a Researcher and Lecturer at the Department of History, University of Tampere. During 2006-2009 she worked as Chief Editor of a scientific journal published by the Finnish Peace Research Association, *Kosmopolis*. Her regional expertise lies within North-Africa, especially with Algeria.

Senja Korhonen is a Training Officer at the CMC Finland. She is responsible for the Human Security Training Programme and she has conducted a pilot course on "Applying Human Security in Crisis Management" and she is responsible for conducting human security sessions in the Core Courses and other training events, including pre-deployment trainings.

5   PLENARY SESSION PRESENTATIONS

5.1 Chair's introduction

CCM Experts

Secondment system regulated by
- Act on the Participation of Civilian Personnel in Crisis Management
- MoI Decree on the Participation of Civilian Personnel in Crisis Management
- Civil Service Act

Direction and implementation divided between
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Ministry of Interior
- Crisis Management Centre Finland

International Organisations

EGT, ESDC, etc.

MFA MoI NGO's Academia

MoJ CMC Finland 1325 Steering Committee

Fnnish Centre of Expertise in Comprehensive Crisis Management National Defence University

MoD Fincent

Pori Brigade

Operations

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Building blocks of Human Security Approach

Human Security

1325 and Gender
Human Rights
Cultural Awareness

Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Management

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FUTURE: New Twenty Years' Crisis? (Booth 2007)

- Epochal crisis
  - New-old -debate
  - Cold peace era, global age…
- Structural crisis
  - Patriarchy
  - Proselyting religion
  - Capitalism
  - Statism
  - Race
  - Consumer democracy
- Decisional crisis
  - Security dilemmas and strategic challenges (nuclear weapons or war on terror?)
  - Globalisation threats
  - Population stress
  - The destroying of nature
  - Governance overload (UN, EU, Nato, OSCE)
  - A season for unreason ("religion strikes back", values competing)

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5.2 Thoughts on evaluation of civilian crisis management
(Juha-Matti Seppänen)

Thoughts on Evaluation of Civilian Crisis Management

CRISIS MANAGEMENT INITIATIVE
Building Bridges for Sustainable Security

Crisis Management Initiative: Overview

- Independent, non-profit organization

- Specialized in private diplomacy and innovative peace building projects

- Comprehensive and practical approach: crisis management, conflict resolution and state building

- Strong track-record in implementing multi-stakeholder initiatives

- Think tank contributing to EU security and development policy

- Rapid reaction capability due to strong network of mediation and subject matter experts

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CRISIS MANAGEMENT INITIATIVE
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CMI's Mission

- Works to resolve conflict and to build sustainable peace

- Brings together diverse actors to seek solutions to human security challenges

- Offers private diplomacy services on a global scale

- Engaged in strengthening the capacity and professionalism of international actors in crisis management operations and post-conflict phases

- Seeks to create innovative and practical approaches and methods for peace building

Governance out of a Box pilot project to be launched in November 2008

The result of Aceh peace talks: destruction of guerilla weapons, 2005

3

CRISIS MANAGEMENT INITIATIVE
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Why CMI is different

- Combines field experience, policy development and high level decision making

- Access to decision-makers at highest levels

- Strong track-record in mediation and multi-stakeholder peace-building projects

- CMI mobilises multiple actors in solving problems (government entities, private sector, civil society and military)

- Capacity for rapid and flexible reaction

- Close collaboration with international and regional organizations, particularly the EU and the UN

- EU policy development in security related areas as well as mediation

- Wide network of local partners, particularly in South-East Asia and West Africa

4

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What we do

Private Diplomacy and Mediation

Track 1,5/2 Diplomacy
- Aceh Peace Agreement and follow up
- Informal consultations with local peace facilitators in Nepal and elsewhere
- Helsinki-meetings for high-level Iraqi participants. Signing of the "Helsinki Agreements" in 2007 and 2008

Country Studies and Networking
- Study on Burma / Myanmar for the European Commission, 2008
- Conflict mapping and networking Sri Lanka
- Ongoing effort to follow and support the peace process in Nepal
- Evaluation of Finnish development aid in Afghanistan, 2007

Capacity building in
Crisis Management and Statebuilding

Four thematic priority areas of work:
★**Peace Mediation**
- Civil Society Participation in the Black Sea
- Addressing gender issues in peace processes
- Leading a mediation cluster in Initiative for Peacebuilding

★**Comprehensive Crisis Management**
- ITCM and supporting ICT4Peace
- Evaluation of Crisis Management & Peace processes

★**Foresight for Peace and Security**
- Participatory foresight process on European security : www.foresec.eu

★**Post-war Statebuilding**
- Governance out of a Box

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Funding

- In 2007 the major part of CMI's funding came from European governments, the European Commission as well as through donations and partnership arrangements with foundations and private sector companies

- CMI's work is primarily funded on a project-by project basis (90% of funding)

- Annual budget: c. € 3 million (2008)

- CMI is seeking to broaden its current funding base in order to increase financial flexibility and to improve capacity and response for mediation requests

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Thoughts on Evaluation
of Civilian Crisis Management

7   CRISIS MANAGEMENT INITIATIVE
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Objective

- To provide food for thought for future discussions on lessons learned and evaluation by

➢ explaining key concepts and methods
➢ reviewing current practices in other IOs
➢ considering needs in the ESDP framework

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Content of the Briefing

- Definition of key concepts and terms
- Why evaluate ESDP?
- Challenges for planning & evaluation
- Current situation in ESDP
- Drawing from existing methods
- Recommendations

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Some Definitions

Reporting terms are used interchangeably for different methods and approaches.

We will retain here:
- Monitoring & Impact Assessment
- Auditing
- Lessons identified
- Best practices
- Evaluation

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Monitoring & Impact Assessment

- <u>Monitoring</u> is distinct from evaluation. It is a continuous function providing managers and key stakeholders with regular feedback on the consistency or discrepancy between planned and actual performance.
- Based on easily collected data, often of a quantitative nature
- <u>Impact assessment</u> provides a comprehensive set of data which allows the tracking of change over time. It is ideally periodic, but this has only been done in some exceptional industrial projects
- Should be both qualitative and quantitative

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Auditing

- *Audit: An assessment of the adequacy of management controls and performance*
- ... to ensure the economic, efficient and effective use of resources ...
- based on a verifiable frame of reference set in advance

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Lessons identified/Learned

- An observation/experience acquired in implementation which can provide direction to the formulation of operational initiatives
- To be "learned" lessons identified need to be validated and endorsed in the form of standardized guidance that needs to be disseminated and monitored.
- Lesson learning is a continuous activity best carried out by practitioners in the field with guidance and support from headquarters.
- LL often focused on internal processes and delivery mechanisms and their improvement

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Best practice

- Best Practice is a technique, method or process that is more effective at delivering a particular outcome than any other technique, method, process, etc.

- Best practice is a useful concept to seek out in real time learning processes. It is positive and helps identify what should be done differently – which is indirectly critical.

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Evaluation

- Evaluation is a systematic assessment of the value of an activity.
- Is part of the policy development process & provides timely assessments of the <u>relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability </u>of interventions.
- Evaluation asks: *did we achieve what was planned? How? If not, why not?*

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Evaluation: The <u>Ground Truth</u>

Myth:
- Evaluation must include a baseline data set
- Evaluation must be adversarial
- Evaluation must 'measure'

Reality:
- Evaluation provides available information
- Evaluation depends on good access to info
- Evaluation verifies (includes qualitative data)

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Progress of Verification

- Many operations will carry out their own monitoring. Documentation review is key
- Evaluations will deploy teams in the field: the core evidence will be obtained externally to the mission through semi-structured interviews of carefully selected respondents, focus groups, surveys, direct observation.
- Workshops and a participatory synthesis process are key
- Independence of the team should be combined with confidentiality rules and protection of information

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Evaluation is the only assessment of the full chain of results

Our actors

Other actors

Relative influence

•Inputs → •Activities → •Outputs → •Outcomes → •Impact

You have control over what you can do; you will not be able to control the total chain of reverberations from your inputs and actions – the further down the results chain, the more difficult it is to evaluate your performance

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Evaluation practises and approaches

- European Commission, EuropeAid
- OECD DAC guidelines and criteria
- UN DPKO Best Practice Unit, PBSO Handbook
- OSCE - results-based management
- Effects Based Operations (EBOs) in military
- Results-based measuring in private sector
- World Bank, Independent Evaluation Group

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Why Evaluate ESDP? 1/2

The rapid increase in civilian operations and large mission in Kosovo with an executive mandate, necessitates that the EU is able to verify the effects of its operations in third countries.

- … to assess intended and unintended results, provide strategic lessons to guide decision-makers and inform stakeholders;
- … to receive continuous evidence-based information that is credible, reliable and useful, enabling the timely incorporation of findings, recommendations;
- Evaluation is a central part of public policy - as a key component to managing for results;

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Why Evaluate ESDP? 2/2

- Improved evaluation practice will enable systematic learning, which will in turn enhance the effectiveness of donor investments.
- ...to enhance institutional learning and improvement of practices
- ...to ensure accountability to both tax payers and host nation/beneficiary population
- Post Lisbon Treaty?

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Challenges for Evaluation

- Short duration of operations – impact may be rapidly visible but not well documented
- Operations take place in countries where numerous other actors are present - difficult to distinguish the impact of one particular operation
- Missions in conflict areas have only limited control over the impact their activities will have.
- Difficult to choose indicators - easy to confuse objectives and indicators and many indicators are unreliable, "number of displaced persons" being an excellent example.
- Agencies rarely integrate an explicit understanding of conflict into strategic planning and reviews may be based on implicit knowledge

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Current situation in ESDP

- The EU has developed a lessons learned activities to capture experiences and good practices from missions, to be utilised in planning future missions.
- CPCC has initiated internal support review process i.e. Monitoring/real time evaluation practise
- However, many organisations, including the EU, underutilise the information generated constraining the feedback of lessons learned information into developing better practice.
- There has been no systematic evaluation of ESDP operations to date, beyond thematic or end of mission lessons learned reviews. Currently there is no capacity to conduct evaluation in the Council; and there exists no systematic methodology or process.
- EULEX Kosovo has included evaluation as part of its new concept of best practises.

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*Building Bridges for Sustainable Security*

What to Learn from Existing Methods?

- Evaluation models and theories derived from other fields contain useful elements for the purpose of evaluation of EU crisis management activities - but should, nevertheless, be treated with care!
- Mandate will form the core point of reference, as well as resource mobilisation
- Useful to share experiences with other organisations such as the OECD and the UN

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Conclusions

- There is a need at this point in time to establish an institutional learning cycle so that evaluation findings and best practise influence policy, training, planning and implementation
- Comprehensive frame for monitoring, LL, BP and evaluation useful in order to identify policies, processes and the division of labour between different units and between HQ and the field
- Evaluation requires that operations have an analytical framework and that staff have quidance on tactical targets and how to achieve them
- Evaluation offers an operationally flexible and well tested system which supplants audit and impact assessment for accountability and management purposes.

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Lessons learned
processes and ESDP
operations

by Peter Hedling,
Senior Administrator, Directorate for
Civilian crisis management (DGE IX),
External relations Directorate-General,
EU Council Secretariat, Brussels

Outline of presentation

- Introduction, situating the lessons process inside ESDP, particular focus on civilian aspects of ESDP

- New guidelines for identification and implementation of lessons and best practices in civilian ESDP missions, 2008

- Future conceptual work and challenges

Introduction

- With new guidelines strive to **learn across missions**, based on particular teams, e g rapid deployment, SSR, integrated rule of law missions. In the past lessons reports were mainly drafted only ad hoc

- ESDP lessons process is **politically driven** – reports are approved by EU Member States

- **Learning from UN-DPKO**, including on need for transparency/communication of lessons, to allow learning

- **Learning from military ESDP** – implementation of lessons needs to be systematic and monitored (EU Guiding Lines paper 2009)

Introduction

- Lessons increasingly focus on political-strategic issues of missions, and not on conduct or administration of missions, unless they need impetus at EU political level – informal division of labour with evaluation/quality control of CivOpsCdr

- Guidelines for evaluation and benchmarking of mission achievement underway

- "Evaluation *whether* a mission objective has been achieved or not – lessons *why* it has been achieved or not" (UK)

Introduction

- Purpose of civilian ESDP missions – EU presence (**power projection**) = traditional diplomacy – *and* a **practical tool** for achieving peace through political reform and capacity-building in conflict States (a civilian instrument that is politically driven, and not merely under local ownership like development aid). No real impact assessment to date.

- EU uses political influence to discuss with foreign governments how they rule their people, assessing issues of crime, corruption and political reform (conflict resolution is essentially political), unless a quick political deal can be struck, or does the two in parallel.

- Time for EU (or international) **standards of government**? (cf human rights, world trade…). The last taboo?

Introduction

- Trying to make foreign government sign up to reform before a civilian ESDP mission is deployed, or more modestly training local police and justice at lower level to mitigate effects of conflict but without aiming at conflict resolution in the short time-frame.

- Personnel in civilian ESDP missions EU government officials in mid of carrier – development aid works with private consultants.

- An ESDP mission is highly visible – an EU development aid project often less so.

New guidelines for lessons and best practices in 2008

- Adopted after 5 years of EU civilian missions. Inspired by UN/DPKO model.

- A <u>continuous learning cycle</u> – the aim is constant improvement of capability through lessons (planning, conduct, or specific issues), reflecting the high political ambition of the EU

- Complemented by <u>evaluation</u> of mission accomplishment <u>and quality control</u> by the Civilian Operations Commander, as part of his delegated responsibility for conduct

- These are civilian missions under a <u>political chain of command</u> in the EU Council – different from development aid

Key steps of the UN/DPKO process

The Institutional Strengthening Cycle

Guidance

Policy & Doctrine

Training

Knowledge Sharing

Evaluation & Lessons

Operations

Key steps of the EU/civilian ESDP lessons process

▪Identification of lessons – every six months by each mission as well as for specific reports

▪Analysis by Council Secretariat and Commission, and political endorsement by Member States (*difference from UN/DPKO*). Annual lessons report agreed by EU Council of Ministers.

▪Implementation (learning) and dissemination – through concepts & policy, Guiding lines for capability development, best practices documents relating to mission conduct. Communities of experts (UN/DPKO model) across headquarters and missions. Future website possible.

Types of civilian ESDP lessons reports

▪The annual report – for EU Council to agree every year:

- compiling and summarizing the main lessons identified and achievements across all missions;

- detecting and analyzing trends across missions,

- proposing action to implement the lessons, assessing whether previous identified lessons have been learned and, if not, what remedial actions could be taken and in what order of priority,

- defining objectives for the next year.

Types of civilian ESDP lessons reports

- <u>At the end of the planning phase of a mission</u> - good planning is key for effectiveness

- <u>At the end of the mission</u> - learning the key lessons for the benefit of other missions

- <u>Mission 6-monthly activity reports</u> - a section on lessons identified in each report, continuous identification of lessons from ongoing missions

- <u>At the change of mandate/mid-term review</u> – the steering document contains a section on lessons identified from the previous phase of the mission

Types of civilian ESDP lessons reports

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Future conceptual work and challenges

- Determine the level of <u>civil-military integration/co-ordination</u> of lessons and evaluation after creation of EU Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD)

- Determine level of <u>integration/co-operation among EU actors</u> after the creation of the EU External Action Service – CFSP diplomatic dialogue, ESDP, EU development aid, EU trade, sanctions, media policy and outreach, EU Member State individual foreign policy action…

- How much should EU foreign policy be subject to accountability, and to systematic evaluation (*Risto's presentation*)? How can peace missions and development aid become more effective foreign policy instruments in the broad sense? How will they evolve in coming years? What will be the most important foreign policy issues in an increasingly globalised world?

CPCC

EVALUATION
and
ACCOUNTABILITY

Risto Nieminen,

Civilian Crisis Management

Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC)

Council of the European Union

November 2009

1

CPCC

CONTENT

- Accountability and evaluation
- Responsibility?
- Management supervision
- Regulatory framework
- Management cycle
- EU level civilian crisis management
- What to evaluate?
- Back to accountability

2

Overview of the missions and operations of the European Union September 2009

CPCC

3

Evaluation and Accountability

CPCC

- Accountability is holding someone responsible for what they were supposed to do.
- Evaluation is the process and documentation used to prove that what was supposed to be done was done and to determine how well it was done.
- Evaluation strengthens accountability (by assessing performance), improves the quality of operations (by disseminating lessons from experience), and informs strategy, resource allocation, and personnel management.
- Like evaluation, accountability is a process targeted to those who are in a position (inside or outside the entity) to influence decisions or to make decisions.
- Accountability request transparency.

4

Accountability, Authority and Responsibility

CPCC

- Maybe like this: When I am driving my car, I am responsible for how I drive my car thus responsible of the safety of my passengers, I have license to drive thus I can decide whether or not to follow the rules, thus I am accountable of my acts towards to my passengers and to law enforcement authorities.
- Can I be held responsible if I have not received adequate authority
- Can I be held accountable if I have not been given responsibility – I think not.

5

Management supervision

CPCC

- Management Supervision: Management supervision is performed to ensure that the implementation of activities is running efficiently and effectively while complying with applicable provisions.

6

Regulatory Framework

CPCC

- Sound financial management (Articles 27 and 28 FR): the principle of sound financial management is a fundamental principle of Community budget law. It derives from Article 274 of the EC Treaty. Article 27 FR sets out the principle that budget appropriations must be used in accordance with the principles of economy, efficiency and effectiveness:
- · The principle of economy requires that the resources used for the pursuit of activities be made available in due time, in appropriate quantity and quality and at the best price.
- · The principle of efficiency is concerned with the best relationship between resources employed and results achieved.
- · The principle of effectiveness is concerned with attaining the specific objectives set and achieving the intended results.
- The aim of Articles 27 and 28 is the effective implementation, including better value for money, of Community policies, programmes, objectives or projects during the various programming, decision, implementation, control and evaluation stages, in particular by using measurable objectives, the achievement of which can be monitored by performance indicators.

7

Compliance with effective and efficient internal control principles

CPCC

- The principle of internal control is incorporated into the Financial Regulation;
- Article 28a specifies that the budget must be implemented in compliance with effective and efficient internal control. More specifically, internal control is made up of all the measures taken by management and staff (for instance the implementation of organisational structures, policies, procedures, controls, checks) and intended to provide reasonable assurance of achieving the following objectives (Article 28a FR):
- · effectiveness, efficiency and economy of operations;
- · reliability of reporting;
- · adequate management of the risks relating to the legality and regularity of the underlying operations;
- · safeguarding of assets and information;
- · prevention and detection of fraud and irregularities.

8

Joint Action (Decision under Lisbon)

• Political control and strategic direction

1. The PSC shall exercise, under the responsibility of the Council, political control and strategic direction of the xxxx. The Council hereby authorises the PSC to take the relevant decisions in accordance with the third paragraph of Article 38 of the Treaty. This authorisation shall include the powers to appoint a Head of Mission, upon a proposal of the HR, and to amend the CONOPS and the OPLAN. The powers of decision with respect to the objectives and termination of xxxx shall remain vested in the Council.

2. The PSC shall report to the Council at regular intervals.

3. The PSC shall receive, on a regular basis and as required, reports by the Civilian Operation Commander and the Head of Mission on issues within their areas of responsibility.

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## Management cycle

Management Cycle

Cion
DG AIDCO

Cion
DG RELEX
country desks

Cion
DG DEV
country desks
ACP countries

Cion
DG RELEX
DIR A

CPCC
Advance
Planning
Team

CMPD

EUMS

CFSP Funds

Country Strategy Papers

Integrated Security
Concept in CMC

Order for Service

CSD

MSO

JA

CONOPS

IMD

OHQ

Identification and implementation of
development programs

Instrument for
Stability

OPLAN

CONOPS

Draft CFSP Civilian Mission
Budget

JA + Fin. St.

OPLAN

FHQ

Other Commission DGs in external relations area

HoM

CONOPS

DG ECHO

DG TRADE

DG ELARG

OPLAN

programme

programme

programme

MS bilateral
programme

MS bilateral
programme

UN
programme

EBRD
programme

Mission
starts

Mil. Op.
starts

Instruments

* Instrument for Stability 251 mio
* European Neigbourhood and Partnership Instrument 1528 mio
* Development Cooperation Instrument 4000 mio + EDF 2900 mio
* European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights 142 mio
* Nuclear Safety Instrument 73 mio
* Instrument for pre-accession assistance 927 mio
* Instrument for Humanitarian Aid 797 mio
* Macro-financial assistance 99 mio
* Instrument for Cooperation with Industrialised Countries 25 mio
* Civil Protection Financial Instrument (third countries) 8 mio
* Emergency Aid reserve 244 mio

* 2009 CFSP/ESDP 243 mio

* 2009 ATHENA xx mio

15

Stakeholders

CPCC

Security
Office

EUSRs

SG/HR
Personal
Reps

Policy
Unit

Geographical
directorates

Citizens

European
Parliament

Press
Office

DGEIX

DGE

Legal
Service

DGE VIII

Sitcen

Relex

Council

PMG

EUMC

SG/HR

PSC

**EU National
Parliaments**

European
Commission

EUMS

Civcom

civ-mil cell

**Host country
Parliament**

Contributing
States

CivOpCdr
CPCC

WKC

national expertise

Heads of Mission
CCMOs

**UN,OSCE
etc.**

Host authorities

16

## Civilian ESDP Areas of Possible Engagement in Crisis Management

preventive / during / post conflict

The Curve of Conflict

War	PEACE MAKING (Conflict management)	PEACE ENFORCEMENT (Conflict mitigation)
Crisis	CRISIS DIPLOMACY (Crisis management)	PEACEKEEPING (Conflict Termination)
Unstable Peace	PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY (Conflict prevention)	
Stable Peace	PEACETIME DIPLOMACY OR POLITICS	POSTCONFLICT PEACE BUILDING (Conflict resolution)
Durable Peace		

Law & Order aspects

Set up foundations for the establishment of Law & Order

Sustainability of local Law & Order Capacity

Intl. Support

Intl. Cooperation

Duration of Conflict

Early Stage — Mid Conflict — Late Stage

(*) **Michael S. Lund**, *Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy,* USIP Press Books, April 1996

Conflict:
• **Inter-state** (Mainly pre-Cold War)
• **Intra-state** (Mainly post-Cold War, mostly affecting civilians, more complex and demanding)

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13

European Union Pillars
(content needs to be modified post-Lisbon)

2 — Common Foreign and Security Policy	1 — European Communities	3 — Justice and Home Affairs
Created by the Maastricht Treaty (1992), later amended by other Treaties	Based on the Treaties that constitute the:	Created by the Maastricht Treaty (1992), later amended by the Amsterdam Treaty (1997)
Includes the ESDP, introduced by the Council of Cologne (1999)	• European Community • Euratom • CECA (European Coal and Steal Community, expired in 2002)	
Intergovernmental decision-making (Council)	Supra-national decision-making (European Commission)	Intergovernmental decision-making (Council)

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ESDP CCMO planning and overview activities

CPCC

PLANNING	REPORTING	MONITORING	"EVALUATION"	FINANCIAL CONTROL
CONOPS OPLAN Business Plans	Weekly Monthly 6 Monthly Ad hoc	Regular VTCs Daily communication Regular visits	Thematic LL Horizontal LL Annual LL ISRs	External audits Commission control visits Evaluation of sound financial management

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What to evaluate and how to measure?

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Political objectives → Operational objectives

Prevention of escalation	Visible monitoring activity
failure	← success
failure	← failure
success	← failure
success	← success

18

Evaluation dilemma

CPCC

- crisis paradox: countries in which ESDP missions are probably most likely to succeed are also the least likely candidates for such missions to be deployed. Namely: in peaceful, democratic, well-governed countries as opposed to countries emerging out of conflict, without an entrenched democratic tradition and full of corruption. This usually makes that while these countries are at the same time politically and strategically the most deserving of EU attention, they are practically the least attractive and most risky for experts to deploy to.
- Risk dilemma – do negative (evaluation) reports lead to risk aversion?

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Evaluation dilemma

CPCC

- Comprehensiveness dilemma – can we only evaluate achievement of operational objectives without evaluating political objectives?
- Or vice versa?

20

Country wide evaluations covering all actions

Individual evaluations covering political and operational sides

Thematic evaluations

Individual evaluations covering operational side

programme   programme   programme   MS bilateral programme   MS bilateral programme   UN programme   EBRD programme   Mission starts   Mil. Op. starts

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What type of accountability

CPCC

?*

MS
Council
PSC
CivOpsCdr
HoM

EP
Commission

political

legal

horizontal

vertical

social

Moral*

diagonal

Worldbank
Accountability and Governance
(modified*)

22

5.4a Accountability in governance (Rick Stapenhurst & Mitchell O'Brien, World Bank, last accessed 23.11.2009)

> Accountability ensures actions and decisions taken by public officials are subject to oversight so as to guarantee that government initiatives meet their stated objectives and respond to the needs of the community they are meant to be benefiting, thereby contributing to better governance and poverty reduction.

Accountability is one of the cornerstones of good governance; however, it can be difficult for scholars and practitioners alike to navigate the myriad of different types of accountability. Recently, there has been a growing discussion within both the academic and development communities about the different accountability typologies. This Note outlines the present debate focusing on the definition and substance of different forms of accountability and considers the key role that legislatures play in ensuring accountability.

What is Accountability?

The notion of accountability is an amorphous concept that is difficult to define in precise terms. However, broadly speaking, *accountability* exists when there is a relationship where an individual or body, and the performance of tasks or functions by that individual or body, are subject to another's oversight, direction or request that they provide information or justification for their actions.

Therefore, the concept of accountability involves two distinct stages: *answerability* and *enforcement*. Answerability refers to the obligation of the government, its agencies and public officials to provide information about their decisions and actions and to justify them to the public and those institutions of accountability tasked with providing oversight. Enforcement suggests that the public or the institution responsible for accountability can sanction the offending party or remedy the contravening behavior. As such, different institutions of accountability might be responsible for either or both of these stages.

Why is Accountability Important to Governance?

Evaluating the ongoing effectiveness of public officials or public bodies ensures that they are performing to their full potential, providing value for money in the provision of public services, instilling confidence in the government and being responsive to the community they are meant to be serving.

What types of Accountability?

The concept of accountability can be classified according to the type of accountability exercised and/ or the person, group or institution the public official answers to. The present debate as to the content of different forms of accountability is best conceptualized by reference to opposing forms of accountability. As such the main forms of accountability are described below in reference to their opposing, or alternate, concept.

Horizontal vs. Vertical Accountability

The prevailing view is that institutions of accountability, such as parliament and the judiciary, provide what is commonly termed horizontal accountability, or the capacity of a network of relatively autonomous powers (i.e., other institutions) that can call into question, and eventually punish, improper ways of discharging the responsibilities of a given official. In other words, horizontal accountability is the capacity of state institutions to check abuses by other public agencies and branches of government, or the requirement for agencies to report sideways. Alternatively, vertical accountability is the means through which citizens, mass media and civil society seek to enforce standards of good performance on officials. While parliament is typically considered as a key institution in constructs of horizontal accountability, it is also important in vertical accountability. Citizens and civil society groups can seek the support of elected representatives to redress grievances and intervene in the case of inappropriate or inadequate action by government. In addition, through the use of public hearings, committee investigations and public petitioning, parliament can provide a vehicle for public voice and a means through which citizens and civic groups can question government and seek parliamentary sanctioning where appropriate.

Political versus Legal Accountability

Parliament and the judiciary act as horizontal constitutional checks on the power of the executive. The role of these two institutions can be further delineated in that parliament holds the executive politically accountable, whilst the judiciary holds the executive legally accountable. These classifications stem from the fact parliament is a political institution, while the judiciary can only adjudicate on legal issues. Together, they provide ongoing oversight in order to keep the government accountable throughout its term in office. They may also be aided by other institutions, such as supreme audit institutions, anti-corruption commissions, ombuds offices and human rights institutes. These secondary' autonomous institutions of accountability' are typically designed to be independent of the executive; in the case of supreme audit institutions (in 'Westminster parliamentary systems'), anti-corruption commissions and ombuds offices they often report to

parliament while in the cases of supreme audit institutions in Francophone countries and human rights institutes, they may be part of the judiciary. Political accountability usually manifests itself in the concept of individual ministerial responsibility, which is the cornerstone of the notion of responsible government (see below).

Another School of Thought: Horizontal versus Vertical Accountability

A minority of commentators diverge in their opinion as to what constitutes horizontal and vertical accountability. An alternate conception of horizontal and vertical accountability relies on the relationship between parties to determine whether one party exercises horizontal or vertical accountability over the other. In instances where there is a classic top-down, principal agent relationship, whereby the principal delegates to the agent, the agent is accountable to their direct superiors in the chain-of-command and this constitutes a form of vertical accountability. For instance the public official answers to the department/ agency minister, the department answers to the minister, the minister answers to parliament (in particular in parliamentary systems), and parliament answers to citizens. Parliament is again a key actor. In terms of holding government officials to account, parliament is the principal and the official the agent. Parliament, as principal, requires the government and its officials, as agents, to implement the laws, policies and programs it has approved – and holds the government and officials to account for their performance in this regard. Parliament is also an agent, in that the electorate (the principal) elects legislators to enact laws and oversee government actions on their behalf. The electorate then holds legislators to account at election time and, in a few jurisdictions, through recall, where dissatisfied voters can recall their elected representative and vote for an alternative.

The absence of the direct principal-agent relationship relegates the accountability relationship to one of horizontal accountability or social accountability. In order for there to be social or horizontal accountability a hierarchical relationship is generally lacking between actor and forum, as are any formal obligations to render account.

Social Accountability

The prevailing view of social accountability is that it is an approach towards building accountability that relies on civic engagement, namely a situation whereby ordinary citizens and/or civil society organizations participate directly or indirectly in exacting accountability. Such accountability is sometimes referred to it as *society driven horizontal accountability*. The term social accountability is, in a sense, a misnomer since it is not meant to refer to a specific type of accountability, but rather to a particular approach (or set of mechanisms) for exacting accountability. Mechanisms of social accountability

can be initiated and supported by the state, citizens or both, but very often they are *demand-driven* and operate from the bottom-up. It is generally accepted that social accountability mechanisms are an example of vertical accountability. However, a minority of commentators argue that, with respect to social accountability, a hierarchical relationship is generally lacking between actor and forum, as are any formal obligations to render account. Giving account to various stakeholders occurs basically on a voluntary basis with no intervention on the part of the principal. Therefore, social accountability would be a form of horizontal accountability. Social accountability initiatives are as varied and different as participatory budgeting, administrative procedures acts, social audits, and citizen report cards which all involve citizens in the oversight and control of government. This can be contrasted with government initiatives or entities, such as citizen advisory boards, which fulfils public functions. Often overlooked in considerations of social accountability is the role that legislators can play in providing weight to such grass roots accountability mechanisms. For example, a Member of Parliament can represent the concerns of his/her constituents by questioning a Minister during Question Period in Parliament or by requesting information directly from a government ministry or department.

Diagonal Accountability

The concept of diagonal accountability is far from settled with two groups of commentators adopting different definitions. The literature does not support a convergence of their ideas. Although, there is conjecture as to what constitutes diagonal accountability, the prevailing view is that diagonal accountability entails vertical accountability actors. Generally speaking diagonal accountability seeks to engage citizens directly in the workings of horizontal accountability institutions. This is an effort to augment the limited effectiveness of civil society's watch dog function by breaking the state's monopoly over responsibility for official executive oversight.

The main principles of diagonal accountability are:

- Participate in Horizontal Accountability Mechanisms

Community advocates participate in institutions of horizontal accountability, rather than creating distinct and separate institutions of diagonal accountability. In this way, agents of vertical accountability seek to insert themselves more directly into the horizontal axis.

- Information flow

Community advocates are given an opportunity to access information about gov-

overnment agencies that would normally be limited to the horizontal axis, for instance internal performance reviews etc. Furthermore, they have access to the deliberations and reasons why horizontal accountability institutions make the decisions they do. Meanwhile, community advocates bring first hand experience about the performance of the government agency to the accountability process.

- Compel Officials to Answer

Community advocates co-opt the horizontal accountability institution's authority to compel a government agency to answer questions (as in the example given above of an MP questioning a Minister about issues of concern to his/her constituents); and

- Capacity to Sanction

Community advocates acquire the authority of the horizontal accountability institution to enforce the findings or influence elected officials.

Some argue that civil society can strengthen the effectiveness of horizontal accountability institutions by pressuring existing agencies to do their jobs more effectively. This type of participation in accountability is not direct action against wrongdoing, as with vertical accountability, but rather society driven horizontal accountability, such as citizen advisory boards that fulfils public functions, like auditing government expenditures or supervising procurement. More generally, active citizens and civil society groups can work with elected representatives to enhance parliaments' representation role.

A minority of commentators diverge in their opinion as to what constitutes diagonal accountability. Some commentators suggest administrative accountability, exercised primarily through quasi-legal forums, such as ombudsmen, auditors, and independent inspectors reporting directly or indirectly to parliament or the responsible minister is a form of independent and external administrative and financial oversight and control. This form of accountability is different to the classic top-down/ principal agent relationship because the administrative accountability institution is not in a hierarchical relationship to the public officials and often do not have formal powers to coerce public officials into compliance. It is argued that these administrative agents are auxiliary forums of accountability that were instituted to help the political principals control the great variety of administrative agents and that their accountability relations are, therefore, a form of diagonal accountability.

Social Accountability versus Diagonal Accountability

Recently the World Bank argued that social accountability is broad enough to encompass mechanisms of diagonal accountability. It was argued that diagonal accountability mechanisms can also be considered a form of social accountability. Considering social accountability is not meant to refer to a specific type of accountability, but rather to a particular approach for exacting accountability, it might be a broader concept than diagonal accountability. This lends weight to the idea that diagonal accountability mechanisms could be a component of the broader approach of social accountability. However, this is contrast to some commentators who draw a sharp distinction between social accountability and diagonal accountability. They argue that the state is often resistant to citizens poaching its exclusive oversight domain, instead encouraging new forms of social accountability, which they dismiss as being merely a form of outreach that provides an opportunity for civil society to inform government about public perception of government behavior.

Conclusion

Parliaments are key actors in what has been termed the 'chain of accountability'. They are, along with the judiciary, the key institution of horizontal accountability, not only in their own right but also as the institution to which many autonomous accountability institutions report. They are the vehicle through which political accountability is exercised. Along with civil society organizations and the mass media, they are also important institutions in vertical accountability. Newer concepts of accountability have emerged: social accountability and diagonal accountability. The former, defined as 'society driven horizontal accountability' seeks to provide direct answerability from government to citizens; parliaments and elected representatives are important vehicles through which citizens and civic groups can also extract enforcement. And – no matter how defined – parliaments are one of the institutions through which diagonal accountability can be exercised.

Further Reading

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5.5 "Evaluation in practice" - Experiences from evaluation projects in conflict and post-conflict environments (Stefan Jansen)

CMC Research Days
18. - 19. November 2009

"Evaluation in Practice"

Experiences from evaluation projects in conflict and post-conflict environments

Stefan Jansen, Consultant
Channel Research

Evaluation in practice
*Experiences from evaluation projects in
conflict and post-conflict environments*

Introduction

▶ **Impact: "***Positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term effects produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended* **" (OECD/DAC).**

▶ **Variety of approaches and evaluation frameworks for Peace and Security related activities**

▶ **Evaluation of CCM is still a new field, there's further need for research and exchange**

▶ **Change of paradigms in development cooperation leads to an amplification of sectors covered by CCM activities**

CMCFinland
Kriisinhallintakeskus
Crisis Management Centre

Evaluation in practice
*Experiences from evaluation projects in
conflict and post-conflict environments*

channel
research

Role of the evaluator / capacities

▶ **Evaluators often deal with traumatized people, this can
affect the objectivity of the evaluator**

▶ **The evaluator can raise expectations which can not be
fulfilled and needs to be very cautious with his/her role**

▶ **Hidden interests of donors and beneficiaries and the
role of the evaluator**

▶ **Personal expertise and experience are key factors;
profound knowledge of the topic, the environment and
the conflict dynamics are needed**

▶ **Ethics of an evaluation should be understood by the
evaluator, conflict sensitivity is a precondition**

CMCFinland
Kriisinhallintakeskus
Crisis Management Centre

Evaluation in practice
*Experiences from evaluation projects in
conflict and post-conflict environments*

channel
research

Evaluation design

▶ **Selection of methodology and evaluation tools for the
assessment**

▶ **Evaluation needs to include a conflict analysis to
identify the root causes of conflict**

▶ **A flexible assessment approach is necessary, as the
conditions can change immediately during the
evaluation**

▶ **How to measure changes in behaviour and attitudes?
The focus of the evaluation lies on the outcome level in
relation to the theory of change / programme logic**

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Kriisinhallintakeskus
Crisis Management Centre

Evaluation in practice
*Experiences from evaluation projects in
conflict and post-conflict environments*

channel
research

Example: Quality Approach in ESDP operation – Training and Evaluation

Objective of Evaluation	What (to be evaluated?)	Who (participates evaluation?)	How (to conduct evaluation?)	Why (purpose of evaluation)
Training: Non-mission specific -Core -Specialization Mission specific - Pre-mission training - Induction training	• training organization • contents • pedagogical and didactical methods • services supporting the training	• all: • EU DG E IX / Cion • trainee/participant • training providers • external evaluation by independent auditors, consultants etc.	• standard evaluation form • external auditing • self-evaluation by the training provider	• relevance of training (needs in operations) • effectiveness of organization (cost- etc.) • facilitation of learning (improved performance, knowledge, skills) • service-delivery (customer-/trainee-orientation)
Participant	• personality and behavior • learning • skills, knowledge and attitude	• all: • trainee/participant • team members • organizers and instructors	• self-evaluation • team evaluation and discussion • external evaluation by the organizers/instructors • tests (language, driving etc.)	• part of human resources quality assurance and criteria for planned personnel • standards for personal development and career development
Mission member	• generic standards of behavior • work and results • individual impacts in working environment	• all: • mission member • team members • supervisor/-s • (partners)	• HR policy and concept • standard evaluation form • evaluation/development discussion	• human resources quality assurance against criteria for personnel in operations
Mission / Internal	• mission organization and structure • mission resources and management • services • programmes, projects, activities	• Mission members • Mission management • DG E IX & CPCC & Cion • Member States	• auditing mechanisms • questionnaires, surveys • general staff meetings • implementation software • reports	• effectiveness and efficiency in crisis management • credibility and accountability of the mission/planning documents
Mission / External (Impact assessment)	• impacts, effects and outcomes in local communities and in region • effects on EU – other -relations	• local community • other IO:s, governments • NGO:s • media • independent institutes, academic etc.	• research, studies, surveys, polls • consultations: evaluation and assessment projects	• EU added-value and difference • EU credibility • peace and prosperity • SAp and enlargement

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Impact assessment

Mission / External (Impact assessment)	• impacts, effects and outcomes in local communities and in region • effects on EU – other -relations	• local community • other IO:s, governments • NGO:s • media • independent institutes, academic etc.	• research, studies, surveys, polls • consultations: evaluation and assessment projects	• EU added-value and difference • EU credibility • peace and prosperity • SAp and enlargement

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Evaluation in practice
*Experiences from evaluation projects in
conflict and post-conflict environments*

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Impact assessment

- **Based on qualitative and quantitative indicators for the outcome/impact level evaluation, the evaluation can track results or early signs of impact. Indicators to identify evidence for change need to be developed**

- **Simple indicators are used to overcome the *attribution problem* relating to the uncertainty regarding the relation between the support strategy, external factors and the specific impact achieved**

- **We still think in very linear models of development:**
  input → output → outcome → impact
  In reality, we deal with a highly dynamic environment with partly non-linear (even chaotic) processes

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Impact assessment

- **Critical factor: How can we obtain reliable information on outcomes and impact from local beneficiaries?**

- **Example:**

  Participatory Conflict Mapping and Outcome Definition Tool, developed by Channel Research

- **Use with comparison groups as counter-factual**

Evaluation in practice
*Experiences from evaluation projects in
conflict and post-conflict environments*

▶ **Opinion of beneficiaries in relation to activities, relevance, outcome and impact; thus highly informative for the evaluator**

▶ **The process of the workshop (conduct of participants, participation, etc) is as important as the information itself; observation of social behaviour and interaction**

Evaluation in practice
*Experiences from evaluation projects in
conflict and post-conflict environments*

Typical challenges in fragile environments

▶ **Timeframe for evaluations in fragile environments is often not adapted to the limitations in the region**

▶ **Evaluation is seen as a threat by beneficiaries of the intervention; confidence building measures take time, which is a highly limited resource**

▶ **The potentials of evaluation as a tool to enhance the relation between donor and beneficiary is often underestimated and not sufficiently developed**

▶ **Theory - Practice gap in evaluation design and ToR, as the reality on the ground can seriously differ from the expected situation**

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Typical challenges in fragile environments

▶ **Lack of infrastructure limits the access to project regions**

▶ **Lack of professional local support staff**

▶ **Communication is often extremely difficult (e.g. no internet access)**

▶ **Security threats**

▶ **Lack of baseline data: how can we identify impact without reliable data about the situation prior to the intervention?**

▶ **Limited information constitutes a problem for triangulation**

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conflict and post-conflict environments*

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Specific challenges for CCM evaluations

▶ **High turnover of staff especially in difficult security environments hampers the collection of information on the ground**

▶ **Whom to meet first? Important issue in conflict and post-conflict settings, as the decision can be wrongly understood as affiliation to a specific conflict party**

▶ **Shall we meet with violent actors (e.g. paramilitary groups, ...)? Ethical question but also question of security. But: these actors might be important for understanding the conflict dynamics and to retrieving background information**

Evaluation in practice
*Experiences from evaluation projects in
conflict and post-conflict environments*

Specific challenges for CCM evaluations

▶ **Difficult communication between peacebuilding /
reconciliation projects and technical or security sector
related projects due to a lack of understanding**

▶ **"Clash of Cultures" between non-state and security
sector actors: especially where the latter take over
classical development activities. This creates often a
situation of competition with other development actors
on the spot**

▶ **In situations with security sector stakeholders and
NGOs, the evaluator finds him/herself in the situation of
becoming a "translator" between the two "corporate
cultures"**

Evaluation in practice
*Experiences from evaluation projects in
conflict and post-conflict environments*

Specific challenges for CCM evaluations

▶ **Security sector is a difficult source for information;
stakeholders are not used to external evaluations and
can not share intelligence information (e.g. village
profiles)**

▶ **Different intervention logics of military and civilian
actors need to be understood; evaluators need to know
their cultures, systems, philosophies and dynamics**

▶ **What are the underlying theories of change for the
interventions?**

▶ **Critical factors: Mistrust, misunderstanding, lack of
knowledge about objectives and goals, perceptions**

Evaluation in practice
*Experiences from evaluation projects in
conflict and post-conflict environments*

Questions for discussion

▶ **A large number of micro-level evaluations do exist, do we need more macro-level analysis to cover the whole range of activities, donor-coordination, policy development and the influence of external actors on Civilian Crisis Management?**

▶ **The evaluation of CCM is also an academic topic. How can we strengthen the communication between practitioners, academics, NOGs and the donor community?**

▶ **"*Lessons learned*" are highly important, how can we strengthen the communication on what can be taken forward and what needs to be avoided?**

6 COMMENTS ON THE PLENARY SESSION BY COMMENTATOR ANTTI HÄIKIÖ

Thank you CMC organizers for advanced thinking selecting the topic of quality for the Research Days, and special congratulations for having such a good collection of speakers - young men but with extended knowledge and expertise.

However, reminding all; talking, reading, writing, studying crisis management is not yet crisis management itself. Crisis management does not take place in class-rooms. The final aim is always assessed, evaluated and valued by those poor people in their troubles. We must keep in mind this essence of helping others, not just ourselves as we still do too much. Therefore it is always good to think, talk and process here and before-hand like we do now. Not mentioned an important fact that EU is just 6 years old operating in the crisis management missions. This is particular, is important in comparison to other longer-time actors as the UN.

Concepts and comparison: UN and ESDP operations by Juha-Matti Seppänen/CMI
- Very interesting views from the "private diplomacy" point of view on mostly governmental activity of crisis management
- terms and terminology not defined - good introduction of main terms, however without opening who speaks with what terms and why
- recognising right points as good practices before best practises, and focus on work at field activities in the missions
- recognizing right points as myths
- "you have not evaluated properly" and "ensuring accountability" - ambitious in current phase or process!

Lessons learned process and ESDP operations by Peter Hedling/Council Secretariat
- Extremely different topic: ESDP is about policy, politics, political issues of 27 member states - politics is not for real quality, honest and objective or external evaluation
- Good briefing of those early, few but still significant steps taken in the concept and implementation of the ESDP lessons-work - without referring to the Commission's work well done in the similar field (as also noted by Amb Karanko)
- I would challenge the trend if focusing more on political-strategic issues, instead of delivery, because improvements needed in all!

- highlighting the essential element on constant, continuous, ongoing process-nature

Accountability and evaluation by Risto Nieminen/Council Secretariat

- "Double challenge" - putting together two high, large and still abstract areas as accountability - and evaluation
- well admitting that at the moment joint discussion and brain-storming is more important than giving answers
- nice words on the work done by Finland, but... call for reality when common approach and action needs 27 Member states
- Introducing management supervision, internal control and chain-of-command - is that the current quality assurance when not yet in the thinking, doing and part of daily business
- ex-ante (ex-post) and impact assessment - can we really cut parts of the mission or part of the action for separate impact assessment, for example: mission as such could fail, still all parts in order
- Important note and description of institutional challenges in the EU!
- Mentioning co-operation between I and II pillars - but also pillar III. It is not only resource matter, when also the substance in policing and criminal law comes from pillar III (European standards and best practices in police and criminal law)
- Good overview of the civilian crisis management in EU frame from planning to the operation, "evaluation" and control mechanism
- Political - operational! This time is the time for operational credibility, results in operation, improving, helping, supporting local life!

Evaluation in practice; experiences from evaluation projects in conflict and post-conflict environments by Stefan Jansen/Channel Research

- Definitions, criteria, ground rules from design to delivery
- Holistic but practical - from analysis and understanding to use of tools and in the limits of them
- Well recognising the challenge of chaos and dynamics
- Who do the evaluations serve most? The one who request? The ones about whom it talks about? The one who is paid? Donor - beneficiaries, but who benefits most?
- Call the external! Importance of local community
- Individual approach, social behaviour - important in particular in civilian crisis management
- Data and information, reliability of data, facts and fiction

- Strengthening the communication - community of experts! Decision - makers?

Questions raised by observing the speakers' points in general:

- What is our ideal we aim at? The theory of the mission?
- Who, where and how define that or those? Effective, efficient and economic for whom?
- Can political be analytical? Can a long leg of the politics be evaluated in terms of good/bad?
- Scientific and research approach: Where do the models came from; peace research, development and humanitarian research, war studies, R & D as in technology sciences, business and industries, multidisciplinary and applied approach?
- How can we learn this critical, analytical, learning thinking to be part of the work?
- Everyone, HoM, key mission personnel, police, advisors, customs and border officers etc.
- What will happen to civilian crisis management in the EU? Is there place for quality work?

7 WORKING GROUPS BACKGROUND PAPERS

WG 1: Measuring what matters in peacebuilding and crisis management

Sarah Meharg writes in her latest publication *Measuring what matters in Peace Operations & Crisis Management*: "Since there is no empirical proof that intervention activities 1) permanently alleviate human suffering; or 2) cause sustainable peace, then intervention activities have not yet got it right. In fact, interventions are experiments, because collectively the international community continues to test intervention theories on various primary stakeholders in conflict environments, with varying results."[1]

The analysis is quite harsh because it questions the whole "business" around crisis management and peace operations, including the activities of CMC Finland. The international community is however most likely to continue its "business as usual" despite increasing criticism.

This criticism should be faced and further analysed via an open discussion between different actors connected to crisis management and peacebuilding: field practitioners, scholars, authorities, NGOs, etc. This working group continues the reflection on the main topic of the Research Days: How to measure impact of crisis management and peacebuilding?

What kind of measures and benchmarks to use, what are the criteria, what are the indicators? Is it too ambitious to talk about evaluation when at least the ESDP operations have just started to establish units in order to collect best practices?

Would it be easier just to identify different lessons instead learning from them? Besides measuring the impact from the operations' point of view, the indigenous populations in conflict environments should always be taken into account in the name of accountability.

How to promote the accountability of the operations vis-à-vis the stakeholders? Are there enough benchmarking, roadmapping and open declaration of aims from the planning phase of the operations down to the implementation level?

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1 Sarah Meharg (2009): *Measuring what matters in Peace Operations & Crisis Management*. Pearson Peacekeeping Centre & School of Policy Studies, Queen's University at Kingston, Canada: p. 255.

WG 2: Current research in the field of crisis management and peacebuilding

First, the WG welcomes all the participants who are willing to present their ongoing research projects in order to have feedback.

Second, the WG gives floor to a wider discussion on different research topics including following reflections:

- In the field of crisis management and peace operations there are different approaches to handle crises and conflicts: for example approaches like integrated or comprehensive crisis management. Recently, a Finnish strategy on comprehensive crisis management[2] was published by the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland. Apart this strategy there exists also a national strategy on civilian crisis management (2008) not to mention the national implementation plan on resolution 1325 "Women, Peace and Security" (2008). These different strategies, approaches, implementation plans etc. and their operationalisation mechanisms require Academic research in order to support the transition from the information management to knowledge management[3]. Field practitioners should be more closely linked to scholars and vice versa.

- What should then be analysed related to the crisis management and peacebuilding? What are the trends, "fashionable" topics, crisis theatres, etc. that are in focus. While some issues dominate (such as Afghanistan) what are the "silent narratives" that should be analysed? What is the ethic of the researcher while analysing policy making activities. Is there any difference between a peace researcher analysing crisis management compared to a researcher representing "military disciplines"? What are the main points of contact and possibilities to cooperate across different disciplines? And how do we guarantee that the scholars are linked to the field practice?

2 http://www.formin.fi/public/download.aspx?ID=49684&GUID={77E14EB2-C317-4A87-8477-48A14FF8EDEA}.

3 Meharg 2009, p. 260.

WG 3: From Crisis Management to Resiliency Management: does it make sense to have "hot spotting" in a multidisciplinary sense?

Resiliency Management (RM) is about ensuring that all organisations, communities, stakeholders etc. are prepared for disasters. If crisis management is more reactive action, RM is preparing the action for disasters. RM is also organising a project to explore the development of a reference model to measure and manage *operational resiliency:* the ability of an organisation to adapt to risk that affects its core operational capacities in the pursuit of goal achievement and mission viability.[4]

The hot spotting is a one form of RM. Basically the idea is to put together key actors and data concerning risks of human behaviour. A simple example of this is preparing for the disasters of fire. Applying the idea of hot spotting we collect all data about citizens and fire organisations in a certain area. What's their socio-economic status? Where do they live? What is citizen's way of life especially in a frame of social- and health behaviour? What's the location of fire-station? By analysing the collected data we are able to be prepared for fires in a certain areas. We may also be able to say where fire-stations should be located in order reduce the risks of disasters.

In this working group we discuss about what are the challenges of RM in a frame of managing networks and multi-disciplinary information.

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4 Caralli R.A. (2006): *Sustaining Operational Resiliency: A Process Improvement Approach to Security Management.* US. Department of Defence, Carnegie Mellon University.

8 WORKING GROUPS CONCLUSIONS

8.1 WORKING GROUP 1: *Measuring what matters in peace-building and crisis management*

The discussion in the WG1 centered first on the question of what matters, and second how to measure it. The differences of civilian missions, military operations and development aid projects were recognized in terms of how evaluation takes place. Also the need to recognize how different missions contribute to common goals was addressed. There are already evaluation mechanisms for ESDP operations which seem to work well. The problem lies in the vagueness of goals, politics involved in designing those goals and the system of reporting of the progress of the mission which does not address concrete measurements of change.

In order to evaluate change, or impact of the mission, the first step is a good analysis of the status of the host country in terms of the goals of the missions.

Therefore, if the mission is designed to improve political legitimacy, rule of law, security sector and economic recovery, there is a need to conduct baseline studies to asses the situation in the beginning. These four sectors cannot be measured in the same way, nor are the different ways of measuring directly comparable with each other e.g, surveys on physical security improvements in comparison to number of court cases resolved during mission. One could also ask in regard to case of Afghanistan the of rule of which law should be measured? Also some aspects are easier to measure than others, therefore a comprehensive evaluation of the mission as a whole seems quite difficult. Also the complexity of the environment needs to be taken into a account.

The difficulties in terms of measuring what matters lies most profoundly the vagueness of goals of the particular missions, as well as the politics involved in designing the missions.

An important aspect is to recognize the impact of the surrounding and constantly changing and evolving environment in which the mission operates. Easily one concentrates on the measuring the mission as a linear process. In reality this is hardly the case as the changing situation in the host country as well as internationally can affect the mission greatly.

Even though civilian crisis management was in the discussion separated from development aid projects as well as military operations, a common goal for all seems to be economic recovery. In terms of crisis management this translates to the emphasis of human security as an overall goal of the missions. Therefore this relates to also priori-

tizing what should be measured and recognizing the problematic which may arise with state-building in regard to the goal of human security.

In short the recommendations deal with the following

1. There needs to be clarity about goals.
2. There needs to be commitment to the goals.
3. Assessment of what can be measured needs to be done. The measurement needs to be more than a narrative of action taken during the missions, but asses concrete changes in the host country
4. Personnel in crisis management need to know their mandate and carry their own responsibility for the overall goals and have clarity of their own goals for the duration of the stay.
5. Institutional vagueness needs to change, as in openness of the goals of the mission and clear plan on how to achieve the goals, instead of politics among EU countries.

8.2 WORKING GROUP 2: Current research in the field of crisis management and peacebuilding

Main themes of the discussion:

1. Is it possible to understand the of military or the character of soldiers?

- "Military dominance" in crisis management (operations)
- Military vs. Civilian way:
→ hierarchical / networking?
→ one opinion / many opinions?
→ ethics lie with the highest level / with the individual?

- Need to have different perspective to organizations, both civilian and military
- Maybe common comprehension of military is enough, fundamental understanding maybe not possible as to the structures → we need to have shared aim of crisis management

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2. The emphasis on dialogue

- we are not educated to dialogue (not all discussions / conversations are dialogue!)
- need to be developed within crisis management based on ethical common values
- is there need for global ethics / is it even possible??

3. Diminishing democracy

-Why the idea of democracy has diminished?
- Is there connection between democracy / moral ethical decisions, lack of confidence

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Recommendations:

- Research to identify the gaps in our knowledge, how can we fill the gaps
- We need more broad scale evaluation, assessing the impact
- We need to reveal this connection between democratic ideas and moral implications (-is democracy the best way to rule a country..?)
- As researchers we have responsibility
- We need a way for researchers to join crisis management operations - access!

8.3 WORKING GROUP 3: From Crisis Management to Resiliency Management: does it make sense to have "hot spotting" in a multi-disciplinary sense?

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- Challenges of Evaluation
- Challenges of Concepts
- "Hot spotting"
- Resiliency Management
- Notes

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Challenges of Evaluation

- Evaluation is based on values from where we set goals

- Who can set these values, because values are always subjective?
  - We are always reflecting our values subconsciously

➔ Can the Human Rights - concept be the focus of CCM Research?
  - Are we patronizing nations under crisis?

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Challenges of Concepts

- CCM is based more to political methods (political rhetoric) than management in the field
- Is CCM more Civilian Crisis Governess?
- Concepts are defined on political rhetoric more than multidisciplinary basis
- Concepts are driven from policy level and not from field level, where values are set by institutions or nations who interfere
    - Are we intruders on target country?
    - All in all everything is based on values set by institutions or nations intervening

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Hot spotting

How to use the idea of hot spotting

- Focus on potential risks in precrisis
- Prevention
- Why?
    - If we make an intervention in post crisis face: huge risk that intervention would be institution of themselves
    - Mount of human right organisation is a huge in the crisis / post-crisis situations

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Resiliency Management

- Rapid response to risk situations and especially preventing actions
- It is easier to coordinate and manage
- Citizens are capable to adapt interventions ideas and options
- Why we cannot concentrate to that pre - period?
    - Politics?

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Notes

- Is the distance from the political decision-making too long to the field?
- How many political decision - makers are adequate to make actually decisions towards values concerning crisis management?

- Why CCM Research is not using more organisation and management sciences?
- Theories and action are not meeting (Argyris)
- We should use more efficient multidisciplinary (not just political) science resources, especially when we are talking about prevention
- CCM trainers should be more multidisciplinary

9   RENEWING PEACE EDUCATION IN EUROPE
BY REIJO E. HEINONEN

Why a new strategy for peace education is needed in a time, when some people in the peace movements speak about backing to the ideals and methods of 1960s and 1970s? Main reason is the changing foundations of our security. To meet the new challenges caused by civil wars, terrorism, ethnic or religious motivated violence, environmental catastrophes, climate change and international crime, we need more holistic strategy, which is based on the understanding of the interrelationship of all these phenomena. Together they create a *circulus vitiosus*, a diabolic circle.

If we try to improve the security on national or international level through stretching only one power factor of society, for example, economic growth or political change towards democratization in western concept and understanding, we can soon realise that profound change of circumstances and attitudes of people need more. The time of civil movements concentrating only on one task or set of values is over. The one-sidedness can lead to controversial actions despite of well meant goals.

From my student time in the University of Tübingen in the spring of 1968, I remember how two well meant groups distributed their leaflets concerning the ongoing Biafra–Nigeria war. On the one side of the street facing to the main building of the university it was distributed an appeal to raise money to help those suffering in the civil war. On the other side of the street another group protested these humanitarian endeavours because the political change should be done first. They challenged people not to give money to Biafra. Their precondition for giving was a total change of the society. These two controversial strategies represented ad hoc and long term thinking, both surely needed. But the problem was that these different strategies for crisis management excluded each other because of the lack of holistic understanding of their interdependence. The history of the development aid in Africa would deliver also cases in which different strategies have blocked essential aid for the suffering people. But how could we understand and deal with the interaction of political, economical and humanitarian strategies in a way that they would not harm each other but improve the total effect of conflict resolution by complementary cooperation.

Interrelationship of individual and collective experiences

We can approach the peace building process from three different perspectives in which individual and collective experiences are converging. Firstly, from the individual point of view we can see humans as self seeking individuals through giving meaning for their experiences. This perspective can be named as existential level

Secondly, we realise that people are self expressing individuals in arts, science and culture. We call this perspective as impressive level.

Thirdly we can describe people as self realising in political and economic decision making. We call this perspective as expressive level.

To the existential level belong the very central questions which can be found in every culture and religion all over the world: "Who am I?", "Where I am coming from?", "Why I must suffer?", "What happens after all of this?" "Why I don't do the right things, although I appreciate them?"

The answers for these questions are articulated often with philosophical, religious or ethical concepts. They include very personal experiences about values and things building the core of personality. One example about of how important reflections on this level are for peace education. The Finnish peace educator and state minister Yrjö Kallinen, on whose philosophy the Peace Education Institute in Helsinki was established, was once asked his opinion on how wars begin, according to his experience. His answer was very exceptional and for many also surprising. He said: "The wars begin, because we all are sleeping." Some people interpreted this simple from psychological frame of reference as lacking consciousness about what is happening. But perhaps behind this statement was more the Hindu concept of *maya*, delusion. In accordance with this, we all are wandering in a world of delusion. Behind the visible world we should find the real meanings and values of things through a spiritual way of life.

Understandably this kind of philosophy will meet lack of understanding and opposition. It is usually taken as idealistic thinking of those how mean to know the real facts of life. For Yrjö Kallinen this does not fit. He was practically oriented and delivered, as minister and lecturer, alternatives for economic and social life. In peace movements we have individuals, whose personal experiences and thinking would enrich international endeavours for conflicts resolution and peace building, but their message does not reach the political decision makers. One problem is that the useful personal experiences in existential level need, in order to be understood, capacities of communication in mutual exchange.

It happens approximately as the same as in the realm of religious communication. In the revivalist movements we have seen, how the specific language giving, the average every day words new meanings, can separate people. But in some other cases new metaphors can inspire new modes of thinking. Crucial in these encounters is how flexible and creative the thinking of discussion partners is. Imaginative capacity and ethical sensitivity are needed and should be promoted in the peace movement.

If the innovative existential religious, ethical and philosophical experiences will be accepted as contributions to a culture of peace, they need to be presented in a dialogi-

cal way. This can happen through mutual discussion or through literature and arts. Thus, our figure of paradigm occurs from the impressive level perspective.

If we think of for example the world famous book of Harriet Beech Stove, "Uncle Bens Cottage" or the speeches of Martin Luther King promoting human rights of blacks in America, we can see the reasons why the authors got their voices through. Ethical and religious experiences were presented in a language which could be understood and could change the average way of thinking. From personal moral experiences of the authors grew up a new public opinion, which, in time, could influence the political decision making.

After Hiroshima, Nagasaki and Auschwitz the threats for mankind have increased in unpredictable amounts. Albert Einstein's' challenge is more concrete than ever as he said: The power of atoms has changed everything in the world except one think: our thinking. It must also change, if the world will survive.

Now we seek the best ways to convince people about the necessity of this change of thinking. Especially we examine the language, which could make our endeavour understandable and accepted. Is it religious language as it was for many centuries, is it the symbol world of arts or is it the language of scientific documentations? After the fragmentation of our western society to small and still smaller groups of interest and professions, a common language is increasingly harder to find. The dominating scientific presentation has the weakness and power, that its facts can be questioned and corrected. This can also turn the truth of the earlier generations to be invalid in the following generations. As well the trust on the capacity of science to solve all the problems can make one blind to see the great threats we are facing now.

Although very little in the well known report of the Club of Rome "The Limits of growth" (1972) has been questioned and the main message has prevailed valid the political decisions in the sufficient strength still wait to be done. In the academic debate more and more investigations have been asked to convince decision makers. In this way the urgent actual measures have been delayed. According to the history of philosophy, also Karl Popper has pointed out that we should not collect more data, when the main issue has been proved. If we do so, we perhaps miss the study of the following problems.

Another weakness of the scientific presentation of problems lies in its audience. Those who are used to read scientific data can be convinced, but the average people's opinion can usually be changed only by using emotional influence and exemplifying its core ideas. The main thesis of "The Limits of growth" is quite understandable:" In a limited ecosystem no limitless growth is possible". It should have made the decision makers and average people thoughtfully aware; nevertheless it could not change the opin-

ions in a lager scale. On the other hand the emotional, challenging film of Al Gore describing the effects of the climate change awoke the sleeping citizens, at least to a while.

Fragmentation of our worldview and attempts to construct a functioning unity

We hear often politicians saying that only hard facts can influence their decision making. We all believe to be realistic, arguing citizens by saying so. Today we see how problematic the concept of factum is. The facts of science imply a theory which means a symbolic element. (Cassierer, p. 59) One of the philosophers who have elaborated this problem already in the 1920's, was German new Kantian thinker Ernst Cassierer. As a Jewish scholar he emigrated in the early 1930's to Sweden and after that to USA.

In the philosophy of symbolic forms "Philosophie der symbolischen Formen" 1923 he investigated the history of scientific thought and analyzed differences and common features of symbol systems in our western culture.

His antipositivistic message is that although scientific thinking is the basis on which the technological and economical development lies, it is only one way to reveal realities of human beings and our life. In his famous book "An Essay on Man" (Yale Univ. press 1944) Cassierer summarizes his multidimensional epistemology by defining the role of myths, religion, art and science in the history of mankind. They all speak with their own symbol system about different realities of human beings. "Physical things may be described in terms of their objective properties, but man may be described and defined only in terms of his consciousness." (p. 5). And he goes on: "Rational thought, logical and metaphysical thought can comprehend only those objects which are free from contradictions and which have a consistent nature and truth. It is however just this homogeneity which we never find in man." (p. 5)

In the history of scientific thought of the 20th century, we can realize how human behaviour was studied especially in psychology and sociology with methods which hardly allowed taking into account this kind of incongruence. Significant to the behaviouristic development was the abandoning of two early important concepts: "consciousness" and "imagination". Their role in the interpretation of human mind and behavior diminished or totally disappeared after the Second World War. Only in the 1990's the concept of consciousness has come back to the scientific debate. The functions of imagination, important for the peace education, are still waiting to be comprehended as valid methods of the cognitive science. The British philosopher of education Mary Warnock says that we must go back to the idealistic philosophy of the 19th cen-

tury in order to understand how holistic imagination is functioning. Through its capacity to combine information from various fields of perception and experience, it lays the basis for our capacity to moral assessment.

The fragmentation of our knowledge and values systems was pointed out by Cassierer.

"Theologians, scientists, politicians, sociologists, biologists, psychologists, ethnologists, economists all approached the problem from their own viewpoints. To combine or unify all these particular aspects and perspectives was impossible. And even within the special fields this was no generally accepted scientific principle..." (p. 21)

These different approaches could have delivered an enriching contribution to human development, if they would not have created "antagonism of ideas" not only on theoretical point of view but have had also practical consequences. This antagonism has namely, according Cassierer, created "an imminent threat to the whole extent of our ethical and cultural life" (21). Because this fragmentation means also a hold back for the development of theory and strategy of peace pedagogies, it must be concerned and studied.

One basic element in the new strategy for peace education would be a more holistic definition of a human being. The information from various fields of science should be critically studied from the point of view, how much their methods are valid for investigation realms of life of what they are dealing with.

In this connection I remember a discussion about the curriculum of the Finnish high school in an official working group of the state. In order to avoid the fragmentation of information already in the school, it was proposed to create a propadeutic program for students, who began their studies in high school. Its aim was to illustrate the mutual complementary relationship of subjects and their methods pointing out on which realm each science was valid but also on which it was not. Then one well known biologist stand up and said: "This kind of summarizing, holistic program is unnecessary. I declare in the introduction of my textbook what life is. It is enough." The program failed in the voting.

From the point of view of symbol theory various approaches of human culture need each other in the interpretation of life and human behaviour. Cassierer states:

"For side by side with conceptual language there is an emotional language; side by side with logical or scientific language there is a language of poetic imagination. Primarily language does not express thoughts or ideas, but feelings and affections. And even a religion within the limits of pure reason as conceived and worked out by Kant is no more than a mere abstraction. It conveys only the ideal shape, only the shadow, of what a genuine and concrete religious life is." (p. 25)

How do all these approaches describe and use the richness of nature in and outside of us could be combined to a working harmonized relationship?

Cassierer's answer to this question is: "Hence, instead of defining man as an animal rationale, we should define him as an animal symbolicum." (p. 26) We need symbol theory in order to understand the options of various areas of culture and their historical development. Myths, religions, art and science are all valid through their various symbol systems and can mediate wisdom and knowledge, which is vital for human survival and development. Some distinctions which help to discern on which level of abstraction the concepts are used. About the difference between signal and symbol Cassierer states: "Signals and symbols belong to two different universes of discourse: a signal is a part of the physical world of being; a symbol is a part of the human world of meaning. Signals are "operators"; symbols are "designators"." (p. 32)

Two main functions of symbols are here representing and referring. If a symbol (word, thing and name) is seen to poses hidden power and presence of the thing, which it is illustrating, it has a strong representing function. A state flag, totem, or a holy icon can be much more than what it is referring to. When the referring function is strong, the symbol material is not so important than in a symbol with a representing function. Important is the other reality, which the symbol is referring to.

When we think about the well known cartoon provocation of the Danish Jyllands Posten 2005-2006 we find in its interpretation also these different symbol functions. For the devoted Muslims illustration of Mohammad was blasphemy also because the picture represented holy objects, which belong to their identity. Many western journalists proposed that it was only a joke, which did not concern Muslim faith. They denied the understanding, that the referring and representing function of symbols of holy issues cannot be separated.

For the communication between different areas of culture it is important to be able to discern functions of symbols and their various forms. The lacks of this competence for dialogue lead to heinous reactions in the Muslim world and to the greatest crisis of Danish foreign policy since the Second World War.

Competence for dialogue and crisis management

Not every discussion is a dialogue, although we are used to say so. The monologues of partners don't lead to mutual giving and getting, which is one of the distinguishing marks of a dialogue. A proper dialogue aims to mutual problem solving and consists of an interactive learning process.

In some extent the competence for dialogue can be reached by learning. The learning process we present here is divided to three different realms: first to the knowledge of rules concerning religious and cultural encounter and interaction, secondly to

the cognitive capacity to use symbol theory in the diagnosis of the common problem, thirdly to the ethical sensitivity to find out the same wavelength.

1. Rules and recommendations for inter-religious and intercultural communication
Asking today what dialogue as genuine interaction in discourse could be, we have to re-fer to the studies in the history of cultures and religions by Gustav Mensching and Udo Tworuschka. They have defined rules and recommendations which promote the trans-formation of everyday one-dimensional interaction into a multi-dimensional dialogue. Some of these rules are vital to learn dialogue competence.

- Firstly religions and cultures should not be compared as entities by saying for in-stance that Muslims, Christians, Hindus are such and such. Generalizations create prejudices and hinder mutual open encountering.

- Secondly intra-cultural plurality must be noticed. There is sometimes great varia-tion inside one religion or culture, depending on historical or local issues. This con-cerns also Christianity. The Catholic Church is called complexion oppositorum- a unity of opposing factors.

- Thirdly the difference between a theoretical and practical religion should be no-ticed. It is not right to compare the practical decisions of a Muslim Sharia court in a village to the noble principles of a Western theory of law. Practice should be compared with practice and theory with theory.

- Fourth it is important to ask, what kind of phenomena belong to the primary and what to the secondary religiosity of a culture or a religion. How do we understand the debate on the right to wear the Muslim scarf? What kinds of themes in the de-bate belong to primary issues of faith and what are secondary features created by cultural history?

- In the comparison, the different phenomena should be assessed on the basis of the core of the religion. It has to be asked what is central in this religion and what this or that phenomenon means from the perspective of the wholeness. The ability to understand and use these presented rules and recommendations we could name as "religious and cultural literacy". In a multicultural society this is needed in order to understand the proportions of various features in religions and cultures.

2. Skills to discern the level of symbolizing of a concept
Meeting the so called fundamentalists, it is not difficult to realize that discussion can be carried out in a harmonious atmosphere only in issues of common agreement. Often the debate culminates in controversy about meaning of a concept which both partners know but understand in different ways. The differences on symbolizing "jihad" or "holy land" create huge practical consequences. In order to identify the levels of abstraction we use

here a model derived from the religious and psychological studies of James Fowler and the symbol theoretical pedagogy of Peter Biehl. The stages of abstraction are presented here (in our stern-figure) so that they can be identified in the discourse.

On the first –the magic-numeric- level, the world of symbols is perceived as reality. Usually this level is experienced in our culture before the school age. The picture of a thing is taken as seriously as the object itself. The same phenomenon we meet in the world of adults. Many taboos are based on this level. Also a name or a word can be understood as taboo. The picture of Ayatollah Khomeini symbolizes Islamic revolution. The ancient Romans used to say "*de mortuis nihil nisi bene*", speak only good things about the departed. Many euphemisms have been created to avoid words and associations related to death. There may be superstition and fear behind this, arisen from the impression that unworthy using of the word brings the thing itself to the space. This means that the representative function of the symbol is here greatest. On this level the discussion is usually blocked by conflict: either you accept my interpretation of the symbol or I do not accept any of your proposals. In the typology of communication of Karl Jaspers this kind of discussion is called "communication of survival". On the level political decision making, this kind of communication of survival leads to a "law of jungle". It means more or less violent conflicts according to the Hobbesian "power principle".

On the second – fundamentalistic – dimensional level the text and words are understood word by word in their lexical meaning. In a nonreligious society "heaven" loses its religious, multi-dimensional meaning and can be understood only as space. When Juri Gagarin, the first Soviet cosmonaut, returned home, he was asked if he saw God in heaven. On the religious side, the creationist attempt to harmonize the creation of Genesis with the knowledge of natural science belongs to the same level of symbolizing. Through interpretation of holy texts on this level it seems to be possible to use them to urge persons to violent actions as it is done in the camps of Al-Qaeda.

On the third –trivial symbolic – level, religious symbols are interpreted in a traditional way, depending upon the cultural heritage in question. Within the Christian culture, "the way" has a different meaning than in Taoism or Buddhism. The specific meaning of the symbol is primary and not so much its average meaning as a human aspiration and endeavour to spiritual self-cultivation.

On the fourth – symbol critical – level the symbol itself is not as important as the phenomenon to which it refers. Its representative function has diminished and its referring function is greatest on this level. On this level it is possible to understand that religious and cultural symbols have very much in common. The difficulties on this level rise from the very general way of seeing religious cultures, and thus the differences are no

longer clear. There is a threat of seeing the world in a syncretistic and superficially unifying manner. The positive effect of the symbol-critical interpretation is that the unifying elements among religions and cultures can be discerned, which is usually much more difficult than to perceive the separating ones. On this level the "great jihad" of Koran as self-cultivation to spiritual aims can be found also in the other great religions.

On the fifth – post-critical, multi-dimensional- level, both the common and differing features of the symbol are realized. The representative and referring function of the symbol are realized. The symbol is understood as representing something and also referring to something. Genuine dialogue is possible on this level. It is based on mutual understanding about what is common and what is different e.g. in the symbol "way", "water", " hand" and "heaven". On this level it is possible to envision that the world's religions and cultures can reciprocally enrich each other. They establish a unity in diversity. In conflict management it is most important to be aware that under the surface of various twists on concrete issues, there is the post-critical –level of symbolizing doctrinal areas which combine religions and make the differences understandable. The ability to find out this level in discourse belongs to the cognitive dialogue competence.

3. Finding the same wavelength

Dialogical discourse can not emerge only through knowledge and communication skills, because the ethos from which communication is derived is vital. It needs some deeper based values and moral principles and free innovations about what is right and wrong, i.e. morality.

After the collapse of socialism in Eastern-Europe and the end of the Cold War in the 1990's, the international community sought for a new basis for peaceful interaction of nations. Irrespective of good promises, the globalization process promoted a widening gap between the rich and the poor. Quite correctly, the Rio Janeiro Summit for the Environment 1992 pointed out the vital role of a new ethical orientation of states and individuals. From that time the global ethic discourse developed on the level of NGOs in five waves in the 1990s.

To the first wave belongs the global ethic declaration of the Parliament of the World's Religions in Chicago in 1993. "A global ethic. The Declaration of the Parliament of World's Religions" (London 1993) include norms, moral principles and recommendations aiming to show that in the tradition of religions and cultures there already exists relevant common moral codes for responsible interaction of states and individuals. The golden rule pointing out the reciprocity of moral behaviour is written in the Bible "Whatever you wish that others do to you, do so to them. "In Buddhism this is formulated as follows:"Treat all creatures as you would like to be treated." The same in Is-

lam:"No one of you is a believer, until you desire for your neighbour that which you desire for yourself."

In the second wave in 1993-1995, the assessment of the declaration took place. It was positively supported by intellectuals in politics and religions. In the third wave in 1995-1997, international organizations like World Economic Forum, IAC (InterAction Council), UNESCO and others adopted the main ideas of the declaration. In the fourth wave in 1995-2000, the foundations for Global ethic were established in Tübingen, Zürich, Amsterdam and Prague to support the intercultural dialogue. In the fifth wave in 2001, the UN began to highlight the necessity of global ethic for taming the negative effects of globalization. The year 2001 was nominated as the year of "Dialogue among Civilizations", and the book "Crossing the Divide" came out. The book was initiated by the Secretary General Kofi Annan with co-writers from various cultures and every continent. The necessity of global ethic was not only pointed out in this book but also in some UN-organizations. For example ILO, the labour organization of the UN, stressed its meaning by writing in its report in 2004 that globalization needs "an ethical frame of reference". What does this mean from point of view of dialogue competence? Firstly, in conflict resolution the ethical atmosphere in which the talks are carried out is important. No promises can convince the partners, if they have a distrust of the aims of others. On the other hand, if the partners can present the ethical principles they are committed to in praxis, small symbols of fairness are enough to bring the discourse towards a positive solution.

The ability to be responsible

No competence for dialogue would improve the possibilities for peaceful solutions, if the responsibility for global solidarity is lacking. But not only the weakness of will of individuals but also the very complicated interrelationships of material and immaterial factors in a post industrialized society hinder one's growth towards personal responsibility.

In his famous book "Das Prinzip Verantwortung" (1979 orig., 1984) (The Principle of Responsibility) the German-American philosopher Hans Jonas describes our possibilities to tackle great problems caused by modern technology. In his perspective Jonas states, that although humans are the only entities in the universe, which can take responsibility for the survival of life, his ability various in the history of mankind. The challenges today are so great that we must ask if humans are grown up to take responsibility for the threats caused by overconsumption and dependence on highly specialized technology. His answer is on one side pessimistic and on the other side slightly optimistic.

"In Man the nature has disturbed itself and let only one small possibility to balance the shaken security

of his self regulation open: his moral capacity." / "Im Menschen hat die Natur sich selbst gestört und nur in seiner moralischen Begabung (die wir wie das andere ihr noch zuschreiben dürfen) einen unsi cheren Ausgleich für die erschütterte Sichehheit der Selbstregulierung offengelassen. (p. 248)"

For Jonas a holistic understanding of the earnest of the state of the world can be realized only as a moral act. In his thinking nature's self correction is not waiting. The passivity and waiting of such self-rescue of nature itself would be a catastrophe for human civilization and forcing it back to the level of bacteria.

The report of World Watch Institut rang alarm signals, but no holistic change of values and attitudes is in sight. According to Jonas, such kind of change is not even possible without a profound new moral awareness of common responsibility.

After the collapse of the Eastern-European socialism a vacuum of values was exposed. The fragile security, earlier established on the nuclear threat between two superpowers was abolished, and new values for common responsibility were not grown up. The United Nations' Rio summit in 1992 tried to contribute to a profound re-evaluation of values and goals of world community. Rio summit was not satisfied with the slogan "sustainable development" created by the Gro Harlen Brundtland committee report 1987, because it laid too much thrust on the economic growth as correcting factor of the negative effects of the globalization. For the international peace movements it is to notice that the NGOs played an important role in creating the spirit of Rio. Against all the diplomatic politeness, the NGO group of India put out the alternatives with an understandable word of Mahatma Gandhi:"We have for everyone's need but not for anyone's greed." It meant that the moral of the people is the decisive factor in the battle for survival. No mechanism, economic, political or social system outside of the human mind can help to rescue the planet without ethical commitment of people.

In this perspective we should ask, what the statement of the Club of Rome in its book "The Limits of Growth" would mean today. As it stated that no limitless growth is possible in a limited ecosystem. We realize that growth is anyway a sign of life. We cannot stop the growth totally. But we must find out a right direction on which it is possible. How should we understand growth so that it would not cause destruction to the common world? In accordance to Hans Jonas and the message of Rio summit we could reformulate the thesis and say: "An unlimited growth is not possible in a limited ecosystem except in one direction to the inner world of humans, it means in his moral world of responsibility." By changing of minds to this direction the peace-education will have its epochal challenge.

10 MANAGING POLITICAL CRISIS/VIOLENCE IN NIGERIA BY THADDEUS CHIJIOKE NDUKWE

Introduction

Politics and violence are like Siamese twins in Nigeria (Obadare 1999), and have been one of the major obstacles to sustainable development in the country. Even some religious violence has been known to have strong political stimuli. A country with multiparty democracy under a federal republican arrangement, Nigeria has been political independent from British colonialism since 1960. Now in its fourth republic, it has experienced democratic elections for only four times in its 49 years of independence. The intermittent undemocratic periods between these years were marred with political conflicts and violence, three-year civil war and 28 years of military dictatorships, largely because the so-called democracy was adulterated with political brigandage and fraudulent electoral processes. Gurr (1970) argues that a major cause of violence is aggression arising out of frustration. In our context of inquiry, it is aggression arising out of political frustration. In a democracy, there exists a normative consensus that politicians should be responsive to their constituents (Grayson 2003) just as elected officials should be accountable to their electorate. This is the very reason why there are elections. They give legitimacy to democracy. Max Weber affirms that legitimacy rests on the acceptance of an action as appropriate. And Steffek (2000) considers legitimacy as the fact that people voluntarily accept domination on the grounds that they believe in the normative rightfulness of an action or process. When election is free and fair, people accept it in good faith. Fair elections lead to fair results, a satisfied electorate, a peaceful society and prosperous development. Whereas fraudulent elections lead to rigged results, disenchanted masses, political conflicts, violence and even civil war. Without fair elections therefore, democracy is deemed illegitimate or simply non-existent.

Democratization and its security threat

It seems a common saying that democracy brings peace and development to every country that adopts it. But it is doubtful if this is a universal fact. It is true that nearly all countries (except very few) have democracy as a political system. But has democratization indeed brought peace and development to more than half of them? On the contrary, it seems to have engineered varied kinds of conflicts and violence and even underdevelopment. Perhaps, Bernard Crick (1983) was right to assert that "democracy is perhaps the most promiscuous word in the world of public affairs". Okoye (2007) agrees by pointing out that "...the political class... often exploits the woolliness in the definition

of democracy to consolidate, and socially reproduce undemocratic political activities in the name of democracy," which leads to various kinds and degrees of socio-political conflicts and violence that often result in indiscriminate destruction of lives and property in various countries.

The end of military rule in 1999 ushered in democracy as an alternative, with multiparty politics, socio-political freedom and electoral opportunities. But not too long thereafter, neoliberalism veered its head into the Nigerian political landscape and gave birth to an unbridled political entrepreneurship. In simple terms: politics was *privatised*, and neoliberal philosophy became the guiding principle of most Nigerian politicians. As with all neoliberalistic ideologies, the end-goal of political entreneurship is wealth as much as possible, sometimes much more than neoliberal economic market forces could even determine. John Dewey (1916) may have foreseen this when he argued that "the liberation... which characterizes a democracy is not of course the product of deliberation.... On the contrary, they were caused by the development of modes of manufacture and commerce...."

One could therefore imagine why some Nigerian politicians see politics as a solid business investment. This has rendered democracy in the country in jeopardy because rather than bring the expected civility, peace and development, it has brought conflicts and violence. Aspirations to electoral positions have become a do or die affair. This happens not only during intra-party primaries and inter-party elections, but also after them. This warped attitude has become a new form of security threat in the country. Musah (2009) reminds us that such security threats were the ones that created the conditions that saw the emergence of military dictatorships in the late 1960s through the 1990s. Another significant cause of the problem is the unacceptably high cost of political campaigns and electoral administration, which has brought the emergence of big political investors called godfathers into the scene, and who, through their financial and/or political might, fuel the crisis by manipulating the political and electoral processes to their selfish ends. They often do this by imposing their surrogates (or godsons) on others. Other causes of political conflicts are as follows: the tendency of the incumbents to cling on to power, the gullibility and opportunism of sections of civil society and the media, and the absence of internal democracy within political parties (Musah 2009).

On the economic front, Musah also notes that democracy is proving notoriously slow in translating "popular" mandates into development dividends. Since 1999, for example, the Nigerian economy (which was relatively and comparatively robust during the military regimes) suddenly began nose-diving, thereby putting people's quality of life and security in serious jeopardy. Unfortunately, the population is also rapidly growing and currently stands at about 150 million, nearly half of which are youths below the age

of 35. A good number is jobless and has become easy prey to callous politicians who train and use them as thugs and militants to fight political opponents before, during and after elections. This immoral attitude keeps these youths in near permanent militancy, and consequently keeps the society very vulnerable and insecure.

The problem is particularly notorious in Anambra State, a small state in the southeast of the country. From 1999 to 2006, for instance, the state experienced some horrible political conflicts and violence that resulted in wanton destruction of lives and properties by warring political rivals within and between political parties in their desperate bid to get electoral positions at all costs. It is such that some politicians and political parties have permanent armed thugs and militants. In fact, in November 2004, the crisis culminated in the kidnap of a sitting governor for the first time in Nigerian political history. Research allegedly discovered that political godfatherism was the strongest force behind the whole menace (Uwhejevwe-Togbolo, 2005).

"Political Godfatherism" could be defined as a kind of political sponsorship directed towards seemingly poor politicians and/or political parties seeking electoral positions and/or political appointments. Gambo (2007) calls it "an ideology... constructed on the belief that certain individuals possess considerable means to unilaterally determine who gets a party's ticket to run for an election and who wins in the electoral contest...." He affirms that this ideology "promotes an entrepreneurial sense of politics as opposed to its conventional civic sense and this, no doubt, raises the stakes of ... electoral politics in an emerging democracy".

In Anambra State, Uwhejevwe-Togbolo (2005) affirms that the "State, which happens to be an industrial state, has been perturbed with godfatherism syndrome, a canker warm that has eaten deep into the polity and economic situation of the state." Dike (2004) agrees by attesting that "the Anambra imbroglio has exposed the negative impacts of crude political *godfatherism* in Nigerian politics."

Managing the Conflicts: Civilian or Military?

Nigeria is a country with strong military power, and so had managed its internal and external crisis through military means. Civilian crisis management (in the strict European sense) is virtually non-existent in the country, but this is not to say that there are no civilian organizations that speak out against conflicts and violence. Of course there are, and prominent among them is the Civil Liberty Organization. But these organizations don't have the legal mandate to go the extra mile of mediating or managing conflicts, especially political. What they usually do is to spur the government to action, and which sometimes uses its military or police force to quench whatever conflict or violence it is.

Unfortunately, this kind of 'quench' does not often address the roots of conflicts, and so the problem lingers on. The case of Niger Delta fits perfectly here. Successive governments have militarily subdued the region, including even the execution of some of its leaders in November 1995. Yet, the crisis continues to mutate into dangerous forms like kidnapping of oil workers and blowing up of oil installations.

Nevertheless, it is good to note that the government sometimes institutes a commission of inquiry into some of these conflicts or violence. But this gesture is more common in religious, cultural, ethnic, and/or commercial conflicts than in political. In other words, political conflicts are often left to the hands of political parties or politicians to settle within or among themselves because it is often considered 'an internal matter of political parties". Unfortunately, some peaceful resolution is not often met because some politicians sometimes resort to quick, illegitimate and militant means to settle their scores, including kidnapping of opponents and even outright assassination. This has often affected not only national security but also regional.

To this, Musah attests that "Nigeria's internal turmoil has often sent jitters across the (West African) region". This indeed makes addressing Nigeria's internal conflicts a paramount importance.

Be that as it may, there is an element of civilian crisis management going in Nigeria at the moment. In matters relating to fraudulent electoral 'victories', the judiciary has become a strong arbiter (or a civilian crisis manager)! Since 1999, it has been able to annul a great number of rigged electoral 'victories' through the court. For example, within 18 months of 2007 general elections, the courts overturned more than "ten gubernatorial, twelve senatorial, eleven House of Representative, and fifteen state assembly (election) results" (Musah 2009) and asked for immediate re-run. In some cases, electoral contestants who were brutally rigged out by their opponents are immediately instated (without any rerun) after a considerable hearing of their cases by the court. Luckily too, such annulments have been highly respected and adhered to by all those (politicians and political parties) involved. This is very significant because it has been able to prevent a lot of potential political violence that could have led to a complete security meltdown in the country. The police have also been able to ensure that such electoral change of baton is always done without any delay or violence.

Therefore, in this sense, the Nigerian judiciary and the police force (which are two of the four key players in EU's civilian crisis management concept) could be presently called the formal civilian crisis managers in Nigeria. The military is only called in if such situation proves resiliently dangerous for the police to handle. Otherwise, it is left for the police. On another hand, the military is more involved in external security assistance than internal. To this, Musah (2009) notes that Nigeria is a country of contradic-

tion that has "an uncanny habit of exporting what it has in scarcity (i.e. electricity to Benin and Togo; conflict resolution and democracy to Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Togo), and importing what it has in abundance (petroleum products)!"

Conclusion

Civilian and military crisis management approaches are both essential in preventing, resolving and/or managing conflicts. However, it is the nature and extent of a conflict or crisis that would determine the methodology to use. Sometimes both could be used. But as some experience has shown, especially in the Niger Delta of Nigeria and Guinea Bissau, it is not recommendable to use military crisis management methodology at the beginning or middle of a conflict/crisis. Civilian methodology would be more appropriate because it can use its civility to cool rising tempers. The military can only be invited when all civilian efforts have been totally exhausted and no tangible progress is made.

In similar vein, in the current Nigerian socio-political society, although the judiciary is the best arbiter in conflict management, it does not go about looking for or gathering cases. It can only preside over a case that is brought before it. Unfortunately, the hoi polloi of the society do not have the money to engage the services of the judiciary in political conflict mediation or management. Therefore, there is the need for a civilian crisis management that should look at the root causes (not just the effects or spillovers) of political conflicts and address them. A massive national orientation program would be useful here to educate politicians and the youths that politics is not a do or die affair. The way to do this should be the prerogative of a civilian crisis management team. If the team is a foreign one (e.g. UN or EU) they should incorporate *confidence building* as a major training strategy. This would remove any impression of superiority complex their presence might give to their trainees. Efforts should particularly be made to sanitize the minds of the youths from being preys to crooked politicians who lure them with money and use them as agents of brutality and death. Politicians should also be advised to be civil and humane in politics, bearing in mind that politics is a call to service to humanity and not a winner-takes-all business.

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11 ENGLISH SUMMARY OF STUDY OF EMERGING PHENOMENA BY JOHAN EHNBERG

This is a summary of Johan Ehnberg's master's thesis "Civilkrishanteringens organisering på fältet: Arbete utöver planer", presented on 2009-10-13 at Åbo Akademi University. The study was facilitated by the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) with help from Lund University. The case for the study was the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia. The study explores how work is organized in ways that are not planned through the concept of emergent phenomena in organizing.

In order to understand how the organization is organized formally, two types of information were used. Firstly, documents pertaining to the mission were collected. These include planning documents, organigrams and communications such as emails. Secondly, as the mission was established according to a command-and-control (C2) model, some basic concepts of C2 are laid out in order to interpret the organization's planning. With an understanding of how the organization is formally organized through these two types of information, the study goes on to look at those phenomena in the organization on the field, which have not been parts of how the organization was planned. Information about these phenomena was mainly collected through interviews and observations during the field study.

Two separate analyses are used in order to identify different types of emergent phenomena. The first, a simple social network analysis, is used to identify work relations of participants in the study. This information is used to identify work relations that span organizational boundaries in ways that have not been planned. The social network is also useful for identifying potentially interesting future participants, i.e. as a convenient participant selection. The second analysis is based on the tool for analysis used in grounded theory. This allows the researcher to identify phenomena that are not visible in the social network analysis. Through this second analysis, information describing the organization performing on the field is codified and grouped, creating categories whose interrelations are explored. This is presented as two main categories with two and three groups respectively: circumstantial factors as internal (planning, guiding) and external (environmental, demanding) as well as the identified emergent phenomena as self-organization, improvisation and emergent groups. The relations of these main categories follows the philosophical concept of emergence: a process where new and complex patterns emerge out of several simpler interactions.

In the thesis, the significant result is a proposal for a typology of emergent phenomena in order to create a clear terminology and definitions for emergent phenomena. These definitions build on earlier research, aiming to establishes their relations without

overlapping or gaps. The typology is defined through three types of emergent phenomena (see figures below). Selforganization emerges within given organizational boundaries and includes neither new agents nor actions. Self-organization typically addresses insufficient planning of actions or redundant work roles, as organization members among themselves find ways to specialize or divide work loads. Improvisation is initiated from within organizational boundaries but includes actions that are not part of the formal organization. Improvisation typically addresses lack of tools or other missing preconditions for performing the required work.

Emergent groups defines relations that span organizational boundaries, within (units, departments) or outside (between organizations) the formal organization, and thus includes new agents.

Figure 1: Self-organization emerges within organizational boundaries.

Figure 2: Improvisation defines new ways of organizing work

Figure 3: Emergent groups appear within and outside the formal organization

Emergent groups typically arise from mutually beneficial cooperation such as information exchange or joint actions, or as a way to address a need for additional human resources.

Being a pragmatic study, one of the main points in the thesis is to develop possible applications of the results. In addition to the academic uses of a typology as well as a method specifically designed for studying international C2-operations in crisis management, the study may have uses for crisis management practitioners. For example, the typology may be used as a tool for organization development by identifying emer-

gent phenomena that are of use to the organization. A Chief of Staff could, for example, do a survey of the work relations in order to identify how information flow in the organization could be more streamlined. Similarly, an officer tasked with planning operations could benefit from learning new and more efficient ways to perform the work, propagating that solution throughout the organization. In this sense, the application is a way to do capacity building within and outside the organization, tapping the skills of experts in the field and bringing them into planning in an otherwise prominently top-down organization.

Emergent phenomena

CMC Research Days 2009

Johan Ehnberg

Key points

☐ Methods
☐ Snowballing
☐ Interviews
☐ Field journal (observations etc.)
☐ Secondary sources (documents etc.)
☐ Material
☐ Analysis
☐ Social network analysis
☐ Grounded theory

# Network analysis without units

Grounded theory analysis

Circumstantial categories
☐ Plans (internal, guiding)
☐ Environment (external, demanding)
Emerging categories
☐ Self-organization
☐ Improvization
☐ Emergent groups

Emergent phenomena, typology

- Self-organization
- Improvization
- Emergent groups

Applications

A tool for organizational development
- ☐ Identifying emergent phenomena
- ☐ Reacting and assessing
- ☐ Integrating into planning

A tool for organizational evaluation
- ☐ Qualitative analysis
- ☐ Ability to adapt
- ☐ Resilience