Seminar Publication

CMC Finland Research Days 2010

What International Community?

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1.0 Foreword

The international community is a work in progress. Many strands of cooperation have asserted themselves over the years. We must now stitch them into a strong fabric of community - of international community for an international era.

<div align="right">Kofi Annan</div>

The international community, it is an ambiguous term for a artificial body, but it is one of the most important actors in the fields of crisis management, humanitarian assistance, and development aid. It is often the scapegoat for failure and the subject of criticism, though the international community is recognised as the watchdog for human rights and the defender of the weak. For this reason it is important that the research community questions, analyses, and works to make it more efficient and effective. These issues were the topic of CMC Finland's Research Days 2010, held in Kuopio on November 17 and 18. This annual event is the highlight of the year for CMC Finland research section; it brings together our research partners for discussion and debate as well as showcases our annual publication of research articles, *CMC Finland's Yearbook 2010 on Peacebuilding and Civilian Crisis Management Studies.* The title of this year's event was, "What International Community?" and it focused on the coherence of the international community from the political/strategic level, the national level and the operational level. The event aims at gathering researchers, the NGO community, universities and practitioners alike to come together to discuss and share ideas on topics directly connected to civilian crisis management and peacebuilding. This year the topic was left intentionally broad in hopes of attracting new people into the crisis management discussion from diverse backgrounds in the hopes of finding new, critical perspectives.

Our distinguished speakers this year included: Member of Parliament Elisabeth Nauclér, Cedric de Coning of NUPI, Petri Hautaniemi of the University of Helsinki as well as Kirsi Henriksson of EUJUST LEX. The speakers gave excellent speeches that highlighted the international community at the various levels and provoked much discussion. Following the plenary, the participants divided into working groups to discuss the issues in more detail.

The questions that were raised and the critical voices that were heard during the event depict the precise need for this type of gathering. The interconnectedness of the world is undeniable and the ever increasing lack of human security necessitates the coherence of international actors on all levels in order to achieve a sustainable future in an international era.

<div align="right">Meghan Riley
Researcher
CMC Finland</div>

2.0 Research Days Programme

<u>Wednesday 17 November 2010</u>

12:00   Plenary Session

Welcoming speech by Jari Mustonen, Head of Research and Development, CMC Finland

Member of Finnish Parliament Elisabeth Nauclér: Politics and international organisations

Cedric de Coning, NUPI: Coherence of the International Community on the political level

Petri Hautaniemi, University of Helsinki: The Coherence of the International Community in Post-Conflict Nepal

Discussion

14:45 - 15.30   Kirsi Henriksson, EUJUST LEX: National level coherence

Liisa Laakso, University of Helsinki: Commentary on the plenary session

Discussion and division into working groups

15:30-17:00   Working Groups

WG 1: The coherence of the IC at the strategic/political level
Moderator: Pirjo Jukarainen, TAPRI
Rapporteur: Mikko Keltanen, CMC Finland

WG 2: The coherence of the IC at the operational level and national level
Moderator: Tanja Tamminen, UPI
Rapporteur: Mirjami Rustanius, CMC Finland

18:00   Publishing of CMC Finland's Yearbook 2010, Kirsi Henriksson, Editor-in-Chief

20:30   Closing of Day 1 of Research Days, Ari Kerkkänen, Director CMC Finland

<u>Thursday 18 November 2010</u>

9:00   Working Groups continue

10:45   Wrap-up of Working Groups
Chair: Senja Korhonen

11:00   Concluding remarks by Ari Kerkkänen

3.0 Participants

Cedric de Coning	Norwegian Institute of International Affairs / African Center for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes
Kirsi Henriksson	EUJUST LEX Iraq
Pirjo Jukarainen	Tampere Peace Research Institute
Tanja Tamminen	Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Senja Korhonen	Crisis Management Centre Finland
Arto Tissari	Crisis Management Centre Finland
Mirjami Rustanius	Crisis Management Centre Finland
Mikko Keltanen	Crisis Management Centre Finland
Petri Hautaniemi	Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland
Jari Mustonen	Crisis Management Centre Finland
Meghan Riley	Crisis Management Centre Finland
Elisabeth Nauclér	Member of Parliament, Åland
Liisa Laakso	University of Helsinki
Ari Kerkkänen	Crisis Management Centre Finland
Anri Heinonen	Finnish Defence University
Maarit Niskanen	University of Eastern Finland
Hannamari Heinonen	Crisis Management Centre Finland
Ville Mertamo	Crisis Management Centre Finland
Rachel Ferlatte-Kuisma	Crisis Management Centre Finland
Kaija Pekkarainen	Crisis Management Centre Finland
Tapio Räsänen	Crisis Management Centre Finland
Peter Sund	Crisis Management Centre Finland
Marko Jäntti	University of Eastern Finland
Kaisa Happo	Crisis Management Centre Finland
Sirkku Terävä	Tampere Peace Research Institute
Jeff Arnold	Embassy of the United States
Harriet Mallenius	University of Helsinki
Kirsi Hyttinen	Crisis Management Centre Finland
Heimo Mikkola	University of Eastern Finland
Roseanna Avento	University of Eastern Finland
Reijo Heinonen	University of Eastern Finland
Monna Airiainen	University of Tampere

4.0 Bios of keynote speakers, commentator, moderators, rapporteurs, and chairs

<u>Keynote speakers</u>

Elisabeth Nauclér has been a Member of Parliament for Åland since 2007. Previously, she has worked as a legislative draftsman for the Government of Åland 1979-1983, notary for the Parliament of Åland 1983-1985, secretary of the Åland Delegation to the Nordic Council 1985-1999, Civil Affairs Officer with UN peacekeeping operation in former Yugoslavia 1993-1996 and head of office in the Government of Åland 1999-2006. She is also a member of the European Union Civilian Response Team.

Cedric de Coning is a Research Fellow with the African Center for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI). He was a South African diplomat in Washington D.C. and Addis Ababa (1988-1997). He served with the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor, as a Civil Affairs- and Political Affairs Officer (1999-2000 and 2001-2002), and he worked with the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations in the Training and Evaluation Service (2002). Cedric holds a M.A. (Cum Laude) from the University of KwaZulu-Natal and is a DPhil candidate at the University of Stellenbosch.

Cedric is currently working on the civilian dimension of the African Standby Force (Norwegian funded Training for Peace programme at ACCORD), civil-military and peacebuilding coordination (Finnish funded African Peacebuilding Coordination programme at ACCORD), integrated conflict management in Africa (Norwegian funded Training for Peace programme at NUPI) and the Comprehensive Approach (Norwegian funded MNE5 project at NUPI). His research interests include civil-military coordination; conflict management; the civilian dimension of peacekeeping; the peacekeeping and peacebuilding nexus: coherence generating processes: assessments, planning, management & coordination and monitoring & evaluation; and the interlinkages between Complexity and International Relations.

Dr Petri Hautaniemi is currently a researcher at the University of Helsinki, Department of Development Studies. Previously, he has worked at the Finnish Embassy in Kathmandu, Nepal as a Counsellor for development and Deputy Head of Mission focusing on education and social development, the peace process, post-conflict statebuilding, human rights and refugees.

Kirsi Henriksson is currently the editor of *CMC Finland Studies on Peacebuilding and Civilian Crisis Management Studies* and working as Evaluation and Best Practice Officer for EUJUST LEX-Iraq. Previously, she worked as the Head of Research and Development at the Crisis Management Centre Finland. She has a Master of Arts in General History from the University of Tampere, Finland.

<u>Commentator</u>

Dr Liisa Laakso is the Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Helsinki. Her regional expertise lies in Africa where she has conducted numerous research projects and written extensively on African development issues. She is also a member of the CMC Finland Advisory Board.

<u>Moderators</u>

Pirjo Jukarainen is a Senior Researcher in Tampere Peace Research Institute TAPRI. She holds also an Adjunct Professorship in Regional Studies in the University of Tampere. Currently she runs a Finnish Academy project: Gendered Agency in Conflict: Gender Sensitive Approach to Development and Conflict Management Practices. She is a vice chairperson for the CMC Finland 1325 Steering Committee and has worked for the joint research project with CMC Finland; the project analyses the changing expertise in comprehensive crisis management.

Dr Tanja Tamminen works as a researcher in the European Union research programme at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs. Previously Dr Tamminen was seconded for two years in the EULEX mission in Kosovo. She has also worked as an advisor at the Finnish Foreign Ministry. Her research on Balkan issues spans over ten years. Her main research interests lie in the EU policies as well as in the regional political context. She has done extensive research both on the enlargement policies as well as on civilian crisis management. In 2009 she received her PhD in political science from the Institut des Etudes Politiques (Sciences Po) in Paris.

<u>Rapporteurs</u>

Mikko Keltanen is currently working as a project assistant for the Director's Office of Crisis Management Centre Finland. His responsibilities include, among other tasks, practical arrangements for various events, communications and website content management. Earlier Keltanen has worked for CMC Finland in the Human Resources and Training sectors.

Mirjami Rustanius is a research assistant at CMC Finland; she is preparing a research article on the role of literacy training programmes as part of building peace in Sierra Leone. In addition, she participates in the organisation of seminars and other events at CMC Finland. Rustanius is currently finishing her Master's degree in Cultural Diversity at the University of Eastern Finland.

<u>Chairs</u>

Dr Ari Kerkkänen has Ph.D. from the University of Helsinki (2001). Currently, he works as Director of the Crisis Management Centre Finland. His former appointments are as follows: University Researcher (University of Helsinki, 2006), Political Advisor (Multinational Task Force North, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 2005), War Crimes Intelligence Analyst (UN International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 2002-2005), Political Monitor and Senior Operations Officer in Serbia (EUMM 2001-2002), UN Military Observer (UNPROFOR 1994-1995, UN Staff Officer (UNPROFOR, 1993) and UN Operations Duty Officer (UNIFIL, 1991-1992). His regional expertise lies within the Middle East and the Western Balkans.

Jari Mustonen is the Head of Research and Development at CMC Finland and is in charge of research on crisis management and the coordination of research with relevant universities and research institutes both in Finland and abroad. In addition, his responsibilities include participating in developing the Research Programme and Research Strategy as well as planning and developing CMC Finland's publishing programme. Furthermore, he is responsible for conducting research on Civil-Military Coordination and Comprehensive Approach.

Senja Korhonen is a Training Officer at CMC Finland. She is responsible for the Human Security Training Programme and she has conducted a pilot course on "Applying Human Security in Crisis Management" and she is responsible for conducting human security sessions in the Core Courses and other training events, including pre-deployment trainings.

5.0 Plenary Session Presentations

5.1 MP Elisabeth Nauclér: Politics and international organisations

It is a great pleasure and an honour for me to address this audience for several different reasons. Firstly because it is a very distinguished audience, but also because as a member of the Finnish Parliament and of its Foreign Affairs Committee I am on a daily basis occupied with these questions, and last but not least because I have been working with minority and autonomy questions my whole life and therefore also asked to join a peace-keeping mission.

I very often speak about the autonomy of the Åland Islands, and one of the most essential components in our autonomy is "politics and international organisations" just as the title that was suggested for my speech here, but I will come back to that later.

I have been asked to draw on my personal experience from "my" peace-keeping mission, which was The United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation (UNCRO) and later United Nations Transitional Authority in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES), or former Yugoslavia. It was the biggest peace-keeping mission at its time, right in the middle of Europe. With the most experienced military peace keepers, as well as the most civilian peace-keepers. Head of the mission was people like Yasushi Akashi and Kofi Annan, my immediate boss was Sergio Vieira de Mello. We cooperated with experienced politicians like Lord Owen, Thorvald Stoltenberg, Knut Vollebaeck, Kaj Eide and many more. Every international organisation and non-governmental organization anyone had heard of, and even non-governmental organizations no one had ever heard of came to join us. Every single non-governmental organization had to be on record having been present in Sarajevo even if just once. Analyst, think tanks, you'll name it they were all there. There were people only trying to coordinate the work of the different organisations, and it all became the international community.

Despite all the ambitions, and all the resources amounted we did not stop the war, we did not make the peace, we did not protect the people who needed protection, we did not solve the conflicts, and we did not build a democratic society with good governance. The war was stopped, and good-governance and democracy is to be found in the Balkans, but it was not done by us. We, the traditional peace-keepers under UN-mandate, nor the military nor the civilian structure. It was solved by the assistance of individual countries, or contact groups representing some countries. The war in Bosnia was stopped in Dayton thanks to the involvement of the US. As this was the media war we had the spotlights on every step taken, and it was impossible do cover-up our failures and hide our short-comings. It was all revealed. Very few countries were ready to operate under UN-command after all the failures in the Balkans. The United States is of course a super power that has been, if not able to operate on their own so at least to run the show, in Iraq, in Afghanistan etc, with or without. But the European countries were obliged, and determined to create a structure within which they could operate together, without killing the UN.

The UN has the institutional memory, and will for many years be important, but we will see the importance of the military component of the UN be of less or no importance. So far it is NATO that has taken over the military crisis management operations, and asked by the UN to do so, but this might change. There can be other configurations such as European or even Nordic. I am convinced there has to be a change in the Security Councils decision making process, but I am unable to even guess how.

We trust that we Europeans are efficient and able to cooperate, but we now on the other hand that the European Rapid Reaction Forces were formed four years ago, and have not yet been in action, and we have also established and trained a Nordic Battle Group with the no lack of tasks, and could be sent to many places around the world. The picture is the same on the civilian side, the Civilian side, the Civilian Response Team has had almost no tasks to perform, and it is not due to lack of competence or readiness. The personnel is well trained and ready to go, but the politicians are incapable of making use of them, it is a question of decision-making.

On the national level we have in Finland as you all know completed a Comprehensive Crisis Management Strategy and I think we have all reasons to be satisfied with our goals. "The aim of the comprehensive crisis management strategy is to strengthen a comprehensive approach in Finnish crisis management activities. Military and civilian crisis management, as well as development cooperation and humanitarian assistance should be coordinated to achieve the best possible synergies as well as sustainable results." The strategy includes most elements that should be there.

I believe it is relatively clear how we should build the national capacity to participate in crisis management missions and how we should maintain the national preparedness. But no strategy is without complications. In Finland the Ministry of Interior is responsible for civilian crisis management, the Ministry of Defence is responsible for military crisis management and the Foreign Affairs is responsible for deciding which operations Finland will take part in. All three ministries assure us politicians that the cooperation runs smoothly, and we are of course happy to hear that, but personally I am not sure that this is the best way of using the resources. The Foreign Ministry has to have the lead on how the foreign policy should be conducted, and crisis management is part of the foreign policy.

The international community is so important to the conflicting parties, may it be the UN, OSCE, NATO, European Union, a Humanitarian Organisation, a non-governmental organization, an individual country or a group of countries that we have the responsibility to be if not a model, so at least assist when needed, both militarily but also in civilian crisis management, and confidence building measures.

Military and civilian components blur the picture, the border line between the military and the civilian components. But this does not mean that the civilians will carry out military duties, but that the military will take on civilian duties, duties that have earlier been done by civilians. Is this what we want? Is this in accordance with our policy, the strategy laid out in the national parliaments? We argue that protection is needed in the area, the civilians can not work with-

out the military protection, and of course there is a need for military escorts and protection in some dangerous situations, but we should not forget that many of the humanitarian organisations and non-governmental organizations operated in the area on their own long before the military protection had arrived. I personally believe that we should be very critical before we accept that the military takes over civilian tasks, may it be in accordance with the new NATO strategy or some other plans. This is in my opinion one of the most dangerous threats to the perception of the "international community". The way the military acts, with or without weapons, is the way the international community is perceived no matter what the goal is.

I said in the beginning that I very often speak about "the international community" in connection with the Ålands islands. The Åland solution is famous because it is one of the few conflicts that have been resolved by an international organisation in a sustainable way. Conflict and minority questions are always international questions, in former Yugoslavia, in China etc. It is very often not until violent actions take place, that the international community is asked to intervene. The Åland question was discussed in Paris after the first World War but referred the League of Nations by Britain in 1921. It was conflict resolution as a confidence building measure long before those terms came to use.

The foreign ministry has taught me that I should have three points:

– We have the responsibility to see to that there is an international community to turn to count on, to trust when needed. Some conflicts are not only internal conflicts, and we have the responsibility to protect.
– There has to be a well thought through strategy on every national level. Of course we have to cooperate internationally, but the civilian and military contribution should be based on the foreign policy and political strategy of the country. All elements should be well connected and based on a common approach. The crisis management training of personal will have to follow these lines.

– The international cooperation should involve the responsibility for the decision making process, and for the coordination. But what does that mean? I do mot think that anyone can answer that question right now. We have still not put our acts together after the war in the Balkans. The UN is still there, and would as we all know have been invented if it had not yet existed. I will not dwell on the difficulties the UN has gone through, and more is to come I am sure of that. There is a need for more regional involvement, the African Union and the EU should be more active.

Finally I want to mention the importance of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women Peace and Security. The resolution is extremely important and can not be left unmentioned in a discussion on international cooperation and conflict resolution. Finland now has a national plan for implementation of resolution 1325 although the plan was produced somewhat late (in 2008). The Finnish national plan is taken seriously and CMC has a central role in the implementation of 1325 in Finnish international cooperation.

5.2 Cedric de Coning: The International Community and the Coherence Dilemma at the Political Level

In this presentation I will argue that our policy expectations about coherence among the peacebuilding and crisis management actors in the international community are unrealistic and naïve. Our official policies are built on the assumption, and create the perception that, there are a body of legitimate peacebuilding and crisis management actors in the international community that are pursuing the same interests, in other words that act coherently. Those that are not part of this group of coherent actors are identified as illegitimate actors or spoilers.

But, in reality, we are all spoilers. We all pursue our own interest at the cost of the stated common goal. More often than not, if a choice has to be made about the common good and our own narrow interests, we will choose the latter.

My point is not that perusing our own interests are dysfunctional, to the contrary, the competition and cooperation that emerge as a result is what keeps our systems dynamic and vibrant. My argument is that our peacebuilding and crisis management models that fail to take this dynamic into account are dysfunctional.

We are naïve when we neglect to take into account that the members of the international community act on self-interests and their own local context. I will argue that this coherence dilemma is caused by an inherent contradiction in the way we view coherence at the systems level, vs. how we perceive coherence at the operational level.

From a systems level we are interested in the overall effect the international community is having on a given conflict system over time. When we look at such a situation in its totality and over time, we can see where coherence is lacking, and we can all agree that it should be improved.

However, the international community consist of a variety of actors, and each of these members of the international community are also independent operational actors. At the operational level, each of these actors perceive the environment through their own policy lens, i.e. from their own context, and from their own interests. Their actions are driven by what they want to achieve, given a specific set of resources in a given time frame.

(I am aware of you as an audience, from my perspective you are a grouping, but each of you are not listening to me as individuals, and interpreting what I am saying from your own individual perspective.)

This tension, between those viewing the same situation from a systemic perspective, and those looking at if from their own operational perspective, is what lies at the heart of the coherence dilemma in international peacebuilding and crisis management.

The International Community

What do we mean with 'the International Community'? The International Community consist of a variety of actors – states, regional and international organizations, non-governmental organizations, private sector commercial actors, etc. The International Community is not an organization, i.e. it is not organized in a hierarchy and no one particular person, or mechanism is in charge. We can best understand the International Community as a system. Somehow we know it is all interconnected, but it is so complex that no one can explain exactly how it works.

One of the things about a system is that its borders are always influenced by the purpose or perspective of the person applying the frame. For instance, if we look at the International Community from a peacebuilding and crisis management perspective, we see a different configuration of actors then if we looked at it from the perspective of say, climate change. In our context it is also often useful to frame at the international community in the context of a given crisis, e.g. what is the configuration of the international community in the context of the crisis in Afghanistan or Sudan.

Coherence

What do we mean with coherence? Our notion of coherence is closely linked to our assumptions about sustainability in peacebuilding. There is a widely held belief that improving coherence will result in more effective peacebuilding and crisis management, and this, in turn will result in more sustainable impact.

This assumption is based on numerous evaluation studies and reports that have found that inconsistent policies and fragmented programmes entail a higher risk of duplication, inefficient spending, lower quality of service, difficulty in meeting goals and, these studies have argued that these shortcomings ultimately result in a reduced capacity for delivery. Consequently, the policy community has come to believe that by improving coherence one will also improve the efficiency of our interventions, and more efficient operations would

ultimately translate into more effective and more sustainable operations.

What does these studies understand coherence to mean? For the purposes of this presentation I will define 'coherence' as the effort to direct the wide range of activities undertaken in the political, development, human rights, humanitarian, rule of law and security dimensions of a peacebuilding or crisis management operation towards common strategic objectives.

Whilst it is recognized that coherence is not an absolute end state than can ever be achieved, it should be possible to distinguish between operations where there is less, or more, coherence. Coherence is thus a matter of degree.

It is possible to distinguish between four elements of coherence in the peacebuilding and crisis management context, namely:

(1) agency coherence, i.e. consistency among the policies and actions of an individual agency, including the internal consistency of the different policies and programs of this agency;

(2) whole-of-government coherence, i.e. consistency among the policies and actions of the different government agencies of a country;

(3) external coherence, i.e. consistency among the policies pursued by the various external actors in a given country context (Rome Declaration on Harmonization, 2003); and

(4) internal/external coherence, i.e. consistency between the policies of the internal and external actors in a given country context (Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, 2005).

To assess the degree of coherence of a specific peacebuilding or crisis management operation, all four elements have to be considered.

One can respond to the apparent contradiction between the high regard for coherence that exist at the policy level and the degree to which it is resisted in practice, in a number of ways. One approach could be to argue that the gap is caused by poor or insufficient policy implementation. If so, the coherence deficit can be addressed by more coordination, better training and improved organization, systems and processes. It is probably fair to say that this is the most common and prevalent policy response.

Another approach, could be to argue that the gaps between policy and practice in the field are caused, at least in part, by inherent contradictions in the mandates, interests and value systems of some of the actors, and the degree to which these actors can be coherent with each other are thus limited.

Both these responses have value and can in fact complement each other. Improved coherence can be achieved by working harder to find common ground. However, there will also be a point at which doing more will no longer yield further benefit. There may thus be limits to how much coherence can be practically achieved, even in areas where it may be theoretically possible to further expand the room for coherence. If these limits are not recognized, the system will keep on trying to improve coherence beyond reasonable expectations, and the energy and time invested in this effort will be wasted.

Pursuing coherence beyond certain limits will thus have a perverse effect, generating the exact opposite outcome than intended: in these circumstances pursuing coherence could actually contribute to inefficiency and ineffectiveness.

To understand these nuances better, we need to take a closer look at some of the factors that may be working against coherence. I will explore two such factors, namely: long-term impact vs. short-term output; and conflicting values, principles and mandates.

<u>Long-term Impact vs. Short-term Output</u>

Most International Actors do coordinate and cooperate with each other on a range of issues at the operational and tactical levels. They exchange information and adjust their actions to avoid obvious overlap and duplication, and they do sometimes do things together. They cooperate when it is in their own best interest to do, in other words when cooperation would meet their interests more efficiently and effectively.

From a strategic or systemic peacebuilding perspective, however, we are interested in agents working together for the common good, measured as sustainable impact on a peace process over time. In this context coherence implies that agents have to adjust their understanding of what is in their best interest at the operational and tactical level to the strategic level. To do so they would have to view their role from a systemic perspective, i.e. see their contribution in the context of what would best inform the longer-term sustainability of the peace process that they are trying to influence.

In other words, success at the strategic or impact level is measured as long-term sustainable peace, whilst success at the operational or output level is measured as maximizing the role and image of the individual actor within a specific time-frame, for instance and annual budget-cycle, or in the context of an application for a further funding period. Strategic coherence assumes that peacebuilding agents are motivated by the former: the empirical evidence suggests they are motivated by the latter.

The overall effect of the combined activities of the peacebuilding agents is observable only from a system-level impact perspective, and the sustainability of their individual activities and its combined effect can only be measured only over the long-term. The interdependence among the actors, and the benefits of improving coherence among them, are thus not immediately obvious to the actor at the output level, and especially not in the short- to medium-term time frame within which they have to make operational decisions.

There is thus a disconnect between those measuring progress at the systems or impact level and those measuring progress at the programme or output level.

This tension between impact and output, between what is good for the system as a whole as measured over the long-term, and what is in the best interest of the individual actor, as measured in the short- to medium-term, consistently undermines coherence.

Conflicting Values, Principles and Mandates

The values, principles and mandates of some of the agents in the international system are inherently incoherent and contradictory. Each actor has emerged within a specific context: humanitarian, military, human rights, development, law enforcement, etc. And each has been schooled in the values, principles, philosophy and theories of change specific to that discipline or profession.

Differences in values, principles and mandates will typically manifest in fundamentally different theories of change and thus disagreements with regard to, for instance, which aspects to prioritize.

Political and security actors may prefer to, or be mandated to, focus on first stabilizing a given situation. This may result in them giving priority to stability rather than to, for instance investigating human rights violations, or to dealing with issues such as corruption, black-market trading, racketeering or narcotics, especially if actors they perceive to be the key to stabilizing the situation are also suspected of being responsible for human rights atrocities or criminal behaviour.

Those actors for whom justice and human rights are paramount will have a directly opposing view. They are likely to argue that enforcing national and international laws and safeguarding human rights will have a far greater medium- to long-term stabilizing effect, because it will also have a deterrent effect, including on others in future conflicts.

Take Afghanistan as an example, some believe a counter insurgency campaign will bring change, other are pursuing negotiation with the 'moderate Taliban'. Others believe a stable Afghanistan will have as yet unknown consequences for the relations between Iran, Pakistan, India and China, and that it is thus in the best interest of the region that it should remain unstable and weak. Yet others believe that the only sustainable change will come from a long-term investment in good-governance, and pro-poor and gendered development. And whilst these competing theories underlie many tensions among international and local soldiers, diplomats and development workers, it is rarely openly discussed. In-

stead, we operate on the broad assumption that ultimately, we all want the same thing, namely what it is in the best long-term interest of the peace process and the people of Afghanistan.

The different approaches highlighted in these examples reflect fundamental differences in the mandates, value systems and principles of some of the agents engaged. It would be naïve to assume that these differences can be resolved through coordination. In the end such differences will need to be negotiated, and trade-offs agreed in each specific context. These case-specific trade-offs cannot resolve the fundamental underlying value differences. And they often leave the specific actors less tolerant towards each other because the trade-off would have been determined by their relative power and respective leverage in that given context. The end-result of such trade-offs is not likely to be conducive to greater coherence among the agents on other issues in the short- to medium-term.

And yet, such trade-offs are necessary, in a given situation, to overcome the practical impasse and find a workable solution that can enable all actors to move beyond that point so that they can continue to carry out their respective mandates. Such ad-hoc transactions should not be confused with strategic coherence, which aims to achieve a common understanding of a situation as well as a common strategic response to it.

An Alternative Notion of Coherence

We need to recognize the complexity of what we are trying to achieve. Building an electricity grid in Monrovia is difficult, but ultimately doable given enough resources. But building sustainable peace in Liberia is complex, regardless of how much resources may be at our disposal. Being aware of the limits of our knowledge and our agency to engineer specific outcomes in complex systems are very useful, because it reminds us not to overestimate our ability to understand these problems, nor to take ourselves to seriously when we attempt to generate specific medium to long-term outcomes.

We should not confuse inter-relatedness with sameness. The fact that we recognize that the peacebuilding agents and the various dimensions of the peacebuilding system are interconnected, does not imply that all the peacebuilding agents have the same objectives, mandates, principles and values. Nor does it follow from having interrelated problems that we need to have one coherent understanding, one common objective and one common response. Interconnected problems call for interconnected responses, not for a common response.

Coherence in this context refers to the process of engaging each other with a view to understanding each other better, so that the respective agents can gain more insights into how their responses are interconnected, and how they impact on each other and the system as a whole. Coherence is about managing these competing interests and interdependencies. The role of dissent, competition for resources, and the tension between different approaches and policy choices, are not only normal, but necessary in order to ensure the optimal functioning of the system.

Conclusion

I argued that our notion of coherence is linked to our assumptions about its causal effect on efficiency and sustainability. There is a widely held assumption in the peacebuilding and crisis management research and policy community that improving coherence will result in more effective action, and this, in turn will result in more sustainable impact.

This notion has resulted in a broad policy consensus that we should all pursue coherence. However, we have not given much thought to why coherence seems so elusive, and how much coherence is realistically achievable. We seem to have adopted a one-size-fits-all pursue coherence to the maximum approach, informed by a linear assumption that if a little coherence is good, than more coherence should be even better.

I tried to question this assumption by probing the limits of achievable or realistic coherence. I argued that our peacebuilding and crisis management efforts

appear to be challenged by enduring and deep-rooted tensions and inherent contradictions between the various peacebuilding dimensions and among the different international actors. It was noted that coherence can also have negative effects and pursuing coherence beyond certain limits can generate perverse outcomes.

I argued that the tension between impact and output, between what is good for the system as a whole as measured over the long-term, and what is in the best interest of the individual agent, as measured in the short- to medium-term, consistently undermines coherence.

Some peacebuilding and crisis management actors in the international community seem to have inherently contradictory values, principles and mandates, and these typically manifest in fundamentally different theories of change and thus disagreements with regard to, for instance, prioritization and how to measure progress.
There are thus limits to the degree to which coherence can be achieved in the peacebuilding and crisis management context. The exact limits are context specific, and will have to be transacted on a case-by-case basis.

My core argument is that whilst pursuing coherence is an integral part of peacebuilding and crisis management, the commonly held causal assumption that more coherence will automatically result in more efficient, and thus more sustainable operations, is flawed. I offered an alternative notion of coherence, one that allows for the coexistence of competing interests, and in this context I argued that at the end of the day, coherence is about managing our interdependencies.

NEPAL PEACE PROCESS AND DEVELOPMENT

The Coherence of the International Community in Post-Conflict Nepal

Petri Hautaniemi

Challenges

- Capacity and balance: How needs for technical assistance are identified and assessed and by whom

- Local ownership: problem of representation

- Timeframe: when and what?

- At what level?

- Coordination and coherence: leadership and volume?

Nepal peace process

- Nepal Civil War 1996-2006

- Comprehensive Peace Agreement on November 2006

- Constituent Assembly elections April 2008

- Two governments within a year

Political objectives

- To bring the peace peace process into a logical end
- To write a new constitution (federal republic)
- To enhance economic growth

Donor harmonization

- Tight collaboration, semi weekly meetings
- Basic Operational Guidelines
- Peace and Development Framework
- Nepal Development Forum?

Peace instruments

- UNMIN
- The United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) is a special political mission established by the United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1740, to support the peace process in Nepal: in particular, to assist in the conduct of the Constituent Assembly election in a free and fair atmosphere.

Peace instruments 3

- Human Rights, tackling impunity with local,national and international agencies
- Basic needs (health, education) and state building
- Natural resources
- Employment, economic growth (AfT)
- Q of militarization and basic services

Conflict and development instruments

- Q of harmonization
- Sector support versus project approach
- Pool funding versus bilateral agreements
- Problem of weak ownership in time of conflict
- Donor driven approach and sustainability

What International Community? National level coherence

CMC Finland Research Days

17.11.2010

Kirsi Henriksson

Vision

International

National

- Peace
- Maintaining stability via global governance: normative treaties, agreements, charters

- Contribution to world peace
- Engagement in commonly decided agreements, global commitment
- |

"It's all politics"

International

- Whose hegemony?
- Visibility & Flag-waving (cf. EU interests in Iraq: oil vs. "promoting new human rights culture by June 2012")
- Fear of barbarians

National

- Being a part of international community, waving national flag
- National Security and Defence Policy
- Fear of barbarians

Fear of barbarians (Todorov 2008)

- Countries of appetite (India, China)

- Countries of resentment (MENA, Pakistan, Afghanistan)

- **Countries of fear (Europe)**

- Countries of indecision (poorest underdeveloped countries)

In practice

International

- European Common Security and Defence policy as an example

National

- 27 Members States, 27 models
- Finnish model as an example

Example of coherence: Calling HQ: Who is answering?

International

- EU (PSC, CIVCOM, operational HQ CPCC and missions) answers: the Member States

National

- Member States answer: EU and the mission
- CMC Finland answers: Moi and the Mission
- MoI answers: have to check with MFA
- MFA answers: have to check with PSC and CIVCOM who will contact the CPCC and the Mission

Example of coherence: presence "in the field"

International

- EU as an example, in Kosovo: delegation, EUSR, EULEX, EC funded projects

National

- National contribution to EU mission, national funded development projects in fragile states, national "direct" capacity-building activities

Coherence – an utopia?

BECAUSE…

- Different perceptions of threats/risks by national authorities and international organisations, different level of preparedness
  - Cf. civil protection – CCM – development activities
- State-building process, how to do it? Tools?
  - What is Rule of Law in practice?
  - Input -driven approach (quantity of CCM experts)
    - Outcome-oriented approach would consider also WHAT are we trying to achieve
- Back to the vision…

Vision: how to operationally achieve peace?

International

National

Operational guidelines, for ex. Mainstreaming HR and gender

Collecting knowledge from the Missions (LL, impact assessment) and LEARNING them

Operational guidelines, for ex. Mainstreaming HR (Finland)

Training

Collecting knowledge from practitioners (via research, surveys, etc) and disseminating the findings

MP Elisabeth Nauclér spoke to an attentive audience

6.0 Commentary: Liisa Laakso

Thank you for the opportunity to comment all these excellent presentations. I do not want to repeat the important practical and theoretical challenges of coherence the speakers raised. Instead I will clarify them in the context of the inherently complex and political task of civilian crisis management. My argument is that while the problem of coherence needs to be paid attention to, it cannot be solved by technical arrangements. The problem of coherence is a precondition for political decision-making internationally, in the donor countries and locally. Instead of trying to explain how to reach maximum coherence, we should look at the power relations in this decision-making and in the resistance towards it.

Civilian crisis management operations are commonly regarded as less risky, easier to accept and easier to implement than military or traditional peacekeeping operations. After the failure of the first humanitarian intervention in Somalia in 1993, it has become increasingly difficult for Western leaders to get domestic political support for their military involvement in violent crises abroad. The idea that a crisis can be prevented and mitigated by civilian means and that these would not presuppose rigid foreign policy doctrine explains why the European Union started to build its common foreign policy capacity in 1999 precisely from this field. It has become evident, however, that civilian crisis management is demanding and requires long-term commitment as well as constant dialogue with all the stakeholders. Traditional peace-keeping, i.e. keeping the warring parties apart, is in fact politically easier when compared to civilian operations covering the form, content and functioning of all important elements of a modern liberal state: the judiciary, prisons, police, democratic elections, population register, civic education, training of civil servants etc. That kind of state building cannot proceed anywhere without some groups gaining and some losing. Therefore it also instigates conflicts and resistance.

As the Cold War time bipolar world of two camps fighting over their ideological influence has disappeared, even the militaries are now involved in comprehensive state building operations where civilian crisis management plays an important role often together with development cooperation, humanitarian aid, international trade, protection of the environment and even migration policies. Therefore there is a need for clear roles for different actors, on the one hand, and coherence between and within different polices, on the other.

Elisabeth Nauclér pointed out that the border line between the military and the civilian components has become blurred as the military is taking care of duties that were earlier under the responsibility of purely civilian actors. Since the power of the military stems from its ability to use force, also resistance towards it takes the form of force and violence. If the target of this resistance is civilian work, then also civilian actors are in danger. And indeed, after the end of the Cold War attacks on humanitarian workers have become more frequent. Humanitarian and civilian workers need protection by the military, but they also need to have a distinctive identity and independence from the military. Their goals might be compatible to those of the military, but they are not the same.

As argued by Cedric de Coning, the international community consists of actors who perceive the environment from their own context and selfish interests. While coherence between these actors evidently entails efficiency of crisis management, it is not possible without shared or concomitant objectives or at least objectives, which do not contradict each other. It is useful to try to imagine a system, where providing enough expertise and information of each others' decisions and their consequences to all players would automatically ensure better results. Achieving the common objectives then would be a technical issue. What is needed is technocratic coordination instead of compromises and dialogue among the actors. This would be a system with maximum level of coherence and minimum level of politics. In theory such a system is possible, but the reality of social interaction is blurred with different and contradictory interests and goals. Political decision making requires first a recognition of these differences and contradictions and secondly conscious weighting between different objectives and interests, priority setting and compromises. Power plays an important role here.

In other words, while everybody wants to promote peace all over the world, it might be that domestic social policy, economic interests related to trade or short-sighted security interests, for instance, are even more important for some players. Effective peace building in far away areas can be sacrificed for such interests. The goal of democratic and liberal states with rule of law might not be realistic in a short term. This raises further problems with regard to the timeframes of the actors: what is coherent in the short run might be incoherent in the long run and vice versa.

The call for coherence then cannot mean more than transparency in the priority setting. What is needed is monitoring of the impacts, also the unintended ones,

of different policies, so that these do not frustrate each other and that the decisions are made consciously. This would also open up the decisions for public criticism. The priority setting can be corrected or modified endlessly. This is what politics is all about.

For the sustainability of crisis management local ownership is pivotal. It is local politics and decision making that should be strengthened, too. Petri Hautaniemi explained the challenges of the peace process in Nepal that has proceeded in term of the harmonization of the policies of Western donors and the UN, but faces the question how to engage with locals: who should represent the people of Nepal? The picture is complicated also by a strong role of regional donors: India and China.

Finally there is the problem of double standards. Sometimes the stated objectives are not what the actors actually what to achieve. Comprehensive crisis management aims to build strong states where these are fragile, failed or collapsed. But is it really in the interest of international community or the Western powers to create a strong state in Afghanistan, Iraq or Somalia, if they do not know who would control that strong state? Kirsi Henriksson notes the Western "fear of barbarism". If the domestic political forces, among them fundamentalists or warlords, do not accept the ideas of Western liberal state, it would be more rational to support the emergence of a limited state under international tutelage than a sovereign state. In some areas civilian crisis management seems not to be a temporary task but a permanent arrangement to ensure international stability. To that extent also crises can be permanent phenomena of the liberal world order: they serve the interests of some powerful actors in it.

7.0 Working Group Background Papers

7.1 WG 1: The coherence of the IC at the strategic/political level

> Oxford Dictionary definition of international community: the countries of the world considered collectively[1]
>
> MacMillan Dictionary definition of international community : political leaders and important organizations from all around the world[2]
>
> "The international community is neither international nor a community. It is not international because, as a moral idea, it does not exist in any recognizable organizational form. It is not a community because it has little to do with social relations, spatial intimacy, or long-term moral amity. Yet there is something compellingly real about this misnamed object. That reality lies in its moral promise."[3]
>
> Arjun Appadurai

The ambiguity of the term "international community" (IC) begs the question, what international community? This working group will focus on the theoretical foundation of what/who constitutes this international community and the coherence at the highest levels.

The dictionary definitions are narrow and limiting; although one cannot say that either is incorrect. However, in the crisis management arena the concept has been elevated to the likes of an actor which has a definite role in the face of conflict and crisis. In this context the membership of the IC is also somewhat wider; it includes not only states and politicians but also intergovernmental organisations (both international and regional) as well as NGOs. Furthermore, in this context the IC also seems to have an implied notion of cooperation and coordination between the different members of the IC. The IC is perceived as having a common goal which is for the good of all people but how is this decision arrived upon and who coordinates the actions in the upper echelons of the po-

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1 International Community. (2010) Oxford Dictionaries. Oxford University Press. Retrieved 13 September 2010, from http://oxforddictionaries.com/view/entry/m_en_gb0167020#m_en_gb0167020.012

2 International Community. (2010) MacMillan Dictionary. MacMillan Publishers Limited. Retrieved 13 September 2010, from http://www.macmillandictionary.com/dictionary/british/the-international-community

3 Appardurai, Arjun. (1 September 2001).Broken Promises. *Foreign Policy.* Retrieved 13 September 2010, from http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2002/09/01/broken_promises.

litical and strategic sphere?

People often look to the United Nations to coordinate an international response to crises, while NATO is undeniably the most prolific military actor and the EU is taking on an increasingly important role both on the military and civilian side of crises. How do these organisations coordinate their efforts for a coherent response to the particular crisis?

The lack of clarity also makes the IC a good scapegoat, failed interventions or slow responses to crises are often blamed on the inaction of the IC, who exactly is this blame aimed at? The UN? NATO? States? Western states? The ICRC? Is there such a construction as an international community, or is it, as Arjun Appardurai claims, a "moral promise" that binds humanity together in the ever globalising world?

7.2 WG 2: The coherence of the IC at the operational level

The coherence of the international community is arguably most important on the operational level where the international community is in direct contact with the crisis afflicted population. It is the actors on the ground that must aid the local people, coordinate with the various actors and promote security; a very difficult task with a lack of coherence at the national level and the political/ strategic level. This working group will examine the coherence of the international community at the operational level in various contexts, not limiting to particular geographical area or type of international engagement. The working group will cover, *inter alia*, crisis management and peacebuilding operations such as Afghanistan, the DRC, the Balkans as well as complex emergencies such as the recent natural disasters in Haiti and Pakistan.

What is the IC in operational areas? Does the IC have a different meaning on the operational level than it does for the political and national levels? For instance, with numerous actors in crisis areas such as Kosovo, Afghanistan, varying from the UN to small NGOs - are all of the organisations present part of the

international community? Many times these actors have rather different mandates, is it therefore possible for these actors to then coordinate their efforts? Often, their mandates are partially overlapping – what implications does this have on the coherence of the international community? Another aspect to take into consideration is the coordination and coherence with the IC and the local population/government/civil society, is the coherence between international actors and local actors an important factor in building sustainable peace and how can this be supported?

The international community is undoubtedly an important actor in crisis management, peacebuilding and humanitarian activities; however a lack of coherence amongst the various actors could potentially have a negative impact. How can those working at the operational level promote coherence in the hopes of achieving optimal results? Are the current structures in place sufficient or does the international community require more coherence at the operational level?

7.3 WG 2: The coherence of the IC at the national level

Within the international community states play a primary role. This working group will examine the issue of the international community through the national perspective in terms of coherence within the state and their participation in international crisis management and peacebuilding.

The participation of states within international crisis management can take on various forms. States can act in their own regard or under the umbrella of an international organisation. National governments are therefore responsible for many aspects of the effectiveness of the international community. When contributing supplies and personnel to operations under international organisations, states must first decide which missions to participate in and what to contribute; these are very politically driven decisions that have a pronounced effect on the comprehensiveness and the success of any operation. Furthermore, it is at the national level that capacity building and maintaining preparedness must take

place. How do national governments ensure that all necessary measures are taken to support the efficiency and coherence of IC to achieve the best results in crisis management and peacebuilding activities?

This working group will also consider the Finnish national role in the international community and the coherence within the Finnish government in relation to crisis management. There are many aspects to consider, first, building national capacity to participate in crisis management missions and maintaining national preparedness. This includes training personnel, continued research and the implementation of best practises and lessons learned both on the military side and the civilian. All of these aspects contribute to coherence within Finland. Another aspect to consider is the inter-ministerial nature of crisis management within the national realm. The Ministry of the Interior is responsible for civilian crisis management, the Ministry of Defence is responsible for military crisis management and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for deciding which operations Finland will take part in. This requires coherence on the national level, between the ministries, in order for Finland to contribute to the international communities actions effectively. Moreover, the multi-actor nature of crisis management is also translated to the national level and other actors must also be considered in addition to the national government. In terms of peacebuilding and crisis management actors, civil society also has significant role. Is there coherence among all of the national actors, including civil society? Is there mutual respect and understanding between the national government and civil society? If not, can there be coherence on a national level?

In November 2009, Finland's Comprehensive Crisis Management Strategy was published. It outlines the Finnish approach in multinational military and civilian operations, the strategy declares that, "Finland aims to strengthen the action of the international community in crisis management", is it working and can Finland do more?

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4 Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland (2009) *Finland's Comprehensive Crisis Management Strategy* Pg. 16.

8.0 Working Group Conclusions

8.1 Working Group 1

Working Group 1:

The coherence of the international community at the strategic and political level

Moderator: Pirjo Jukarainen

Why, who, how?

Why:
Rule based society
(common understanding)
Common humanity
(human rights, human security)
International ethics
(moral philosophy)
Responsibility to protect
or
Exporting liberal values?

Who: (Agency)
UN revival
NATO critique
Private military/
security companies
Local ownership

Crisis
Management

How:
In the name of…?
"Democracy"
"Humanitarian bombing"
"Human rights"
Supporting political change from a
bottom-up perspective

When and how long:
Correct timeframe
Drawing a stronger line
when responsibility
switched to locals

Critical points

- Responsibility to protect:
  - Never the only reason
  - Wrongly used, hence rejected by some (e.g. African Union)
- Quick and easy opposed to long and complex
  - "We do not want to support our actual aims as it is too complicated"
  - Projects instead of long time impact (e.g. women empowerment)
- Ethical framework
  - What are our values? Why are we not sticking to them?
- Over stepping the role
  - A stronger line between crisis management intervention and long term development
  - Change should not be expected instantly but over time
    - If change is not violent, the international community should stay back

Publishing of the CMC Finland Yearbook 2010
by editor-in-chief Kirsi Henriksson

8.2 Summary of Conclusions WG 1

The coherence of the IC at the political/strategic level
Moderator: Pirjo Jukarainen, TAPRI
Rapporteur: Mikko Keltanen, CMC Finland

The international community is largely seen as a Western concept based on Western conceptions of morality, responsibility and ideals. It is from this point of departure that the group spoke about the IC from a Western perspective. To approach the question of international community at the political and strategic level, Working Group 1 first discussed the fundamental basis of the international community, the who, the why and the how of the international community.

The approach to the first aspect, why, was framed by a discussion the philosophic basis or the moral philosophy of the IC. From the Western perspective, there is a need for a rule-based society; however it was widely acknowledged that this is largely based on the Western perception of the rules. From the onset this poses a problem and a possible breach of coherence; conflicting perceptions of which rules are acceptable can result in contention, and ultimately incoherence. Furthermore, the imposition of the Western concept of "rules" on the rest of the world, particularly crisis stricken areas and developing countries, brings up the question of Western imperialisation. The IC exports values and systems, specifically Western liberal values and systems, as a means to bring order and prosperity. However, often these exported systems are fundamentally different to the pre-existing cultural norms and fraught with conflicting interests. In terms of violent conflict, the imposition of Western values can prolong violence.

This lead to the discussion of the "how" aspects of the international community. The IC views this value exportation as creating like-minded world in order to bring a long term solutions to the violence ridden chaos that ensues around the world. Democracy was discussed as one of the Western exports that are commonly introduced by the IC. It was noted that the Western view of democracy, being the same for all, is an illusion. There is part of the innate hypocrisy in the goodwill of the IC. Other examples that discussed were the responsibility to pro-

tect (R2P) and international human rights. R2P is widely used by the IC to justify their involvement in a particular conflict; to protect the victims of violence and bring peace to a conflict zone. This can be seen as a paradox as it is often the West (or the IC) who in fact was the catalyst for the conflict. An example that was sited during the discussion was the practice of favouring particular political leaders. When the IC supports a political leader, under the shroud of democracy, one that is sympathetic to Western ideals and willing to succumb to the wishes of the IC before the wishes of the people, can become the impetus for internal disruption. Furthermore, it was discussed that many people in the global south, Africa was particularly mentioned, view R2P as a manipulative tool used by the West to meddle in the affairs of other nations. It was noted that they have become cynical towards this concept because protecting civilians is rarely the sole reason for intervention. Moreover, organisations such as the African Union have rejected the term due to its ambiguity and misuse. International human rights were another example that was highlighted as part of the "how" in terms of IC intervention. In conjunction with R2P, international human rights abuses are often cited as a reason for intervention by the IC. However this is often seen as hypocritical as the dominant force in international relations, the United States, is accused of international human rights abuses yet faces no consequences or repercussions. It was discussed that in the future it would be necessary to take a more democratic approach to this issue and make the entire world responsible for upholding human rights and all countries accountable for their actions. This spurned a discussion about human ethics and the ethical framework of human rights and responsibility. It was noted that there needs to be a global discussion what are our global shared values. Furthermore, force by the IC should not be used to convey the Western ethical ideas and import Western values into crisis areas but rather to prevent violence and wide scale conflict.

The IC has a tendency to "over-step" their role in terms of crisis management. The line between crisis management and long term development has been so blurred that there it is difficult to differentiate between them and no definite point for an intervention to end. Local ownership is one of the foundations of peacebuilding, when the IC over steps its position and deprives responsibility

from the local community the effectiveness and legitimacy of the IC's efforts come into question. Conflict transformation takes time and if there is no violence the IC should not intervene in the normal development of peacebuilding. Conflicts do not start overnight and should not be expected to be resolved overnight. However, the paradox is that the IC tends to expect immediate changes for the better. The IC favours quick and easy projects instead of supporting long term impact projects. The long term effectiveness is sacrificed as the real aims are complicated to solve and take significant investment.

The last question addressed was the who or the agency. With no clear delineating criteria of who is a part of the international community the common organisations that are cited are the United Nations and NATO. While both are criticised and are over due for reform, they seems to be enjoying a revival in light of current crises. There are also numerous new actors involved in current crisis management. Non-governmental organisations already play a significant role in but new actors are increasingly important however not for the positive. Private militaries are becoming more prevalent in crisis situations which beg more moral questions and again challenge the legitimacy of the IC to transform conflicts.

COHERENCE AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL

- Example of Kosovo (lack of functionality, ambiguous mandates)
- Lack of coherence (functionality) between international actors - confusion among locals?
- Lack of interest to promote dialogue competence also withun IC (instead technical solutions)

- Find out what we have in common
- Reduced aimes among actors, "baby steps"

COHERENCE AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL

- Stable funding in recruiting, training, expert pool - still more needed
- Comprehensive approach good - NGOs?
- R&D need more funding
- Different budget lines necessitate good coordination
- Finland is active mainly in the EU framework, should be more active in the UN, OSCE, etc.
- Finland should and could be active in training of dialogue competence
  - Gather knowledge e.g. from the NGOs
  - Academic research

8.4 Summary of conclusions WG 2

The coherence of the IC at the national and operational levels
Moderator: Tanja Tamminen, UPI
Rapporteur: Mijami Rustanius, CMC Finland

Operational Level

Coherence of the international community at the operational level is perhaps the most challenging but it is where coherence and cooperation are most crucial for a successful outcome. The discussion in WG 2 focused primarily on Kosovo. In Kosovo there are numerous different international actors working with ambiguous and often conflicting mandates. This causes tension within Kosovo and can prolong disorder. For example, some international organisations recognise the independence of Kosovo, and others do not. The IC is actually working against each other in some instances and therefore coherence and functionality are challenging issues under these circumstances. Furthermore, there are actors who work only with one ethnic group though they should be active in bringing different parties together to promote conflict transformation. Another issue that was brought up was dialogue competence. It is common that locals learn how to interact with different international actors and nationalities, but at the same time the tools to improve the interaction between the local conflicting parties is missing. This only delays any real progress in conflict transformation and resolution. This is also a problem within the IC as the various actors often do not communicate with each other. There seems to be a lack of interest to promote (real) dialogue competence within IC instead of, or besides, technical solutions as well as with the local actors in different levels. IC actors are "teaching" and promoting something which they themselves cannot accomplish between themselves.

It was also discussed in the group that lack of coherence between IC actors can

cause confusion among locals. From the local perspective this also contributes to a lack of legitimacy for the IC. Why should the local people listen and trust international actors if the IC themselves do not work together coherently? The IC is incapable of leading by example causing confusion and apprehension amongst the locals.

One challenge is that many IC actors claim to have strictly technical missions and the political aspects are pushed aside - though all interventions and all missions are political. Addressing the root causes of the conflict and facilitating conflict transformation are complicated, expensive and long term, all of which are undesirable from the perspective of the international funder who is trying to accomplish the same goal with simple and cheap solutions in the shortest possible time. Political aims are viewed as lofty and impractical while technical missions have clear goals and tangible outcomes, which is what funders want to see. This is a problem of incoherence throughout all levels of the IC, culminating at the operational level.

This lead to a discussion of practical ways that the IC to improve their actions and achieve the desired goals. Coherence amongst the IC actors on the grounds was seen as one of the most important aspects of ensuring a successful outcome. However, to act more coherently the different IC actors should examine more carefully what they have in common, share information and utilise lessons learned. Working together towards a common goal is more effective and efficient. Moreover, a reduction and simplification of complex aims of IC actors would improve the coherence. The working group concluded that IC must remember to take "baby steps" towards the goals, giant leaps are unrealistic and do not build the necessary framework to ensure a sustainable future.

National Level

Working group 2 was also tasked with discussing coherence at the national level of the IC; the discussion was focused on Finland and its national coherence for crisis management. At the national level, the funding is rather stable in for re-

cruitment and training for civilian crisis management personnel. Also, the existing expert pool is quite comprehensive and convenient. At the national level these two aspects function quite well and sufficiently meet the needs. It was noted, however, that more efforts are still needed, and there should more emphasis on research and development. One positive example of coherence at the national level in Finland is that at present the budget lines for crisis management training, recruitment and research come from various places and therefore necessitate good coordination in order to function. This coordination has proven to be quite effective and was a considered a notable achievement. Although, it was also discussed that NGOs are commonly left out and cooperation of all national capacities, including NGOs and the research community, should be improved.

Another aspect of national coherence in the IC that was discussed was the international organisations that Finland is a part of and seconds personnel to in their various missions. Finland is active mainly in the EU framework, but it should be more active in the UN and OSCE missions, for example. Within the limited EU framework that focuses on very technical missions, Finnish capacities can also become limited and Finland's clout in other organisations may suffer. At the national level Finland should concentrate on coherence amongst the IC actors that it is involved with. Another aspect that was discussed was future possibilities where Finland's capacity in the international arena could be developed. Finland should be more active in training of dialogue competence and peace mediation, building on the legacy and expertise of Martti Ahtisaari. This would not only help to diversify Finland's expertise amongst the actors of the IC but also contribute to the national coherence in terms of focus. By putting some focus on building the national capacity in one specific area, such as peace mediation and dialogue competence (which is fundamental in every peacebuilding endeavour), it would engage all national actors to work together for a common goal. In this respect, the national actors also include academia, and perhaps most importantly, the NGO community.

Coherence on the national level was seen as a one of the foundations to achieving coherence on the operational and political levels. In terms of Finland, there

is national coherence which is visible both in the national bodies and in the experts that Finland seconds to international missions. However, more efforts must be made to incorporate lessons learned and involve civil society in order to reach an optimal level of coherence.

CMCFinland

Kriisinhallintakeskus
Crisis Management Centre